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iFOREWORD
A functioning multiparty system is a sine qua non for a modern democracy. 
It is an empirical observation that a democracy remains an empty shell if 
there is no political competition and interaction between the various political 
parties. Even in this age when the civil society seems to be more vibrant than 
political society, and when we can see a general discontent with politics 
among citizens all over the OSCE region, political parties remain indispen-
sable for the functioning of representative democracies.  
Indeed, as early as the Copenhagen Document of 1990, the OSCE Partici-
pating States recognized “the importance of pluralism with regard to politi-
cal organizations.” As such, the governments of these participating states 
committed themselves to “respect the right of individuals and groups to es-
tablish, in full freedom, their own political parties or other political organiza-
tions and provide such political parties and organizations with the necessary 
legal guarantees to enable them to compete with each other on a basis of 
equal treatment before the law and by the authorities.” Therefore, assisting 
the development of multiparty systems is a field for which the OSCE is well 
positioned. The other partner in the work done in Georgia and of which this 
book is its testimony, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy 
(IMD), was established especially to help develop these systems and the de-
mocratic political parties that are part of them. 
In its governance work the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR) stresses the importance of governments being 
representative, responsive and responsible. Assistance to political parties – 
both in and out of government – seeks to promote these goals among actors 
across the entire political spectrum. The IMD shares that mission. The three 
main principles on which our work rests are: 
Responsiveness, which means that governments are able to react to the de-
mands and needs of society at large, are open to effective interaction with 
civil society and various interest groups and are able to consider various 
views and interests in policy- and law-making processes. In this respect, 
transparency in the work of governments is crucial to making them respon-
sive. The ODIHR and the IMD are prepared to lend assistance to political 
parties in their attempt to be responsive to their membership, thereby also 
enhancing the responsiveness of governments. 
Responsibility, which means that governments can be held accountable by 
their own societies. While this is most visible at the time of elections, democ-
racy in a democratically governed country actually functions between elec-
tions as “a daily plebiscite.” Responsible governments govern in accordance 
with the rule of law, where laws are open, well-known and apply equally to 
all. Procedures ensure that political minorities can contribute effectively to 
inclusive law-making processes and that a culture of boycotts and non-
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participation is avoided. And promoting multi-party systems where parties 
are accustomed to interacting directly contributes to achieving this goal. 
Representativeness, which means that, while governments are responsive to 
public needs, they also represent distinct political interests, values, ideas and 
programmes, not only during election periods, but also between elections. 
Representative governments work on institutionalizing political life and pub-
lic political participation through legitimate institutions such as political 
parties, thus simplifying and clarifying political choices faced by individual 
citizens. In our work on promoting multiparty democracy, The ODIHR and 
the IMD assist parties in developing and clarifying their platforms so as to 
make clear to the public what ideas and values the various parties represent. 
In recognition of the fact that political parties are unique institutions of gov-
ernance and that it is the parties that can make a valuable contribution to 
creating an environment where government is responsive, responsible and 
representative, the ODIHR has entered the field of assistance to political 
parties. This is done strictly on an impartial, inclusive multiparty basis in a 
project to promote ownership of democratic processes by all political forces.  
It is fitting that this type of a project was first tested in the OSCE region 
in Georgia, following the Rose Revolution, which brought about changes in 
the political landscape. This is why the ODIHR and the IMD started to work 
on political party development through the innovative methodology of an 
interactive assessment. A knowledgeable local partner -- the Caucasus Insti-
tute for Peace, Development and Democracy (CIPDD), was the third partner 
in making the project a success. 
We hope that this programme has enhanced the parties’ understanding 
of their own and each others’ strengths and weaknesses and made the field 
of political competition more transparent. We also hope to have identified a 
way forward that involves strengthening the internal democratic organiza-
tion of the parties, enhancing women’s political activity within parties and 
decision-making processes, increasing international contacts and improving 
the way the parties identify themselves at the local level. The OSCE/ODIHR 
would like to maintain this momentum by continuing the engagement in 
democratic political party development in the spirit of OSCE’s emphasis on 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The IMD is committed to re-
main a strong partner in that endeavour.  
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The ODIHR would like to thank the governments of Canada and the United 
States for funding this project: truly an international effort in the political 
sense, but strictly a non-partisan effort to assist Georgia to further enhance 
its young democracy. 
Vladimir Shkolnikov 
Head of the ODIHR Democratization Department 
Jos van Kemenade 
Chairman of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy 
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1Introduction
Democracy in Georgia is a matter of international interest. That has been 
said repeteadly by Western leaders during the last 15 years. While the as-
sessment that led to this book was going on in 2005, US President George 
Bush visited the country and, to a multitude at the central square in the capi-
tal Tbilisi, he openly declared the interest of the world in having democracy 
succeed in Georgia. Other Western politicians and leaders of bordering 
countries like Turkey have also shown that interest. On its part, Georgia is 
promising to do all it can to join the club of democratic countries and the 
European and transatlantic organizations linked to them. At the same time it 
is seeking to improve its relations with the partners in the direct and unsta-
ble region of the Caucasus. In other words, the Georgian political class faces 
real major challenges.
Good and democratic political institutions are indispensable to a sustain-
able democracy. In countries coming from authoritarianism or where de-
mocracy is relatively young, those kinds of institutions and the democratic 
political culture upon which they rest are not available and have to be con-
structed. But it is first necessary to understand how they work. A good analy-
sis of the existing political culture and organizations must be seen as a cru-
cial part of a successful democratization process. Political parties in particu-
lar should be analyzed to help us understand how and why they work as they 
do. A well functioning political party system is evidently an important condi-
tion for a well functioning representative democracy. 
Georgia is such a country. Since the last decade of the twentieth century it 
has been struggling with the construction of its democratic architecture. Step 
by step, achievements have been reached and new challenges addressed. But 
what are the prospects for the future? What is the current situation of the 
political party system and how can it be improved so that it can contribute to 
a sustainable democracy? To answer those questions we have carried out an 
interactive assessment in which Georgian political parties have been actively 
involved and have worked very closely with a team of researchers from the 
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD), the Caucasus Insti-
tute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD), and the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR). The assessment was carried 
out as an interactive process between the different actors whereby the politi-
cal parties themselves delivered the different fragments of the picture and 
the diagnoses of their organizations. The process has provided the analytical 
foundation upon which future practical co-operation with and technical as-
sistance programmes for these parties can be built. This book presents a 
report of the assessment process and the outcome. 
The assessment was a joint-venture coordinated by IMD, who also con-
tributed the methodology to assess the political party system. Together with 
2the CIPDD, IMD organized the workshops, analyzed the outcome and 
helped to edit this document. The CIPDD was responsible for adapting the 
asssessment to the Georgian context. It carried out the fieldwork and the 
study of the institutional political framework, and it prepared the drafts for 
the different chapters of this report.  
The representatives of the various political parties organized the work-
shops, fine-tuned the questions to be asked and the areas to be covered and 
drew up the conclusions and recommendations. Their active participation 
was crucial. The whole process was assisted by the OSCE-ODIHR and an 
Advisory Group that included prominent members of Georgia’s civil society.  
The first step in the research was to select the participating parties. The 
criterion for selection was the party’s influence on the current political proc-
ess. Parties were selected from those which are represented by more than 
one deputy in the acting Georgian Parliament, and/or acting Tbilisi City 
Council, the largest and most important elected political bodies in Georgia. 
Based on this criterion, a choice of the following six parties was made: the 
Conservative Party of Georgia, Industry Will Save Georgia, the Labour 
(Shormis) Party of Georgia, the New Conservative Party, the Republican 
Party and the United National Movement. Designated representatives from 
each political party worked in close cooperation with the research team.
The second step was to discuss and identify the specific topics to address 
in the research. That was done in a workshop in The Hague attended by the 
Georgian partners and experts from the Netherlands. The research itself was 
conducted in 24 workshops with political party representatives, four with 
each of the six selected parties.  
Half of these workshops (or two with each party) were held in the capital 
of Georgia and the other half in organizations outside the capital. Each of the 
four workshops with each of the political parties was dedicated to one of the 
following specific topics: 
• Ideological identity of the party and its policy-making; 
• Organizational structure/Human and financial resources; 
• Internal democracy;  
• Public relations and election campaigning. 
Usually, more than ten party members participated in each of these work-
shops, including party leaders, mid-level activists and members of grass-
roots organizations. The atmosphere during the discussions was very open, 
and party representatives were willing to discuss very sensitive issues. The 
workshops were conducted in June-September 2005 and delivered the data 
for the analysis presented here in the chapters dealing with the institutional 
development of political parties.
A multi-party conference held on 31 May 2005 in Tbilisi and attended by 
representatives of all six participating parties was another important source 
of information. The discussions during this conference are reflected in the 
chapters of this document dealing with relations between the political parties 
3and the State, and the role of women in Georgian political parties. In addi-
tion, several face-to-face interviews were held with representatives of each 
party in order to specify particular issues relevant for research. The final 
draft of this document was discussed at a second multi-party conference held 
in March 2006 and attended by high-ranking representatives from all parties, 
civil society and the international community. 
In addition to all of the above contacts with political parties, the assess-
ment team gathered further information from such sources as the general 
literature on political parties, analytical papers by Georgian experts on the 
Georgian political party scene as well as other aspects of Georgian political 
development, the results of public opinion polls conducted by different or-
ganizations and reports by international organizations on assessing different 
political events in Georgia.  
The meetings with the political parties gave rise to distinct pictures of the 
current condition of each party, the inter-party relations and the relation 
between each party and the rest of Georgian society. This document contains 
those pictures and aims to provide guidance and orientation to politicians, 
policymakers, organizations and international actors interested in the further 
development of democratic institutions and politics in Georgia. 
For their contribution to this work we would like to thank the members of 
the Advisory Group: Ana Dolidze, Eka Kvesitatdze, Lela Khomeriki, Giorgi 
Gogia, Giorgi Khelashvili, Gocha Tskitishvili, David Paichatdze, Devi 
Khechinashvili; the representatives from the Georgian political parties: 
Giorgi Mosidze, Irakli Kavtaradze, Vladimer Kokhreidze, Kakha Kukava, 
David Tsagareishvili, David Usupashvili, Levan Bodzashvili, Marina Tsu-
lukidze; from OSCE/ODHIR: Tiina Ilsen, Childerik Schaapveld, Vladimir 
Shkolnikov; from the Netherlands: André Gerrits, Ruud Koole, Petr Kopecky, 
Gerrit Voerman, Ruben Verheul, André Krouwel; CIPDD´s team members 
Lia Sanikidze, George Gotua, Zurab Tatishvili and IMD´s team members 
Wiebe de Jager and Pepijn Gerrits. We owe all of them our sincere apprecia-
tion and gratitude.
Ghia Nodia - CIPDD 
Álvaro Pinto Scholtbach - IMD 

51. Democratic Transitions and Political In-
stitutions
This book begins by outlining the development of the new state, democracy 
and the democratic institutions in Georgia since the collapse of Commu-
nism in 1990. Political parties function in a given context, which, in turn, 
influences them; conversely, the development of political parties is one of the 
principal factors in – as well as indicators of – the consolidation of a stable 
democratic system in a country.
This context is defined by a number of factors, two being the political so-
ciety and its different institutions. Georgia has been a country notorious for 
its political instability and this has expressed itself through multiple transi-
tions to democracy. Part of this 
chapter recapitulates the history 
of these transitions and tries to 
derive lessons from them. Two 
of these attempted transitions 
were never consolidated and led 
to the establishment of weak 
state institutions and semi-
authoritarian political regimes, 
in which a large part of the 
public was effectively excluded 
from political participation. The 
Rose Revolution of November 
2003 marked a new attempt at 
democratic transition in Geor-
gia, and the overarching goal of 
Georgian political and societal 
actors is to consolidate this 
transition, that is, to create a sustainable political regime ensuring effective, 
limited and accountable government, broad citizen participation, and fair 
conditions for political competition.  
This last point is directly linked to the relations between the state and the 
political parties, which is mainly expressed in the legal environment in 
which Georgian political parties operate. The Georgian Constitution and 
other legislation respect citizens’ rights to create political parties and to be 
active in the public sphere. In practice, legislation has not restricted political 
parties, with the notable exception of the ban on parties that are regionally 
based. However, the electoral legislation has been extremely unstable as it 
has been renegotiated in the run-offs to all major elections. This has been 
confusing to the voters and has not contributed to the development of a vi-
able political party system. One of the important goals of Georgian democ-
What Georgians Want to Achieve
To create stable democratic state insti-
tutions able to serve citizens effectively; 
To overcome territorial fragmentation 
of the country through peaceful 
means;
To create a robust and inclusive civil 
society as an avenue for broad partici-
pation;
To overcome poverty, achieve prosper-
ity for all citizens;  
To join European and Euro-Atlantic 
institutions.
6racy is to agree on fair rules of political competition that fairly represent citi-
zens’ interests but also ensure a robust and stable system of political parties.  
Political parties also function in a social context. They respond to and ex-
press citizens’ demands and concerns. In a number of cases – the Rose 
Revolution was the last of them - Georgian citizens have sent a strong mes-
sage to their political elites that they will not tolerate authoritarian rule. No 
political groups espousing openly anti-democratic or anti-liberal ideas have 
been successful in attracting significant support from voters. However, save 
for revolutionary moments, most Georgian citizens have not actively partici-
pated in civic and political life. Civil society organizations, other than those 
based on relatively narrow elites, are weakly developed and do not provide an 
effective mechanism for broad civic participation. Political parties should 
always be closely connected to civil society and its non-governmental organi-
zations, trade unions, professional associations, and faith- or community-
based organizations. Their development will make the democratic system 
more inclusive and accountable.
Political parties and other political actors and institutions function more 
and more in an international environment. This is true for all countries and 
certainly for Georgia’s new democracy. During the last fifteen years, devel-
opments in Georgia have been influenced by a number of international ac-
tors. While relations with Russia, Georgia’s closest and most powerful 
neighbour, have been central to Georgia’s security, politics and chances for 
economic development, a wide variety of other actors, usually described as 
“the international community” and including major international organiza-
tions, the governments of the US and of a number of European countries, as 
well as some private foundations, have had a considerable impact on the 
development of Georgian political and civil society institutions. Orientation 
toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration has been one of the notable 
points of consensus in mainstream Georgian politics, and the likelihood of 
consolidating democratic institutions is closely linked in the minds of many 
Georgians to the prospects of integrating into NATO and the European Un-
ion. This is also true of Georgian political parties, who are looking for oppor-
tunities to establish close contacts with like-minded parties in the West. 
While there have been some programmes of international assistance to 
Georgian political parties, this has never been a real priority of the interna-
tional assistance programmes in Georgia.  
This book argues that the international community can and should do 
much more to help Georgian political parties to become robust democratic 
institutions capable of effectively representing the interests of the citizens of 
Georgia. Each of the book’s chapters opens with a box containing the main 
recommendations in terms of policy options. The first section will focus on 
the national and international context in which the new Georgian democracy 
has developed during the last 15 years.  
71.1 Georgia’s New State and Democratic 
Transitions
Georgia’s democratic challenge is to make sure that November 2003 goes 
down in Georgian history textbooks as a “revolution to end all revolu-
tions.” This means that democratic institutions do indeed consolidate and 
allow routine constitutional transfers of power. For this, the government 
must learn to deliver the services needed by the public, and enter into a 
constructive dialogue with the opposition parties. It is crucial that citizens 
actively participate in governance through developing robust civil society 
institutions rather than only taking part in elections and sporadic protest 
rallies. Building sustainable political parties that effectively represent citi-
zens’ interests is essential in realizing this participation. 
The Georgian state is very young and very old at the same time. Being an 
ancient nation may be one of the most important facts ingrained in the 
Georgian psyche. Georgian schoolchildren read stories about Georgia’s rela-
tions with ancient Greece and Rome, and every Georgian remembers that 
this country was among the first in the world to adopt Christianity as its state 
religion,1 or that it had its Golden Age in the 11th-12th centuries. However, 
the country became fragmented after this period, and the first political um-
brella under which the lands of contemporary Georgia were reunited was 
that of the Russian Empire. A brief interlude of independence in 1918-21 left 
behind a strong normative idea that having an independent State is the only 
acceptable political option for Georgians. But this normative idea was not 
underpinned by relevant political or institutional traditions.  
Therefore, for all practical purposes, Georgia as a modern state is less 
than fifteen years old. Its new political institutions started to emerge in the 
late 1980s, in the twilight of the weakened Soviet Union. This was when the 
first political parties, independent media, and genuine public associations 
(nobody as yet used the term “NGO”) were created. The first multiparty elec-
tions were held in October 1990; Georgia declared independence in April 
1991: this is when its new state institutions started to take shape, although 
they were built on the basis of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, a part 
of the Soviet Union. Because the road that the country followed during this 
decade and a half was particularly bumpy, Georgia’s record is probably more 
dramatic than that of any other post-Soviet State.  
For all practical purposes, Georgia as a modern state is  
less than fifteen years old 
                                                          
1 This happened in the 4th century. 
8In this chapter, we briefly analyse the major landmarks on the road that 
Georgia travelled before reaching its current condition. The chapter gives an 
overview of the current state of its political institutions, discusses its place in 
the region and in the world and describes the relations between the Georgian 
state and its major political parties.  
Nation-Building and Democratic Transition(s): the Story of Three 
Revolutions
The inception and coming to power of the national-liberation movement 
The new Georgia starts with the period of perestroika and glasnost, a fateful 
attempt to liberalize the Soviet political regime undertaken by the last Soviet 
leader Mikhail Gorbachev from 1985 on. Georgians used the opportunities 
provided by the new liberties to launch the national independence move-
ment, which mobilized the public around the slogan of independence from 
the Soviet Union. The inevitable tensions with the Communist authorities 
came tragically to a head in the early morning of 9 April, 1989, when the 
Soviet army dispersed a huge pro-independence rally, leaving twenty people, 
mostly young women, dead.  
This tragic event represented the moral death of the Communist regime 
in Georgia: its legitimacy was fatally injured and never recovered. Even 
though the Communist authorities were formally in charge for another year 
and a half, they were never able to implement any policies on their own. The 
controlling hand of the Kremlin was gradually losing its grip as well. In Oc-
tober 1990, the first multiparty elections led to the victory of the nationalist 
and anti-Communist Round Table coalition led by the charismatic Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia with 54 per cent of the vote.2 This event was branded the 
“peaceful revolution” – the first and the most constitutional change of gov-
ernment in Georgian history until then. The electoral victory was consoli-
dated in May 1991, when Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected president with 86 
per cent of the vote.
This period defined Georgia’s political agenda, its public discourse and 
the character of its political institutions. The agenda was dominated by two 
ideas: nationalism and democracy. Georgia had to be an independent state 
within the borders of the former Soviet Georgia; it also looked towards 
Europe, which meant that it had to become democratic. There were virtually 
no alternative political programmes then being publicly promoted by the 
different political groups. Political debates focused only on issues of strategy 
and how to reach the widely shared twofold objective.
These years were marked by serious challenges to the creation of stable 
political institutions. The challenges had especially to do with the failure of 
                                                          
2 To be more precise, the elections were concluded in November when the run-off elec-
tions were held in those single-mandate constituencies where none of the candidates had 
received more than fifty per cent of the vote in the first round.  
9the different political groups and ethnic communities in the country to reach 
a consensus beyond the twofold objective. Having a commonly shared 
agenda proved insufficient. The opposition against the Communists was 
internally divided into different factions that fought each other as fiercely as 
they opposed the Communist authorities. On the surface, disagreements 
were about tactics, but in essence the divisions were about the personalities 
and ambitions of the different leaders. Zviad Gamsakhurdia had emerged as 
the most charismatic among them and had been rewarded with resounding 
electoral victories. But other leaders in the resistance against the Commu-
nists did not accept his pre-eminence as legitimate. The Georgian political 
factions clearly failed to reach a consensus about the basic rules of the game 
and considered each other enemies rather than competitors.  
Gamsakhurdia’s rule had a strong popular mandate but was very soon 
denounced as authoritarian 
Gamsakhurdia’s rule embodied a paradox typical of many young and imma-
ture democracies: it had a strong popular mandate but was very soon de-
nounced as authoritarian. These charges were justified at least in part since 
the government tended to interpret its popular mandate as the right to dis-
miss the opposition as irrelevant and to brand it as hostile to the state rather 
than to the government. The media was under strong pressure and only two 
independent publications were allowed to remain active while others were 
closed down.  
Ethnic-territorial conflicts 
Adding to the difficulties in achieving political pluralism was the problem of 
ethnic pluralism. The emergence of Georgian nationalism was paralleled by 
the development of counter-nationalist programmes in the autonomous 
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Abkhaz and the Ossetes formed 
their own nationalist movements and demanded secession from Georgia. As 
in many other multi-ethnic countries, an attempt at democratic transition 
created challenges to the unity of the country.
The emergence of Georgian nationalism was paralleled by development of 
counter-nationalist programmes in the autonomous regions of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia 
According to the census of 1989, ethnic minorities comprised somewhat 
under thirty per cent of the population of Georgia, with Armenians, Rus-
sians and Azeris making up the largest groups (see table 6 on p. 65). How-
ever, the most serious problems arose not in relation with these groups but 
with the Abkhaz and Ossetes, who had enjoyed the status of territorial-
administrative autonomous units under the Soviet nationality system. This 
had helped them to create their own bureaucratic elites and cultural and 
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educational institutions, which later served as the basis for the secessionist 
movements. The third autonomous republic, Achara, was based on confes-
sional rather than ethnic principles (most Acharans are Muslims but they 
consider themselves ethnic Georgians). Acharans have challenged Georgia’s 
nation-building as well, but they have never demanded secession, and rela-
tions with the centre never reached anything close to an open conflict, at 
least not until the spring of 2004.
There is an important demographic difference between the two seces-
sionist regions. Ethnic Ossetians comprise more than a two-thirds majority 
within their respective autonomous unit; therefore, they could base their 
claim to self-determination on democratic procedures. At the time in ques-
tion, ethnic Abkhazs comprised only 17 per cent of the population of 
Abkhazia, with ethnic Georgians making up 45.6 per cent. Nonetheless, as a 
“titular” group the Abkhaz enjoyed preferential treatment with privileges in 
terms of high fixed quotas for jobs in the bureaucratic and economic-
managerial offices. The principle of democratic majority would have endan-
gered these privileges, so the Abkhazs had problems not just with Tbilisi, but 
also and especially within Abkhazia. 
The Georgian national liberation movement lacked a clear idea about how 
to deal with the issues of the autonomies. The agenda for independence re-
volved around the struggle with the central government in Moscow, and the 
minorities’ problems were considered only in the context of that struggle. 
The Georgian nationalists detected a Moscow-made conspiracy behind any 
minority claim, and attempts to establish a dialogue with minority represen-
tatives were only incidental. But it would probably not have been easy anyway 
to reach a compromise, even if the new Georgian elites had displayed more 
goodwill or political skills. Radicalism and aversion to compromise were as 
widespread among the Abkhaz and Ossetian nationalists as among their 
Georgian counterparts. Moreover, the Soviet authorities, concerned with a 
rising nationalist movement for an independent Georgia, had a vested inter-
est in encouraging and supporting anti-Tbilisi movements with a weakening 
effect within Georgia.
However, the fact that Zviad Gamsakhurdia was a strong ethnic national-
ist who openly called most ethnic minorities in Georgia active or potential 
traitors to the nation greatly fuelled the tensions. The conflict first reached a 
critical phase in the Ossetian case. On 9 December, 1990, the newly elected 
Ossetian Supreme Council proclaimed the South Ossetian Republic, which 
could well be interpreted as secession from Georgia, or at least a step in that 
direction. Gamsakhurdia's Supreme Council responded by unanimously 
voting to abolish South Ossetian autonomy. The subsequent attempt by 
Georgia to establish control over the region by military means was unsuc-
cessful and degenerated into a low-scale war that continued for several years. 
In the fall of 1991, Gamsakhurdia, having learned a lesson from the Ossetian 
debacle, reached a power-sharing compromise with the Abkhazians. This 
compromise did not last as it would soon be unravelled by the second Geor-
gian revolution.
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The Christmas coup and its aftermath 
Gamsakhurdia's greatest problem lay not in his relations with the Commu-
nist Government in Moscow or with the ethnic separatists, but rather with 
his internal opposition. His radical opponents never recognized his legiti-
macy and were ready to challenge his rule. Accusations of authoritarianism 
were shared by an increasing section of society. His erratic style of govern-
ance alienated some of his closest lieutenants, while his fiery ethnic national-
ism gained him notoriety in the West. In August 1991, most of the National 
Guard, which in fact is the Georgian army in a nutshell, defected together 
with its leader Tengiz Kitovani and the Prime Minister, Tengiz Sigua. After 
several months of uncertainty and failed negotiations, the rebels attacked the 
Parliament building on 22 December. Two weeks later, on 6 January, Gam-
sakhurdia and his supporters were forced to leave the building. More than 
one hundred people died during the hostilities, but the worst was still to 
come.
Many people perceived Gamsakhurdia’s removal as a fresh start for de-
mocracy in Georgia 
However one assesses the leaders of the Christmas coup, as this event is 
sometimes called, or their motivations, the whole event was branded by its 
supporters as a popular rebellion against tyranny. Many people perceived 
Gamsakhurdia’s removal as a fresh start for democracy in Georgia. In March 
of the same year, the leaders of the rebellion summoned Eduard Shevard-
nadze to seize the reins of power. Although he was the former Communist 
leader of Georgia, he also had some credentials with the Georgian liberals 
and the international community for his benevolent stance in allowing the 
1989 velvet revolutions in Eastern/Central Europe and the reunification of 
Germany. In October 1992, fairly democratic parliamentary elections were 
held. Shevardnadze was overwhelmingly elected through parallel direct bal-
lot to the position of Chairman of Parliament and Head of State. Parliament 
was extremely fragmented, but the majority supported Shevardnadze.
In one sense did the removal of Gamsakhurdia indeed give a new impe-
tus to democratic transition. Aggressive rhetoric against ethnic minorities 
ceased or softened, the political discourse became much more tolerant to-
wards all kinds of differences, the independent media proliferated, criticism 
of Shevardnadze was more open and accepted and political parties were 
mainly free to act as long as they recognized the legitimacy of the new gov-
ernment. Even so, the overall situation in the country was one of disorder 
verging on anarchy. Supporters of Gamsakhurdia did not give up and took 
control of Megrelia, the home region of the deposed president in western 
Georgia; the victorious militias did not want to concede the levers of power to 
Shevardnadze’s civilian administration but did not have the internal coher-
ence and discipline to exercise effective control either. Military attempts to 
restore control in the rebellious Megrelia were unsuccessful and only further 
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disaffected the local population. The country was in fact divided between 
local warlords and criminal chiefs. This was an embodiment of the “failed 
state.”
The country was in fact divided between local warlords and criminal 
chiefs. This was a “failed state” embodied 
Escalation of ethnic-territorial conflicts made the situation even more critical. 
In July 1992, the Russia-brokered peace deal ended hostilities in South Os-
setia, creating the first zone of “frozen conflict” in Georgia: most of South 
Ossetia remained under control of the separatist Government, and the cease-
fire was monitored by the tripartite Georgian-Russian-Ossetian peace-
keeping forces. However, on 14 August, 1992 hostilities broke out in 
Abkhazia after Georgian troops entered the region ostensibly to guard the 
railways and highways. At stake was not only Abkhazia but neighbouring 
Megrelia, which was under control of the Zviadists, with both enemies of the 
new Tbilisi Government having a vested interest in coordinating their activi-
ties. The Abkhaz militia offered military resistance, supported by armed 
volunteer groups from the North Caucasus and, at least as the Georgian side 
alleged, by the Russian military. This was a bloodier war than that in South 
Ossetia, ending in September 1993 in defeat for the Georgian government. 
The whole ethnic Georgian community of Abkhazia (about 300,000) fled the 
region. In April 1994, Russia brokered a ceasefire agreement to be upheld by 
peace-keepers of the Commonwealth of Independent States, in fact repre-
sented by Russian troops. The peace-keeping operation was monitored by the 
UN observers mission UNOMIG.  
Since then, these two regions have often been called “zones of frozen 
conflict”: there is no final settlement, and a precarious peace is occasionally 
interrupted by episodes of low-key violence (as happened in May 1998 in 
Abkhazia and in July-August 2004 in South Ossetia). Although almost all 
ethnic Georgians fled Abkhazia and many of them South Ossetia, these terri-
tories still have mixed populations (tens of thousands of Georgians returned 
to the Gali district of Abkhazia which had been almost homogeneously 
Georgian before the war). Some institutions are reasonably consolidated in 
these separatist entities, but they are not considered legitimate by any other 
recognized state. The perpetuation of these “frozen conflicts” with uncertain 
prospects for the future constitutes a human tragedy for the people who live 
there or who were forced to flee and is the single most important obstacle to 
the development of the Georgian state.  
The perpetuation of “frozen conflicts” is still the single most important 
obstacle to the development of the Georgian state 
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The Shevardnadze stabilization 
Defeat in Abkhazia was followed by an escalation of the conflict between 
Tbilisi and the Zviadist rebels. In October 1993, the latter started an armed 
offensive but were defeated relatively easily . This marked a turning point 
after which the Georgian Government led by Eduard Shevardnadze started to 
consolidate its power over the whole territory of the country save for separa-
tist or semi-separatist zones (the latter taking in Achara).  
 Shevardnadze’s greatest success was to neutralize the National Guard 
and the Mkhedrioni, paramilitary groups led by Tengiz Kitovani and Jaba 
Ioseliani respectively, through a series of successful manoeuvres. The task 
was completed by the summer and autumn of 1995. In August 1995, the 
new Constitution was adopted, largely modelled on the American system. In 
the elections held that same autumn, Shevardnadze was elected President by 
a wide margin, while the party he created in 1993, the Citizens’ Union of 
Georgia (CUG), gained a majority in the new Parliament (in a coalition with 
a group of independent MPs). The two other parties that made it to Parlia-
ment, the Union of Revival and the National-Democratic Party, could hardly 
be considered the opposition in the proper sense.  
As a result of his victory, Shevardnadze created a hybrid political regime 
that allowed a certain space for civic and political freedoms but few condi-
tions for genuine political competition and participation. Real power was 
concentrated in a fairly narrow power elite. The CUG, the government party, 
served as a formal umbrella for this elite, but was very weakly institutional-
ized. The fact that it was dissolved as soon as Eduard Shevardnadze exited 
from power, was the final confirmation of its institutional weakness.  
The power elite could be described as a network of clientelistic networks 
centred around the personality of the president. Shevardnadze created a hy-
brid political regime that allowed space for civic and political freedoms but 
few conditions for genuine political competition and participation. Having 
been summoned to bring stability to a chaotic and fragmented Georgia 
where an extremely confrontational style of political competition prevailed, 
Shevardnadze’s main method of rule was to co-opt representatives of differ-
ent interest groups into the power elite and maintain a balance between 
them. This made him an inherently weak but at the same time indispensable 
leader. The political system maintained itself, but its ability to act for the 
public good was rather limited.  
The team of “young reformers” headed by Zurab Zhvania constituted one 
of the most important centres of power within the Shevardnadze system of 
balance. This was a group of young people, most of whom had come to poli-
tics through a moderate wing of the national liberation movement. In 1995 
Zurab Zhvania became the Speaker of the Georgian Parliament, and his 
team also controlled the apparatus of the CUG.3 That made him the second 
most powerful leader in Georgia, and some observers (especially Westerners) 
                                                          
3 Zhvania was the first Secretary General of the CUG.  
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considered him Shevardnadze’s heir. He and Shevardnadze were also per-
ceived to have informally divided responsibilities between them: Shevard-
nadze ensured stability, Zhvania’s team pushed for reforms. To strengthen 
his reform agenda, Zhvania tried to attract into government Georgians who 
were working or studying in the West. One of them was Mikheil Saakashvili, 
the future President of Georgia, then a young lawyer who was elected to Par-
liament while he was still a doctoral student at George Washington Univer-
sity in the US, and who was immediately appointed chairman of the key 
Parliamentary committee responsible for the legal reform agenda.4 His dep-
uty was another young lawyer educated in an elite Russian university, Nino 
Burjanadze, the future Speaker of the Georgian Parliament.  
Year The winning party and per-
centage of votes in propor-
tionate vote 
% of 
seats 
Other parties and 
percentage of votes 
Electoral 
barrier  
1990 The Round Table bloc, 54 62 Communist Party – 
29.6
4%
1992 Peace bloc, 20.8 16 Bloc October 11th – 
10.7, National Democ-
ratic Party – 8.2 
1995 Citizens’ Union of Georgia, 
23.7
46 National Democratic 
Party – 8, Revival Un-
ion – 6.8 
5%
1999 Citizens’ Union of Georgia, 
41.8
56 Bloc Revival of Georgia 
– 25.2, Industry Will 
Save Georgia – 7.1 
7%
2003/
4
United National Movement, 
66.2
68 Bloc “Rightist Opposi-
tion” – 7.6 
7%
Table 1. Results of Parliamentary elections in independent Georgia 
In the second half of the 1990s, the Georgian Parliament adopted important 
new legislation, mainly following Western models and advice: the civil code, 
civil proceedings code, criminal proceedings code, tax code, general adminis-
trative code, etc. Some aspects of this legislation could be criticized, but 
overall these reforms brought Georgia closer to European standards.  
The young reformers pushed for drastic reform in the judiciary, which 
led to the introduction of new meritocratic criteria in appointing judges and 
replacing most of the Soviet-era judges. In 1999, Georgia was the first coun-
try in the South Caucasus to be admitted to the Council of Europe. This was 
considered not only a great victory for the country led by Shevardnadze, but 
also recognition of the efforts of the “reformers” led by Zhvania.
Another achievement of this period was the development of civil society 
institutions such as independent media and non-governmental organiza-
tions. That was an important manifestation of democratic progress since 
their existence ensured fairly lively public debate on policy issues and some 
level of public oversight of the government’s activities. The Rustavi-2 TV 
company soon gained prominence and popularity as the flagship organiza-
                                                          
4 This was the Committee of Constitutional, Legal Issues and the Rule of Law.  
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tion of the independent media. Development of these civil society institu-
tions gradually made the public and the government used to the idea, that 
citizens can question the actions of the government and that free debate is a 
normal condition of society. However, only a small fraction of society actu-
ally took part in this civic area; the vast majority of citizens remained specta-
tors only. NGOs mostly represented the young urban educated elite, and the 
circle of the publicly active organizations was rather narrow. The new civil 
society organizations were broadly considered allies of the “young reform-
ers” in Parliament.
The administration of Shevardnadze and Zhvania could not be called 
democratic in a proper sense, but it certainly brought the spirit of pluralism 
into Georgian society. But achievements in the area of democracy develop-
ment were restricted to the relatively small elite, and the majority of the peo-
ple was excluded from effective participation in political processes. The po-
litical regime worked very much along the lines of what has been called 
“competitive authoritarianism”5: competition and pluralism were allowed 
but within a limited scope, and the real levers of power remained in the 
hands of a small elite that did not allow other groups to enjoy effective 
means of political competition. 
From stability to stagnation: election fraud, corruption, and state failure 
Two main traits of the Georgian political system could be regarded as reflect-
ing the undemocratic character of Shevardnadze’s regime: fraudulent elec-
tions and corruption understood as “state capture.” International assess-
ments of the Georgian parliamentary and presidential elections were mainly 
positive though increasingly critical; domestic observers and the Georgian 
media, however, assessed the electoral process in a much more critical vein. 
It is now impossible to evaluate exactly the degree of electoral fraud in Geor-
gia in the period 1992-2001,6 but there is a near- consensus in Georgian soci-
ety that the quality and fairness of the electoral processes were in decline 
throughout that decade. However, until 2003 one could not convincingly 
argue that electoral fraud was serious enough to change the winners. Typical 
electoral violations included multiple voting, stuffing of ballot boxes, pres-
suring voters, and the fraudulent tabulation of election results by electoral 
commissions on different levels. The general perception among the popula-
tion was that the government was prepared to allow the opposition to com-
pete as long as it did not claim the right to actually defeat the government 
party or presidential candidate. 
                                                          
5 On this concept see Stephen Levitsky, Lucan A. Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authori-
tarianism”, Journal of Democracy, 13-2 4/02: pp. 51-65. 
6 See more on this in David Usupashvili and Ghia Nodia, Electoral Processes in Georgia,
in: International IDEA, Building Democracy in Georgia, Discussion Paper 4: “Electoral 
Processes in Georgia”, May 2003, pp. 8-15.  
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There was a near consensus in Georgian society that the  
quality and fairness of the electoral processes were in decline throughout 
the decade 
“State capture” as a mechanism through which decision-making processes 
in a state mainly serve the private or group benefits of the narrow power-
elite,7 also took place in Georgia. The Georgian government was dominated 
by clientelistic networks or “clans”, as Georgians themselves call them (see 
more on this in the Society and Citizenship chapter). Georgia’s image was 
that of one of the most corrupt countries in the world: in 2002, Transparency 
International rated it 85th out of 102 countries surveyed; in 2003 it was 124th 
out of 133 countries, with the ratings of 2.4 and 1.8 respectively.  
The phenomenon of “state capture” was also linked to the problem of 
state weakness, or in a more radical formulation, state failure.8 Georgia un-
der Shevardnadze was often called a “failing state”, particularly in the last 
period of his rule. Failure of territorial control was its most obvious expres-
sion. Apart from the zones of “frozen conflicts” in Abkhazia and South Os-
setia, there remained uncertainity about the jurisdiction over the Autono-
mous Republic of Achara. Its leader, Aslan Abashidze, took advantage of the 
period of chaos in the early 1990s to create a regime of personal dictatorship 
in the region. He never formally contested Georgian sovereignty over Achara 
and even labelled himself as the guardian of Georgian unity. However, in 
practice he ensured the effective independence of his turf from the Georgian 
authorities, often openly resisting even legitimate demands from Tbilisi. The 
Acharan government was fully dominated by his family clan, and the region 
refused to transfer tax revenues to the state budget. Abashidze monopolized 
control over the port of Batumi and the Sarpi checkpoint, the main passage 
to Turkey. He exercised his own foreign policy, which was much more pro-
Russian than that of Tbilisi, and had his own contacts with the separatist 
authorities of Georgia. While in the mid-1990s his Revival Party was formally 
in concord with the CUG, towards the end of the decade Abashidze became 
openly opposed to the Shevardnadze regime, heading the largest opposition 
bloc in the 1999 parliamentary elections.  
Since 1999, Georgia has also lost effective control over a small area of 
Pankisi bordering on Chechnya. The inhabitants of this area, the Kisti, are 
related to the Chechens. The problem in this area emerged as a spillover 
effect of the war that Russia was conducting in Chechnya when thousands of 
                                                          
7 See more on this in Joel Hellman, “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reforms in 
Post-Communist Transitions”, World Politics No. 50, January 1998; Robin S. Bhatty, 
“Touch Choices: Observations on the Political Economy of Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia”, memo prepared for the World Bank, <http://www.cis7.nsf.>  
8 See more on this in David Darchiashvili and Ghia Nodia, The Weak State Syndrome and 
Corruption, in: International IDEA, Building Democracy in Georgia, Discussion Paper 5: 
Power Structures, the Weak State Syndrome and Corruption in Georgia, May 2003, pp. 
16-22.
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Chechen refugees fleeing the war moved to this area where some seven 
thousand Kisti already lived. Because some of them were anti-Russian insur-
gents, Moscow accused Georgia of harbouring terrorists. Pankisi soon de-
generated into an area outside effective state control and became a haven for 
the illegal trade in arms and drugs and in kidnapping for ransom. Georgian 
law enforcement officials had de facto given up policing the area.
Georgia’s image of that of one of the most corrupt countries  
in the world 
However, if only because of the kidnappings, full isolation of the Pankisi 
area proved to be impossible. Residents of the neighbouring region of Ak-
hmeta created a militia and threatened to establish order on their own, and 
this militia became a problem in its own right. In October 2001, by mysteri-
ous means (some alleged they were helped by Georgian law enforcement 
officials) a group of Chechen fighters relocated from the Pankisi to the vicin-
ity of Abkhazia and tried unsuccessfully to fight its way into the renegade 
province.
Elections in Georgia 
Reports of OSCE-ODIHR election observation missions are important 
sources of information on the quality of elections in Georgia. The final 
report on the 1999 parliamentary elections in Georgia mentioned “some 
instances of intimidation and violence...occasional restrictions on the 
freedom of movement for political parties...a clear advantage for the ruling 
party in the electronic media and ballot-stuffing.” Polling in the regions of 
Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli was considered “less than satisfac-
tory” and in Achara “unsatisfactory.”  
After the 2003 November parliamentary elections, the OSCE-ODIHR 
mission wrote that “the elections demonstrated that the authorities lacked 
the political will to conduct a genuine democratic process. This resulted in 
widespread and systematic election fraud during and after election day, 
most obviously in the Adjara and Kvemo Kartli regions.” In the process of 
tabulating voting results, the election commissions “disregarded the vot-
ers’ choices and were directly involved in producing dishonest election 
results.”
Assessments improved after the Rose Revolution. According to the 
OSCE-ODIHR mission report on the March 2004 partial repeat parlia-
mentary elections, they “demonstrated notable progress and were the 
most democratic since independence.” However, the report also noted 
continuing problems that “posed a challenge to the integrity of election 
results in some districts.” Achara and Kvemo Kartli regions were named 
as the most problematic.
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While the Georgian central government’s lack of capacity partially explains 
the authorities’ inability to control the situation in Pankisi, it also appears 
true that corrupt law enforcement agents preferred to tolerate an environ-
ment that permitted them to profit from the criminal activity thriving in the 
area.
After September 11, 2001, the global pre-eminence of the issue of terror-
ism changed both Georgian and international attitudes toward areas like 
Pankisi. Uncontrolled enclaves within failing states, especially if they hap-
pened to be populated by Muslims, were seen as possible sources of terror-
ism. Georgia came under pressure from both Russia and the United States 
to take action, and this pressure produced results.9 Georgian law enforce-
ment agencies undertook several operations in Pankisi and gradually suc-
ceeded in improving the situation, but this only happened after corrupt offi-
cials in the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security were dismissed. 
The Pankisi problem led the United States to launch its Georgia Train and 
Equip Programme in 2002, which sent 200 US Special Forces soldiers to 
Georgia in order to help train the Georgian military. 
By the end of Shevardnadze’s rule the state’s capacity to exert territorial 
control was weakened, which meant a setback in the positive trend of the 
mid-1990s. With it, the state’s capacity to deliver on such public concerns as 
security, conditions for economic growth, and the development of public 
infrastructure, was also diminished. This led to a catastrophic drop in the 
government’s popularity. Georgians decided that Shevardnadze’s genius for 
“balancing” had exhausted itself.
The end of the Shevardnadze era and the Rose Revolution  
It was the rift between the group of “young reformers” who had been shaped 
under the umbrella of the Shevardnadze government and the more conserva-
tive part of the political establishment that played a decisive role in bringing 
about the next change. This rift started to show after the 2000 presidential 
elections were won by Shevardnadze. The “reformers” themselves split into 
various groups. Several politicians with a background in business, who had 
joined Parliament in 1999, defected from the majority faction as early as in 
2000 and created the New Rights Party (from 2005 on New Conservative 
Party). In September 2001, the then Minister of Justice, Mikheil Saakashvili, 
resigned and created the opposition National Movement. Zurab Zhvania’s 
and Nino Burjanadze’s estrangement from the president’s camp was com-
pleted in the spring of 2002 when they created the United Democrats’ Party. 
Another important factor was the Labour Party, which attracted the votes of 
the poorest electorate and, as such, was a relevant player on the side of the 
opposition. Industry Will Save Georgia (IWSG), another party of business-
                                                          
9 Ariel Cohen, “Moscow, Washington, and Tbilisi Wrestle with Instability in the Pankisi,” 
Eurasia Insight, 19 February, 2002. 
<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav021902.shtml> 
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men that had achieved relative success in the 1999 elections, tried to find a 
middle way between the government and the opposition.10
The local elections of 2002 were a testing ground for the new struggle be-
tween the government and the opposition. It ended in a crushing defeat for 
the government, notably in the Tbilisi City Council elections where the CUG 
obtained less than two per cent of the vote. However, the opposition looked 
fragmented. In the Tbilisi elections, the Labour Party and the National 
Movement prevailed, getting about a quarter of votes each, and Mikheil Sa-
akashvili became the chairman of Tbilisi City Council. Outside Tbilisi, where 
voting was not according to the proportional system but based on the first-
past-the-post system, the New Conservatives and IWSG were more success-
ful.
The results of the local elections showed that the government had no or 
very limited chances of winning the parliamentary elections scheduled for 
November 2003, in the event they would be fair. On the other hand, various 
attempts to unify the opposition failed and the National Movement, the 
United Democrats and the New Conservatives limited themselves to agree 
not to attack each other in public and to concentrate their campaigning ef-
forts on denouncing the government. The Labour Party chose to distance 
itself from both the government and its recent defectors, criticizing both in 
equally harsh terms.
The elections that took place on 2 November 2003 showed that the gov-
ernment was ready to revert to large-scale fraud in order to retain power. As 
Table 2 shows, serious discrepancies existed between the “official” results 
and the parallel vote tabulation (PVT) conducted by the International Society 
for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), a Georgian election-monitoring 
organization working in cooperation with the National Democratic Institute 
of the United States. PVT gave the four opposition parties a clear and over-
whelming victory over the government parties. The latter were united in the 
“For a New Georgia” bloc of Shevardnadze’s supporters and worked together 
with the Revival movement led by Aslan Abashidze, the Acharan leader with 
whom Shevardnadze would cooperate in parliament.  
Reaching agreement between different opposition forces in such a par-
liament might still be problematic, but the National Movement was emerg-
ing as a clear leader among them, and the record of Tbilisi City Council elec-
tions the previous year suggested that the opposition would be able to take 
control of parliament. The official results announced by the Central Election 
Commission (CEC), however, gave the two government parties room to ma-
noeuvre if they entered into alliance and attracted the support of most candi-
dates from the single-mandate districts (as they were expected to do). In 
short, the electoral fraud was significant enough to make a difference be-
tween allowing or denying the opposition a chance to control parliament.  
                                                          
10 For more background information on the different Georgian political parties see their 
files in the Annex.
20
Parties CEC re-
sults 
PVT results 
For a New Georgia 21.3 18.9
Democratic Revival Union 18.8 8.1
National Movement 18.1 26.3
Labour 12.4 17.4
Burjanadze-Democrats 8.8 10.2
New Conservatives 7.4 8
Government parties total 40.1 27
Opposition parties total 46.7 61.9
Table 2. CEC and PVT results of 2 November 2003 vote in party lists 
While the CEC was counting votes (the official results were only announced 
on 20 November), mass demonstrations were going on demanding that the 
government either recognize the victory of the opposition or resign.11 These 
mass rallies were led by the National Movement and Burjanadze-Democrats, 
while the Labour Party and New Conservatives chose not to join them. After 
the CEC announced the results and the first session of Parliament was 
scheduled for the afternoon of 22 November, it became clear that things 
would come to a show-down. The opposition demonstrators disrupted the 
new Parliament session a few minutes after it began and forced the MPs and 
the president, who was delivering his opening speech, to leave the room. The 
next day, the president resigned, which, according to the constitution, made 
Nino Burjanadze, the acting speaker of Parliament but also one of the oppo-
sition leaders, the interim president. Soon afterwards, the Supreme Court of 
Georgia invalidated the results of the 2 November vote.  
The Rose Revolution demonstrated the Georgian people’s commitment to 
defend both the values of democracy and their political rights 
The Rose Revolution was at the same time a demonstration of failure and a 
great success for the Georgian people and its institutions. The latter failed to 
provide for an orderly and constitutional transfer of power when the gov-
ernment had obviously lost its popularity and people demanded change. On 
the other hand, however, the events of November 2003 demonstrated the 
commitment of the Georgian people to the values of democracy and their 
intolerance towards blatant infringements on their political rights. Society 
developed an ability to successfully mobilize peaceful and orderly protests for 
defending its rights. After the president was forced to resign, events quickly 
fell back into the constitutional groove. This was in glaring contrast to the 
events of 1992 when the president was also forced to leave but only after 
blood had been shed and nothing could prevent a lengthy and dramatic pe-
riod of internal turmoil.
                                                          
11 The Burjanadze-Democrats had a somewhat different demand: that election results be 
nullified and new elections called.  
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The revolution also propelled Mikheil Saakashvili and his National Move-
ment to uncontested leadership. Before the revolution, three leaders and 
their parties – Mikheil Saakashvili, Nino Burjanadze and Shalva Natelashvili 
from the National Movement, United Democrats and the Labour Party re-
spectively - enjoyed similar popularity ratings without a clear leader among 
them. The invalidated vote of the 2 November elections showed that many 
people had switched their support to the National Movement at the last mo-
ment, but even then (provided the votes had been counted according to the 
PVT) Saakashvili would have been only first among equals. However, during 
the days of mass protests, he and his movement convinced most Georgians 
they were the fittest to lead the nation. On 4 January 2004, Saaksashvili ran 
virtually uncontested in snap presidential elections (no other important po-
litical leader took part) and obtained 96.27 per cent of the vote. In March 
2004, the National Movement merged with the United Democrats into the 
United National Movement and carried the parliamentary elections with 
66.24 per cent of the vote. The new generation of Georgian politicians re-
ceived an unprecedented popular mandate. Now they had to give a fresh start 
to the country. 
Map 2. Georgia and territorial fragmentation 
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The third attempt at democratic transition: State and nation-
building as the new political agenda  
As has been said, being a “weak” or, in more extreme words, a “failing” state 
is the central problem that has haunted Georgia since its independence. It 
appears that from its very inception the new Georgian government has given 
priority to efforts aimed at improving Georgia’s score on this issue.  
The problem of state weakness can in its turn be divided into two major 
categories. One is about the issue of territorial control and nation-building,
or territorial unity and national integration. The second relates to the control 
of the state bureaucracy (or “state capture”) and state effectiveness.
When it comes to the issue of territorial control, the new Georgian gov-
ernment faced three very obvious challenges: the two unrecognized separa-
tist regimes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the uncertain status of 
Achara. The Shevardnadze government took steps to tackle these issues, but 
with no success. Arguably, at some point Shevardnzdze’s government 
started to regard these issues as insoluble, at least for the time being.  
Reintegrating Achara was the first spectacular success of the new Geor-
gian authorities 
The new authorities gave a new sense of urgency to solving the issue of terri-
torial control and displayed a determination to achieve results as quickly as 
possible. The first and rather spectacular success, which was in Achara, was 
made possible because ties between Achara and Georgia had never really 
been severed: the people in Achara felt part and parcel of Georgia, the Acha-
ran economy was not separate from the Georgian economy and Acharans 
always took part in Georgian elections. It was only Aslan Abashidze’s regime 
that defied the Georgian government. With the new and determined gov-
ernment in Tbilisi, conflict was unavoidable. However, the parties to the 
conflict were not, strictly speaking, Tbilisi and Batumi. To the surprise of 
many, it was the people of Achara, obviously inspired by the Rose Revolution 
and encouraged and supported by the new government, who rose against 
Abashidze and, in early May 2004, forced him to flee after a series of mass 
protests. The events in Achara were perceived as a double victory: a victory 
for democracy because an autocratic ruler was overthrown through a demon-
stration of popular power and a victory in the process of state- and nation-
building. The people and land of Achara returned to the Georgian, now de-
mocratic political space.  
Encouraged by the Acharan developments, President Saakashvili’s gov-
ernment decided to take the next step in South Ossetia. After ten years of 
“cold peace”, there were no obvious expressions of hostility between Georgi-
ans and Ossetians. People could move freely between the zone of conflict 
and the rest of Georgia and were actively trading with each other. This fed 
the idea that the problem was only the corrupt clan of Eduard Kokoiti ruling 
in South Ossetia and that it would suffice to send some signs of encourage-
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ment to the Ossetian people for the separatist government in Tskhinvali to 
fall. The Tbilisi authorities closed down the wholesale market in Ergneti, in 
South Ossetia, that used to be a huge legalized loophole for smugglers be-
tween Russia and Georgia, thus hoping to sever the economic base of the 
Tskhinvali regime. At the same Tbilisi started a “humanitarian offensive” 
through a set of measures aimed at winning over the people of South Os-
setia. The effort was backed up by a demonstration of force aimed at intimi-
dating the separatist government by formally moving some troops into the 
region under the terms of the 1993 ceasefire. However, the effect was con-
trary to that planned since Ossetians consolidated behind the separatist gov-
ernment, while Georgian military manoeuvres soon led to armed skirmishes 
and human casualties. The Georgian government withdrew its forces after 
the failure of its strategy became obvious and so avoided a full-scale war. 
However, in contrast to the triumph in Achara, the episode of South Ossetia 
turned out to be an overall setback for the Georgian government.12
Thus, the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain the 
main challenges to state- and nation-building in Georgia. Neither the Geor-
gian authorities nor the international community have a clear strategy for 
solving this problem.
The government is trying to move Georgia’s unresolved conflicts to the 
forefront of international attention, insisting that the issue cannot be 
postponed indefinitely 
Although the international community insists that only peaceful means 
should be applied, nobody knows how long peaceful diplomacy may take 
until the issue is resolved, if ever. While accepting that only peaceful means 
are to be used, the Georgian government does not permanently rule out a 
military option. Its strategy seems to be to move Georgia’s unresolved con-
flicts to the forefront of international attention and to force the internaltional 
community to realize that the issue cannot be postponed indefinitely. In 
January 2005, the government presented its peace plan on South Ossetia and 
won international approval at the OSCE year-end conference in Ljubljana in 
December 2005. Observers highlighted the fact that the Georgian peace plan 
received Russia’s endorsement, Russia being the key-player in resolving 
these conflicts. Georgia’s and Russia’s approaches to the issues of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia had been often at odds. This endorsement thus represents 
a small diplomatic breakthrough for Georgia, although there is a great dis-
tance between this and actual change on the ground. 
Increasing state effectiveness was the second major task prioritized by the 
new government. This implies that the government is able to manage state 
bureaucracy and to provide public goods. The first obvious step was that of 
paying adequate salaries to state employees. In Shevardnadze’s time, even 
                                                          
12 For the most comprehensive account of the summer 2004 crisis in South Ossetia see 
Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia, International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 
159, Tbilisi-Brussels, November 2004.
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ministers got salaries that were barely above the living wage, while the vast 
majority worked for a wage on which they theoretically could not survive. 
That implied that those holding government positions were expected to use 
them for getting their livelihoods themselves: by taking bribes, by taking 
their cuts for protecting businesses, etc. Therefore, the government’s first 
step was to start raising salaries for public employees. The increase had to be 
substantial to make any real difference (in fact, even a one hundred per cent 
increase would not change a great deal), and obviously this could not be done 
for everybody. A Reform and Development fund was created in 2004 to pay 
salaries to several thousand top government officials. It was funded by inter-
national donors and Georgian businesses. Later, similar funds were also 
created to support reforms in the fields of defence and law enforcement.  
These measures were quite controversial, as huge differences in salaries 
could not be called fair, and government spending through such extra-
budgetary funds bypassed normal monitoring procedures. However, the 
measures did at least create a category of government employees who could 
rely on government salaries for their subsistence. They mainly comprised 
the top layer of civil servants, as well as army and law enforcement officers. 
This allowed the government to attract qualified young people into the civil 
service, many of whom had previously worked abroad, for international or-
ganizations, NGOs or in the private sector.
The new government is especially proud of substantial increases in public 
revenues and salaries of public servants and of investments in public in-
frastructure 
The failure of governments to collect public revenues has been an especially 
notorious indicator of state weakness in Georgia. According to different es-
timates, up to seventy per cent of the Georgian economy can be considered a 
“shadow” economy, and until recently, governments have collected only 
around ten per cent of the GDP in public revenue, the lowest level even in 
the former Soviet Union. Even very modest budget targets were never met, 
and at the end of every year the government, under pressure from the IMF, 
was forced to cut its budget. It is particularly in the fiscal area where the new 
government is now claiming its greatests achievements, since during the 
short time tax collection has increased dramatically.13
The sharply increased budget allowed the state to do things it could not 
previously afford to do. Apart from increasing the salaries of public servants, 
it also invested in public infrastructure. Road repair, repainting the façades 
of buildings and the reintroduction of free medical emergency services are 
achievements the new government is especially proud of. 
                                                          
13 In 2003, actual budget revenues constituted 932 million lari; in 2005, they constituted 
3.26 billion lari. – Galt and Taggart Securities, Georgia Weekly Stock Market Commen-
tary, 26 January, 2004 and 23 January, 2006.  
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The balance between the executive and legislative powers in Georgia 
The relations between the political institutions of the new Georgian state are 
determined by the 1995 Constitution amended in February 2004. The Presi-
dent is elected by direct popular vote for a five-year term, while Parliament is 
directly elected for a four-year term. The President appoints a Prime Minister 
who then appoints the Government members (Ministers) with the President’s 
consent. Ministers of Internal Affairs and Defence are appointed by the Presi-
dent directly. The Government (the Cabinet of Ministers) needs to obtain the 
support of Parliament. However, if the Government fails to obtain Parlia-
ment’s support three times, the President can appoint the Prime Minister 
without this support. In such a case, and in the event that Parliament rejects 
the budget proposed by the Government three times, he/she shall dissolve 
Parliament and schedule extraordinary elections. The President also enjoys 
the unrestricted power to dissolve the Government. Before February 2004, 
there was no institution of Prime Minister and Government, and the Presi-
dent did not have the powers to dissolve Parliament.  
The current system is defined as semi-presidential, but some experts also 
call it super-presidential, because it gives rather extended powers to the Presi-
dent. Its supporters consider it to be the first step in a gradual transition to a 
more European system where the Cabinet is separate from the President, and 
Parliament has a greater role in shaping it. They also consider the extended 
powers of the President necessary for a transitional period when speedy re-
forms are needed. The opponents are concerned with a weakening of Parlia-
ment and excessive concentration of power in the executive. Such systems are 
usually not conducive to the development of political parties because the par-
ties are removed from the centre of power, which is concentrated in the per-
son of the President. International organizations such as the Council of 
Europe have urged Georgia to further revise the Constitution in order to 
achieve greater balance between the executive and legislative powers. 
The fight against corruption and organized crime is another priority of the 
new government. This is an important part of the agenda of streamlining the 
Georgian state, as uncontrolled corruption and the power of the organized 
crime have been reasons to see Georgia as a “Mafia-dominated state.” To 
fight corruption, the government has relied on the law-enforcement agencies 
to break the “syndrome of impunity”, and has undertaken structural reforms 
aimed at preventing corrupt practices. One of the government’s first steps 
after coming to power was to introduce new legislation to facilitate the 
speedy and effective prosecution of corruption cases. This included plea bar-
gaining that allowed suspects to be released after pleading guilty, providing 
useful information to the prosecution, and re-paying embezzled sums to the 
state. This procedure was applied to a number of high-ranking officials of the 
Shevardnadze regime who were arrested on corruption charges and were 
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soon released after having paid hefty sums to the treasury. This practice, 
however, has invited widespread criticism, including that of the Council of 
Europe,14 for giving too much arbitrary power to the prosecution and not 
following the norms of due process. The most salient arrests were made 
early in 2004; later, those arrested and prosecuted on corruption charges 
were mostly middle-level public officials.  
A number of structural reforms targeting corruption have also been un-
dertaken. In July 2004, the notoriously corrupt traffic police were disbanded 
altogether and replaced by a new patrol police that became much more popu-
lar. The government also simplified procedures for property registration in 
both tax and customs offices. In the summer of 2005, the first national ma-
triculation exams were organized by the Ministry of Education and Science. 
The grades achieved in these exams became the only basis for being admit-
ted to Georgian universities. While university admissions used to be ex-
tremely corrupt, these entrance exams are nowadays widely recognized as 
fair. In some areas where the government did not believe it had resources to 
eradicate corrupt practices, it made bold but controversial decisions to annul 
some government functions altogether. For instance, the government sus-
pended the mandatory technical inspection of all cars.  
The government believes that it has been successful in breaking the pat-
tern of systemic corruption in major public agencies 
The government believes that it has been successful in breaking the pattern 
of systemic corruption in major public agencies. It is too early to judge how 
deep these changes are and how sustainable they are likely to be in the long 
run. International monitoring bodies such as Transparency International 
still consider Georgia among the most highly corrupt countries. Many pro-
cedures continue to be insufficiently transparent, most notably in procure-
ment. Many important decisions are spontaneously made and hastily im-
plemented, and are then justified as necessary in order to increase efficiency. 
The new government also considers breaking networks of organized 
crime to be its priority and claims it has made some achievements in this 
area. However, it was in late 2005 that this issue was moved to the forefront 
of the government agenda. The President signed new legislation against 
organized crime which among other things has criminalized belonging to 
organized criminal networks, and a new campaign was started against the 
domination of organized crime in the penitentiary system.
                                                          
14 Honouring of obligations and commitments by Georgia, Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe, Resolution 1415 (2005). 
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Further challenges 
Although most independent observers recognize that the new government is 
responsible for some notable achievements in making the Georgian state 
work, there remain many further challenges. Government actions often in-
vite criticism as well. The unresolved issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
are still the main strategic impediments to normalizing the Georgian state. 
Here the Government faces an important dilemma because, although the 
Georgian government has pledged to use only peaceful means to resolve 
conflicts, its reliance only on the long-term efforts of quiet diplomacy and 
confidence-building may once again relegate the problem to the periphery of 
the international agenda as another “frozen conflict”, and the status quo may 
continue ad infinitum as in other similar areas of the world. The govern-
ment’s insistence that the conflicts should be resolved within a few years (in 
the South Ossetian case, a one-year time frame is usually given) appears to 
be aimed at instilling a new sense of dynamism and urgency to solving the 
problem.
In the area of strengthening government institutions, it is recognized that 
a sharp increase in public revenues may not continue and that greater stress 
should be now laid on increasing the efficiency of state institutions. The 
development of well-paid, professional public services is crucial in this area. 
In 2004 the government was accused of acting in a “revolutionary mode”, 
which included, among other things, frequent reshuffles of government 
officials and periodic drastic staff overhauls in public agencies. Many key 
political figures changed three or four top government positions within the 
first year and a half. Critics also noted that the government relied on well-
meaning but spontaneous decisions rather than on a well-designed strategy. 
The situation started to improve in 2005 and, as noted by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), “The post-revolutionary eupho-
ria has given way to more pragmatism; the hasty, sometimes even chaotic 
initial approach to reforms is very gradually being replaced by a clearer focus 
on priorities and by a better-defined strategy.”15
In 2005, the government took some steps towards formulating strategy, 
having adopted such documents as the “Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action 
Plan”, and the “National Security Concept.” The office of the Minister of 
State, Kakha Bendukidze, prepared its own plan for the reform of public 
institutions. However, the shortage of qualified personnel is a serious prob-
lem impeding the development of the civil service. 
Building Democracy 
When the new Georgian government is criticized, the most frequent area of 
criticism is democracy. This may seem paradoxical as the ethos of the Rose 
                                                          
15 Implementation of Resolution 1415 (2005) on the honouring of obligations and 
commitments by Georgia, Resolution 1477 (2006) of PACE. 
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Revolution was apparently democratic, and the new government includes 
many figures that first became known to the public as pro-democracy and 
human rights activists. Some people joke that if the period of Shevard-
nadze’s rule was characterized as “democracy without democrats”, now 
Georgia has arrived at a period of “democrats without democracy.” However, 
there may also be some logic to this paradox. Having embarked on an 
agenda of speedy reforms in order to preserve its momentum for change, the 
government tried to concentrate decision-making within the small circle of 
like-minded individuals. But this did not benefit the development of an in-
clusive decision-making process based on deliberation and striking a balance 
between different societal groups and their interests.
This does not mean that the new government has nothing to boast of in 
the area of democracy and human rights. Presidential and parliamentary 
elections in 2004 (and later by-elections), while not perfect, constituted a 
significant improvement compared to previous elections: the OSCE-ODIHR 
described them as “the most democratic since independence.”16 In 2005 the 
new media law was adopted, which decriminalized defamation and has 
made it much more difficult to sue journalists. State-run TV and radio were 
turned into a public service. Violence against religious minorities was 
stopped. Important new legislation was also adopted by local governments. 
However, there are also important challenges in the area of democracy-
building that some commentators feel may even outweigh the achievements.  
The weakest point of the nascent Georgian democracy is the lack of bal-
ance between different government branches and societal institutions. Some 
of this imbalance may be blamed on specific decisions taken by the current 
government, but most of these problems are structural in their nature. In 
February 2004, one of the first steps of the new government was to push 
through Parliament amendments to the Georgian constitution that substan-
tially strengthened presidential powers vis-à-vis Parliament (see box p. 25).  
The weakest point of the nascent Georgian democracy is the imbalance 
between different government branches and societal institutions 
Georgia has never had a strong independent judiciary system, but it is widely 
believed that, under the new government, there is increased executive pres-
sure on the courts who rarely dare to seriously displease the prosecution. 
Measures taken against allegedly corrupt officials from the previous gov-
ernment are often said to constitute “revolutionary justice” rather than the 
application of the due process of law. The government retorts that the exist-
ing court system is very poor and, precisely in order to change this, it has to 
take energetic measures that opponents portray as pressure against the 
courts. Both sides recognize, however, that the court system in Georgia is 
                                                          
16 Georgia: Partial Repeat Parliamentary Elections 28 March 2004, OSCE/ODIHR Elec-
tion Observation Mission Report, Part 2, Warsaw, 23 June 2004.  
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grossly inadequate for a democratic country and it may be the single weakest 
point of Georgian democracy.  
The absence of viable local governments is another glaring imbalance. In 
late 2005, a new law on local governments was adopted, and local elections 
are expected in the autumn of 2006. The law instituted the single level of 
local government in Georgia, which is the rayon (district). The government 
believes the rayon can be a viable unit of local government, but the new legis-
lation is often criticized for not leaving local governments enough resources 
to create viable institutions.
The weak position of the opposition constitutes another grave concern. 
The post-revolution Parliament is dominated by a single party, and only one 
opposition party managed to overcome the seven per cent threshold in the 
2004 elections. The United National Movement effectively controls more 
than two thirds of the Parliament vote, which allows it unilaterally to change 
the Georgian constitution at will. The opposition continues to be rather weak 
even two years after the Revolution. During parliamentary by-elections in 
October 2005, all five seats still went to the UNM, although there were no 
complaints about the unfairness of the vote tabulation.  
Problems experienced by the media are another matter of concern. These 
include both the genuine independence of the media and its competence 
and professional standards. After the Rose Revolution, two important TV 
networks (Rustavi-2 and Mze) changed ownership, with people close to the 
new government becoming their new owners. In January 2006, ownership of 
both networks was concentrated in a single individual. Some political talk-
shows that gave the floor to opponents of the government were taken off the 
air, allegedly under hidden government pressure. Typically, the independent 
media in Georgia are not a lucrative business and their owners are said to 
subsidize them from the revenues from other businesses. Therefore, estab-
lishing and keeping media outlets may be motivated by the pursuit of some 
other political or economic agenda. In January 2005, the Council of Europe 
considered “a self-censored media” to be an important area of concern in 
Georgia.17 In January 2006, it noted that “The media are financially weak and 
still lack the democratic culture which would allow them to credibly perform 
their role of democratic watchdog.”18
This is not to say that the Georgian media, including major TV networks, 
do not criticize the government or give time to its opponents. The Georgian 
media legislation is rather liberal. However, the quality of public debate on 
Georgian TV is rather low, and what Georgian TV viewers usually see are 
personal attacks rather than discussions on public policies. Georgian media 
have yet to grow economically and professionally enough to develop into a 
strong and sustainable pillar of democracy.  
                                                          
17 Honouring of obligations and commitments by Georgia, Resolution 1415 (2005) of 
PACE.
18 Implementation of Resolution 1415 (2005) on the honouring of obligations and com-
mitments by Georgia, Resolution 1477 (2006) of PACE. 
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Civil society institutions experienced a relatively high level of development 
before the Rose Revolution, this widely considered as one of the reasons why 
the revolution was successful. However, once Georgia got a popular and 
active government, civil society started to look less robust than it had before. 
While civil society organizations in Georgia have developed important organ-
izational capacity and expertise, they are still largely confined to a narrow 
social circle of young urban elites. There are almost no broad membership-
based organizations, and the existing organizations mainly depend on for-
eign donor assistance. Civil society organizations are active in public debate, 
but they have yet to develop the capacity to become an independent societal 
actor.
The main question about Georgia’s democratic development is whether 
or not the change of power in November 2003 was a “revolution to end all 
revolutions”, leading to the creation of a consolidated system of democratic 
institutions that allows routine constitutional transfers of power. From a 
more sceptical point of view, the Rose Revolution could be seen as just start-
ing a new political cycle, whereby an unpopular government is ousted 
through mass public protest and a new one creates a dominant party that – 
like its predecessor – gets amalgamated with state agencies, while a weak 
and marginalized opposition merely criticizes the government but does not 
propose a viable alternative. The latter scenario suggests the threat that po-
litical competition again will spill out of the constitutional framework, and 
change of government will only become possible by means of a revolution, 
coup, or other violent event.  
In consolidated democracies, the main actors in competition for power 
are political parties. The development of stable democracy in Georgia is 
hardly conceivable unless a system of viable and sustainable political parties 
develops. Political parties are organizations that represent the multiplicity of 
social interests and approaches to different issues of public policy, but allow 
conflicts among them to be channelled into an orderly and constructive 
process.
Political parties, however, can only develop in a certain environment. The 
state has to create the legal and institutional grounds on which the parties 
function, but parties should also be rooted in the diversity of societal groups 
and interests. In the next two chapters, the legal and social environment in 
which Georgian political parties function will be discussed.  
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Main findings 
? Georgian society has demonstrated its commitment to democratic val-
ues and a firm resolution not to tolerate autocratic rule; however, sev-
eral attempts at democratic transitions have yet to lead to the creation of 
a system of consolidated democratic institutions; 
? Since independence, Georgia has been haunted by the weakness of 
state institutions and political instability; 
? The existence of unresolved territorial conflicts constitutes the major 
impediment to Georgia’s state -and nation-building; 
? The Rose Revolution has brought some notable successes, especially 
with regard to strengthening state institutions, but fundamental struc-
tural challenges still have to be addressed.  

33
1.2 Putting Georgia on the Map: The Inter-
national Dimension and Impact 
Georgia is a neighbour of Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey, and 
has access to the Black Sea. Together with Azerbaijan and Armenia, it 
forms the small region of the South Caucasus, but it is often seen as part 
of larger regions such as the former Soviet Union, the Black Sea area, 
wider Europe, and the wider Middle East. Georgia is a member of the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, former 
CSCE, 1992), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC, 
1992), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, 1993), the Council 
of Europe (1999), and the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2000). In 
2004, it was included in the European Neighbourhood Policy of the Euro-
pean Union and launched an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) 
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
The general direction of Georgia’s foreign policies  
As for every small and vulnerable country, finding its place in the web of 
international relations is especially important for Georgia. On the level of 
public discussions, the dilemma of Georgian foreign policy is often under-
stood as that between being “with Russia” or “with the West.” This is, of 
course, a simplification; in fact, Georgia needs good relations with countries 
of the region as well as with major international organizations and the pow-
erful states that define the direction of international politics. However, the 
South Caucasus is often seen by international analysts as an arena of inter-
national competition for influence in which Russia on the one hand and the 
leading Western countries on the other have emerged as the main actors. 
Two of Georgia’s main neighbours – Armenia and Azerbaijan – have been 
involved in a protracted conflict over Nagorny Karabakh. On the whole, 
Georgian foreign policy has developed in a contentious environment.  
Despite internal political conflicts and deep differences between govern-
ments, the general direction of Georgia’s foreign policy has been fairly stable 
since independence. Zviad Gamsakhurdia did not have time to develop 
genuine international policies since he was deposed before Georgia gained 
international recognition. For the governments of both Eduard Shevard-
nadze and Mikheil Saakashvili, the first priorities on the international scene 
were to attract the political and economic support of the United States and 
Europe and to cooperate with the major international institutions, most no-
tably NATO and the European Union, with membership in them as the ul-
timate goal. Different governments, as well as the Georgian political elite in 
general, have regarded joining Western institutions as the ultimate guaran-
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tee of their security and development. But this is also a matter of identity 
because Georgians consider themselves to be a European nation and want to 
be recognized as such.  
Despite internal political conflicts, the general direction of Georgia’s for-
eign policy has been fairly stable since independence 
On the other hand, having good neighbour relations with Russia, as well as 
with other countries of the region, is also extremely important. Russia is 
Georgia’s main economic partner, and without these economic contacts 
prospects for economic development would be seriously challenged. Russia’s 
policies are also extremely important for solving internal conflicts in Geor-
gia, such as the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Eduard Shevardnadze was successful in attracting international political 
and economic assistance to Georgia. Under his leadership, Georgia became 
one of the top recipients of US aid per capita in the world. Due to his role in 
the unification of Germany, Shevardnadze’s Georgia also enjoyed an espe-
cially good relationship with that country.  
There were also important EU programmes implemented in the country, 
such as ECHO humanitarian assistance, the Food Security Programme and 
the Tacis National Programme. Total EU assistance in the period 1992-2003 
amounted to about €370m.19 One of the most notable projects initiated by 
the European Commission in 1993 was the TRACECA (Transport Corridor 
Europe Caucasus Asia) programme which aimed at developing transport 
infrastructure in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Within this pro-
gramme, technical assistance projects and investments for the rehabilitation 
of infrastructure have been funded and are now being implemented.  
The most important international economic project carried out in Geor-
gia, with the strong political support of the US Government, was the con-
struction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (the Georgian part was 
completed in 2005) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline (to be com-
pleted in 2006). These projects have not only brought large foreign invest-
ments to Georgia but have also created a stake in Georgia’s security for ma-
jor international players, especially the United States, and have increased 
energy security for Georgia.  
In April 1999, Georgia was admitted to the Council of Europe, which was 
considered by Georgian society as an important recognition of the country’s 
European orientation. Zurab Zhvania’s dictum of the time, “I am Georgian, 
therefore I am a European”, became a catchphrase to express Georgia’s Euro-
enthusiasm. While Shevardnadze’s government gradually developed its co-
operation with NATO, it was only in November 2002 that Georgia formally 
announced its bid to join the alliance. As for EU membership, Georgia un-
der Shevardnadze never made a formal bid to join.  
                                                          
19 See EU Relations with Georgia: Overview, 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/georgia/intro/> accessed 7 February, 
2006.
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Eduard Shevardnadze was successful in attracting international political 
and economic assistance to Georgia 
The context of the “War on Terror” gave a new, military dimension to Geor-
gia’s cooperation with the United States. The US Government became con-
cerned that Pankisi Gorge was going to become a safe haven for Islamic 
terrorist cells affiliated to Al Qaeda. Against this backdrop, in April 2002, the 
US Government started a $ 64 million Georgia Train and Equip programme, 
which included training the Georgian military.  
In the mid-1990s Georgia was considered one of the front-runners in 
democratic reforms in the post-Soviet space, and Shevardnadze had an in-
ternational reputation as a leader who was gradually building up democratic 
institutions. This, in addition to interests related to the oil pipeline, was 
probably the main reason behind the high level of political support and fi-
nancial assistance that Georgia was receiving. In the last years of Shevard-
nadze’s rule, however, foreign donors gradually became disillusioned with 
Georgia, which was considered yet another weak and corrupt state where 
most international assistance was misappropriated.  
Despite this, Shevardnadze left behind a legacy of a fairly high level of 
support from and cooperation with major Western countries and organiza-
tions. His record of relations with Russia was less successful. In fact, Geor-
gia may have the poorest relations with Russia of all the former Soviet coun-
tries. It was the last country to join the CIS, in the autumn of 1993, after its 
defeat in Abkhazia, and this was widely believed to have happened under 
pressure from Russia. Subsequently, the Georgian government announced 
its policy of a “strategic partnership” with Russia. In practice, this meant that 
Georgia recognized Russia as the sole peace-keeping force in Abkhazia (Rus-
sian peace-keepers formally have a CIS mandate), and it signed an agree-
ment legitimizing Russian military bases in Georgia (which nonetheless was 
never ratified by Parliament). In return, Georgia expected a vast resolution of 
the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts under Russian brokerage. As the 
latter failed to materialize, Georgia started to give priority to its relations with 
the West, which did not please the Russian political elite.  
Since then, Georgian-Russian relations have tended to get worse rather 
than better. Russian politicians often disapprove of what they see as Geor-
gia’s excessively “pro-Western” policies, and accuse the Georgian govern-
ment of unfair “anti-Russian” rhetoric. Georgia, on the other hand, blames 
Russia for supporting separatist regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The 
bilateral relations reached their nadir after Russia accused Georgia of har-
bouring Chechen terrorists in Pankisi Gorge. In 2002 the two countries were 
on the verge of a military conflict, and Russia even bombed Pankisi Gorge.20
                                                          
20 See on this Jaba Devdariani, “Georgia and Russia: the Troubled Road to Accommoda-
tion”, and Oksana Antonenko, “Frozen Uncertainty: Russia and the Conflict over 
Abkhazia”, in Bruno Coppieters and Robert Legvold, Eds., Statehood and Security: Geor-
gia after the Rose Revolution, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. – London, England, 
2005, pp. 153-271. 
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Drive to Europe: Repositioning Georgia’s regional identity after the 
Rose Revolution 
The new government that came to power after the Rose Revolution aug-
mented Georgia’s efforts to join Europe and the Euro-Atlantic space. In this 
area, the differences between the new leaders and their predecessors may be 
best described by saying that the former are more straightforward in formu-
lating their foreign policy goals, they push for them more aggressively and 
they are more willing to recognize that the likelihood of achieving foreign 
policy goals is linked to internal reforms.  
The new government clearly set membership of NATO and the European 
Union as its strategic foreign policy goal. The highlighting of Georgia’s 
European orientation has become a central feature of President Saakashvili’s 
frequent visits to the West. Starting from the presidential inauguration 
ceremonies in January 2004, the EU and Georgian flags have been consis-
tently displayed side by side on all official public occasions in Georgia. The 
new government can claim some important achievements in relations with 
both the EU and NATO. In May 2004, the General Affairs Council of the EU 
reversed its previous decision and included three countries of the South 
Caucasus in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The very fact of the 
Rose Revolution and the active diplomacy of the new Georgian leaders are 
believed to be at least in part responsible for that decision. The new Action 
Plan that will put Georgia’s relations with the EU on a new footing is ex-
pected to be adopted in 2006. An Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) 
with NATO was approved in October 2004.  
After the Rose Revolution, the new government augmented Georgia’s 
efforts to join the EU and NATO 
However, enthusiasm about joining the EU has abated over time. The main 
reason is that Georgia’s aspirations have been dampened by Brussels. While 
Georgia considered inclusion in the ENP as offering the possibility of mem-
bership in the EU, Brussels considers this framework as a polite way of de-
clining the bid for membership. Frequent visits to Brussels have shown 
Georgian politicians that the fatigue and trauma caused by the unravelling of 
the European Constitution Project have made the prospect of Georgian 
membership in the EU more distant.  
On the other hand, enthusiasm for NATO is growing. The Georgian gov-
ernment hopes that it can start a Membership Action Plan (MAP) with 
NATO after the IPAP has been implemented in 2006 and that it will be in-
vited to join NATO as early as 2008. NATO does not encourage predictions 
containing specific dates, but the prospect of membership looks much more 
realistic than it did a few years ago. In that sense, Georgia could follow the 
same path of integration followed by other European countries, first becom-
ing a member of the security alliance and afterwards of the EU. 
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Other foreign policy activities are linked to this goal. Georgia is looking for 
allies mainly in the context of getting support for its European and Euro-
Atlantic aspirations. The National Security Concept of Georgia, adopted in 
the summer of 2005, defined three countries as Georgia’s “strategic part-
ners”: the United States, Ukraine and Turkey. While the EU is relatively 
passive in the region, Georgia considers the United States as the main guar-
antor of its security. Georgia is an active participant in the US-led military 
operation in Iraq, where it has a fairly large military detachment (850 sol-
diers,) making Georgia one of the most significant contributors to the coali-
tion forces in terms of a country's per capita troop deployment. Georgia was 
also included at the last moment in the US Millennium Challenge pro-
gramme, which was a symbolic expression of goodwill towards Georgia on 
the part of the US government. Under the programme, Georgia will receive 
US assistance amounting to $295 million to implement programmes in the 
development of infrastructure, support of small business and other activities 
aimed at reducing poverty in Georgia.
Georgia hopes to be invited to join NATO in 2008 
Special links with Ukraine and Turkey may in part be explained as the at-
tempt by the new Georgian government to reposition Georgia in terms of the 
region to which it belongs. One of the reasons why Georgia’s European am-
bitions are often shunned is that Georgia is considered part of the South 
Caucasus, a region which is usually associated with conflict and disorder. 
While Georgia cannot and does not wish to deny its Caucasian identity, it 
does want to broaden the definition of the region to which it belongs and 
within which it can play an active role. In different international fora, Geor-
gia promotes the concept of the Black Sea region; on the other hand, it in-
creasingly wants to be seen within the context of an even broader region that 
includes countries between the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Caspian.  
Especially close relations with Ukraine are essential to this, and their de-
velopment may be the most striking new feature of President Saakashvili’s 
government in the foreign policy sphere. The Georgian government cele-
brated the Orange Revolution in Ukraine as if it were its own success. The 
Ukrainian revolution was broadly considered part of a new tide of popular 
uprisings for democracy in the post-Soviet space, and Georgia thus acquired 
the informal status of a country that initiated a new stage of democratization 
in the former Soviet Union. This is very important for the international im-
age of Georgia and something the new government wants to capitalize on. A 
link to Ukraine is also important because Ukraine is more often considered 
as a prospective candidate for EU membership than is Georgia.  
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Georgia’s National Security Concept 
In the summer of 2005, the Georgian government adopted a National 
Security Concept that for the first time defined the main guidelines for 
Georgia’s foreign and security policy. It described Georgia as “an integral 
part of the European political, economic and cultural area” and affirmed 
its determination “to return to its European tradition.” This will be 
achieved through “full-fledged integration into the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU)”, contributing “to the 
security of the Black Sea region as a constituent part of the Euro-Atlantic 
security system.” The concept listed independence, freedom, democracy 
and the rule of law, prosperity, peace and security as “fundamental na-
tional values.”
The concept incorporated into the main directions of Georgia’s security 
policy the strengthening of public administration and consolidating of 
democratic institutions, the strengthening of state defence, the restoration 
of the territorial integrity of Georgia, and Georgia’s integration into NATO 
and the EU. In pursuing these goals, the Concept described the United 
States, Ukraine and Turkey as “strategic partners” of Georgia, while Rus-
sia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are considered “partners.” 
On 12 August 2005 in Borjomi, Georgia, Presidents Mikheil Saakashvili of 
Georgia and Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine signed a declaration calling on 
the leaders of all countries within the Baltic-Black-Caspian Sea area who 
share their vision to create a Community of Democratic Choice (CDC). In 
November of the same year such an organization was launched at a summit 
meeting of nine Heads of State in Kiev.21 The CDC will focus on the promo-
tion of democratic values, regional stability, and economic prosperity. Being 
one of initiators of such an organization is another way for Georgia to un-
derscore its commitment to European values.  
Through this and other measures, Georgia is cultivating a group of 
friends within the EU and NATO. Relations with the three Baltic States, Po-
land, Romania and Bulgaria have been the most active in that context. In 
February 2005, these countries formally established a New Group of Friends 
of Georgia.22 Georgia expects lobbying for its admittance to the EU and 
NATO as the highest expression of this friendship.  
Turkey, on the other hand, is a very important partner for Georgia in the 
energy and military spheres. A bilateral energy partnership was sealed by the 
                                                          
21 Ukraine, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Moldova, Slovenia, and Mace-
donia joined the CDC. 
22 This group was called ‘new’ since a decade ago a Group of Friends of Georgia had 
already been created in order to help Georgia solve its separatist conflicts. It was com-
prised of the United States, Germany, Britain, and France, and Russia. 
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Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline projects. 
Probably even more important, Turkey has served for several years as a 
bridgehead to NATO as it implemented several programmes of military as-
sistance to Georgia.
Georgia does not see a conflict between its aspirations to join NATO and 
the EU and establishing good partnership relations with Russia. President 
Saakashvili has often reiterated that Georgia fully welcomes the participation 
of Russian business in the Georgian economy. In May 2005, the two coun-
tries reached an important decision to withdraw Russian bases in Georgia. 
This issue had been another stumbling block in bilateral relations for several 
years and resolving it was an important achievement for both countries. 
However, the unresolved Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts continue 
to challenge bilateral relations. Georgia understands that it needs much 
friendlier relations with Russia, but achieving significant progress with re-
gard to conflict settlement appears to be a necessary precondition for this.  
While Georgia increasingly seeks to broaden and “Westernize” its sense 
of regional belonging, presenting itself as a “Black Sea and South-Eastern 
European State,”23 it does not forget to give priority to relations with its im-
mediate neighbours in the South Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The 
latter was usually seen as the main partner in the energy projects already 
mentioned. Relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan are also crucial in 
the context of the integration of large Armenian and Azeri minorities within 
Georgia. The importance of economic contacts between the three countries 
is also obvious. However, while the conflict over Nagorny Karabakh remains 
unresolved and relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan remain as hostile 
as they are, the South Caucasus cannot really work as a region. Logically, for 
the time being Georgia will be looking for a larger and more comfortable 
region to fit into.
The Impact of International Actors  
Since independence, different Georgian leaders have given priority to secur-
ing international support for achieving their national policy goals. What has 
been the actual impact of the involvement of international actors? 
Measuring this impact is notoriously difficult. Those who prefer to ex-
plain politics in terms of conspiracy theories are tempted to see foreign pow-
ers behind all principal developments in a small and weak country like 
Georgia. Such simplistic speculations are easy to dismiss. But it is also obvi-
ous that had it not been for the activities of international players, Georgia 
would be a rather different place. Some major areas where the impact is 
easier to trace can be outlined here.  
The Rose Revolution is a good case. Quite a few observers are convinced 
that it was the United States government which was behind the regime 
change; according to this theory, Washington became disillusioned with the 
                                                          
23 National Security Concept of Georgia, 2005. 
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elderly and ineffective leader and facilitated his replacement by a younger, 
more dynamic US-educated lawyer.  
This view is hard to substantiate as there is no evidence in its favour. 
Western players, however, had an obvious indirect role in the success of the 
Rose Revolution. Their most important role was their decade-long support of 
civil society organizations and independent media in Georgia, both of whom 
were important in the events of November 2003. It is no wonder that many 
autocratic and semi-autocratic leaders of the CIS countries have started to 
become concerned over the role of international democracy-promoting foun-
dations in their countries.
The development of civil society institutions like the independent media 
and NGOs in Georgia is widely considered a success story when it comes to 
international assistance programmes. It is certainly the case that after they 
encountered a much more robust and active counterpart in the new Geor-
gian government, civil society institutions started to look much less formida-
ble than they had previously seemed. Still, by regional standards, Georgia 
looks promising in terms of the development of democratic institutions and 
civil society. This could hardly be the case without the involvement of inter-
national actors. 
The development of civil society institutions is widely considered a suc-
cess story of international assistance programmes in Georgia 
Cooperation with international organizations in the context of Georgia’s 
possible membership is probably the most productive in terms of influenc-
ing internal reforms. By insisting on its European orientation and aspiring to 
membership in prestigious international organizations, both the Georgian 
government and Georgian society voluntarily set themselves ambitious goals 
that serve as major benchmarks of their development. In the process of join-
ing the Council of Europe, Georgia carried out a number of important re-
forms that brought it closer to democratic standards and undertook an obli-
gation to take further steps in the same direction. Fulfilment of these obliga-
tions may take more time than initially planned, but they have set the coun-
try in the right direction.
Georgia’s bid to join NATO and the EU pushed it to set even more ambi-
tious goals with regard to internal reforms in different areas. Becoming a 
member of these organizations, or even closly cooperation with them, re-
quires fulfilment of specific action plans, such as IPAP and possibly MAP in 
the case of NATO. Action plans inherent in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy require specific actions from countries but also provide powerful “car-
rots” that motivate the country to implement often painful reforms.  
In the area of market reforms, cooperation with the International Mone-
tary Fund and the World Bank as well as the process of being accepted into 
the World Trade Organization have all played a similar role.  
Last but not least, the involvement of international actors is an important 
factor for maintaining regional peace and stability. The main conflicts in the 
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region, such as those in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh, 
occurred during the demise of the Soviet Union when security was uncer-
tain. Russia could not enforce regional security any longer, while the interna-
tional community was not yet on the scene. The persistence of “frozen con-
flicts” does not prove the international community’s ability to solve conflicts, 
but the influence of international actors is important in containing these 
conflicts and preventing them from returning to the “hot” stage. Political 
actors involved in the web of international relations and obligations are 
much less likely to take chances with attempts to use violent means for re-
solving conflicts.
Political parties and international policies 
As has been said, when it comes to issues of international orientation there 
is greater consensus than division between Georgian political parties. The 
period of 1993-94, when Georgia joined the Commonwealth of Independent 
States and declared Russia to be its principal strategic partner, was probably 
the only exception to this rule so far.  
At that time, a large part of the political elite around Eduard Shevard-
nadze believed that Georgia’s future lay in close cooperation with Russia, 
while the opposition of the time considered this view as a betrayal of Geor-
gia’s national interests and called for closer cooperation with the West. The 
government expected that orientation towards Russia would lead to a resolu-
tion of Georgia’s territorial conflicts and would bring economic prosperity. 
As these expectations were frustrated, Shevardnadze’s government gradually 
drifted towards orientation to the West. 
When it comes to issues of international orientation there is greater con-
sensus than division between Georgian political parties 
While there are political groups in Georgia who question the country’s stra-
tegic goal of integrating into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions and 
who call for orientation towards Russia, they have always been marginal and 
have never played a role of any importance in Georgian politics.
It is more typical in the Georgian political debate for the opposition par-
ties to criticize the government for not being consistent enough in its orien-
tation towards Western institutions and for making too many concessions 
towards Russia. Mutual allegations of a hidden pro-Russian agenda also 
abound. This was as true in Shevardnadze’s time as it is today. For instance, 
while the United National Movement initiated a move to demand the with-
drawal of Russian peacekeepers from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the oppo-
sition parties such as the New Conservatives, Conservatives and Republicans 
pushed for Georgia’s withdrawal from the CIS as well.  
In general, consensus on the main foreign policy issues exists among all 
relevant political parties. This is certainly a major factor of stability for the 
country.
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Main findings 
? International actors play a significant role in stimulating Georgian civil 
society and democratic institutions; 
? International attention to Georgia by European and transatlantic insti-
tutions has contributed to dimishing the chances of internal armed 
conflict;
? The foreign policy choices of different Georgian governments have 
been strongly focused on combining Western-oriented steps and good 
relations with neighbouring countries; 
? There is a general consensus among all relevant political parties on 
foreign policy issues and this is a major factor of stability for the coun-
try.
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1.3 Parties and the State 
The Georgian constitution on political parties 
Article 26 
2. Citizens of Georgia shall have the right to form a political party or other 
political association and participate in its activity in accordance with the 
Organic Law.  
3. The creation and activities of such public and political entities whose 
goal is to overthrow or change the constitutional order of Georgia by force, 
or violate the independence of the country or violate the country's territo-
rial integrity or advocate war and violence, or attempt to induce ethnic, 
racial, social and national unrest is impermissible. 
General provisions of political party legislation in Georgia  
In any country, laws on political parties serve several purposes, one of them 
being to provide legal guarantees for unimpeded political participation. The 
law must protect parties from pressure from the authorities and allow them 
to express their opinions and declare their interests freely. On the other 
hand, the law may need to limit the activities of political parties in order to 
protect democratic institutions and public peace in the country. International 
experience shows that organizations advocating the use of violence are capa-
ble of undermining the existing democratic political system and even of in-
ducing civil war. The Weimar Republic in Germany is the most famous ex-
ample of this phenomenon. This danger justifies imposing certain regula-
tions on political parties, even though such limitations may at first glance 
appear undemocratic.
The Georgian constitution tries to meet both these requirements. It guar-
antees the main civil and political rights and freedoms, including freedom of 
conscience, freedom of speech and the right to take part in political activity. 
Together with the right to form public associations of other kinds, Article 26 
of the Georgian constitution recognizes the right to form a political party and 
take part in its activities. It also defines possible reasons for banning a politi-
cal association. Constitutionally it is forbidden to create political associations 
that aim “to overthrow or change the constitutional order of Georgia by 
force, or violate the independence of the country or violate the country's ter-
ritorial integrity or advocate war and violence, or attempt to induce ethnic, 
racial, social and national unrest” (Article 26.3). However, the constitution 
also stipulates that even in these cases, the activities of a political party can 
be prohibited only by a decision of the Constitutional Court. 
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Georgian law recognizes the particular importance of parties to the de-
mocratic political system 
In Georgia, the legislation regards political parties as entities of public law. 
The Organic Law of Georgia on Political Associations of Citizens adopted in 
1997 spells out regulations for political parties in greater detail. The law de-
fines a political party as a “voluntary and independent association of citizens 
based on a common world outlook and an organizational structure that is 
registered in accordance with the rule established by this law and carries out 
its activities within the framework set by the Constitution of Georgia and 
other legislation.” According to the law, a party is a “necessary legal constitu-
ent part of a democratic society” which “takes part in expressing the citizens’ 
political will.” Thus Georgian law recognizes the particular importance of 
parties for a democratic political system.  
Organic Law of Georgia on Political Associations of Citizens  
The main points: 
? The political party is defined as a voluntary association of citizens based 
on a common worldview and organizational structure; 
? The party cannot be created or be active if it aims to overthrow or vio-
lently change existing constitutional authorities, undermines the inde-
pendence or territorial integrity of the country, propagates war or vio-
lence, breeds hatred on national, regional, religious or social grounds; 
? Creation of regionally based parties is not allowed; 
? Parties are registered by the Ministry of Justice. In order to be regis-
tered, they need to have at least 1,000 members and a party statute; 
? Once a party is registered, only the Constitutional Court of Georgia can 
prohibit its activities; 
? Representative party congresses should be held not less than once every 
four years. The party congress can adopt and amend the party pro-
gramme and statutes, and elect the governing bodies of the party. Some 
governing bodies are specified in the law; 
? Parties are entitled to certain financial and other kinds of support from 
the state (see box on p.47). At the same time, private financing is also 
allowed. This financing is restricted to 30,000 laris per year from a pri-
vate person and 50,000 per year from a legal entity.  
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The 1997 law also requires parties to conform to the following general prin-
ciples in their activities and organizational set-up: 
a) voluntary membership and termination; 
b) independence and self-governance; 
c) electivity and accountability; 
d) equality of parties before the law; 
e) transparency of establishment and activities of parties.
At the same time, the Organic Law does not always specify how each of these 
principles should be implemented. For instance, it does not define what 
“electivity and accountability” actually mean in practice. Therefore, the law 
allows for a great variety of types of internal party hierarchies in Georgia, 
including organizations where all party positions at all levels are filled 
through elections or those where leaders of local party organizations are 
appointed by their superiors. The law specifies the governing, executive and 
auditing bodies (the congress, board, commission, audit/inspection com-
mission) and describes the function of each of them. However, it allows for 
the existence of other entities within the party structures as well. The existing 
political parties usually adopt the organizational model prescribed by law 
without any modifications. 
There are some restrictions to membership in political parties. All Geor-
gian citizens can join political parties, while foreigners cannot. On the other 
hand, members of the armed forces and law enforcement bodies as well as 
judges and prosecutors are obliged to suspend their membership in political 
parties. Most democracies do not have such limitations on the political rights 
of such groups of state officials. In the Georgian context, the motivation for 
instituting such restrictions was probably a legacy of both Communist rule 
and the first period of independence. In the Soviet regime, the law enforce-
ment system was dominated by the Communist party and the concept of a 
politically neutral justice system hardly existed. On the other hand, in the 
period of the struggle for independence and the civil war, some parties de-
veloped militarized branches of their own. Therefore, the law-makers felt it 
was necessary to draw a hard and fast line between the army and law en-
forcement on the one hand and the realm of political competition on the 
other.
The law stipulates the conditions which have to be met to create and reg-
ister a party. These requirements are not overly complicated: in order to reg-
ister, parties need to have the signatures of at least a thousand members, 
organize a party conference with at least 300 participants and also submit a 
copy of the party charter and a notarized signature of the party leader to the 
Ministry of Justice.  
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Cases of denying registration to political parties 
In the recent history of Georgia, there have been only two parties to whom 
the Ministry of Justice has denied registration. The best-known is the case 
of Virk (old Armenian name for Georgia), which at some point changed its 
name to Zari (meaning “Bell” in Georgian) but later reverted to Virk. This 
organization is based in Javakheti, the region populated mainly by ethnic 
Armenians. It champions the idea of creating a special autonomous status 
for regions of Georgia with an ethnic Armenian population. It has been 
denied registration several times since 1998. Virk continues to act openly, 
but the fact that the party is not registered prevents it from taking part in 
local or national elections.  
Registration was denied based on the article of the law banning region-
ally based parties. However, Virk claimed that the organization had 
branches in different parts of the country and that it could therefore qual-
ify for registration. In 2001, the Ministry of Justice denied registration to 
Mkhedrioni. This was a successor to a powerful paramilitary group that 
played an important role in overthrowing the Government in 1992, but 
whose many members were later imprisoned for criminal activities. The 
Ministry argued that, although the organization's charter did not include 
any goals conflicting with Georgian law, the leaders of the organization 
were individuals who in the past had committed many crimes against the 
state and society. Accordingly, it was inadmissible to register such an or-
ganization as a political association.
The most important limitation on establishing political parties introduced by 
the Organic Law is stipulated in Article 6, which does not allow registration 
of parties that are established according to the regional or territorial princi-
ple, although it is unclear what precisely “territorial principle” in practice 
means. The main motivations for imposing this restriction are the experi-
ence with separatist movements in Georgia and a fear that new movements 
may emerge in other regions where ethnic minorities are concentrated.24
                                                          
24 See more on ethnic minority problems in the next chapter, Society and Citizenship, on 
p. 61. 
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State funding of political parties in Georgia 
In December 2005, the Georgian Parliament enacted amendments to the 
1997 Law on Political Associations of Citizens. The amendments defined 
the formula for calculating state assistance to political parties. Parties are 
now entitled to such assistance if they received more than four per cent of 
the vote in the last elections. Every year these parties will receive 2 laris for 
each voter for the first 200,000 votes they received, plus 1.5 laris per voter 
between 200,000 and 500,000 votes, and 1 lari per voter above 500,000 
votes.
This rule, while it corresponds to international democratic practice, 
was disadvantageous for those opposition parties that did not participate 
in the March 2004 elections independently but broke away from the Na-
tional Movement later (this includes the Conservative and Republican 
parties). After negotiations with the party in power, it was decided that the 
disadvantaged parties would receive their share from the funding intended 
for the National Movement proportionately to the number of MPs from 
these parties elected through the common party list. State funding will 
also be divided equally between those parties that created electoral blocs.  
Unlike some other countries, the law does not institute any limitations 
for the ways political parties spend funds provided by the state. 
In general, the Georgian legislation is considered liberal when it comes to 
the creation and functioning of political parties, and the parties themselves 
do not envisage serious problems in this area. The ban on regional and terri-
torial parties is the only important exception (see box above). However, there 
are a number of vague formulations in the law, such as the requirements of 
electivity and accountability or the prohibition of incitement to hatred be-
tween social groups, that may potentially be abused by the state if it decides 
to restrict the activities of certain parties.
State funding of political parties 
In a democratic country, the state guarantees political rights, such as the 
freedom for a political party to be set up and to function without state inter-
ference. However, many democratic countries go further and institute state 
support for major political parties. This is based on the recognition of the 
fact that robust political parties are necessary for the smooth operation of 
democratic institutions. In addition, the availability of public funding may 
protect political parties from overdependence on private interests.  
The Georgian state also provides financial support for political parties. 
However, this support was rather symbolic until recently and it did not play 
any important role in actual party financing. In Western European countries, 
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state support is more substantial and plays an important role in the institu-
tional development of parties (see table 3 on p. 49). 
According to the original version of the Law on Political Associations of 
Citizens, the state provided funding for all the parties which had won more 
than five per cent of the vote in the most recent parliamentary election. This 
funding extended to the whole period between elections. However, the law 
did not specify how the amount of party funding was to be determined. In 
practice, this legal provision has not been observed since it was adopted. The 
only exception has been the financing of the parliamentary groups in propor-
tion to the number of their members, but these sums were very small and 
play an insignificant role in party budgets.
The generally low level of public revenues in Georgia served as an excuse 
for this practice. Political parties did not find it expedient to press for state 
funding too strongly when the state was not even able to pay meagre retire-
ment pensions. As public revenues have grown considerably in the last two 
years, the issue of state financing for the political parties has again become a 
matter of debate.
In December 2005, following a series of discussions and negotiations 
with opposition parties, Parliament enacted a package of amendments to the 
election code and the law on political parties. It envisaged increased state 
financing for those parties that had received at least four per cent of the vote 
in the most recent parliamentary elections. This time the law defined a pre-
cise formula for calculating the amount of state funding for each party (see 
inbox).
When this law is enacted, the absolute volume of party funding received 
from the state will constitute a sizeable addition to the political party budg-
ets. However, it is also clear that such financing will not be sufficient for 
political parties to be able to cover the major expenses involved in maintain-
ing their organizational infrastructure or conducting election campaigns. 
Campaign expenditure 
Another more important part of Georgia’s election legislation refers to the 
transparency and accountability of party spending during elections. The elec-
tion code requires political parties to submit reports on their sources for 
financing electoral campaigns and on campaign spending, both within a 
month after elections. These reports are made public.  
The parties do not contest the need for such legislation nor do they de-
mand that it be amended. However, there are widespread doubts about the 
effectiveness of such legislation. It is widely believed that the parties report 
only a fraction of their actual campaign spending. Since, however, this is 
true both of the government and the opposition parties, it rarely becomes an 
issue in discussions between them. It is only the media and civil society that 
point to some inconsistencies or uncertainties in the financial reports of 
political parties. However, even these groups do not press the issue too far as 
it is believed that strict enforcement of rules regulating the transparency of 
49
party financing may in fact be disproportionately damaging to the opposition 
as private businesses may be reluctant to be seen openly subsidizing the 
opposition.
France Germany Netherlands United
Kingdom
Introduction 
direct funding 
and recipients 
1988
Party presiden-
tial and parlia-
mentary elec-
tions and candi-
dates
1959 National 
party organisa-
tion
1968 parliamen-
tary groups 
1964 Parliamen-
tary group 
1971
central party 
organisations 
1975
Parliamentary
opposition 
(none to na-
tional party 
organisations) 
Targeting General purpose 
and campaign-
ing 
General and 
campaign reim-
bursement 
Research and 
education
General 
Contribution
limit for private 
donations
Yes No, but with 
strict registra-
tion of identity 
of donors 
No Yes, anonymous 
gifts illegal 
Matching funds No 50 per cent No No
Interval Annual and 
election 
Annual and 
election 
Annual Annual
Audit require-
ment 
Annually to 
independent 
body
Annually to 
independent 
body both in-
come and ex-
penditures 
account
Annually to 
Ministry of 
Finance, only 
overall account 
of ancillary 
organisations 
Quarterly (or 
more frequent if 
requested) to 
Electoral Com-
mission of both 
party and ancil-
lary organisa-
tions
Basic Allocation 
Criteria 
Per seat, per 
vote and per 
candidate
Per vote and per 
seat, minimally 
0,5 % of 2nd 
votes
Basic amount 
plus per seat. 
Not to exceed 10 
% of salary 
expenditures 
and 30 % of all 
expenditures 
Per seat 
Introduction of 
indirect support 
and subsidies 
and recipients 
1988
billposting, 
mailing and 
telephone facili-
ties, (partly) free 
travel, free 
broadcasting,
and press access 
1983
billposting, 
broadcasting,
youth, foreign 
aid and educa-
tional organisa-
tions
1925 subsidy for 
media broadcast-
ing, billposting 
1972 research 
organisations 
1975 women and 
youth, educa-
tional organisa-
tions
1990 East Euro-
pean Assistance 
1975 broadcast-
ing, mailing and 
use of public 
halls
Table 3. State support for political parties in Western Europe 
Source: A. Krouwel: 1999. “The development of the catch all party. A study in arrested 
development. Phd Free University Amsterdam.  
The electoral system  
Electoral laws may be the single most important element in the legal envi-
ronment that influences the character of competition between political par-
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ties as well as their internal development. They also happen to be among the 
most contentious pieces of legislation in Georgia. Different political actors 
are continuously trying to change the electoral legislation to their advantage. 
But this is not strange. As Table 4 shows, state regulations in Western 
Europe are not uniform; rather, they differ substantially between countries, 
reproducing the political system and the correlation of power between the 
political parties in each country. 
Electoral laws are among the most contentious pieces of
legislation in Georgia 
With regard to elected bodies, Georgian citizens participate in three kinds of 
elections. These are presidential elections, parliamentary elections and local 
elections. In addition, residents of the autonomous region of Achara take 
part in regional elections. In other Georgian regions (“mkhare”) there are no 
elected assemblies. 
France Germany Netherlands United
Kingdom
Campaign 
finance from the 
state
Yes (Presidential 
elections) 
Yes No No
Restrictions on 
TV access 
Equal access Proportionate No Proportionate
Paid political 
ads on TV 
allowed 
No Yes, but regu-
lated 
Yes No
Free airtime to 
political parties 
Yes
4 minutes slots 
Yes
2,5 minutes slots 
Yes
7-8 minutes slots 
10 minutes slots 
Fair balance 
rules
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Leader debates 
televised
Yes Yes Yes No
Ban on publica-
tions of opinion 
polls prior to 
election 
No (abandoned 
in 1998) 
No No No
Spending limits Yes No No Yes
US consultants 
involved in 
recent cam-
paigns 
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 4. State regulations concerning political campaigning by political parties. Source: 
Norris 2002, Farrell and Webb 2000, quoted in A. Krouwel 2004. Partisan states. Legal 
regulation of political parties in France, Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom. 
Wolff Legal Publications, Nijmegen.  
The 1995 constitution made the president the most powerful political leader 
in the country. The president is elected by direct popular vote and is consid-
ered elected if he or she receives more than half of the votes cast. If none of 
the candidates receives the required number of votes, a run-off election is 
held in which the two strongest candidates take part, and the candidate who 
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receives more votes is declared the winner. Thus far, there has been no 
precedent for the second round in Georgian presidential elections.  
Presidential elections have never been particularly important for party 
politics since the competition here is among individuals. Moreover, in each 
presidential election there has been a clear frontrunner who was elected 
without serious competition. Parties are effectively sidelined from this proc-
ess.  
This leaves parliamentary elections as the main arena where political par-
ties in Georgia compete for votes. Local elections are also quite competitive, 
but the competences of local councils have been extremely limited; parties 
therefore consider local elections more as testing grounds in preparation for 
the more important parliamentary elections. Now that the new local gov-
ernment law was enacted by the Georgian Parliament in December 2005, the 
cost of winning local elections will probably increase, as the local councils 
will elect heads of rayon-level administrations (these officials were previously 
appointed by the president).
According to most political parties, there are several very important and 
controversial issues related to the electoral law. The first is the mode of elec-
tion: the majoritarian, or first-past-the-post system (FPP) as opposed to pro-
portional representation (PR); the second issue is the thresholds for political 
party lists in PR; and the third is the composition of the electoral commis-
sions.
The Georgian Parliament has 235 members, elected through a mixed vot-
ing system combining FPP and PR methods. Its 150 members are elected in 
a PR vote using nationwide party lists, and 85 members represent single-
mandate constituencies. The electoral law recognizes the parties and blocs of 
parties as key participants in the electoral process that can submit electoral 
lists, while representatives of parties and blocs as well as independents can 
run for the single-mandate seats.  
In November 2003, simultaneously with parliamentary elections, a refer-
endum was held on reducing the number of MPs in the Georgian Parlia-
ment. Based on its results, Parliament adopted amendments to the Georgian 
constitution. The number of MPs was reduced to 150, with 50 MPs elected 
by the majoritarian system and 100 through proportional representation. It is 
yet to be decided how the 50 majoritarian mandates will be divided between 
the Georgian regions. The next parliamentary elections, expected in 2008, 
will be held according to the new rules.  
While many details of the electoral legislation (the composition of elec-
toral administration, rules according to which proportional elections are 
held, etc.) are changed before each election, the mixed system of voting has 
been relatively stable. It was initially adopted for the first multiparty elections 
held in October 1990. As in other Eastern European countries, in Georgia the 
anti-Communist forces feared that, in a totally majoritarian system, the rul-
ing party would use the clientelistic networks that had taken shape over 
many years to win elections in individual localities and so form a majority in 
Parliament. The introduction of the mixed voting system in the elections 
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became possible through a compromise reached between the Communist 
Party and the opposition. Since then, it has been traditional to consider the 
proportional system of voting more democratic. Single-mandate constituen-
cies are often won by independent candidates who distance themselves from 
all political parties, but once in parliament, independent candidates are more 
likely to support the pro-government faction. This was true for all convoca-
tions of Parliament.
In 2005, Parliament, following the initiative of the United National 
Movement, enacted new legislation introducing multi-mandate FPP for the 
majoritarian part of Tbilisi City Council elections (other mandates for the 
City Council will be distributed by the PR system). The city is divided into 
several large electoral districts with a certain number of seats (three or four) 
allocated to each. Elections in these districts will be based on the winner-
takes-all principle: the party list that gets a plurality takes all the seats allo-
cated to the given district. The opposition strongly contested this system as 
they believed it was biased towards the government party. This will certainly 
be true as long as the opposition remains fragmented. The system will be 
tested in the local elections expected in the autumn of 2006.
An electoral threshold for political parties was introduced for the first 
time during the 1990 elections. The threshold was set at four per cent and its 
introduction aimed at admitting to Parliament only the strongest of the nu-
merous political organizations that were in existence at the time. Then as 
now it was widely recognized in Georgia that the political scene was too 
fragmented with more than 180 parties officially registered; therefore a 
threshold was needed to limit the chances of parliamentary representation of 
groups that were considered by many to be marginal. In the first election 
under these new rules, only the victorious Round Table-Free Georgia coali-
tion and the Communist Party cleared the threshold.  
The high threshold for political party lists is supposed to cut off marginal 
political players, but it also endangers fair representation and  
political pluralism
In the 1992 elections that followed the ousting of President Gamsakhurdia 
and fragmentation in the country, the electoral threshold was rejected alto-
gether as the aim was to keep all political groups in Parliament rather than 
on the streets. In later elections, however, the electoral threshold was pro-
gressively raised to five per cent in the 1995 constitution and to seven per 
cent before the 1999 elections. In 1995 and 1999, three parties cleared the 
threshold, in 2004 only two were successful. Indeed, the victorious coalition 
coming out of the Rose Revolution also refused to introduce changes, argu-
ing that a lower threshold was conducive to the proliferation of numerous 
small parties that would not be advantageous to developing a strong party 
system in Georgia. Before the 2004 elections, the OSCE-ODIHR and the 
Council of Europe recommended that Georgia reduce the threshold to at 
least five per cent since a high threshold created the risk of a parliament 
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without any opposition being elected.25 This recommendation was supported 
by the opposition parties. Since the elections were held in the aftermath of 
the Rose Revolution when the National Movement was extremely popular, 
there was a fear that no opposition party at all would be able to clear the 
threshold (in the end, the New Conservatives barely made it past seven per 
cent).
    
Threshold (%) Votes for parties 
over threshold (%)  
Unrepresented
voters (%) 
1990 4 83.6 16.4
1995 5 38.6 61.4
1999 7 74.0 26.0
2004 7 73.6 27.4
Table 5 
This, as well as the introduction of a winner-takes-all system in multi-
mandate districts, suggested that the current government is in favour of 
legislation that is advantageous only to strong parties. The party in power 
also proposes extending the same system (winner-takes-all in multi-mandate 
districts) to the majoritarian part of parliamentary elections to be held in 
2008. This could push the opposition parties into joining forces against the 
government party since a fragmented opposition will have no chance of suc-
ceeding under such legislation.  
Frequent changes of electoral thresholds and, more recently, the intro-
duction of multi-mandate districts demonstrate a tension that exists in the 
Georgian political system between the two imperatives, that of reducing par-
liamentary fragmentation and that of ensuring fair representation and politi-
cal pluralism. It is widely believed that the current system hampers fair po-
litical representation and democratic pluralism at the national level and en-
courages the system of single dominant parties. Table 5 shows that this sys-
tem results in a considerable number of voters not being represented in 
Parliament since they voted for parties that did not clear the threshold. How-
ever, there is still the fear of fragmentation, which could bring instability and 
reduce the effectiveness of Parliament. The 1992-95 Parliament, which was 
extremely fragmented since the parties were elected without any threshold,26
is also believed to have been especially chaotic and ineffective, although, it 
did adopt a constitution.  
                                                          
25 PACE (Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe), Functioning of Democratic 
Institutions in Georgia, Resolution 1363 (2004). 
26 Twenty-four parties and blocs were elected to Parliament, in addition to 60 independent 
candidates. 
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Administering elections 
Staffing the electoral commissions at different levels continues to be one of 
the most controversial issues. Until this year, the composition of the elec-
toral commissions was based either on the principle of party representation 
or on the mixture of party representation with notionally neutral civil ser-
vants; the latter, however, were presumed to be biased in favour of the gov-
ernment. This approach also goes back to the time of the first post-
Communist elections in 1990. With no experience of democratic elections, 
there were no institutions at that time that could be trusted with impartial 
election administration; having some kind of parity in electoral commissions 
between the government and the opposition therefore appeared to be the 
only acceptable solution.
However, the exact balance of power within the electoral commissions 
became the arena of intense party infighting in the run-up to each election. 
Since the government had the stronger bargaining position, it always man-
aged to get majorities in electoral commissions. As a result, faith in the elec-
toral process was at a very low ebb, and election tabulation, especially since 
1995, was widely believed to be massively fraudulent. Opposition parties and 
both the media and NGOs routinely accused the government of rigging elec-
tions on a mass scale. Assessments of international organizations were more 
cautious but increasingly critical. Commentators also spoke about behind-
the-scenes deals in electoral commissions struck between political parties; in 
this way at least some opposition parties derived their own benefits from 
electoral fraud. 
In April 2005, Parliament enacted amendments to the electoral code that 
abolished party representation in electoral commissions and declared that 
these commissions should be staffed by impartial civil servants selected by 
the President and Parliament on the basis of open competition. The failure 
of the electoral commission based on party representation to ensure clean 
elections was referred to as the main reason for this decision. This change 
provoked vigorous protests from the opposition, which called such electoral 
administration a “single-party” administration.  
In this case as well, Georgian legislators have to strike a delicate balance 
between two requirements: developing a professional and politically inde-
pendent electoral administration and ensuring that all political players have 
confidence in its impartiality. So far, the Georgian political elite have failed 
to arrive at a consensus on this extremely important issue.  
The Parties and their Relations with the State 
The current state of inter-party debate reflects the most contentious issues of 
state-party relations in Georgia. This analysis and that found in the next 
chapters of this book are mainly based on the meetings with party represen-
tatives held within this research project.  
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Attitudes to existing electoral legislation in Georgia differ radically between 
the party in power and the opposition parties. The latter firmly believe that 
the existing electoral laws, especially recent amendments to them, create 
unequal conditions favouring the party in power. The United National 
Movement, on the other hand, asserts that the whole point of recent changes 
in electoral legislation is to create conditions for conducting fair and orderly 
elections.
Staffing the electoral administrative commission 
The representatives of the opposition stress that members of the Central 
Electoral Commission are nominated for Parliament's approval by the Presi-
dent, who is at the same time the chairman of one of the political parties. 
This arouses the opposition’s suspicions that the new electoral administra-
tion will in fact defend the interests of the government and facilitate fraud. 
They believe that the previous rule for staffing the electoral administrative 
commission, under which parties appointed some of the commission mem-
bers, used to give the opposition a greater opportunity to safeguard their 
votes, thereby creating greater confidence in the fairness of the process. 
“This is a step backwards from the multiparty principle which had already 
established itself in Georgian politics.”27 The opposition has no theoretical 
objections to the principle of an electoral administration staffed by impartial 
public servants, but it does not believe it can work in present-day Georgia.  
The opposition believes that recent changes to the electoral legislation 
favour the party in power, while the latter insists the reforms were neces-
sary to ensure fair and orderly elections and effective government 
The United National Movement refers to the experience of past elections in 
justifying the reform that they initiated. It says that participation by parties in 
election administration did not prevent electoral fraud; on the contrary, the 
quality of elections deteriorated over time. The electoral commissions be-
came the arena for back-room deals between parties, whereas the ruling 
party could always have a majority within electoral commissions anyway. The 
UNM believes that impartial, civil-service-based electoral administration will 
create better chances for conducting free and fair elections.
High electoral threshold 
Opposition parties consider the seven per cent threshold for political party 
lists for the parliamentary elections to be too high. In their opinion, this 
threshold works to the ruling party's advantage. It was this rule that led to 
the total domination of Parliament by a single party. According to a repre-
sentative of the Republican Party, this “shifts the political centre of gravity 
                                                          
27 Conservative Party 
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towards the authorities, which substantially impedes the normal develop-
ment of multiparty democracy.” The opposition parties normally support 
lowering the threshold to four or five per cent. It should be noted that even 
this threshold would be considered too high in many European democracies. 
The ruling party representatives believe that a high threshold contributes 
to the creation of larger and more effective parties. At the same time, they 
say they do not have very strong opinions on the subject and concede it is 
open to debate. However, they believe that the opposition exaggerates the 
importance of this problem. 
The “administrative resource” or the “merger” between the party in power 
and the state.
The opposition parties contest not only the election legislation, but also the 
established patterns of relations between the authorities and the opposition. 
They think that there is a need to change the established practice of relations 
between political actors. 
The issue most frequently mentioned is government abuse of the so-
called “administrative resource.” This, according to the opposition, manifests 
itself in the use of state resources by the party in power. For instance, a party 
can spend its budgetary resources just before elections on specific districts 
where it needs votes; high-level government officials can take part in the 
election campaign at public expense, and so on. 
In more general terms, this problem is defined as that of merger between 
the state and the (majority) party. The opposition has claimed that staffing 
the state apparatus with members of the party in power is symptomatic of 
such a merger. This practice did not start with the current government but 
has been typical of Georgia since independence. In a negative way, this prob-
lem was confirmed by the fact that the previous ruling party simply ceased to 
exist as soon as it was divorced from state bureaucracy. However, the situa-
tion also failed to improve under the new authorities. “The model of the 
political party which is adopted by the incumbent authorities, similar to the 
model that existed under the previous authorities, is not an organization that 
unites the people around some idea. It is a political party that is formed by 
those in power,” a Labour Party representative said.  
According to the opposition, annulment of the constitutional norm which 
had banned the President from taking a party position28 demonstrates that 
the party in power is not interested in separating itself from the state.
The most common solution to this problem is clear delimitation of the 
top positions in the executive to be filled by political appointees. All political 
parties recognized that it is normal for the party in power to appoint people 
                                                          
28 Until February 2004, Article 72 of the Georgian constitution said that “The President 
can hold no other position.” In the period 1995-2002, President Shevardnadze was also 
chairman of the Citizens’ Union of Georgia, which the opposition considered a violation 
of the constitution. In February 2004, the above article was amended and the words 
“...except for a party position” were added. 
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to key positions in government. Beyond that, however, the civil service 
should remain stable and independent from political change. There are legis-
lative norms in Georgia that make such a distinction, but they are not fol-
lowed in practice.  
Financing political parties: general challenges 
The issue of party financing is especially important because it is often 
linked to political corruption. Donations to political parties by different 
interest groups may lead to abuse of political power in their favour and be 
detrimental to the public interest.  
Two major kinds of responses emerge to solve this problem. One is 
adopting regulations concerning both the public and private funding of 
political parties/candidates. This includes restrictions on the size of pri-
vate donations and demands that all parties’ financial activities be made 
transparent through disclosure of earnings and spending. Another re-
sponse is the financing of political parties by the state, either directly or 
indirectly (providing tax relief, free broadcasting time, etc.). State financ-
ing makes parties less dependent on private groups.  
Although Western democracies have accumulated considerable experience 
in trying to fight political corruption, countries differ significantly in how 
successful they are in this. Yet it is a shared view that currently existing 
regulations cannot provide full guarantees for preventing the undue influ-
ence of particular interests on party activities. Existing regulations may be 
circumvented in different ways. Therefore, there is no generally accepted 
recipe for solving the problem. Rather, a well-informed and careful proc-
ess of choosing particular measures appropriate for each country is 
needed.  
The United National Movement strongly rejected accusations of merger with 
the State apparatus. On the contrary, UNM representatives said that the party 
made a special effort to avert the danger and drew a clear distinction between 
party members who hold government posts and party activists who do not. 
For instance, not a single chairperson of a regional branch of the UNM is 
simultaneously involved in the local branch of executive power, contrary to 
the established practice of the Shevardnadze government. By taking this 
step, the UNM ensured that “it reacts appropriately to socio-political devel-
opments and preserves the function of public oversight [of the party].” As to 
the mass staff dismissals in government agencies that the new government 
initiated, they were caused by requirements of radical reform in the state 
apparatus and the need to uproot corruption. 
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Party financing 
Georgian political parties view the issue of party financing as particularly 
important for the development of the party system in Georgia. In discussions 
that preceded enactment of the amendments to the Law on Political Associa-
tions of Citizens which introduced a new scheme of state funding for politi-
cal parties (this is discussed earlier in this chapter), it was admitted that the 
existing system was utterly inadequate. 
As state financing has not been sufficient for party activities (nor will it 
cover all party expenses after the introduction of the new scheme), parties 
depend mainly on private donations. The political parties in opposition claim 
that the existing domination by a single party in the country hampers their 
fundraising activities. They allege that businessmen are afraid to donate 
money to their parties as they fear reprisals from the government. Therefore, 
the general political situation in the country must change so that parties can 
raise funds in a free and transparent manner. 
Parties recognize that the current legislation impels them to conceal their 
sources of financing. Most concede they have both legal and illegal sources 
for financing.  
All parties agree that there is a need for state funding for political parties. 
But the United National Movement in particular is in favour of independent 
fund-raising as well. Its representatives insist that every party should raise 
funds independently. In this case, a party's financial assets will be propor-
tionate to its popularity. 
Party registration
No party complains that Georgian law creates any significant obstacles to 
forming and registering new parties. Most politicians recognize that the 
procedure for registering parties in Georgia is quite liberal and they consider 
this beneficial for Georgian democracy.
Conversely, some party representatives – though a minority – have even 
argued that party registration is too simple in Georgia. They blame this for 
what they see as the excessive number of political parties in Georgia; having 
more than 100 parties is anomalous, they say. In order to create a more effec-
tive political system, they think the number of political parties should be 
reduced. State policy towards political parties should aim to preserve only 
those parties that have “appropriate financial and intellectual resources.” In 
particular, it was proposed that, as prerequisites for party registration, the 
signatures of 10,000 members should be required (as against the 1,000 sig-
natures stipulated in the current legislation) and that parties should have 
branches in no less than one third of the administrative districts of the coun-
try.
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Main findings 
? In general, the state does not hinder the creation, registration and func-
tioning of political parties in Georgia. The ban on regionally based par-
ties is the only serious restriction to forming political parties. In addi-
tion, there are uncertainties in the Law on Political Associations of Citi-
zens that may potentially be exploited by the state against political par-
ties if it decides to curtail the political rights of its citizens; 
? Until recently, state funding for political parties was insignificant. A 
package of legislative amendments adopted by Parliament in December 
2005 is expected to create a much more effective mechanism of state-
based financial support for political parties; 
? There is no consensus between the party in power and the opposition 
parties on certain basic rules of political competition. In particular, 
there are strongly different views on the issue of the composition of 
electoral commissions, on the threshold for party lists and on the multi-
mandate majoritarian districts; 
? The opposition parties allege that abuse of “administrative resources”, 
that is, the lack of a clear separation between the party in power and the 
state, is a major challenge to fair political competition in the country. 

61
1.4 Society and Citizenship
In the early 1990s, Georgian society underwent a series of deep and trau-
matic transformations that included violent conflicts, a breakdown of the 
economy, dramatically reduced living standards, and drastic changes in 
political and economic institutions. The existence of the self-proclaimed 
states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which comprise about 15 per cent of 
Georgia’s territory, as well as widespread poverty are the most conspicu-
ous lasting effects of this crisis. The consequences of this in terms of citi-
zenship have been notorious.  
The nature and conduct of political elites are in general representative of the 
societies in which they operate and the way in which people exercise their 
citizenship. The political party system as the playing field of those elites is 
naturally linked to the structure of society. Parties act in a social context and 
normally they seek support among specific social groups or fragments of 
society. At the same time, each political party can be considered as a model 
of society at large: its internal structure, relations between its members, and 
internal problems reflect those of society and its political culture.29
While it is beyond our ambition here to present a comprehensive picture 
of Georgian society, this chapter dwells on those characteritics that are rele-
vant to political institutions and parties, namely the main cleavages within 
Georgian society and its elites, the main areas of consensus and the state of 
citizenship.
Socio-economic cleavages: poverty and corruption 
Widespread poverty is one of the most pressing problems in Georgia. Ac-
cording to different statistical estimates, about half of the population of the 
country lives below the poverty line. Despite respectable figures of economic 
growth in recent years (the GDP grew by 8.4 per cent the last year), Georgia’s 
poverty rates do not show any signs of dropping. As many economic com-
mentators have observed, “Economic growth has not been translated yet into 
an overall decrease in poverty rates.”30
It may still be too early to judge the effects of the new government’s poli-
cies on the living standards of the population. Tough measures to uproot 
                                                          
29 For a classic in the field of studies on civic and political culture see “The Civic Culture. 
Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations”, G.A.Almond & S.Verba eds., New-
bury Park, 1989.  
30 Gabriel Labbate, Levan Jamburia and Guram Mirzashvili, Improving Targeting of Poor 
and Extremely Poor Families in Georgia: The Construction of Poverty Maps at the District 
Level, UNDP Country Office in Georgia, Tbilisi, 2003. 
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mass corruption, a sharp increase in tax collection, greatly expanded invest-
ments in infrastructure, massive salary increases for public servants but also 
drastic cuts in the size of state administration – all this may yield important 
economic results in several years’ time, but in the short term they have had a 
rather mixed effect on living standards. While some people have had the 
chance to enjoy a decent quality of life without involvement in corruption, 
the overall picture with regard to poverty has yet to improve.31
Georgian commentators often claim that “there is no middle class in the 
country.” To be sure, many Georgians perceive themselves as having a mid-
dle income relative to other people.32 In that sense, they may be called “mid-
dle class.” However, in a country where over half of the population is consid-
ered to be living below the poverty line, statistically a middle income does 
not necessarily imply the decent living standards often associated with the 
concept of “middle class.”  
Most importantly, when people in Georgia do have decent living stan-
dards, this status may often have been achieved through involvement in cor-
rupt practices. Businesses – small or large – are said to need government 
“roofs”, informal protection provided by public servants, in order to survive. 
On the other hand, until the Rose Revolution, token salaries were paid in the 
public sector and they usually fell well below the minimum living wage. 
Therefore, government employees who enjoyed a middle-class standard of 
living were presumed to be corrupt. This presumption extended to such usu-
ally respectable professions as schoolteachers or university lecturers. Con-
versely, abusing public funds or government positions could be said to con-
stitute one of the most effective (if not the best) paths to the middle-class 
status (or to riches, in the case of top officials).  
After the Rose Revolution, the salaries of the top echelon of public offi-
cials were increased dramatically so that they would suffice to guarantee 
modest middle-class living standards, but this has been the case only for a 
few thousand elite public servants. The rest of the public employees who also 
received considerable salary increases now find themselves just somewhat 
above the living wage. Regarding other groups, the government’s admittedly 
successful measures in curbing mass corruption undermined the economic 
positions of many thousands of persons who depended on it. There is a 
small but slowly growing market for professionals who can earn a decent 
living outside state organizations as businessmen, managers, accountants, 
lawyers, physicians, experts in different fields, or competent office workers. 
In these areas, having a Western education or at least a good knowledge of 
English strongly increases one’s chances of success.  
                                                          
31 According to the Department of Statistics of the Ministry of Economic Development of 
Georgia, in the first quarter of 2005 54.9 per cent of the total population was below the 
poverty line as opposed to 49.1 per cent in the first quarter of 2005. <www.statistics.ge>, 
accessed 2 November 2005. 
32 For instance, according to a poll conducted by the International Republican Institute 
(IRI) in 2003, 31 per cent assessed their income as “middle’, 65 per cent as “poor”, and 2 
per cent as “well-off.” 
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In general, a widespread perception persists that acquiring wealth through 
honest means is hardly possible in Georgia. This, as well as a set of ideas 
from Communist times, is maybe the reason that in a country with a consid-
erable level of economic inequality33 like Georgia, people do not think in 
terms of rich and poor but rather talk about “the corrupt” and “the socially 
unprotected.” This reflects the conviction that citizens’ economic well-being 
mainly depends on the state, whereas affluence implies some sort of corrup-
tion.
There is a high level of economic inequality and “rich and poor” are syn-
onymous for “the corrupt” and “the socially unprotected” 
This suggests that no political party can achieve serious success in Georgian 
elections unless it attracts the votes of a large part of those who live below the 
poverty line. That does not necessarily mean using the appeal of the tradi-
tional left, such as supporting social equality against unhampered market 
forces. Instead, the stress is on fighting corruption. It is corruption rather 
than specific economic policies that is considered responsible for poverty. 
The political parties that were the most successful in the years preceding the 
Rose Revolution have made fighting corruption their main platform; in fact, 
some analysts even called this event an “anti-corruption revolution.”34
The anti-corruption discourse transcends the traditional division between 
left and right and can be used by parties of all ideological persuasions. It also 
conceals the issue of poverty and diminishes the relevance of socio-economic 
cleavages for political party formation. So far, the cleavage between rich and 
poor has not been a prominent factor in Georgian politics; it may be called a 
dormant factor which may or may not come to the fore in the future.  
Ethnic divisions and political participation 
Georgian society is traditionally multi-ethnic. At the time of the Soviet col-
lapse, some 30 per cent of Georgia’s population was composed of ethnic 
minorities. Georgia’s loss of the effective jurisdiction over Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia together with a large-scale emigration of more ethnic minori-
ties than ethnic Georgians resulted in the proportion of ethnic minorities 
dropping to 16.3 per cent (according to the 2002 census). Azerbaijanis and 
Armenians comprise by far the largest ethnic minority groups (table 6).35
As has already been pointed out, the existence of breakaway territories 
jeopardizes Georgia’s chances of achieving security and development. How-
                                                          
33 According to the 2003 data, Georgia’s GINI index, which measures economic inequal-
ity, was 38.9 – higher than in most European countries, but slightly lower than in the US 
and much lower than in most Latin American countries. 
34 Louise I. Shelley and Erik R. Scott, “Georgia's 'Revolution of Roses' Can Be Trans-
planted”, Washington Post, 30 November 2003, p. B05. 
35 These figures do not include people residing in separatist territories, as the Georgian 
government was unable to conduct a census there. 
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ever, this cannot properly be called an issue of social cleavage since people in 
the separatist entities do not consider themselves part of Georgian society 
(with the exception of the ethnic Georgians who live in these territories). No 
elections to Georgian political bodies are held in those territories, and no 
Georgian political parties are or can be active there.
Therefore, when one speaks of the ethnic cleavages in Georgia that are 
relevant for internal party politics, this implies not so much the Abkhazian 
and Ossetian conflicts, but the relations between ethnic Georgians and those 
ethnic minorities that reside in the territory effectively under Georgian juris-
diction. The greatest concerns are about ethnic minorities concentrated in 
specific geographical areas bordering with their “ethnic homelands”: Arme-
nians who mainly live in the province of Samtskhe-Javakheti (bordering with 
Armenia and Turkey) and Azeris residing in Kvemo Kartli (which borders 
with Azerbaijan and Armenia). These are not issues of ethnic separatism and 
irredentism. While some Georgians are suspicious of hidden nationalist 
cravings within these minority communities, the latter have made no separa-
tist demands or organized irredentist movements. The main areas of con-
cern are the lack of socio-political integration of these minorities and the low 
level of their genuine participation in Georgia’s nascent democratic institu-
tions.
The main areas of concern are the lack of socio-political integration of 
these minorities and the low level of their genuine participation in Geor-
gia’s nascent democratic institutions 
The main obstacle is the inability of these minorities (unlike those dispersed 
in urban centres like Tbilisi) to speak the Georgian language, which is the 
only official language of the country36, and there has been no visible progress 
with regard to their proficiency in Georgian since independence. This en-
genders a number of problems:  
(1) Relations of minority citizens with the state: Members of ethnic minori-
ties have difficulties in their relations with state agencies as the latter operate 
only in Georgian. They are obliged to work through interpreters, which leads 
to substantial practical complications and diminishes their perception of 
themselves as full citizens.  
(2) Communication between citizens: Russian continues to be a lingua 
franca within Georgia when it comes to relations between ethnic Georgians 
and the minorities. However, given that the level of knowledge and daily use 
of Russian in Georgia is in decline, young people – whether ethnic Georgi-
ans or minorities – are no longer fluent in it. Therefore, citizens of Georgia 
have problems in communicating with each other.
                                                          
36 The Georgian constitution also recognizes Abkhazian as an official language in the 
territory of Abkhazia. 
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Poor knowledge of the Georgian language is the major impediment to the 
full exercise of citizenship rights for the ethnic minority population 
(3) Insufficient information for minority citizens about national develop-
ments: Almost all the Georgian media work in Georgian and cannot be un-
derstood by most minority citizens. Russian, Armenian and Azerbaijani TV 
stations, which broadcast only limited information about Georgia, are the 
minorities’ main sources of information. Moreover, and this is especially 
true of Russian TV, their manner of presenting this information is some-
times unfriendly towards Georgia. During the last several years, with the 
help of the OSCE, some Georgian news programmes have been rebroadcast 
in the Javakheti region with simultaneous translation into Armenian. After 
the Rose Revolution, Georgian state television and radio (since 2005 – Geor-
gian Public Broadcasting) resumed news programming in minority lan-
guages. This certainly helps, but is not enough. There is an ongoing concern 
that citizens belonging to national minorities are poorly informed about the 
latest Georgian legislation. 
Ethnic group Residents (in 
thousands) 1989 
Residents (in 
thousands) 2002 
Share of coun-
try’s total popu-
lation 1989 
Share of coun-
try’s total popu-
lation 2002 
All 5400.8 4371.5 100 100
Georgians 3787.4 3661.1 70.1 83.7 
Armenians 437.2 248.9 8.1 5.7 
Russians 341.2 32.6 6.3 0.75 
Azeri 307.6 284.8 5.7 6.5 
Ossetians 164.1 38.0 3.0 0.87 
Greeks 100.3 15.1 1.9 0.35 
Abkhaz 95.9 3.5 1.8 0.0008 
Ukrainians 52.4 7.0 1.0 0.0016 
Table 6.37
                                                          
37 Source: Department of Statistics of the Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia. 
The 2002 figures do not include residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
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Institution Posi-
tive
Rather 
positive
than
negative 
Rather 
negative
than
positive
Nega-
tive
Diffi-
cult 
to
ans-
wer
2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 
1 Parliament 1.2 9.6 4.7 35.0 22.7 29.6 71.5 23.9 0 1.7 
2 The
executive  
1.1 15.5 4.2 35.9 19.3 25.4 75.4 22.4 0 0.7 
3 NGOs 5.9 15.0 25.0 32.7 28.1 22.1 38.6 24.5 2.4 5.6 
4 Georgian
Orthodox
Church
38.6 52.1 38.2 32.1 12.7 6.8 9.0 4.1 1.5 4.8 
5 Mass
Media
25.6 31.7 41.3 36.6 18.3 17.0 14.5 13.6 0.3 0.8 
6 Police 2.3 17.5 5.7 26.1 16.7 23.1 75.2 31.3 0.1 2.0 
7 The
Prosecu-
tor’s Office 
3.0 11.1 5.5 20.0 17.1 27.1 73.8 38.7 0.7 3.0 
8 Court 3.1 10.2 8.0 20.2 20.3 25.6 67.6 40.2 0.7 3.8 
Table 7. Polls of 1,000 respondents in three major cities of Georgia conducted by the 
International Centre for Conflicts and Negotiations (ICCN) in spring 2003 and spring 
2004.
(4) Political representation: Minorities are not adequately represented in 
political institutions in Georgia. There were only 14 MPs of ethnic minority 
origin in the 1999 Parliament, and this number fell to eight after the Rose 
Revolution. Moreover, some of these MPs are scarcely effective in represent-
ing the interests of their communities, as they are not fluent in the language 
in which Parliament operates. Minority participation is even weaker in the 
executive: no Armenian or Azeri held a ministerial position in Georgia from 
the time the country gained independence until the Rose Revolution; after-
wards, one Kabardin and one Ossetian obtained Cabinet-level positions.38
Even in those provinces where minorities are concentrated, they usually 
become deputies but not the heads of local government agencies. The only 
exceptions are Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda, two districts that comprise a 
Javakheti region (part of the Samtskhe-Javakheti administrative province), 
where over 95 per cent of the population is ethnic Armenian. Here the whole 
local administration is Armenian and it operates in the Russian and Arme-
nian languages. This is an obvious violation of Georgian legislation, but the 
government turns a blind eye to it.  
The most frequently quoted reason for this is that there are no qualified 
minority candidates who have mastered enough Georgian to fill important 
government positions. In recent years, some professionals (such as physi-
cians) have had to pass government-organized exams in order to obtain the 
necessary license for practicing their professions. Here again, lack of profi-
ciency in Georgian is a serious barrier to members of ethnic minorities, even 
though allowances are made for them and they are permitted to sit exams 
through interpreters. In 2005, after the national matriculation exams were 
introduced as a necessary precondition for being admitted to universities, 
                                                          
38 The former was dismissed in November 2005. 
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only a rather small number of minority candidates were able to pass. Poor 
knowledge of Georgian was the main impediment.
(5) The low level of political participation may also be at the root of the above 
problem. Minorities think that it is safer to steer clear of Georgian political 
disputes. The political strategy of minorities is to show loyalty to the gov-
ernment party which they identify with the state. Minority regions usually 
vote overwhelmingly in favour of the ruling party. In response, the latter may 
include some minority representatives in its electoral lists. For instance, in 
the 1999 Parliament all minority MPs were also members of the ruling Citi-
zens’ Union (this pattern changed somewhat after the Rose Revolution). 
Opposition political parties rarely have minority members of any promi-
nence. Since there are almost no politically active people who are of ethnic 
minority origin, this reduces the probability of minority representatives ris-
ing to high positions in government.  
While there is no pronounced animosity or open conflicts on ethnic 
grounds, one can speak of mistrust and alienation between ethnic communi-
ties. Georgians interpret the failure of minorities to learn Georgian as a lack 
of interest in the country's development or even a lack of loyalty to Georgia. 
Minorities, on the other hand, resent insistence on language proficiency as a 
precondition for increased representation and access to prestigious jobs be-
cause they perceive it as discrimination on ethnic grounds. From time to 
time, demands for ethnically based autonomy are expressed by some groups 
in Javakheti, where minority concentration is the highest, but these demands 
lead to concern among Georgians as ethnic autonomy is considered to be the 
first step towards secession.  
The Georgian state supports minority-language schools in the Russian, 
Armenian and Azerbaijani languages. Their existence may rightfully be con-
sidered an expression of respect for minority rights. However, the way these 
schools function is also part of the problem. The curriculum has changed 
little since Soviet times; as a result the schools do not guarantee proficiency 
in the Georgian language. Moreover, there is a shortage of teachers of Geor-
gian in minority regions. As a result, graduates of these schools are not pre-
pared to function in Georgian society and tend to emigrate to Russia, Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan or other countries. On the other hand, plans of the Georgian 
Ministry of Education and Science to strengthen the teaching of Georgian in 
the minority-language schools have led to fears of assimilation.  
Ethnic relations in Georgia suffer from elements of mutual mistrust, ma-
jority prejudice and minority self-isolation. Aggressive anti-minority senti-
ments do not play any important role in Georgia, and there are no extreme 
exclusionist parties that try to capitalize on such sentiments. On the other 
hand, minorities are considered a threat and a large segment of society is not 
ready to accept minority representatives in leading positions in the state. For 
instance, some political opponents of the late Georgian Prime Minister 
Zurab Zhvania openly made an issue of the fact that one of his grandparents 
was Armenian. This did not prevent Zhvania from becoming one of the lead-
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ing politicians in Georgia and holding the posts of Speaker of the Parliament 
and of Prime Minister, but the presence of this topic in public discourse may 
have discouraged “fully-fledged” members of the Armenian and Azeri mi-
norities from real participation in Georgia's political life. Whatever the rea-
son, minorities are not developing and pursuing a realistic strategy of inte-
gration into Georgian society, thus perpetuating their marginal status.  
Ethnic relations in Georgia suffer from elements of mutual mistrust, ma-
jority prejudice and minority self-isolation 
As with socio-economic cleavages, there is a notable paradox. Objectively, 
integration of the effectively marginalized ethnic minority population is a 
crucial problem in Georgia’s nation-building, and the post-Rose Revolution 
Government increasingly recognizes this. However, since the period of the 
ethnic-territorial conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the minority issue 
has been peripheral to Georgian politics. One could even call them “forgot-
ten minorities” since international organizations and a handful of Georgian 
NGOs have paid much greater attention to the issue than has the govern-
ment. The majority party took the minority vote for granted and opposition 
parties have hardly tried to compete in these areas.39 The Georgian media 
occasionally reported on the activities of some Armenian nationalist groups 
in Javakheti, but this did not really make the headlines.  
One possible explanation may be the collective memory of the conflicts of 
the early 1990s. The majority and the minorities learned the lessons that the 
politicization of ethnicity is extremely dangerous for all sides and that it is 
better to put the issue on the back burner for the time being. There was a 
tacit contract: the minorities expressed their loyalty through voting for the 
government party, while the majority never challenged their formal citizen-
ship status.
It is unlikely, however, that the minority issue can be neglected indefi-
nitely. There are different ways for the minority population to become active 
in Georgian politics. One is to make Georgian political parties compete for 
the minority vote; another for the minorities themselves to create their own 
ethnically based parties. The ban on regional parties as well as the high 
threshold for political party lists (see the previous chapter on Parties and 
State on this issue) are legal mechanisms that will make the latter outcome 
less likely.40 However, unless existing political parties – including those in 
the opposition – become more open to ethnic minorities and find ways to 
articulate and represent their concerns, existing legal barriers may not be 
enough to prevent the creation of ethnic political parties in the future.  
                                                          
39 The National Movement tried to break this tacit assumption before the 2003 parliamen-
tary elections for the first time, but did not achieve any notable success. 
40 While the ban on regional parties was clearly caused by the fear of ethnic separatism, 
maintaining a high electoral threshold may be in part motivated by the wish to prevent 
the creation of ethnic minority parties. 
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The role of religion and religious pluralism  
Georgia’s multi-ethnicity is accompanied by the multi-confessional nature of 
the country. According to the 2002 census, 83.9 per cent of Georgia’s citizens 
considered themselves Orthodox Christians (this includes mainly the Geor-
gian Orthodox Church but also a small fraction of the Russian Orthodox), 9.9 
per cent were Muslims (this includes Georgian Sunni Muslims in Achara 
and Azeri Muslims, some of whom are Sunni and others are Shia), 3.9 per 
cent were Armenian Apostolic and 0.79 per cent were Catholics (this in-
cludes ethnic Georgians, Armenians, Poles and some others). 
However, relations between the major religious communities in Georgia 
have never been politicized. Religion did not play a role in the ethnic-
territorial conflicts of the early 1990s.41 While there were some concerns 
about the infiltration of Islamic terrorist groups linked to Al-Qaeda in Pank-
isi Gorge in the early 2000s, Georgian Muslim communities have so far gen-
erally seemed immune to the influence of political Islam. Most Georgians, 
including most religious Georgians, tend to be fairly tolerant towards the so-
called “traditional” religious communities. 
Georgia is a multi-religious country, but relations between the major reli-
gious communities have never been politicized 
It is the relation between the historically dominant Georgian Orthodox 
Church and the state that have been an important issue of political life since 
independence. The rights of the so-called “non-traditional” communities 
such as Jehovah Witnesses, Baptists and so forth is another bone of conten-
tion.
Georgia boasts an ancient Christian tradition which is an important part 
of the country’s identity; Christianity has been the official religion of the 
Georgian state from the 4th century onwards, and the Georgian Orthodox 
Church is one of the most ancient autocephalic Churches in the world. Most 
of the medieval history of Georgia consists of the struggle with its more 
powerful Muslim neighbours such as the Persian and Ottoman empires. In 
this struggle, Orthodox Christianity, together with the Georgian language in 
which this religion was preached, served as the main guardian of Georgian 
identity.
This role of the Church diminished somewhat after Georgia was ab-
sorbed by fellow-Orthodox Russia (during the period of the Russian Empire, 
the Church was stripped of its autocephalic status, but it was reaffirmed after 
the Tsarist Empire broke up). The Soviet regime enforced atheism as an 
official ideology but simultaneously tried to control the hierarchy of the 
Church. Conversely, the Georgian independence movement restored to the 
                                                          
41 The Abkhaz are partly Muslim and partly Orthodox, although the level of religiosity in 
this community is very low; the Ossetes share the Orthodox faith with the majority of 
Georgians.
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Church its status as a symbol of Georgian identity and the major national 
institution.
The status of the Orthodox Church 
1. The state shall declare complete freedom of belief and religion, and it 
shall recognize the special role of the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox 
Church of Georgia in the history of Georgia and its independence from 
the state. 
2. The relations between the state of Georgia and the Apostolic Autoceph-
alous Orthodox Church of Georgia shall be determined by the Constitu-
tional Agreement. The Constitutional Agreement shall correspond com-
pletely to universally recognized principles and norms of international 
law, in particular, in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
Article 9 of the Georgian constitution after amendments of 30 March 2001  
All public opinion polls invariably show the Orthodox Church to be by a 
large margin the most trusted institution in Georgia (See table 2). In 1990, 
the construction of new churches became a conspicuous trait of life in Geor-
gia, whereas almost no other new pubic buildings were constructed. 
Simultaneously, the level of religiosity sharply increased. In the poll 
quoted above, 18.5 and 77.8 per cent of those surveyed considered them-
selves respectively “very religious” and “somewhat religious.”42
The relations between the historically dominant Georgian Orthodox 
Church and the state have been an important issue of political life 
After the break-up of the Communist regime, many Georgians believed that 
the special role of the Church had to be reflected in Georgian legislation. 
More liberal Georgians insisted, however, on the division between the 
Church and state and the protection of religious pluralism. The architects of 
the 1995 Georgian constitution found a compromise between these two de-
mands by including an article that both recognized the special historical role 
of the Georgian Church as well as the freedom of religion in all denomina-
tions.
This proved insufficient to resolve the issue. Defenders of the Orthodox 
Church thought that recognizing only its historical importance did not suf-
fice. As the popularity of Eduard Shevardnadze’s government and public 
trust in state institutions plummeted in the second half of the 1990s, the 
public increased pressure to upgrade the status of the Orthodox Church to 
that of “state Church” or established Church. Moreover, a large part of soci-
                                                          
42 These are data from 2003; no significant changes were observed the following year. 
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ety developed a fear of and hostility towards the proselytizing activities of 
Western-based Protestant groups, especially of the Jehovah Witnesses, but 
also of Baptists, Evangelicals, Pentecostals, etc. This activism was widely 
believed to represent a threat to the national identity, as the resources of the 
rich West where these religious groups were based were seen as vastly supe-
rior to those of the Georgian Orthodox Church. This led to demands for the 
adoption of a law on religion to curb the activities of the “non-traditional” 
Western-based sects.  
Such a law was never enacted by Parliament. However, animosity towards 
religious minorities found a more openly aggressive outlet: Georgia went 
through a wave of violent attacks against the “non-traditional” religious 
groups (Jehovah’s Witnesses, again, were the main but not the sole target) 
which peaked in the period from 1999 to 2002. The attacks were perpetrated 
by the group surrounding the defrocked Orthodox priest Basil Mkalavishvili 
and members of some other extreme religious organizations. Although the 
Orthodox Church publicly distanced itself from Mkalavishvili, some of its 
members informally encouraged the attacks. The police did nothing to stop 
the violence. This could be explained as reluctance on the part of a weak and 
unpopular Government to go against popular sentiment. A sizeable part of 
society sympathized with the offenders: many of those who notionally dis-
agreed with violent means saw the main source of the problem in the failure 
of the Georgian State to protect their national culture from the encroach-
ment of sects that are perceived as aggressive.43
One could say that attitudes towards religious pluralism and the status of 
the Orthodox Church have been defining issues in the Georgian public de-
bate. On the one hand, there were religious traditionalists who demanded 
official status for the Orthodox Church and legislation that would outlaw or 
at least seriously curb the activities of other, especially non-traditional, reli-
gious organizations. These were opposed by liberals who demanded the 
radical separation of Church and state and expected the State to effectively 
protect the rights of religious minorities. The latter view was most openly 
defended by human rights NGOs. Most of society inclined to the former 
position. Since the Orthodox Church was overwhelmingly the most revered 
institution in Georgia, no politician would openly oppose its demands. Im-
portantly, while the status of the mainstream Church and of religious mi-
norities dominated the public agenda, the Church and other religious or-
ganizations were not active in those other areas of public policy to which 
their Western counterparts paid a great deal of attention. For instance, the 
Church never tried to raise the issue of abortion, and there is hardly any 
public discussion on this issue in Georgia.  
The adoption of the Constitutional Agreement between the state of Geor-
gia and the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia (infor-
mally referred to as the Concordat) in October 2002 was another compro-
                                                          
43 In the poll quoted above, 45.2 per cent of the respondents “positively” or “somewhat 
positively” evaluated the activities of Basili Mkalavishvili, the main perpetrator of the 
violent attacks. 
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mise between these two positions. This was preceded by several years of 
public discussions in which human rights groups first resisted the very idea 
of the Agreement, and – after they saw it was unavoidable – tried to prevent 
any formulations that would restrict freedom of conscience.  
President Saakashvili’s new government put an end to religious violence 
by imprisoning Basil Mkalavishvili and some of his associates. This is often 
described as the new government’s greatest achievement after independence 
in the sphere of human rights. The issue of religious pluralism became less 
acute but still controversial. Much of society is still ill-disposed towards reli-
gious pluralism and views religious minorities as a threat. Even though 
physical safety is no longer a major concern for the minorities, other prob-
lems, such as the construction of new places of worship for them, persist.  
In all major state ceremonies, the Catholicos-Patriarch of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church stands next to the President as the spiritual father of the 
nation. At the same time, there are serious disagreements within the Church 
because the strong conservative wing openly resents liberalism as hostile to 
the Church. This makes religious circles potentially the main stronghold of 
anti-Western sentiment in Georgia, though officially the Church never ques-
tions Georgia’s choice of European and Euro-Atlantic cooperation.  
Independence and the Pro-Western Orientation: the National Con-
sensus  
There are cleavages and divisions in every society, but a political nation can-
not be viable unless there are points of consensus that unify a sizeable ma-
jority of the people. The existence of such a consensus on specific issues can 
be measured by surveys of public opinion, but the behaviour of rival political 
parties can also be a valuable indicator: if there are issues on which other-
wise strongly oppositional political parties vote in unison, they can be viewed 
as points of national consensus.  
One such point is obviously national independence. Both the new Geor-
gian national agenda and the political elite have developed around the strug-
gle for independence from the Soviet Union. There has been no political 
party in Georgia that has openly contested this standpoint. Parties can only 
accuse each other of not supporting the idea of independence strongly 
enough.
There is no sizeable opposition in Georgia to the agenda of joining NATO 
and the European Union 
Naturally, the agenda of territorial integrity is part and parcel of the project of 
the independent state. The existence of breakaway regions like Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia demonstrate that the business of creating an independent 
state is still unfinished. But there is no agreement on how the problem 
should be solved. Georgians may be divided on the issue of whether or not 
military means should be rejected outright or may still be used if negotia-
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tions fail, the international principle of the non-use of force notwithstanding. 
However, nobody denies that the problem should be solved, and “solution” 
means the effective extension of Georgia’s jurisdiction over these territo-
ries.44
In the Georgian case, the agenda of independence strongly correlates 
with the project of joining the West and accession to major Western institu-
tions such as NATO and the European Union. This agenda, popular with the 
vast majority of Georgians,45 is not contested by any influential political 
force. Presumably, one cause of such near-unanimity is that joining NATO 
and the European Union is a rather distant prospect involving organizations 
about which people know very little. Experience of the post-Communist 
countries of East-Central Europe has shown that as soon as joining NATO 
and the EU became the immediate issue, the opposition to joining also 
strengthened. However, the present desire to become closer to the West 
gives a general sense of direction to Georgian policies since such a move is 
considered the best way to guarantee Georgia’s security and consolidate the 
country’s political institutions while putting Georgia firmly on the map of 
modernity. No political force of any significance – even the most nationalist 
figures that are the Georgian equivalent of what is called “extreme Right” in 
Europe – advocates a change of direction.  
This orientation negatively correlates with relations with Russia. There is 
no detectable animosity in Georgia to Russian culture and ethnicity; Rus-
sians have never been major targets of Georgian ethnic nationalists even at 
the peak of the struggle for independence. Georgians would certainly wel-
come good neighbour relations with Russia, especially because it is crucial 
for the development of the Georgian economy. For example, a prominent 
Russian industrialist of Georgian origin was given a portfolio for economic 
reforms in the post-Rose-Revolution Georgian cabinet.
Nevertheless, due to a number of factors (of which the most important is 
the alleged Russian support for the secessionist movements in Georgia) the 
Russian state is considered the main threat to the implementation of the 
Georgian national project. This attitude is strengthened by the fact that many 
Russian public figures do not hide their resentment towards Georgia’s aspi-
rations to integrate into Europe, which they consider a challenge to Russia’s 
interests. Therefore, the strong wish to reduce the dominating Russian mili-
tary and political influence in Georgia constitutes one more point of political 
consensus. Draft resolutions demanding the withdrawal of the Russian mili-
tary bases or – more recently – Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia – are passed unanimously in Parliament. This does not exclude some 
politicians questioning the political expediency of challenging Russia under 
                                                          
44 According to a public opinion poll conducted by IRI in June 2005, only 1.5 per cent of 
those polled accepted Abkhazia and South Ossetia being independent or part of Russia, 
while 93 per cent insisted they should be part of Georgia. 
45 According to the IRI poll conducted in October-November 2005, respectively 76 and 81 
per cent of those polled supported Georgia’s accession to NATO and the EU; only 8 and 3 
per cent respectively opposed. 
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certain circumstances, but these doubts concern elements of political strat-
egy rather than the goals this strategy is designed to pursue.  
Ethnic minorities may not subscribe to some elements of this agenda. 
Minorities felt threatened by the Georgian movement to independence in the 
late 1980s since this period also saw the zenith of ethnic nationalism, charac-
terized by deep distrust towards the minorities. Yet no minorities save for 
the Abkhaz and the Ossetians in South Ossetia challenged this agenda 
openly. Georgian integration into Europe is welcomed by the minorities as 
well since they hope that such integration will make Georgia more liberal 
and hence more respectful of the minorities’ rights.  
There is some contradiction, however, between the prevailing Georgian 
security agenda and the sentiments of the Armenian minority. The latter are 
unhappy about Georgian-Russian tensions and blame the Georgian govern-
ment for this. Specifically, the local Armenian community in southern Geor-
gia opposes the withdrawal of the Russian military base from Akhalkalaki, 
though most Georgians strongly welcome this development.46 The main 
reasons for this are solidarity with the state of Armenia, which relies on Rus-
sian support in its conflict with Azerbaijan, and deeper collective sentiments 
that cause Armenia to fear Turkey, the country with which the Armenian-
populated regions in Georgia border. However, as the process of the with-
drawal of the Russian military from Akhalkalaki started in summer 2005, 
there were no strong expressions of protest in the region.  
Commitment to Georgian culture and identity is an important element of 
the pro-independence agenda that unifies most of society. Among other 
things, it underpins the status of the Georgian language as the only official 
language of the country (save for Abkhazia where the Georgian constitution 
also recognizes the official status of the Abkhazian language)and emphasizes 
the central role of the Orthodox Church in Georgia’s moral and spiritual life, 
as was discussed above.  
                                                          
46 According to a poll conducted by IRI in October-November 2005, 74 per cent of those 
surveyed thought the Russian bases had a negative influence on Georgia and 8 per cent 
assessed their influence as positive. 
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Attitudes to democracy 
So far, Georgians have not succeeded in developing stable democratic 
institutions. However, different data show that they are committed to de-
mocratic values. A comparative research project carried out by John S. 
Dryzek and Leslie T. Holmes in a number of post-Communist countries 
showed that there is no significant anti-democratic discourse in Georgia 
(see Post-Communist Democratization: Political Discourses across Thir-
teen Countries, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 
147?157). In other words, few people in Georgia favour anything other 
than a democratic political system.  
In their investigation of different political opinions in Georgia after the 
Rose Revolution (the research was sponsored by International IDEA) Ma-
rina Muskhelishvili and Louise Arutiunova also found a degree of consen-
sus on core liberal-democratic values such as: democracy requires plural-
ism of opinions; the country’s constitution will secure conditions for de-
mocracy and political competition; the authorities should observe the con-
stitution in the same way as ordinary citizens do.  
In two International Republican Institute polls conducted during 2004, 
70 and 71 per cent of those polled agreed that it is important for Georgia 
to have a political opposition, with only 10 per cent against (the approval 
rating of the government was rather high at that time).  
In research carried out by the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy 
and Development and the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute in 1997, 69 per 
cent of respondents said that democracy would be better for their children 
than communism – and this rating was about 80 per cent among young 
respondents. Seventy-five per cent (and a larger majority among younger 
people) agreed that it was “normal for people to have different opinions 
and pursue different interests as long as they respect the rules.” 
Citizenship and clanship 
Democracy is only viable when the institution of citizenship is sufficiently 
developed. A citizen may be defined as a person who is a member of a politi-
cal community and is involved in its governance. The strength of citizenship 
depends on many factors. On the one hand, the state constitution should 
allow its citizens to be genuinely involved in governance: that is, it should 
provide for political rights. For instance, it should guarantee the right to cre-
ate and be active in political parties – a topic that was discussed in the previ-
ous chapter. On the other hand, people should be willing and able to take 
part in public affairs; they should feel responsibility for the state of their 
country and feel an obligation to be involved in it.  
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How active are Georgians as citizens? Democracy activists in the country 
often complain that most Georgians are passive and display a low level of 
involvement in public affairs. These concerns are understandable but some-
what exaggerated. The Rose Revolution is the most vivid example of Georgi-
ans being ready to defend democratic values in their country. The organized 
and peaceful character of the Rose Revolution was an important indicator of 
the quality and not just intensity of civic participation. The level of participa-
tion in elections is usually reasonably high. The lack of reliable voter regis-
tries and frequent ballot-stuffing in the past have made voter turnout figures 
unreliable, but public opinion research and long queues at polling stations 
show that people care about participating in elections.47
However, as research also shows, a large majority of Georgians tend to 
use limited forms of political participation, such as elections and occasional 
public protests, but not other participatory forms.48 There are almost no 
mass membership organizations in Georgia, such as trade unions or large 
issue-based associations.49 A number of non-governmental organizations 
have developed certain skills and exercise some level of influence, but they 
only exist at the level of the elite and depend on donor assistance. Various 
efforts to develop community-based organizations, on the other hand, do not 
appear to have been particularly successful so far. Neighbourhood communi-
ties are rarely successful at drawing together resources for solving issues of 
common interest.
A large majority of Georgians tend to use limited forms of political par-
ticipation, such as elections and occasional public protests, but not other 
types. 
There may be different reasons why people do not exercise their citizenship 
rights in full. Some of them will be discussed below.   
Clans and networks. When Georgians speak of features inherent in their 
social structure which hamper their efforts to create a modern democratic 
system, words like “clans” and “clannishness” are used most often. This 
means that in public life Georgians tend to stick to “clan” loyalties at the 
expense of formal institutions and transparent procedures. However, the 
word “clan” may be misleading here because what Georgians have in mind 
does not usually mean anything like Scottish clans, that is, groups united by 
common ancestry, but rather informal personalistic networks centred on one 
                                                          
47 According to an IRI poll held before the 2003 parliamentary elections, 73 per cent of 
those polled intended to vote, even though only 21 per cent expected them to be free and 
fair. 
48 Nana Sumbadze, Civic Participation in Public and Political Life, in; International IDEA, 
Building Democracy in Georgia, Discussion Paper 7: Developing a Democratic Commu-
nity in Georgia, May 2003, pp. 29-35. 
49 According to 2003 IRI poll, about 3 per cent of those polled were members of political 
parties, and 0.3 per cent were members of non-governmental organizations. 
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or several leaders who enjoy formal or informal authority. Kinship is one but 
not the only element around which such networks are built; what counts is 
personal loyalty, which may be based on ties of personal friendship or grati-
tude for benefits received.  
Social Capital
Democracy requires not only the proper design of state institutions, but 
also certain social or cultural preconditions. The American sociologist 
James Coleman coined the term “social capital”, which refers to people’s 
ability to work together for common purposes. Such ability requires a high 
level of trust. In every society, people tend to trust members of their fami-
lies or close friends; it is the level of trust towards people with whom one 
has no personal connection that counts for the development of successful 
social institutions and organizations – large businesses, public associa-
tions, and political parties. Those societies where the social capital of trust 
hardly transcends a small circle of friends and relatives are often called 
“clan societies” or “familistic societies.” In such societies, people depend 
more on state intervention, since they are less able to create large organi-
zations on their own. In his book Trust: the Social Virtue and the Creation 
of Prosperity, Francis Fukuyama divided societies into high-trust and low-
trust societies and highlighted the importance of this factor for the ways 
different nations develop their political and economic institutions. 
Another way of describing these attitudes in terms of social psychology may 
be that Georgians have a narrow horizon of trust, which makes them ori-
ented towards small groups. This means that they lack the social capital that 
would allow them to create effective and large organizations. According to 
this view, Georgians’ attempts to create large-scale organizations (including 
political parties) fail because, in effect, they develop into a network of small 
groups dependent on personal trust rather than on common values and for-
mal rules. 
Scepticism towards the state and anti-political attitudes constitute another 
trait that strongly correlates with the former, as was demonstrated by most 
public opinion research during the 1990s. The period after the Rose Revolu-
tion gave some grounds for optimism since it led to a notable surge in trust 
towards the government agencies (see Table 2). While three-quarters of the 
population did not trust the executive, Parliament or the police during the 
unpopular government of Eduard Shevardnadze, now overall trust towards 
institutions has risen sharply.  
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However, optimism needs to be tempered, as the same survey showed that 
three times as many people considered a criminal boss to be a more “prestig-
ious position” than a policeman.50 Notably, in late 2005 the Georgian gov-
ernment started a public campaign against organized crime that included 
not only new legislation and reforms in the penitentiary system, but also 
strong rhetoric about the necessity to fight both the “criminal mentality” and 
favourable attitudes towards criminal bosses in society.
The level of trust towards state institutions has increased after the Rose 
Revolution but there are still grounds for concern 
Most notably, the mistrust towards the state expresses itself in a strong reluc-
tance to cooperate with the law-enforcement system. Many crimes could not 
be prosecuted in Georgia because no one would volunteer to testify against 
criminals, even when crimes were committed in public in the presence of 
numerous witnesses.  
While some individual politicians at particular times may enjoy a hero-
like status, the political class as such is largely despised, and politics is usu-
ally referred to as an arena of unbridled ambition and greed.51 The public 
debate is usually not between supporters of different political platforms or 
creeds; rather, it is the government on the one hand and society on the other. 
Therefore, increased criticism of the government does not always translate 
into support for the opposition.
Such a nihilistic attitude towards the state and the political sphere is 
sometimes explained by the fact that the modern state is seen as having been 
imposed on Georgia by an external force (Russia). On the other hand, the 
Communist state alienated citizens even more because it represented false-
hood and repression, while only the trusted network of friends, relatives and 
neighbours represented solidarity and authenticity. In this sense, post-
colonial and post-Communist attitudes merge.52
Anti-political attitudes combined with reliance on small groups based on 
personal trust are at the heart of what many political scientists call neo-
patrimonialism, or privatization of the state by small clientelistic networks. If 
judged against the standards of modern statehood, such an attitude to the 
                                                          
50 18.1 per cent of those polled considered criminal boss a “very prestigious” occupation, 
whereas only 6.2 per cent said this of a police officer. 
51 In a 1997 poll by CIPDD and the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, 78 per cent of those 
polled agreed that “if you keep out of politics you have peace and a clean conscience.” – 
Theodore Hanf and Ghia Nodia, Lurching to Democracy. From agnostic tolerance to 
pious Jacobinism: Societal change and people’s reactions. Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlags-
gesellschaft, 2000), p. 105. 
52 Some authors consider anti-political attitudes generally typical of the post-Communist 
world, but also of post-colonial societies like those in Africa. Such an approach, in which 
post-Soviet and African states were compared, was used, for instance, in Mark R. 
Beissinger and Crawford Young (Eds.), “Beyond State Crisis: Postcolonial Africa and Post-
Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective”, Woodrow Wilson Center Press: Washington, 
DC, 2002. 
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state is usually branded “corruption”. The problem of corruption writ large 
and the privatization of state institutions by “the clans” was the most salient 
political issue in Georgia in the last period of Eduard Shevardnadze’s tenure. 
The political agenda of the anti-Shevardnadze opposition, and afterwards of 
the new government, was dominated by the idea of overcoming “clannish-
ness” and corruption. Naturally, there are different opinions as to how suc-
cessful this government has been in implementing this agenda.  
Georgian society is in no way unique in these characteristics. The dimin-
ishing role of political institutions and public confidence in them is notice-
able in many societies. In different ways, these trends express themselves in 
developing countries that are only starting to build democratic institutions 
and in consolidated democracies in Western countries, as has been the case 
in the last decade with the rise of anti-politics or neo-populist movements 
against European integration, globalization, migration, etc. The dynamics of 
the last fifteen years may in general be considered positive in the Georgian 
case where awareness of civic and political rights has tended to rise and the 
quality of participation has increased, as demonstrated by the example of the 
Rose Revolution. A further increase in the intensity and quality of citizens’ 
participation requires the development of civil society institutions, including 
political parties.
The old and the new elites 
While a large part of society is relatively passive in exercising its political 
rights, and economic or ethnic cleavages do not play a central role in defin-
ing the identity of major political players in Georgia, rifts within elites may 
become highly salient as well as politically relevant.  
One way to define the schism between elite groups in Georgia is through 
their linkages with the institutions of the old and the new political regimes. 
This cleavage developed in the years following the Soviet Union's break-up 
but it still retains some relevance today. The difference between the two el-
ites can be described in objective terms, and it is also vividly present in pub-
lic discourse. By “old elites” we understand networks formed around institu-
tions of the Soviet regime: the old Communist Party and Komsomol no-
menklatura (leadership), managers of Communist enterprises, and intellec-
tuals who rose to high status in the academic institutions and “creative un-
ions” of the Soviet era. These were the people who dominated the Soviet 
regime in terms of power and status.  
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Revolution as elite change 
In his classic book,53 the renowned Italian political sociologist, Vilfredo 
Pareto, understood revolutions as primarily changes of elites. While ana-
lysts often argue whether the Rose Revolution was a true revolution or not, 
Pareto’s theory can be relevant to this debate. According to him, a domi-
nant group only survives in power if it allows the best people of different 
backgrounds to join it and if it does not hesitate to use force to defend its 
privileges and rewards. As the dominant elite loses its capacity to recruit 
the most able members of society and loses its nerve in defending its 
dominant position, it also “tends to increase its unlawful appropriations 
and to indulge in major usurpations of the national patrimony”, which 
increases resentment against it. This is the moment when the most able 
and motivated members of the society are concentrated in an alternative 
elite and mobilize public sentiment for ousting the old one. The difference 
between the Georgian case and those Pareto had in mind is that the identi-
ties of rival Georgian elites were not linked to social classes such as the 
bourgeoisie or the working class, but rather to different sets of institu-
tions.
The new elites initially defined themselves through their opposition to Soviet 
rule, but also through participation in the new institutions that emerged as a 
result of the political and economic transformations that started in the period 
of Gorbachev reforms and continued in independent Georgia. These in-
cluded anti-Communist movements and political parties, independent me-
dia, private business, non-governmental organizations, and Western and 
international organizations which were established in Georgia and recruited 
Georgian staff. All these were institutions that simply did not exist under 
Communism. 
In the countries of Eastern Europe such a division was of central impor-
tance for political party formation in the period of democratic transition and 
the early 1990s and it continues to be relevant today. While in the late 1980s, 
alternative elites ousted the Communists from power, the latter redefined 
themselves as social-democratic parties and, in several countries, came back 
in the second post-Communist elections. They fitted well into the democratic 
power game and recruited many younger people, but their origin in the old 
power elites, as opposed to the parties rooted in the anti-Communist move-
ments, continues to be an important marker for the identity of different po-
litical parties there (even though the importance of this marker tends to di-
minish with time).  
                                                          
53 V.Pareto. The Rise and Fall of Elites: an Application of Theoretical Sociology. Transac-
tion Publishers: New Jersey, 1991. 
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Unlike Eastern European countries, no such successor party to the Soviet-era 
Communist organization was created in Georgia. When the anti-Communist 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia was ousted from power and was replaced by Eduard 
Shevardnadze, the former Communist leader in Georgia, it superficially 
resembled the return of reform Communists to power in Poland or Hun-
gary. To be sure, Shevardnadze’s return to power served as an informal ex-
culpation of the old Communist-era elites, and many former Communists 
returned to the state apparatus. However, the Citizens’ Union of Georgia, the 
party created around Shevardnadze, could not be considered a successor to 
the Communist party whether formally or informally. Nonetheless, the party 
tried officially to become a social-democratic party and in that sense showed 
a shift similar to that of the transformed former Communist parties in East-
ern Europe. Several groups of people had been central to its creation, some 
of them rooted in the old elites, some with a background in the national in-
dependence movement.  
Therefore, in the Shevardnadze period, one can speak rather of the mix-
ing of the elites.54 Former Communist elites did not have separate political 
tools for articulating their interests and attitudes in the new environment. All 
publicly active people declared their allegiance to the institutions and values 
associated with the new Georgia, such as independent statehood, democracy, 
human rights, and the market economy. However, the “old elite” persisted as 
a recognizable and relatively distinct informal network, while the “new” peo-
ple still defined and legitimized themselves through their opposition to the 
old one. The old elite represented such qualities as experience, moderation, 
being closer to cultural traditions, but also – as viewed by its opponents, – 
corruption, opportunism, and hidden resistance to democratic values. The 
new elites claimed to be true proponents of democratic reforms, but were 
portrayed by their opponents as dangerous radicals who were not sufficiently 
dedicated to national traditions. 
It would be difficult to understand the processes that led to and have de-
veloped since the Rose Revolution without taking this hidden opposition into 
account. The Rose Revolution is often understood as the second attempt to 
break away from the Communist past. Its leaders themselves often portray 
the Rose Revolution, and the events that followed it, as a belated replica of 
the 1989 “velvet revolutions” in the East-Central Europe. However, despite 
the strongly anti-Communist rhetoric of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, many top 
leaders in his government were former high-ranking Communists. It was 
only as a result of the Rose Revolution that the former Communists were 
genuinely ousted from power. While several key leaders of the Rose Revolu-
tion have also served in the Shevardnadze government, nobody with any 
links to the Communist-era institutions continues to hold high positions of 
power.55 On the other hand, the higher education reform, which is often 
                                                          
54 See on this Theodore Hanf and Ghia Nodia, Lurching to Democracy (2000), pp. 52-55. 
55 Out of twenty ministers who held their positions in November 2004 three had served as 
ministers under Shevardnadze (two for a very brief period) and two had served as deputy 
ministers (one as Saakashvili’s deputy of during his tenure as Justice Minister). Fourteen 
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considered one of the most important undertakings of the new government, 
also highlights an important aspect of the change of elites since universities 
are often seen as the last strongholds in which the Communist-era elites are 
entrenched. These reforms are seen as an attempt by the new elite to take 
over the universities and are often resisted.  
New elites 
The new Georgian elites may be most clearly defined in the context of 
globalization. In the Communist era, the language of advancement was 
Russian, which gave access to resources controlled by the imperial centre 
in Moscow. Therefore, Russian is still perceived to be the language of the 
old elites. The new people, on the other hand, have access to resources 
provided through contacts with the West that opened up after independ-
ence. First of all, this involves a knowledge of English (as well as – to a 
lesser degree – other Western languages), giving priority to advanced 
means of communications (the Internet) and an ability to use the global 
“language” (or rather jargon) used by actors identified as the “interna-
tional community.” To use popular shorthand, these are people who have 
knowledge of “English and computers.”  
In Georgia such people also happen to be young. This may in fact be 
the principal social cleavage of the globalized world, one that has simply 
extended itself to Georgia. After the Rose Revolution, the new government 
made a serious effort to attract Georgians who had studied and worked in 
the West and had experience of working in international organizations or 
Western-funded NGOs to high and middle positions in the government. 
The generation that had mastered the language of globalization came to 
power.
The generation gap is the most obvious – even if somewhat superficial and 
often misleading – marker distinguishing the old and the new elites. The fact 
of having been socialized under the Communist regime (which also symbol-
ized foreign domination) is often considered a kind of contamination stig-
matizing the elder generation, something that is even acknowledged by 
some of the latter. Being “old” is often associated with entrenchment in So-
viet-style practices unsuited to the new realities. It was said in the 1990s that 
for the sake of progress in Georgia, the new generation that had been social-
ized after independence should take the lead. Within Eduard Shevardnadze’s 
government, a latent conflict between the so-called “young reformers” led by 
Zurab Zhvania and Mikheil Saakashvili and nomenklatura people rooted in 
                                                                                                                               
were born in 1961 or later, six had either worked or studied abroad, and eight had previ-
ously worked for Georgian NGOs or international donor organizations. Jonathan 
Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in 
the Former Soviet Union, Ashgate: Burlington, p. 200. 
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the Communist and Komsomol networks developed into the major political 
intrigue of the late 1990s. It was the story of the hidden conflict between the 
“old” and the “new” that culminated in the Rose Revolution. The govern-
ment that came to power as a result of the revolution is very young: Sa-
akashvili was thirty-seven when he was elected President; many ministers 
are around or under thirty. This is not a coincidence: the age and biographies 
of the new leaders are supposed to signify a radical (if somewhat belated) 
break from the (Soviet) past. 
It is true that this cleavage is often oversimplified – and, in this simplified 
form, greatly resented by the older generation. Values and attitudes are not 
automatically linked to age or even biography, and there are different people 
in every age group. However, the fact of the matter is that the Rose Revolu-
tion made being young an important asset in itself. Admittedly, the transfer 
of power from Shevardnadze to Saakashvili was symbolic of a whole genera-
tion being left out of the political process. This generation is constituted of 
people who were too young during the time of the Communist gerontocracy 
but may feel almost redundant when they see people in their twenties be-
come ministers.  
Since the new generation that speaks the language of globalization came 
to power, the social cleavages may be redefined 
However, since the new generation that speaks the language of globalization 
came to power, the social cleavages may be redefined. As time passes and the 
Communist regime becomes a memory of the distant past, the issue of the 
difference between the old and new elites is bound to fade. One could al-
ready say that the main social rift in Georgia is between those who can take 
advantage of the benefits of globalization and those who are harmed by poli-
cies inspired by global blueprints.
One might expect that at the political level this rift would lead to competi-
tion between the liberal Westernizers and those promoting nostalgia for the 
Soviet past – or, alternatively, anti-Western nationalists. However, despite the 
deep economic crisis that followed the Soviet demise, nostalgia for the Soviet 
past is not strong in Georgia – at least, no political party has been successful 
in capitalizing on it. So far, there is no distinct anti-globalization movement 
in Georgia either. 
On the other hand, there are many among the opposition leaders and 
supporters who also belong to the “new elites” as defined above. Economic 
protectionism and cultural traditionalism may be ideas that political groups 
can use if they want to capitalize on the disadvantages suffered by those peo-
ple who consider themselves losers in Georgia’s greater integration – or at-
tempts to integrate – into global political and economic space. But this need 
not challenge Georgia’s general orientation towards modern Western models 
of building political and economic institutions. 
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Main findings 
? Around fifty per cent of Georgians live below the poverty line. Despite 
relatively high economic growth in recent years, the poverty indicators 
remain dramatic; 
? Ethnic minorities are weakly integrated into civil and political life.
About seventeen per cent of the Georgian population (excluding people 
living in the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) be-
long to ethnic minorities. Many of them do not speak the Georgian 
language and their level of civil and political participation is lower than 
that of the Georgian population; 
? Religion is important. Since independence, there has been a steep in-
crease in religiosity. This has bolstered the authority and status of the 
Georgian Orthodox Church and has led to debates and divisions with 
regard to the status of the dominant church as well as the rights and 
status of religious minorities; 
? Public support for democracy is high. Despite severe problems and 
obstacles in building sustainable democratic institutions in Georgia, 
such as deeply-felt anti-political attitudes and low levels of social trust, 
the majority of Georgia’s population strongly supports the democratic 
direction of the country. This correlates closely with a broad consensus 
around the desire to join Western institutions such as the European 
Union and NATO; 
? Citizenship is of low intensity. The domination of personalistic net-
works in the social sphere, scepticism towards political institutions, and 
the failure to create broadly based civil organizations has led Georgian 
society to take a generally passive stance, save for special episodes like 
the Rose Revolution; 
? Cleavages within the elites are more politically relevant than broader 
economic and ethnic divisions. There is a salient rift between the old 
and new elites that may be defined through linkages to the Communist 
institutions and related networks in the case of the former and the 
globally connected new institutions which emerged after the independ-
ence in the case of the latter. The Rose Revolution led to the domina-
tion of the new elite. It is still uncertain how this will redefine the exist-
ing social cleavages.
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2. The Institutional Development of Political 
Parties
This section covers the current condition of political parties in Georgia. It is 
based on an interactive assessment with the six leading political parties in 
Georgia: the Conservative Party of Georgia, Industry Will Save Georgia, the 
Georgian Labour Party, the New Conservative Party of Georgia, the Republi-
can Party, and the United National Movement. Their active participation in 
assessing their situation took place through multiparty and individual meet-
ings in different parts of the country. 
Conservative Party of Georgia – Head office, Kakheti regional organizations, 
Didube district organization, Gori district organization;
Industry Will Save Georgia – Head office, Kvemo Kartli regional organiza-
tion, Gldani district organization, Terjola district organization; 
Labour Party of Georgia – Head office, Dusheti district organization, Var-
ketili district organization, Batumi organization; 
New Conservative Party – Head office, Gori district organization, Gldani 
district organization, Kutaisi organization;  
Republican Party – Head office, Tbilisi organization, Poti organization, Ba-
tumi organization; 
United National Movement – Head office, Mtskheta district organization, 
Tbilisi organization, Gurjaani district organization.  
While the state, society, and the international community represent the ex-
ternal environment in which political parties operate, parties also constitute 
an environment for each other. By definition, parties operate in competition 
with other parties. Therefore, this chapter starts by analyzing the political 
party system in Georgia. Since independence this system has been character-
ized by the presence of a single dominant party and a multitude of much 
weaker opposition parties. The party system is weakly institutionalized; par-
ties mainly depend on the personalities of their leaders, or small groups of 
leaders, and they are easily formed and dissolved. Coalitions tend to be tacti-
cal and unstable, and the list of major contenders can change dramatically 
before each election. The political system combines a high concentration of 
power with a strong fragmentation among the opposition. The level of ideo-
logical polarization is low. Cooperation mainly takes place between opposi-
tion parties, while the level of confrontation is high and often takes bitterly 
personalistic forms. Therefore, the further development of political parties in 
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Georgia will probably be linked to general changes in Georgia’s political 
system.
At the same time, a strong 
democratic political system 
depends on the capacity of 
individual parties to be 
robust institutions that 
adequately represent citi-
zens’ interests. For this 
parties require a number of 
qualities. The first of such 
qualities is a distinct iden-
tity. The public needs to 
know what each political 
party stands for. Party identities are supposed to be defined through alle-
giance to certain values and principles, specific ways of achieving the public 
good, and/or linkages to the interests of specific social groups. Such party 
profiles are often referred to as “ideologies.” Most political parties in Georgia 
have distinct ideological labels, though they are often criticized for depend-
ing more on the personalities of their leaders than on principles and policies, 
or else for being opportunistic in the application of those principles. How-
ever, the political parties also recognize this problem and try to develop more 
distinct and sustainable identities beyond the personalities of their leaders.  
Parties are also competitors for power in the public space. In order to win 
public support – and elections – they need to convey their messages to the 
public. Public relations and election campaigning are the central activities of 
any party. In this second section, attention is also paid to the methods that 
Georgian political parties use to win the support of an electorate that is in-
creasingly experienced and sophisticated.  
Running campaigns and doing other political party work requires re-
sources – organizational, human and financial. This implies, first of all, the 
setting-up and management of party organizations. Resources in all parties, 
even relatively strong ones, are always limited, so effective management of 
the available resources is crucial to a party’s success. Another chapter in this 
section analyzes what resources the Georgian political parties have at their 
disposal and how successful they are in making the most of them. 
All Georgian parties agree that human resources are their most important 
assets. These involve national or local leaders and networks of dedicated 
activists, that is the rank-and-file members of the party. But what does mem-
bership mean? Are members sources of financial support, do they just follow 
the orders of the party leadership, or are they the true backbone of political 
parties who define the party’s identity and policies? Are parties that claim to 
fight for democracy also internally democratic? A special chapter tackles 
those issues.  
In order to be internally strong and win public support, it is important for 
political parties to reflect the diversity of social interests, and represent them 
Political Parties that participated in the 
interactive assessment 
Conservative Party of Georgia (CPG) 
Georgian Labour (Shromis) Party (GLP) 
Industry Will Save Georgia (IWSG) 
New Conservative Party of Georgia (NCPG) 
Republican Party (RP) 
United National Movement (UNM) 
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within their own ranks. In this context it is extremely important that women 
– more than half of the population – take an active part in party political 
work. There are a number of notable female political leaders in Georgia, and 
the contribution of women is also very important for the success of party 
work at the grass-roots level. However, more can and should be done to in-
volve and empower women in politics since they are an important resource 
for the further development of political parties in Georgia.
Leading political parties in Georgia have been involved in international 
contacts with like-minded parties or party networks, and with international 
organizations that assist the development of political parties. All Georgian 
parties are enthusiastic about such contacts and consider them an important 
resource for their development. But what specifically have the Georgian par-
ties gained from international contacts and what can they hope to gain from 
international cooperation? This is the theme of the last chapter in this sec-
tion.
Each of the seven chapters opens with a “What to do” box where the main 
recommendations are outlined with regard to the future development of 
political parties in Georgia. These recommendations are further elaborated 
in the next pages with facts, figures and analyses of the current state of de-
velopment of Georgian political parties, highlighting their achievements and 
challenges and the attitudes of the parties themselves to problems of party 
development in Georgia. Each chapter ends with a “Main Findings” box.
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2.1 Introduction: Origin and Functions of 
Political Parties 
Changing, but not disappearing 
The character and function of political parties and of party systems have 
been changing continuously during the centuries. From ancient Greece to 
today’s universally more Western type of mass consumption societies, 
political parties have been through radical changes but they have not dis-
sappeared. Their functions in representative democracies have remained. 
They also varied in different periods of Georgia’s history such as the brief 
interlude of Georgia’s independence in 1918-21 or the very first years after 
the break-up of the Soviet Union. The current situation of Georgia’s politi-
cal parties can be better understood if it is placed in an international and 
historical context. The context in which political party systems emerged in 
the nascent Western democracies of the 19th and 20th centuries is natu-
rally different from the context of post-Communist Georgia at the begin-
ning of the 21st century. The local origins of the Georgian case are impor-
tant to have in mind. On the other hand, Georgian political parties have 
developed since the break up of the Soviet Union in a globalized world 
and are being influenced by it. They also display some similarities with 
and important differences, from comparable processes in the countries of 
Eastern Europe. 
How political parties emerged in the West and elsewhere
Political parties in the broad sense of the word already existed in ancient 
Greece. There, at public meetings in Athens, they were what can be defined 
as confrontational groups involved in fighting for power over a long period of 
time, and in that power-game they acted as the representations of different 
groups of citizens divided according to their social status, place of residence 
and attitudes towards certain public isues and figures.56 But together with 
this representative function, the political party as we known it today with also 
its institutional function, emerged with the establishment of constitutional 
governments and the introduction of legitimate elections.57 It became “an 
organization linking the governors with the governed, ensuring representa-
                                                          
56 Hans Daalder, “The Rise of Parties in Western Democracies”, in Political Parties and 
Democracy, ed. by Richard Gunther, Larry Diamond, the Johns Hopkins Univ. Press: 
Baltimore, 2001, pp.40- 51  
57 Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge 
Univ. Press: New York, 1976. 
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tion and obtaining power through the nomination of candidates during elec-
tions.” The further development of political parties into wider public organi-
zations came with the introduction of universal suffrage.58
When the predecessors of modern political parties (Whigs and Tories in 
England, Liberals and Conservatives in South America) appeared, the right 
to vote was the privilege of a small elite. It did not take much effort for a 
candidate to become a member of a legislative body; it merely depended on 
his personal reputation or that of his family. Once in parliament, its mem-
bers established factions based on their common interests or personal rela-
tionships. But at the same time, at the end of the 18th century there occurred 
what the Scottish philosopher David Hume described as “the most unac-
countable phenomenon that has yet appeared in human affairs, factions 
from principle.”59 Later, the English philosopher and politician Edmund 
Burke provided a more accurate definition of those factions or parties: “a 
body of men united upon a particular principle to promote the common 
good of men.”60 This definition of the political party includes one of its most 
important characteristics: a conviction, set of ideas or ideology shared by its 
members and supporters.  
The development of political parties and the different party systems in the 
period after the introduction of universal suffrage is part of the institutional 
development of democracy. Notwithstanding the differences that do exist 
between the different types of political parties (elite, mass, cadre, network, 
etc…61) when seen from a functional point of view, political parties are sup-
posed to contribute to the democratization process by seeking legitimation
for their exercise of power, by showing inclusiveness and integrating all peo-
ple into the political process, by being programmatic and elaborating plans 
for stable and efficient governments (or executing their checks-and-balance 
role from the opposition), and by canalizing and solving by peaceful means 
the conflicts of interest that are inherent to any society.  
How political parties emerged in Georgia
In Georgia, political parties first emerged and developed in early 20th cen-
tury. At that time, Georgia was part of the Russian empire and had no sepa-
rate political or even administrative status. While this was the period when 
the Russian empire started experimenting with representative institutions 
(such as the state Duma), there were no local representative bodies like 
                                                          
58 For a very complete overview of the different classifications of political parties see Rich-
ard Gunther, Larry Diamond, “Types and Functions of Parties”, in: Political Parties and 
Democracy, ed. by Richard Gunther, Larry Diamond, the Johns Hopkins Univ. Press: 
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Georgia on the outskirts of the empire. Therefore, political parties were 
mainly involved in extra-parliamentary activities. After the break-up of the 
Russian empire lead to a brief interlude of Georgia’s independence in 1918-
21, a spectrum of parliamentary parties emerged.  
The creation of parties in Georgia was preceded by the development of 
groups (today we would say, civil society groups, though nobody used that 
language at the time) promoting different social and cultural agendas. These 
groups emerged in the second half of the 19th century and their members 
came mostly from the educated strata: nobility with university education, 
schoolteachers, clerks working for the Tsar’s administration. These groups 
were formed mainly around newspapers and journals in which their agendas 
were promoted. Despite differences, most of these groups were influenced 
by liberal ideas, inherently (later, openly) opposed the Tsarist autocracy, and 
saw their greatest priority in educating the Georgian society, that is exposing 
it to the progressive ideas of the time. However, groups differed on what 
issues they gave preference to. Some focused on the “national” issue, that is 
the agenda of preserving Georgian ethno-cultural identity against the assimi-
lationist policies of the Russian empire, known as “Russification”. Others 
rather highlighted the “social” issue in line of the left-radical ideas of the 
time. This difference became later the main division within the pre-Soviet 
Georgian political class, that between the nationalists and the socialists.
The development of new civil society groups can be traced back to the ac-
tivities of Tergdaleuili,62 a group of young Georgians who returned to their 
homeland after being educated in Russian universities and who became 
involved in activities aiming at reviving the Georgian culture. Ilya Chavcha-
vadze was the most prominent figure among them and he became the sym-
bol or icon of the idea of the modern Georgian nationhood.
The second group led by Niko Nikoladze and Giorgi Tsereteli was closer 
to the radical progressive ideology that was developing in Europe and the 
Russian empire at the time. Another notable group was Xalxosnebi who 
followed the lead of the Russian Narodniki (the Populists). They were in-
spired by the idea of educating the lower classes and exposing them to the 
progressive ideas. In 1892, the more to the left oriented part of Georgian civil 
society organized itself in the Mesame Dasi [the Third Company]. It became 
the immediate predecessor of Georgian social democracy. 
In the early 20th century, these groups started to organize themselves into 
political parties. The first and the strongest of them were the Social Democ-
rats who were established in Georgia in 1900. However, this was not really a 
strictly Georgian party but rather operated as a local committee of the Rus-
sian Social Democratic Workers' Party.63 It included groups of the intelli-
gentsia, workers and peasants, and had branches or committees in towns 
and even in some villages. The intense and fairly well-organized activities of 
                                                          
62 Literally “those who drank [the water of] Tergi”, the river on the border between Geor-
gia and Russia. 
63 One should note that quite a few Georgians played a prominent role in the Russian 
Social Democratic at the imperial level. 
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this party enabled it to win large numbers of members and supporters. Over 
a short period of time it had achieved the reputation of being the main force 
of opposition against the unpopular and as unjust perceived Tsarist regime, 
and became the most popular political movement among the largest stratum 
of Georgian society, the peasantry. The Social Democrats, in Russia as well 
as in Georgia, soon split in Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, respectively the 
more moderate and more radical factions. In Georgia, there was a strong 
predominance of the Mensheviks. 
This success of the Social Democrats gave an important impetus to the 
creation of other parties. At the congress that took place in Geneva in 1904, 
the Georgian Revolutionary Socialist Federalist Party was founded. This 
party had its ideological origin in the Xalxosnebi (Populist) movement. Its 
core was made up of representatives of the intelligentsia who supported the 
platform of moderate populist socialism altough they were more nationalist-
oriented. Its main policy aim was to achieve Georgia's autonomy. Unlike the 
Social Democrats, the Federalists, as they got to be known, were an inde-
pendent Georgian party rather than a local branch of the imperial organiza-
tion. The party was not as successful as the Social Democrats, but it could 
count on the solid support of the middle classes and gentry, concerned as 
they were with Russia’s assimilation’s policies. In the climate of Tsarist au-
tocracy, political activities were often clandestine and took the form of illegal, 
sometimes violent actions. This trend and party activism peaked during the 
1905-07 revolution. Party propagandists were active in different parts of the 
country. Wide parts of society took part in the armed struggle against the 
regime under the leadership of the political parties, foremost the social-
democrats. Members of the socialist parties carried out a number of attacks 
against high-level officials of the imperial regime and other opponents of the 
revolution.
The defeat of the revolution and post-revolutionary persecutions by the 
authorities dealt a significant blow to the Georgian political parties. Many of 
their leaders were arrested or emigrated. Political activities were again lim-
ited to small groups of the intelligentsia and consisted mainly on publishing 
periodicals.
The two Russian revolutions of 1917 that made an end to the Tsarist re-
gime and brought radical Bolsheviks to power radically changed the envi-
ronment for the political struggle in Georgia. The prospects of establishing 
in Russia a democratic republic based on federalist principles vanished. That 
brought social democratic and nationalist goals closer to each other and both 
movements found a common denominator in the idea of creating a democ-
ratic Georgian republic independent of Bolshevik Russia. Consensus on 
these issues in the period 1917-1919 manifested itself through the coordi-
nated activities of all main parties, namely the Social Democrats, the Social 
Federalists, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and the newly created party on the 
right, the National Democrats. In this period, first the short-lived Transcau-
casus Federation was created, to be succeeded by the independent Georgian 
Republic in May 1918.  
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Thus started the second period in the development of Georgian political 
parties, focused in the establishment and functioning of a parliamentary 
republic. The henceforth strongest Social Democratic party, now independ-
ent of its imperial centre, emerged as the dominant political force behind the 
process of creating the new state. Its higher level of organization and over-
whelming popularity among Georgian peasants marked the difference with 
other parties. This was the only really mass-membership party in Georgia. 
According to some data, its membership in independent Georgia reached 80 
thousand (Georgia's population at that time did not exceed 2.5 million). The 
nobility, army officers and national minority groups did not share the enthu-
siasm for the Social Democrats, and the National Democratic Party, an ideo-
logical heir of Ilia Chavchavadze’s liberal nationalism, emerged as the 
strongest among these groups. The small but troublesome Bolshevik party 
represented the greatest danger for the emerging democratic system as it did 
not share the new national consensus in favour of independence, but actively 
proclaimed joining Bolshevik Russia and chose for the illegal armed struggle 
against the Georgian Republic.
In the first Georgian elections to the Constituent Assembly, the Social 
Democrats won 108 of the total of 130 seats. Without alsmost any experi-
enced personnel for the burocratic apparatus (very few Georgians had any 
experience of working for the Russian Tsarist state), the Social Democratic 
Party became the backbone of the new state structures. At the same time, 
while the Georgian army had only existed on a very small scale, the National 
Guard, which effectively was the armed brunch of the Social Democratic 
party, acted as the main military force of the Republic. In other words, there 
was a kind of “party-based state”, and the structure of the political party sys-
tem looked very much like the one we can find in contemporary Georgia: a 
single dominant party that is hard to distinguish from the state apparatus 
and a multitude of small opposition parties, none of whom serves as a realis-
tic contender for power. At the same time, since during the brief interlude of 
independence the very existence of the Republic was continuously chal-
lenged, there were no important political differences between the parties.  
Occupation by the Russian Bolshevik Red Army soon brought an end to 
political pluralism in Georgia, although the Bolsheviks could not enforce full 
control overnight and some parties could retain legal status before being 
forced to announce their dissolution and declare their loyalty to the Bolshe-
vik authorities. Those parties that continued to operate did that as under-
ground resistance parties. In 1922, they founded the so-called Damkomi or 
Independence Committee. The Damkomi was the main organizer of the 
1924 anti-Soviet rebellion and ceased to exist after the rebellion was quashed. 
Its leaders and most participants were arrested or emigrated. From then on 
Georgia had only one and hegemonic Communist party. Small groups tried 
to create opposition organizations but were soon arrested and their members 
imprisoned. The Republican Party, still active today, was one of such organi-
zations created in 1978. 
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International context  
Social changes after the World War II considerably affected the development 
of political parties in Western democracies. Rising overall welfare and educa-
tional standards, the individualization and in some countries secularization 
of society made more diffuse the boundaries between different social strata 
and their alleged interests. A more educated and well-off citizenry, most of 
whom considered itself middle-class, had a wider and more complex array of 
challenges and (political party) choices.  
Blurring of ideological boundaries, and thus rearranging the structure of 
political agendas, was one of the principal outcomes of the new environ-
ment. Political agendas grew closer to each other. This opened the way to 
cooperation between political parties that had previously been seen as 
irreconcilably opposed to each other. The party scene was also significantly 
influenced by media developments. While in earlier times parties connected 
to their electorate mainly through local organizations and the party press, 
now the independent media and particularly the electronic media became 
the main tool for reaching out to society. This naturally lead to a diminished 
importance of party membership. Reductions in numbers of party members 
were the most obvious outcome of this. Party leaders began to focus more on 
directly addressing the electorate rather than maintaining a strong corps of 
regular members. Moreover, as political leaders entered the citizens’ living-
rooms through their TV sets, their personal attractiveness became an in-
creasingly crucial factor.
As a result of all these changes existing parties changed and new parties 
emerged. Their most common feature became their focus on winning elec-
tions and catching the vote of the majority of the population. Almost all par-
ties without any exception become so-called “catch-all” parties. These 
changes in party structures and activities triggered debates about their role in 
society. The emergence of social movements and one-issue organizations 
appeared to be a serious threat to political parties and to some political scien-
tists and analysts the beginning of their apocalypses. But reality demon-
strated that parties were changing, their importance in the eyes of ordinary 
people diminishing, but their institutional relevance in representatives de-
mocracies certainly not decreasing. Parties may have a lesser role when it 
comes to representing the variety of social interests and parties face harsh 
competition in carrying out this function against interest groups and social 
movements. But they are the only organizations able to aggregate those in-
terests. Parties are also machines for the recruitment of political personnel. 
Political parties remain the indispensable intermediary layers between soci-
ety and the state.64
                                                          
64 Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge 
Univ. Press: New York, 1976 
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Functions of political parties in a democratic society 
The activities of political parties can vary from one country to another. They 
may be involved in creating combat units, providing social assistance to 
lower strata of the society, or owning media sources. These, however, are 
hardly the functions that are specific to political parties. What are those func-
tions that are common tor different political parties, and that constitute the 
main purpose of this political institution? What makes them indispensable 
for an effective democratic system?  
Previously we mentioned four important contributions that parties can 
make to the democratization process. It is possible to say that these contribu-
tions take place at two levels. On the one hand, parties normally have their 
origins in society; they operate within and work with society. On the other 
hand, by being in power or in the opposition, they influence political deci-
sion-making and constitute part of the country's political system. At each of 
these two levels, the parties perform different functions. With regard to soci-
ety, the parties have the function of articulating (expressing) and aggregating 
(that is, accumulating and balancing) different interests; they pass political 
information to the public and supply the information from the public to the 
authorities; they serve as agents of political socialization. With respect to the 
government, the parties perform two main functions. They recruit and breed 
future politicians, nominate their candidates in the elections or appoint them 
to political positions; they also formulate policies and implement them in the 
event of coming to power. 
Articulating (expressing) and aggregating (balancing) interests. One of the 
reasons to create political parties was to protect the interests of different 
strata of society. From this point of view, parties are similar to interest 
groups and social movements. Parties try to represent the interests of their 
voters and take appropriate stands on relevant political issues. What make 
them different are the methods of implementing these interests. While one-
issue or particular interest groups and social movements try to achieve their 
goals by exerting pressure on political institutions, the parties achieve these 
goals from “inside” of the political system. In that sense they are also indis-
pensable vehicles for interest groups. 
The desire to win votes in the elections pushes the parties to include the 
interests of different social groups in their campaign promises. This is how 
yet another function which we have mentioned, that of aggregating (balanc-
ing) interests, is performed. Unlike social movements and interest groups 
whose activities are focused on one particular social group or even a single 
issue, the parties try to include in their programs diverse, at times very dif-
ferent interests. The need to perform this function may at times lead to con-
tradictions with the party’s ideological stand. The parties usually want to 
preserve their identity that is linked to their ideology but at the same time 
make it flexible enough in order to incorporate a variety of social interests. 
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Creating party coalitions is another way of aggregating different social inter-
ests.
Supplying information to the public. One might say that the parties perform 
the function of politically educating society. They regularly raise different 
issues thus influencing public opinion. This function of the parties is 
deemed so important in some European countries that it constitutes one of 
the major arguments in favour of state financing for the parties.
Political socialization. The parties bring together different groups of their 
supporters that may come from various social strata. As the parties abide by 
the rules of the game which are prescribed by the political system of a coun-
try, they thus contribute to shaping the citizens’ loyalty to the political sys-
tem. The existence of stable groups of supporters of different parties in a 
society is conducive to its political stability. The long-standing allegiance to 
an established political organization makes it less likely that a citizen will 
cross over to some populist leader or an extremist group. The existence of 
such stable attachments among the voters makes the outcome of the elec-
tions more predictable than it would have been otherwise. It is also an im-
portant incentive for a citizen to go to the ballot box on the election day and 
thus connect to the system of governance.  
The existence of parties has yet another significant purpose. It provides 
the possibility of shifting the brunt of the citizens' displeasure from the po-
litical institutions (the state or its different agencies) to the ruling party. In 
this case, change of the parties in power is not associated with the change of 
the political regime in the country.
Attracting and breeding political leaders, taking part in elections and ap-
pointing to political positions. Joining a party and getting involved in its ac-
tivities is the best way to get a chance of obtaining a political (rather than a 
civil service) position in the government. “Given that in most countries with 
a representative parliamentary democracy nearly all the holders of political 
posts are nominated by political parties, this should be considered one of the 
most important functions of the political parties.”65 Not only do the parties 
attract future statesmen, they also take part in training them. Before taking a 
position in government, most politicians go through a long party career, 
during which they acquire skills that are required for leadership.  
Democratic elections imply making a choice between the parties or the 
candidates that are nominated by them. This means that the parties structure 
the elections: this is one of their main functions. The existence of political 
parties makes it easier for the citizens to choose between different groups of 
politicians and political views, whether the choice is between party lists or 
individual candidates. The parties compile different ideas into a general pro-
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gram under a common name and give the voters the possibility to decide 
whom they should support. The decision which was made once helps the 
citizens to take some position on different issues in the future. In the newly 
democratic countries, both the emergence of the parties and their establish-
ment as a central element of the political landscape is mainly associated with 
the introduction of free and fair elections. Should they win the elections, the 
parties appoint their members or supporters to a number of positions. This 
expedites coordination between the legislative and executive branches of 
power and ensures the legislative branch's support for the government. The 
identification with the same party and party discipline also facilitates coordi-
nation between the members of the parties which are represented in the 
government. Parties bring order in the system.
Policymaking. The parties formulate government policy and, when they are 
in opposition, develop alternatives to this policy. When the parties are disci-
plined enough, their policy is based on the campaign programs, although 
these are often so general that the party has a wide leeway for manoeuvring 
after coming to power. When several parties take part in forming the gov-
ernment, the government policy is formulated by negotiations between these 
parties. On the other hand, the opposition parties push the government to 
take into account alternative policy options and, sometimes, modify their 
decisions respectively. The government does this because the failure to adopt 
the most effective policy may cost the party success in the next elections. 
Thus, party competition leads to a higher quality of policy decisions.  
Criticism of parties 
Political parties and the political class in general are popular subjects of criti-
cism in many countries. Some critics reject the value of political parties in 
public life altogether and consider them merely the instruments for pursu-
ing the interests of a limited number of party leaders.  
Criticism of political parties is as old as the institution itself. Advocates of 
the traditional dynastic system disliked the parties because they undermined 
the established rule and traditional values. On the other hand, some early 
democrats also considered political parties and the spirit of “factionalism” 
that comes with them as dangerously divisive and the upholding of selfish 
group interests against the general interest. For instance, such an attitude 
towards political parties could be extracted from the farewell speech of the 
first president of the US, George Washington. In his case, the negative tone 
with regard to parties was based upon widespread ideas of the time about 
direct democracy, general will and social harmony. As American political 
scientist William Crotty assumes, such attitudes to political parties are not 
unusual in countries attempting to form a democratic government for the 
first time.
People living in contemporary Western democracies have other reasons 
to feel less positive about political parties. Presumably, the changes that were 
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described above, such as weakening ties between parties and particular social 
groups, blurring ideological boundaries and the readiness of political parties 
to combine different agendas for electoral purposes have led to a somewhat 
pejorative view of the political class as the corps of political entrepreneurs 
who are primarily motivated by the greed for power rather than allegiance to 
certain values and social interests. Moreover, during the last 40 years of the 
20th century, the ongoing individualization of people led to a more and more 
independent attitude towards authorities.  
The authoritarian or totalitarian experience that some countries have 
gone through may have contributed to the perception of the state as a pre-
dominantly oppressive institution, which obviously has a negative effect on 
the attitude towards parties as well.66 From a completely opposite point of 
view, parties have been criticized precisely because of their attempts to in-
clude a wider public in politics. According to this elitist approach, ordinary 
people have no essential capacities to participate in politics; consequently, 
they are prone to be manipulated by skillful political entrepreneurs. Parties 
are only instruments for this manipulation.  
Parties in Eastern Europe and Georgia 
Are parties and party systems that emerged after the demise of the Commu-
nist rule any different from those in other countries? In any event, the evolu-
tion of party systems in the new democracies of the Eastern Europe is the 
most natural point of comparison for the Georgian political party scene. If at 
the dawn of democratic transformations a number of political scientists 
thought that parties in this region would follow the route of their Western 
predecessors, it later became obvious that the process exhibits significant 
differences from the party development in the West. 
Parties emerged in Eastern European countries as a result of the over-
throw of Communist regimes and the establishment of political pluralism. 
On the first stage of this process, their political scenes were dominated by 
broad movements whose main purpose was to mobilize the public against 
the Communists (such as the trade union Solidarity in Poland, the Civil Fo-
rum in the Czech Republic, the Popular Fronts in Baltic States, etc.). As their 
main goals were achieved, significant disagreements as well as organisa-
tional problems arose within these movements. In the beginning of the 
1990s, new political parties emerged on the basis of either existing move-
ments or parts of them. Thus, a short while after toppling Communist re-
gimes, political parties became the major participants of political processes 
in Eastern European countries.67 However, the new party systems were not 
as stable and well-institutionalized as they were in Western countries. There 
were frequent divisions and regroupings between the parties, and they 
lacked wide support among the population. That explains why the volatility 
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and change of preferences of voters between elections is higher and more 
frequent in Eastern European countries than in the West.68 Unlike parties in 
established democracies, Eastern European parties do not have roots in par-
ticular social groups. The identification of voters is conditioned largely by 
attitudes to the past (opponents of the Communist nomenklatura and its 
supporters), the attitude towards Western values, and personal sympathies 
and antipathies. Linkage between voting patterns and social strata have cer-
tainly gradually emerged, and the voters with less income who have suffered 
more from market reforms tend to support the left-wing parties stemming 
from former Communist networks, while more successful citizens support 
liberal and centre-right oriented parties.69
There are a number of similarities and differences between political party 
developments in new democracies of Eastern Europe and Georgia. The 
Georgian movement against the Communist political regime tried but failed 
to create an umbrella organisation like the Popular Front and, despite having 
a common agenda, it was split among numerous mutually hostile organisa-
tions. However, like in Eastern European countries, Georgian political par-
ties never aimed to represent the interests of particular social groups. They 
put forward their claims through the confrontation with the Communist 
government and emphasized nationalist interests. Some of these parties 
proved successful at mobilising a fairly large number of supporters for street 
actions (those united into the Round Table coalitions proved the most suc-
cessful among them). On the other hand, there were a number of small club-
type parties that mainly united intellectuals and tried to disseminate their 
ideas among the elite groups (Republican Party, Dasi, Christian Democratic 
Party, the Free Democrats, etc.) The closed nature of these parties which 
emerged by the end of 1980s as well as the absence of internal democracy 
hindered their relations with the wider public.70 Almost all of them were 
markedly personalistic. 
Unlike the parties in Eastern Europe, the Georgian parties failed to estab-
lish themselves as principal players in the political life of the country after 
the demise of the Communist regime. They played only a secondary role 
compared to the dominant power structures. The latter included paramilitary 
groups like Mkhedrioni (until the destruction of the group in 1995) or oligar-
chic networks that moved around personal powers of Eduard Shevardnadze 
or Aslan Abashidze. As one political observer stated then, social life was 
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“…characterized by the drastic reduction of the political party role.”71 Geor-
gian political observers agree that ideological orientations have played a mi-
nor or no role in the life of Georgian political parties. Since gaining inde-
pendence, the most successful parties have been the ones with no clear ideo-
logical stand and those who have targeted at all social strata. This includes all 
parties that have been in power in different years: the bloc Round Table – 
Free Georgia, the Citizens’ Union of Georgia, the Union of Revival, and the 
United National Movement.72 In contrast to the Eastern European party 
scene, in Georgia the former Communist nomenclatura failed to create a 
reformed left-oriented political party to attract the voters especially harmed 
by democratic and market reforms. Some observers considered the Citizens 
Union of Georgia to be such a party because its leader, Eduard Shevard-
nadze, had been a prominent Communist in the past. However, in fact the 
Citizens’ Union included people of different social background among its 
leaders, including reformist Westernizers, and it rallied around the personal-
ity of its leader rather than the interests of a social group. Nonetheless, the 
Citizens’ Union attempted to become a social-democratic party and was offi-
cially linked to the Socialist International as an observer-party.73
By the end of the 1990s, a trend towards greater linkage between political 
parties and particular social interests started to develop. Parties like Industry 
Will Save Georgia and the New Conservatives gave priority to promoting 
business interests, while the Labour Party was considered to be the advocate 
of the interests of the most vulnerable social groups that did not benefit from 
market reforms. Obviously, the phenomenon of clientelistic parties present 
in Eastern Europe is characteristic of Georgian political life as well. The Citi-
zens’ Union of Georgia could be considered an example of this. “Only the 
governing party, which can use the instruments of attraction through force 
or economic benefits, has a lot of members and supporters,” wrote a Geor-
gian observer at the time of the CUG being in power.74 As other parties re-
mained weak, the clientelistic party could retain power over a long period of 
time.
On the following pages we will focus on the current state of affairs of po-
litical parties in Georgia. 
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2.2 The Georgian Political Party System 
What to do? 
? Develop clear and viable policy profiles and coherent party policies; 
? Put peoples’ interests first when designing party policies; 
? Transfer from personality-based to policy-based competition; 
? Re-evaluate the importance of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
opposition;
? Work together when policy choices make case-by-case cooperation nec-
essary; 
? Develop and implement democratic codes of conduct by parties in gov-
ernment and opposition; 
? Parties with similar programmatic and ideological goals establish more 
stable partnership. 
Weak multiparty system and the high death rate of political parties 
Different indicators may be used to describe a political party system in any 
country. The most general principle is a quantitative one. Three categories 
are usually distinguished in this case: one-party, two-party, and multiparty 
systems. In a one-party system, only one strong political organization func-
tions legally and it is in full control of the government. Such a system does 
not allow real political competition; in fact, strictly speaking, one cannot even 
speak about a party system here. The two remaining categories do involve 
competition. In a two-party system, there are two political organizations of 
approximately equal strength. In such systems, the legislation does not re-
strict the establishment of new parties but in practice other parties have only 
a slim chance of competing with the two main players. Analysts speak of a 
multiparty system when there are at least three strong political actors. 
The number of registered political parties in Georgia exceeds 180. This, 
however, is not unique to Georgia. In much older and more consolidated 
democracies the number of registered parties can also be very high. But in 
the Georgian case diversity does not automatically mean multiparty. In mul-
tiparty systems, public support is usually distributed among several parties 
in such a manner that the winning party is compelled to create a coalition 
with other parties to form a government.75 By contrast, in Georgian elec-
tions, winning parties tend to reach landslide victories and enjoy comfortable 
majorities in Parliament without the need to cooperate with other parties.
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In Georgian elections winning parties tend to reach landslide victories and 
enjoy comfortable majorities in Parliament without the need to cooperate 
with other parties 
Based on the experience of the last fifteen years, the Georgian political party 
system may be described as what some analysts call a “loose multiparty sys-
tem.”76 Another name for it could be a dominant political party system. In 
such a system, a single political party achieves outright victory in parliamen-
tary elections and takes full control of government agencies. There is no 
clear distinction between the government and the ruling bureaucracy. There 
also exists an opposition that participates in elective bodies, raises political 
issues, and criticizes specific government actions. In this way it exercises a 
limited influence on the political process, but none of the opposition parties 
can be considered a viable contender for political power. Parties in such a 
system tend to form and dissolve coalitions and alliances easily and without 
adherence to firm principles.  
The domination by a single political party within a formally multiparty 
system has been common to many countries, especially at the early stages of 
the development of democracy. Such systems can be both stable and unsta-
ble, depending on the ability of the ruling politicians to reach compromises 
with others and incorporate different political players into the power system.  
The emergence of dominant-party systems, whether stable or unstable, 
may correlate with the issue of presidential versus parliamentary models of 
democracy. Multiparty scenarios are more typical of parliamentary systems. 
Presidential systems are notable for their high level of concentration of 
power in a single person, and this is reflected in the arrangement of political 
parties. All three dominant parties in Georgia were presidential parties and 
depended on the personal charisma of their leaders.  
The type of political party system also strongly correlates with the mode 
of change or alteration of holders of power. The multiple transitions to de-
mocracy in Georgia have not been within the normal constitutional process; 
rather they have happened through extreme confrontation of political forces 
and a high level of explosive public mobilization. The outcome of the strug-
gle is that the winner takes all and the loser loses all (which could include 
property and freedom). The emergence of a single dominant party is merely 
a logical outcome of such a struggle.77
                                                          
76 Robert Jackson and Doreen Jackson, ibid., p. 323 
77 On the influence of the presidential system on the instability of power change, see Juan 
Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism”, Journal of Democracy, 1 (1990), pp. 51-69 
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The Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party 
In Georgian political discussions, the example of Mexico and the Mexican 
Institutional Revolutionary Party is sometimes invoked as a model of a 
dominant political party system that could be compared to the Georgian 
situation. But the differences are considerable and the example not advis-
able. The PRI ruled in Mexico for more than 70 years without interruption 
and showed itself to be a very strong institution not dependent on any 
particular leader and with regular successions of leadership. But the price 
of such a system in terms of corruption and democratic rights and values 
was very high. In Georgia, three dominant political parties have been in 
power within a period of fifteen years, all of them revolving around single 
leaders. Two of them (the Round Table bloc and Citizens Union of Geor-
gia) did not survive the exit from politics of their leaders. 
Further development of the political party system in Georgia may follow the 
established pattern or break with it. It may lead to the institutionalization of 
a dominant party system (which would bring Georgia closer to the examples 
of Mexico or other countries with the same defects in terms of democratic 
governance), the gradual emergence of a multiparty or two-party model, or 
some other scenario. Much depends on the parties themselves and their 
mutual relations. The levels of institutionalization, fragmentation, and po-
larization within the party system are valid indicators for describing the po-
litical scene in Georgia.
Institutionalization 
The stability of the actors in inter-party competition is the main evidence for 
a highly institutionalized party system. In the Georgian case, the evidence on 
this account is negative: the Georgian political party system is very weakly 
institutionalized. A large number of parties and blocs have taken part in all 
the parliamentary elections held in Georgia since independence, but only a 
few of them will take part in the next elections. For example, 24 parties and 
blocs gained seats in the 1992 parliamentary elections. However, only eight 
of these parties participated in the 1995 elections and only one of these – the 
National Democratic Party – managed to gain representation. A similar rela-
tionship exists between parties that took part in the 1999 and 2003 parlia-
mentary elections respectively.  
The Georgian political party system is very weakly institutionalized 
The case of the repeated parliamentary elections held on 28 March 2004 is 
especially notable. They were scheduled after the results of the elections of 2 
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November 2003 had been declared invalid. Of the 20 parties that participated 
in these elections, however, only four had also run in the November 2003 
elections. This does not mean that 80 per cent of participants completely 
changed in five months; rather, parties created coalitions or changed part-
ners, individual politicians may have moved from one party to another. But 
the extreme instability of the party system is still evident. 
Of the individual parties that have been more or less successful in recent 
years and are the protagonists of this report, only three – the New Conserva-
tive Party, Industry Will Save Georgia, and the Labour Party of Georgia, had 
experience of taking part in parliamentary elections independently before 
2004. The United National Movement and the Conservative Party of Georgia, 
in their present form, were created after the Rose Revolution. The Republi-
can Party has been a rather stable entity over the years, but it always took part 
in parliamentary elections in blocs, and these blocs kept changing from one 
election to the next.  
None of the parties can count on a solid and relevant base of electoral 
support. Pedersen's index of electoral volatility, which measures changes in 
voters' attitudes in periods between elections, reached 75 per cent between 
the 1992 and 1995 parliamentary elections and went down to 46 per cent 
between the 1995 and 1999 elections.78 These percentages are much higher 
than in other countries in Eastern Europe and show the difficulties for party 
formation in Georgia. 
Frequent changes in election legislation (see more on this in the Parties 
and State subchapter) may be contributing to the instability of the political 
party system, but these changes are not fundamental enough to serve as the 
primary explanation for the instability of the party system.  
Ties with society
Parties can be said to have good ties with society if they have close contacts 
with their constituencies and are successful in articulating and promoting 
genuine public interests. Most analysts are sceptical in assessing this aspect 
of Georgian political parties. The instability of the political party system indi-
rectly confirms this scepticism: had the major political parties been more 
rooted in social interests, it is less likely that so many political actors who had 
played prominent roles before would have disappeared altogether or been 
completely marginalized. 
                                                          
78 Jonathan Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed 
Transition in the Former Soviet Union, Ashgate Publishing Company, Burlington, 2005, 
p. 158. A higher percentage implies higher volatility in voters’ attitudes. 
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Gap between political and civil society 
Most analysts believe that Georgian political parties are weakly linked to 
social groups and that they are rather vehicles serving the interests of rela-
tively small groups. Jonathan Wheatley believes that Georgian political 
parties aspire to get into Parliament only for the personal gain of the lead-
ership, in order to lobby certain business interests and get hold of the 
legislative mechanisms required to this end. “In this context the publicly 
espoused political platform of parties should be understood as no more 
than window-dressing, devised to convince the population that the party 
really cared for them or to show Western governments that Georgia really 
was a democracy.”79
Public opinion research also demonstrates the low level of people’s associa-
tion with political parties. According to research carried out by GORBI in 
2001, 4.4 per cent of those polled said that they were members of a political 
party. Half of them presented themselves as members of the Citizens' Union 
or Revival80 - the party that had disappeared after the Rose Revolution. Ac-
cording to an International Republican Institute (IRI) study of Georgian 
national voters in June 2004, those who declared themselves members of a 
political party fell to 2.6 per cent. This also raises the question of what mem-
bership in a party really means – this is discussed in the following chapters.  
Political parties are weakly rooted in social interests 
Parties themselves consider their lack of connection with society to be a 
problem but believe that it is primarily conditioned by problems prevalent in 
society itself. According to one of them, public interest groups are poorly 
developed and, correspondingly, it is extremely difficult to reveal what public 
demand actually is. Parties have therefore to take political decisions and risks 
completely independently.81 Citizenship of low intensity (discussed in the 
Society and Citizenship chapter above) is of course not sufficiently stimulat-
ing, and parties need to become architects of an active society as an ally in 
the development of democracy. Political parties also need the practical 
knowledge of specific social groups in order to design efficient policies.  
                                                          
79 Jonathan Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed 
Transition in the Former Soviet Union, Ashgate: Burlington.
80 Ghia Nodia, Political Parties, Democracy Building in Georgia, p. 47. 
81 Republican Party member. 
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The legitimization of the electoral system and parties  
This indicator is closely linked to the previous one and is measured by the 
level of public trust in political parties and in the fairness of the electoral 
process. The level of trust towards political parties tends to be low both in 
absolute figures and in comparison with other civil institutions.82
People express trust in particular political figures and cast their vote 
based on their attitude to the leader. According to several public opinion 
polls conducted by IRI in 2003-5, about two-thirds of the population voted for 
a party because they liked its leader. Although the same survey shows that 
public trust in political parties increased from 19 per cent in 2003 to 37 per 
cent in 2005, they are still among the least trusted institutions in Georgia. 
The level of public confidence in the fairness of the electoral process is 
also quite low. This reached its nadir in the November 2003 elections, 
though it improved substantially thereafter. International and local observer 
organizations have often assessed the elections held in Georgia as unfair; the 
assessments tended to worsen up until November 2003. Parties themselves 
often express no confidence in the electoral process, pointing out numerous 
violations by the government. Such distrust was especially widespread under 
the previous regime but it has remained, albeit on a somewhat smaller scale, 
since the Rose Revolution. Opponents usually do not charge the new gov-
ernment with direct fraud but with pressuring voters or misusing state re-
sources for party ends.  
                                                          
82 The research conducted in 2004 by the Caucasus Research Resource Centre revealed 
that 41.4 per cent of those polled distrusted political parties and only 27 per cent trusted 
them. In 2005, the indicator changed to 38.1 and 18 per cent respectively (the “neutral” 
attitude increased). This indicator was worse than any other comparable civil (political 
and social) institution, including Parliament, police, the court system, etc. In surveys 
conducted in 2003, 2004, and 2005, the IRI studied the characteristics of politicians and 
parties which people found unacceptable. The characteristic respondents found most 
unacceptable was making false promises and lying. 
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Excerpts from the OSCE/ ODIHR report on the extraordinary presi-
dential election in Georgia in January 2004 and the parliamentary election 
in March 2004 
“The 4 January 2004 extraordinary presidential election in Georgia dem-
onstrated notable progress over previous elections, and in several respects 
brought the country closer to meeting OSCE commitments and other 
international standards for democratic elections. In contrast to the 2 No-
vember 2003 parliamentary elections that were characterized by systematic 
and widespread fraud, the authorities generally displayed the collective 
political will to conduct a more genuine democratic election process.” 
“The 28 March partial repeat parliamentary elections in Georgia during 
the pre-election period demonstrated notable progress and were the most 
democratic since independence. In this respect, the election process was 
brought to closer alignment with OSCE commitments and other interna-
tional standards for democratic elections. However, developments during 
the post-election period, including irregularities observed during the tabu-
lation of results, implausible voter turnout, the mishandling of some 
complaints and the selective cancellation of election results posed a chal-
lenge to the integrity of election results in some districts.” 
Even citizens’ decision to participate or not to participate in the elections is 
conditioned by the fear that the elections will not be fair. According to the 
2003 IRI poll, 26 per cent of those wishing to participate in the elections said 
they wanted to go to the polling station just in order to prevent the expected 
vote rigging. On the other hand, among those who planned to abstain, 32 per 
cent explained their decision by saying that they were certain the elections 
would be rigged anyway and could see no point in participating. Prior to the 
2003 parliamentary elections, 65 per cent of those polled were sure that the 
results of the 2002 local government elections would be rigged, and 50 per 
cent expected that the results of the upcoming parliamentary elections in 
2003 would be rigged as well. People usually laid the blame for election rig-
ging on the ruling party and the government.83
                                                          
83 No similar research data were available with regard to popular trust towards the elec-
toral process, given the fact that no similar research into public attitudes was conducted 
in 2004 and 2005, but as the level of trust towards government institutions increased 
considerably, one can presume this extends to higher trust in the fairness of the electoral 
process. It has to be noted, though, that all major elections after November 2003 (presi-
dential elections in January 2004, parliamentary elections in March 2004, elections to the 
Supreme Council of Achara in June 2004, took place in the context of post-revolutionary 
euphoria and were not genuinely competitive in nature. It remains to be seen whether the 
electoral process will be fair if the UNM faces a realistic threat of electoral defeat. 
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The institutionalization and stability of the party system is largely condi-
tioned by the internal strength of party organization. If parties have a stable 
organizational structure, if they have sufficient material, human, and profes-
sional resources, are not excessively dependent on their leader and have 
workable mechanisms of resolving internal disagreements, this increases 
their capacities in terms of viability, mobility, and adaptation. Eventually, this 
contributes to the overall stability of the party system. This factor will be 
discussed in detail in a separate sub-chapter below.  
Fragmentation
The degree of fragmentation of the political system significantly influences 
the nature of relations between political parties. This can be measured by the 
number of relevant parties in Parliament and outside.84 A political system is 
considered fragmented if that number is high. In Georgia, the political op-
position to the dominant government party is divided between several politi-
cal parties whose level of support is roughly even.85 The big picture is that of 
a high degree of concentration of votes and post-electoral political power. 
This is not conducive to coalition- and consensus-building. In the period 
between elections, given the high volatility, it is hard to predict which party 
will emerge as the ruling party and which one as the major opposition force. 
However, it would be misleading to link the level of fragmentation to the 
high number of registered parties (over 180), as a large majority of them do 
not effectively participate in the political process.  
The Georgian political system is noted for its high degree of concentration 
of votes but also for the high degree of fragmentation on the opposition 
side 
The parties themselves consider the situation to be problematic. They believe 
that votes of social groups with similar interests are divided between a large 
number of small parties. This weakens each party and leads to dispropor-
tionate representation between different social groups. There is no agree-
ment as to what number of political players would be optimal for Georgia. 
Most do not agree that a two-party political system would be appropriate 
here. It is often said that there is no point in discussing this issue and that 
the number of parties the society needs has to be regulated by the “political 
market.”
                                                          
84 See Rae´s index of fragmentation and IMDA Framework for Democratic Party-
Building, p. 14-15. 
85 According to results of the poll conducted by GORBI in December 2005, the Conserva-
tive Party was the most popular among the opposition parties with six per cent support. 
The Labour Party was in third place with five per cent. It was followed by the Republican 
Party - four per cent, and the New Conservatives Party, and Industry Will Save Georgia 
with three per cent support. 
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An electoral threshold in proportionate elections is one of the means of regu-
lating the level of fragmentation. As a high level of fragmentation is a con-
cern within the political elite and society, the threshold was gradually in-
creased and reached seven per cent in 1999. Later on the opposition called 
for it to be reduced, but all parties seem to agree that the threshold should 
not be lower than 4 or 5 per cent. It is recognized that a lower barrier would 
encourage excessive fragmentation of political organizations.  
Polarization
This indicator is usually measured by the degree of difference and incom-
patibility between the ideologies/values of different political actors. If values 
and principles of the political actors differ radically, the party system is char-
acterized by a high degree of polarization. In such systems, co-operation 
between the parties is difficult. Correspondingly, such systems are character-
ized by a lack of stability and are considered to be “risky.” The polarization of 
the political party system can be considered as its most relevant determina-
tor.86
The Georgian political system is characterized by a low degree of polariza-
tion, at least in terms of formal ideological differences between the relevant 
parties. Most relatively strong political parties consider themselves to be 
centre-right ideologically, and only the Labour Party clearly positions itself on 
the left. At the same time, the specific demands of the centre-right parties 
are often no different from those of the left, and cooperation between them 
is not hampered by ideological differences. In fact, there are many common 
elements in the views and social identities of the parties. Moreover there 
exists a record of successful tactical cooperation between parties that claim 
allegiance to different ideological principles. Interestingly, leaders of political 
parties themselves sometimes prefer to play down their ideological differ-
ences.87
The Georgian political system has a low degree of polarization in ideologi-
cal terms 
People also find it difficult to distinguish between the parties based on their 
ideological differences. In research conducted in June 2004, the IRI asked 
respondents to categorize parties in terms of right-wing and left-wing orien-
tation. Approximately 39 per cent of those polled found it hard to answer this 
question and marked “do not know” on the questionnaire. Twelve per cent of 
respondents said that the New Conservative Party and the Industrialists, 
                                                          
86 Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, 1976, New York: Harper and Row
87 A representative of one of the most successful leftist parties in Georgia says that “in the 
era of space research, it is hard to talk about a clear-cut difference between the parties. 
Not only states but party ideologies within countries are getting closer in the process of 
globalization. Today, both the leftist and rightist movements have moved to the centre 
and meet at the centre.” 
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which are considered to be the parties with the most pronounced right-wing 
orientation in Georgia, were left-wing.  
The social characteristics of voters of different parties do not demonstrate 
a high level of party polarization either. Table 8 below, based on IRI research, 
gives a socio-demographic breakdown of voters of two parties that notionally 
find themselves on the opposing wings of the left and right spectrum.  
   
Labour Party of Georgia New Conservative Party  
Male 49 45
Female 51 55
Age 18-29 14 22
Age 30-49 41 42
Age 50+ 45 36
Secondary Education 60 42
High Education 34 56
Lowest Income 29 18
Medium Income 44 45
Highest Income 27 37
Tbilisi Inhabitant  35 43
Big City Inhabitant 15 16
Small City Inhabitant 8 13
Rural Inhabitant 42 28
Table 8. Social profiles of voters 
Despite the low level of polarization on ideology and policy issues, Georgian 
political life is certainly characterized by a high level of polarization in terms 
of confrontation, usually between the government and the opposition par-
ties. This will be discussed in greater detail below.  
Specific features of relations between political parties in Georgia 
There are some specific features of the political party system in Georgia 
which deserve special attention. This includes the relations between the 
dominant political party and the opposition, the lack of trust between the 
parties, and the primacy of personal relations for contacts between them. 
The dominant party and the opposition. The main political division in the 
country is that between the ruling party and the opposition. This has been 
the case both before and after the Rose Revolution. In all Georgian Parlia-
ments, the pro-government party has enjoyed a comfortable majority and 
usually has no difficulty passing legislation without having to co-operate with 
other parties.88 While there have always been a fairly large number of inde-
pendent MPs from single-mandate districts, they usually tend to vote with 
the ruling party on major issues. The ruling party is the main resource for 
                                                          
88 Formally, the 1992-95 Parliament was an exception: there was no established pro-
government party that had a majority, but there still existed a loose pro-government ma-
jority coalition. 
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staffing agencies of the executive. While Georgian legislation distinguishes 
between political appointments and non-political civil servants, in practice 
this difference is rarely observed. Moreover, local government bodies have 
extremely limited powers and resources and cannot be considered a coun-
terweight to the ruling party. Such pre-eminence of a single party gives it a 
free hand to carry out reforms needed in the country.  
Representatives of most parties believe that the benefits of a dominant 
party system cannot outweigh the negative results associated with it since the 
high concentration of power poses a threat to the development of democratic 
institutions in the country.  
Extra-parliamentary activities of opposition parties 
While the ruling party enjoys full control over political power in the coun-
try, the functions of opposition parties become similar to those of non-
governmental human rights and other social organizations which study 
the problems prevailing in the society and try to raise awareness about 
them. This may be true of opposition parties who have or do not have 
seats in the legislative body. One of the main responsibilities of these party 
organizations is to study people’s problems and hold consultations with 
citizens. The opposition representatives often act as third parties in the 
court hearings defending citizens filing lawsuits. The parliamentary oppo-
sition is also active in criticizing action taken by the government and rais-
ing public concern on the negative outcomes of governmental initiatives. 
Government representatives often accuse the opposition of being “uncon-
structive,” that is, only criticizing government policies without proposing 
viable alternatives. The opposition retorts that the ruling party has a two-
thirds majority, and with that a constitutional majority in Parliament, and 
under these conditions it is useless to act in Parliament as the opposition.89
The predominance of a single party vis-à-vis a weak and fragmented op-
position arises particularly around the issue of political responsibility. The 
opposition holds the ruling party solely responsible for the developments in 
the country and does not think that it shares any responsibility. This was also 
confirmed by an MP from the party in power: “This is a ruling party and it is 
held responsible for every step taken by the government. The voters think 
that if the bureaucracy is working badly, this is the fault of the party for 
which they voted and from which they demanded change.”90
This situation rules out cooperation between the ruling and the opposi-
tion parties, as political actors do not think they need each other. “President 
Saakashvili came to power with 97 per cent support. He does not need to 
                                                          
89 Member of Parliament, the Conservative Party of Georgia. 
90 Member of Parliament, United National Movement. 
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cooperate with the opposition, so he does not. For the ruling party, we are an 
organization that has no influence. The cooperation between us will be pos-
sible only when the mutual need arises.”91 Opposition parties perceive the 
strength of the ruling party as a threat. They assert that the government in-
fluences the court, the media, and the election administration. Opposition 
parties see the main ways to reduce this danger in strengthening democratic 
institutions, decentralizing power, and establishing the balance between 
different branches of authority. In their opinion, this will provide equitable 
conditions for the development of political parties. 
Opposition parties try to cope with the dominant position of the ruling 
party by uniting and pulling in resources. For example, during by-elections 
held in five single-mandate districts in 2005, four opposition parties organ-
ized primary elections and confronted the ruling party with their joint candi-
dates (though to no avail). While the opposition parties remain weak, ideo-
logical differences between them become less relevant.  
The dominant party system rules out cooperation between the party in 
power and the opposition 
Lack of trust between parties and the primacy of personal relations for mu-
tual contacts. Another important peculiarity of the political arena is the lack 
of trust between the parties. In general, parties usually express readiness to 
cooperate with all political organizations: “We have normal relations with all 
parties. We do not have antagonistic relations with anyone and we will co-
operate with everyone with great pleasure.”92 However, in their public 
speeches, they often accuse each other of being unprincipled. A low level of 
mutual trust is especially obvious between the ruling and the opposition 
parties. But opposition parties tend to mistrust each other as well. Opposi-
tion party leaders often question other parties' true adherence to their ideo-
logical principles and accuse each other of secret collusion with the ruling 
party.93
Most relatively strong Georgian political parties have “faction origins” 
which determine the special character of their relations with each other. As a 
rule, parties are created around leaders or groups within the legislative body. 
They get into Parliament through the winning party’s list and later, claiming 
disappointment with the policies of the ruling party, defect from it and create 
an opposition faction that eventually develops into a political party. Among 
the parties participating in this research, the only exceptions are the Republi-
can Party and Industry Will Save Georgia (although in March 2004, the Re-
                                                          
91 Member of Parliament, New Conservative Party. 
92 Member of Parliament, Industry Will Save Georgia. 
93 Jonathan Wheatley believes that it is virtually impossible to achieve a high level of trust 
between the Georgian political parties. In his view, political competition in Georgia is 
conducted according to the rules of a zero-sum game: one group’s coming to power 
through elections or other means is perceived by the rest as a threat to the very existence 
of the party and the liberty and property of their members. 
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publicans also got their parliamentary representation through the party list 
of the United National Movement, and moved to the opposition in the sum-
mer of the same year). Defections also take place in other directions. For 
instance, several members of the Labour Party elected to the Tbilisi City 
Council in 2002 soon moved to the National Movement faction (which was 
then still in opposition at the national level). Such changes of party affilia-
tions are perceived as betrayals, and their memory poisons relations between 
political parties.
Frequent defections from political parties sour relations between them 
Since parties are dependent on the personalities of the leaders or a small 
group of leaders, making and breaking coalitions between them largely de-
pends on relations of personal trust within the narrow circle of party leaders. 
Clashes of personal ambitions may hamper establishing coalitions between 
otherwise like-minded political groups, and they may need some “neutral” 
figure to facilitate the coalition. For instance, the Conservative Party of Geor-
gia and the Republicans succeeded in creating a unified faction in Parlia-
ment in the autumn of 2005 (the Democratic Front) after a neutral figure, 
David Zurabishvili, a recent defector from the United National Movement, 
emerged as its leader.  
Cooperation and mergers between political parties 
The United National Movement was established as a result of a merger of 
the National Movement and the United Democrats. The Conservative 
Party of Georgia was established as a result of a merger between the 
United Conservative Party and the Alliance of National Forces. Two other 
parties among those involved in this research, the New Conservative Party 
and Industry Will Save Georgia, created a bloc before the 2004 parliamen-
tary elections and continued to co-operate in Parliament. A merger be-
tween them was considered a possible outcome. However, in February 
2006 they created two separate factions in Parliament.
In the autumn of 2005, two parties involved in this research, the Re-
publican Party and the Conservative Party of Georgia, together with some 
independent MPs, jointly established a faction called the Democratic 
Front.
Personal attitudes are important not only at the level of national party or-
ganizations, but also for regional branches. Members of local party branches 
often choose to develop relations with other parties based on personal pref-
erences. If a leading party member in the local party chapter finds it uncom-
fortable relating to representatives of other parties, this may seriously ham-
per cooperation between these organizations in a given region. 
114
Cooperation and confrontation between the parties 
Forms of Cooperation. The most widespread forms of co-operation between 
political parties are the creation of blocs and alliances before elections. Such 
alliances may be tactical and temporary, but mergers between the parties 
sometimes occur as well. One of the strongest incentives for the creation of 
such alliances is a high electoral threshold (seven per cent). Few parties can 
be confident of being able to overcome the threshold independently. Elec-
toral blocs may be created between parties that have comparable electoral 
prospects. Sometimes, however, small political organizations often gather 
around strong parties and appear as their satellites. For instance, before the 
2003 elections several small parties allied with the Citizens’ Union of Geor-
gia, the ruling party at the time, to create the For a New Georgia bloc. In this 
way strong parties gain additional human resources and/or specific electable 
public figures, while for small organizations such an alliance represents the 
only chance to get into Parliament. 
Major political parties in Georgia look favourably on electoral alliances. 
The Labour Party of Georgia is an exception in this regard. The party mem-
bers believe that an electoral bloc is “a result of the mercantile deal” and is 
doomed to break up after the elections (even if it succeeds). “In civilized 
countries, the creation of a bloc is a normal occurrence that does not pose a 
threat, but here it is unacceptable even from a moral viewpoint.”94 Corre-
spondingly, the creation of coalitions is acceptable to this party only after 
elections, in order to form the government. 
Another form of cooperation between parties is the creation of a single 
faction in the legislative body. Parties are pushed to do this because the law 
does not allow formally establishing a parliamentary faction – and becoming 
eligible to certain privileges and resources that accrue – unless ten MPs join 
it.
Parties often create tactical, issue-based alliances, that is, they join forces 
to promote specific issues. Usually, such alliances are established between 
opposition parties. At the end of 2005, for instance, all major opposition 
parties made a unified stand in support of direct elections of Tbilisi’s mayor 
(the legislation sponsored by the United National Movement and enacted by 
Parliament envisages election of the mayor by the city council). Opposition 
parties often organize joint protest actions against specific decisions of and 
steps taken by the government.  
 In the autumn of 2005, four opposition entities (the Conservative Party 
of Georgia, the Labour Party, the New Conservative Party and Industry Will 
Save Georgia bloc, and the Freedom Party) experimented with a new form of 
cooperation between parties: preliminary elections (primaries). The prima-
ries were held two weeks before parliamentary by-elections in October 2005, 
when five seats were contested. Each party could nominate a candidate for 
primaries, while the winner ran against the candidate of the United National 
                                                          
94 Member of the Labour Party of Georgia. 
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Movement.95 In electoral terms, the experiment was unsuccessful: the oppo-
sition candidates lost in all five districts. With the exception of one district 
(Isani), despite the agreement with regards to the primaries, the parties that 
were defeated in the primaries did not make any real effort to support the 
joint candidate of the opposition. However, this mechanism still increases 
the chances of opposition candidates in majoritarian elections. It is yet to be 
seen whether the opposition parties will use this form of cooperation again 
in the future.  
Seeking consensus 
At the end of 2005 the United National Movement tried to initiate a 
document with a national agreement between different Georgian parties, 
whether in government or opposition, regarding the basic values and in-
terests of the country. The opposition parties, however, declined to coop-
erate, saying it was just a publicity stunt on the part of the ruling party.  
The parties came closest to finding consensus between both govern-
ment and opposition parties when a Code of Ethics of Members of the 
Georgian Parliament was signed in October 2004. However, individual 
MPs rather than parties were the signatories. 
In the past, ideological principles espoused by the parties have often not 
been the decisive factor in choosing political partners. Currently, one of the 
most important factors that facilitates or impedes the formation of political 
alliances is a party’s attitude towards such a seminal event as the Rose Revo-
lution. Among the opposition parties involved in this research, the Republi-
cans and the Conservative Party of Georgia took an active part in the Revolu-
tion, while the others abstained from participation. The dividing lines cre-
ated then continue to be valid today. Representatives of the Conservative 
Party of Georgia believe that “different organizational structures and atti-
tudes to the Rose Revolution impede integration between the parties with a 
similar ideological outlook.”96 The New Conservative Party representatives 
also perceive attitudes towards the Rose Revolution to be a serious problem: 
“We may have a lot in common with other right-wing forces but we were on 
different flanks when the revolution took place. This issue is still topical and 
very important.”97
A further obstacle to cooperation or integration between parties with 
similar political views is their strategic preferences. As one of representative 
                                                          
95 The Labour Party of Georgia participated in the organization of primaries between the 
parties too. It did not nominate its candidates but promised to support the winner of 
primaries in the elections. 
96 Member of Parliament, Conservative Party of Georgia. 
97 Member of Parliament, New Conservative Party. 
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said, “We often agree with other parties on the what, that is to say, what 
needs to be done, but there are great differences in terms of the how.”98
Competition and confrontation. Political competition is a necessary part of 
party politics. It peaks in pre-election periods, when the parties compete for 
votes; but it may also be fierce in periods between elections, when it ex-
presses itself in policy debates, more often within the elective bodies or in 
the media.
As a general characteristic of the Georgian political system, competition 
takes place mainly between the ruling and opposition parties. The opposition 
parties tend to play down their differences in public. In fact, of course, they 
also compete with each other for public support. One of the spheres of com-
petition is criticism of the government: parties hope to attract greater support 
through finding better ways to criticize government actions. Experience 
gained in previous years suggests that an opposition party’s presentation of 
itself as an implacable opponent of the government may boost the party’s 
popularity.
Emotional politics 
Physical violence between political parties became a common feature in 
the final year of Eduard Shevardnadze’s mandate. This trend abated after 
the Rose Revolution, but in the second half of 2005, the Georgian public 
witnessed a new escalation of serious confrontations between the ruling 
party representatives and the opposition. Several brawls broke out in Par-
liament and in the Tbilisi City Council. Notably, bitter personal confronta-
tion and fistfights occurred more often between erstwhile political part-
ners and personal friends, who claim allegiance to rather similar political 
principles.
All parties admit that such actions are unacceptable and are to be con-
demned. They also note that there is a low level of political culture and 
insufficient experience of orderly political competition in Georgia. Some 
have attributed it to the especially fiery temperament of Georgians. The 
public considers venomous and often physical altercations between politi-
cians to be the most detestable characteristic of Georgian politics. Accord-
ing to the IRI 2003 research, 27 per cent of those polled named fighting in 
Parliament to be the most unpleasant trait of politicians and parties. In the 
2004 poll, it came second in a list of dislikable features after issuing false 
promises. However, following a new outbreak of inter-party brawling in 
the summer and autumn of 2005, inter-party fighting regained its status 
as the feature of the Georgian politicians least appreciated by the public. 
                                                          
98 Member of Parliament, New Conservative Party. 
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Since independence, Georgian politics has been notable for an extremely 
confrontational style in relations between political groups. It is notable for 
frequent personal attacks that are usually focused on issues of character 
rather than policies. Participants in political debates, whether in legislative 
bodies or TV talk shows, accuse each other of dishonesty, incompetence, 
betraying the interests of their country, using criminal methods, and so on. 
Verbal insults sometimes lead to physical abuse. Such debates usually take 
place between representatives of the ruling party and the opposition, though 
opposition groups may target each other as well. 
Because violent brawls are considered a common feature of party con-
frontation, some parties have groups of young men in good physical shape 
who are ready to engage in such confrontations. Their main function is to 
provoke opponents and settle scores by physical means. Some of these peo-
ple have a criminal background. Such groups were created in the period 
preceding the Rose Revolution but continue to exist. In the internal party 
jargon, they are called “Sonderkommandos.” Parties assert that the majority 
of political organizations have such teams. Parties consider having them a 
necessity since otherwise they would feel unprotected. In particular, they 
think that at election time, the existence of such groups of young men may 
be important for protecting them from electoral fraud.  
Notably, however, bitter personal confrontation is more typical of rela-
tions between party leaders. Even while such relations are rather tense, rank-
and-file members of the parties, including members of electoral bodies, may 
engage in quite civil and even friendly relations with each other.  
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Main findings 
? More than 180 political organizations are registered in Georgia but only 
a small part of them are politically active. The party system cannot be 
fully classified according to conventional types of one-, two- or multi-
party systems: it is a loose multiparty system with a single dominant 
party. Political competition occurs mainly between the party in power 
and the multitude of opposition parties. This has been a characteristic 
of the Georgian party system since 1990, despite the change of political 
leaders;
? The political system is weakly institutionalized. The map of major po-
litical players undergoes dramatic changes in periods between elec-
tions. Parties are weakly linked to social groups and the level of legiti-
mization of the party system is low. Political parties are one of the least 
popular social institutions in Georgia. Public support for a party mainly 
depends on trust towards its leader, and the public is fickle in its pref-
erences; 
? While political power is concentrated in a single ruling party in power, 
the degree of fragmentation among the opposition parties is rather 
high. Ideological polarization, on the other hand, is low; 
? Cooperation between political parties takes the form of creating elec-
toral blocs, common factions in Parliament, and tactical alliances 
around specific issues. The latter usually occurs between opposition 
parties and there is little cooperation between the party in power and 
the opposition. Organizing primary elections to define common candi-
dates of the opposition has been the new feature of party cooperation 
first tested in the 2005 by-elections to Parliament; 
? Confrontation between political parties is high (usually between the 
party in power and the opposition) and often takes the form of bitter 
personal attacks which occasionally escalate into violent brawls. De-
bates about general policy issues are weakly developed. Relations be-
tween the parties largely depend on personal relations between their 
leaders rather than policy issues. 
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2.3 Party Identities and Policy Development
What to do? 
? Highlight ideological profiles of political parties and overcome exces-
sive reliance on the leaders’ personalities; 
? Get involved in broad strategic dialogues on party policies involving a 
greater number of party activists and consultations with international 
and local civic organisations, as well as like-minded parties abroad; 
? Train a larger number of activists of political parties, especially in local 
organizations, in developing policy-making skills; 
? Opposition parties should give greater priority to developing and pro-
moting alternative public policies; 
? Do research on the policy behaviour of different parties in order to help 
parties rethink their identities. 
Political parties’ attitudes to the issue of ideology 
In a multiparty system, each political party needs to define how it differs 
from others. The most common way to define the party identities is through 
values, principles and the policies that they promote and enhance through 
their activities. When these elements are closely interlinked in a coherent 
and close or dogmatic package then we talk about ideologies. Ideologies as 
such have not disappeared but have certainly gone through processes of 
change in the last quarter of the 20th century. Now they may be defined in 
relative terms (such as left, right, centre), or substantive terms (conservative,
liberal, socialist, etc.). The central importance of ideological tendencies as we 
had better call them now, or party identities, is that they make it possible to 
distinguish between the different parties. As these identities are often linked 
to the interests of specific social groups or classes, making reference to a 
social group may be considered equivalent to the ideological definition of a 
given party (such as in Labour or Workers’ parties, Peasant parties, etc.).  
The importance of political ideologies for their identities is widely recog-
nized by the Georgian political parties. Out of six parties involved in this 
research, four (Conservative Party of Georgia, New Conservative Party, La-
bour Party of Georgia, Republican Party) have ideological brands in their 
names, while Industry Will Save Georgia refers to the social group that it 
represents (they often refer to this party as “the Industrialists”).  
At the same time, a certain vagueness and inconsistency can be perceived 
in the ideological positions of Georgian political parties. This has different 
expressions. It is a commonplace and hardly contested view that identities of 
Georgian political parties are primarily defined by their leaders (this may 
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imply an individual charismatic leader or a small group). People usually join 
a given party or vote for it because they trust the leader(s), not necessarily 
because the party represents specific political principles, or interests of a 
distinct social group with which a given citizen identifies him/herself. Fur-
thermore, blocs and alliances between the parties do not necessarily follow 
the logic of political principles.
Georgian political parties are criticized for vague and inconsistent ideo-
logical positions 
There may be a number of parties that can hardly be distinguished from 
each other by their stated ideological identities, but they nevertheless fail to 
merge or even cooperate. There may be a discrepancy between formally 
stated principles and stands taken by a party on a given issue; it often hap-
pens, for instance, that centre-right parties defend principles that are conven-
tionally considered issues of the left. Respectively, mutual accusations of 
ideological opportunism are common in the Georgian political arena. When 
asked how they are different from parties who have a similar ideological 
stand, or why they do not cooperate with such parties more closely, the most 
popular answer is that they are more consistent in upholding their ideologi-
cal principles. It has happened quite a few times that parties that consider 
themselves rightwing and leftwing have created a single electoral bloc.99
Moreover, significant ideological differences nature may be noted between 
leaders or members of the same party.  
Representatives of the parties themselves often admit that these problems 
exist. Some of them even consider using the party's international contacts to 
resolve them. Sometimes the easiest way to define the ideological identity of 
a given party is to ask which of the well-known parties in the West they feel 
closer to, or which of them they would prefer to see as their partners. “One 
of the things that we want to ask of those international organizations we 
cooperate with is to help us in ideological self-identification because even the 
basic fundamental issues are unresolved in Georgia, which results in wrong 
perceptions,” a Republican Party leader said.  
It has to be noted, however, that there are different attitudes within the 
Georgian political elite to the very idea of how much a party needs a distinct 
ideology. Some parties particularly stress that they have a clearly defined 
ideological position. The New Conservative Party is a good example of this. 
Their representatives take pride in the fact that, despite the popularity of 
leftist slogans in the country, they have gone against the predominant sen-
timents and have consistently defended centre-right positions.  
                                                          
99 Most notorious is the example of the Revival bloc that ran in the 1999 parliamentary 
elections: it included the ideologically amorphous and personalistic Union for Democratic 
Revival, the Socialist Party and two rightist parties, the Union of Georgian Traditionalists 
and the Popular Party. 
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Georgian parties and the Rose Revolution 
Even now, two years after the Rose Revolution, attitudes towards this event 
still draw a dividing line between different parties in Georgia. While some 
leaders and parties that are now in opposition led or took part in the revo-
lutionary events of November 2003, others were strongly against a revolu-
tionary change of government. Despite a relatively high level of coopera-
tion between the opposition parties, this division expressed itself in their 
parliamentary arrangement. Former activists of the Revolution have joined 
the “Democratic Front” faction, while those who opposed it, the New Con-
servatives and the Industrialists, have created the “Rightist Opposition” 
bloc. In February 2006, the latter two parties created separate factions. 
In some cases parties intentionally maintain vague ideological positions for 
electoral reasons.100 This is more or less true of all the parties that have 
played dominant roles in different periods of recent Georgian history. Their 
names - the Round Table-Free Georgia, the Citizens’ Union of Georgia, the 
Union of Revival of Georgia, the United National Movement - display con-
scious or implicit efforts to avoid conventional ideological definitions (the 
United National Movement denies that the word “national” in its name has 
anything to do with the ideology of nationalism, and that it merely implies 
the party of and for the whole nation). One of the leaders of the United Na-
tional Movement said: “I do not like the word ideology because it denotes a 
false world outlook.”101
Apart from ideological principles, attitudes to seminal political events 
such as the Rose Revolution are relevant for defining party identity. Out of 
the six parties involved in this research, three were active participants in the 
Rose Revolution (United National Movement, Conservative Party of Georgia, 
and Republican Party), while three others (New Conservative Party, the In-
dustrialists, and the Labour Party) opposed it. Even beyond these six parties, 
there is no correlation between being on the right or the left and taking or 
not taking part in the Revolution.  
The importance of wrong colours in politics 
Most more or less influential political parties in Georgia that do underline 
their ideological identity tend to define themselves as centre-right parties. 
This has been the case throughout the recent Georgian history, and contin-
ues to be so. An obvious explanation for this is that the political party system 
in Georgia emerged in opposition to the Communist rule. Full domination 
                                                          
100 Georgia: Rise and Fall of Façade Democracy, Jaba Devdariani. “ Demokratizatsia”, 
Winter 2004. 
101 MP and prominent operator within the UNM. 
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of the Communist party throughout several decades of the Georgian history 
has discredited not only radical Communist ideology, but even social-
democratic policies. The fact that the social-democratic government of the 
independent Georgian Republic of 1918-21 did not succeed in maintaining 
Georgia’s sovereignty is sometimes blamed on a perceived insufficient 
commitment of the social democrats to the idea of national independence in 
the first place. This strengthened scepticism towards leftist ideas even more.  
“In Georgia, to have the word “rightist” in the name was a positive thing,” 
one of the New Conservative leaders noted.102 Being on the political right 
was associated with democratic institutions, market economy and protection 
of human rights. As one of the leaders of the Republicans noted, when they 
were an underground party in the Soviet Union, their positions could be 
called moderate social- democratic, but in the period of open fighting against 
the Soviet regime their positions shifted toward the right. Being on the left, 
on the other hand, was often associated with being nostalgic towards the 
Communist past (whether or not a given party really tried to capitalize on 
nostalgic feelings for the past that are shared by some people). 
As time has passed, the importance of the opposition to Communism is 
waning. However, the tendency to claim centre-right orientation remains 
strong among the political elite. That makes Georgia different from many 
Central and Eastern European countries. It has no strong party that can be 
considered heir to the old Communist party or to have presented a softer 
version of its ideology. There were some attempts to create such a party in 
the early 1990s but without any success. Personal networks established 
around the Soviet Communist party and its youth branch, Komsomol, per-
sisted and were particularly strong under the previous government, but their 
members almost never advertised their affiliation with the previous regime 
as a positive thing. Apparently,103 there is electoral space for a centre-left 
party that would pursue social-democratic policies, and several political or-
ganizations have tried to occupy that political niche. However, the dominant 
part of the political spectrum is still centre-right.  
Most more or less influential political parties tend to define themselves as 
centre-right parties 
The pre-eminence of centre-right ideas within the political class can be con-
sidered paradoxical in a country where more than half of the population lives 
below the poverty line, and most people expect the state to take care of their 
welfare. Nonetheless, some parties that generally can be labelled as conserva-
                                                          
102 Literal translation into English of the name of this party would be “the New Right.” 
However, as in the West this word is often associated with extreme right-wing parties, the 
party prefers to be referred to as “the New Conservative Party” in English. 
103 Some polls indicate that a large number of people in Georgia rather espouse values 
that can be identified as centre-left. It could be suggested that more research in this topic 
should be done. 
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tive often appear to be defending typical leftist causes, presumably because 
this is what actually attracts votes.
Grouping the Georgian parties 
According to their stated ideological principles, the six political parties in-
volved in this report can be grouped into three main categories. Four of six 
parties, the United National Movement,104 Conservative, the New 
Conservative Party, and the Industrial-
ists, can be labelled as centre-right con-
servative. The Republicans could have 
been called liberal in the American 
sense of the word or social-democratic 
in European terms, but from the very 
beginning they have usually been con-
sidered centre-right as well. Therefore 
they fit more into the centre-right lib-
eral label in German terms. However, 
since trying to put parties into these 
categories tends to be too simplistic and 
confusing, later in the chapter another 
two-dimensional classification will be 
proposed.
During the last ten to fifteen years there have been a number of parties that 
tried to occupy the left flank of the political spectrum. They view themselves 
as centre-left parties and identify themselves with European social democ-
racy. Such was the case in Georgia with Shevarnadze’s Citizens’ Union and 
is now the case with the Georgian Labour Party. Some smaller parties, like 
the Socialist or Social-Democratic parties of Georgia are also trying to occupy 
the same position on the left-right scale.  
All these parties try to stress their ideological identities through participa-
tion in international networks of like-minded parties. Parties on the right or 
conservative centre-right strive to cooperate with the International Democ-
ratic Union and European People's Party. The Republicans have stressed 
their liberal credentials through becoming the main partners of the Friedrich 
Naumann Foundation (linked to the German Free Democrats), and – con-
trary to their name – have decided that out of the two major US parties, their 
positions would be closer to those of the Democrats. The Labour Party coop-
erates with the social-democratic European Forum for Democracy and Soli-
darity (See more on this in subchapter 2.8).
An apart category is constituted by the parties in government and their 
claims to be above ideologies and to combine centre-right and centre-left in 
their policies and rhetorics. Today the United National Movement fits into 
                                                          
104 As the party of government the United National Movement has manifested itself as a 
supra-ideological party, meaning a nationwide oriented movement, but after its decision 
in 2006 to join the European Peoples Party it can be positioned in the centre-right.  
Parties on the left and right
Centre-right conservative: 
United National Movement 
Conservative Party
New Conservative Party  
Industry Will Save Georgia 
Centre-right liberal: 
Republican Party 
Centre-left: 
Labour
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this category. It positions itself as the party of the nation, the unifying force 
that serves all social groups and aims to strengthen the state in general. This 
party claims to respond to the people's demands: some of them call for more 
leftist policies, while others push the party to take centre-right stands. Never-
theless, the party’s decision to join the European People’s Party (EPP) means 
that it must be positioned in the category centre-right conservative. 
None of the relevant political parties in Georgia can be seen as belonging 
to the extreme right or extreme left. Such political groups do exist, but they 
have never played an important role in Georgian politics after the independ-
ence. This does not mean, however, that ideas that are usually associated 
with the extreme left or, especially, extreme right, have never had currency in 
the Georgian political agenda. Political parties themselves occasionally ac-
cuse each other of promoting “fascist”, “fundamentalist” or “neo-Bolshevik” 
ideas.
Economy and culture: Consensus and differences between Georgian political 
parties
While denominations like “left” and “right” continue to be valid for describ-
ing the ideological orientations of political organizations, they may also be 
misleading as in different contexts these terms have acquired a variety of 
meanings. Values and principles defining identities of political parties are 
easier to identify around concrete issues of public life. One of those issues, 
taken in black and white terms, is individual rights versus traditional com-
munitarian values. While most parties would say that they respect both, in 
making real political decisions and in debates or campaigns aimed at attract-
ing voter support, they will inevitably have to give priority to one or the other. 
Therefore, the parties can be ranked according to where they stand in an 
imagined space between these two poles.  
The second issue is related to the economic policies of the state and eco-
nomic globalization. A political party may promote liberal economic policies 
that imply minimal state intervention in economic life and free trade,that is 
exposing the economic life of a given country to unhampered international 
competition. On the other hand, a political party may think that the state 
should play an active role in economic life. In this case, the principal aims of 
this public intervention are usually fairer redistribution of wealth and/or 
protection of local business from international competitors.  
The combination of these two problems allows us to construct a two-
dimensional space in which each party may be assigned a certain position. 
We asked two groups of respondents, representatives of political parties in-
volved in this research and independent analysts, to assess the stands of the 
six political parties according to these two issues on the scale of one to ten. 
Their findings are shown in two graphs. Graph 1 presents the positioning 
given by the political parties, while Graph 2 presents those by the analysts. 
The horizontal axis reflects the assessment of the parties with regards to 
their attitudes to cultural issues (1 denotes commitment to traditional com-
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munitarians and 10 – to liberal individualism), while the vertical axis repre-
sents their stands on economic issues (1 stands for an state-oriented or eta-
tist/protectionist position, while 10 represents support for liberal free market 
principles.
These two graphs and comparison between them gives ground for some 
general observations. Obviously, there is a strong difference between mutual 
perceptions of political parties on the one hand and their assessments by 
independent analysts on the other. The Republican Party may be the only 
one that is perceived similarly both by its opponents/competitors and outside 
observers.
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Graph 1. Ideological positioning by parties themselves (horizontal axis attitutes to cultural 
issues, vertical axis attitudes to economic issues)  
In other cases, discrepancies are rather substantive. This may be explained 
by a possible bias in assessing one’s opponents or competitors. On the other 
hand, however, one can interpret this as another confirmation that images of 
political parties have not stabilized in Georgia. It is also notable that some 
respondents had difficulty in deciding what to take as a ground for position-
ing political parties: their stated values or their real political positions.  
Cultural Values Economy
Experts Parties Experts Parties 
GLP 2 3,5 2 5
CPG 2,8 4,5 3,5 8,2
IWSG 3,2 4,5 3,8 8
NCP 3,4 4,75 4,7 2,8
UNM 5,2 6,25 5,3 2,6
RP 6,8 8,5 7,2 7,6
Table 9. Discrepancies between evaluations of party positions by independent analysts 
and parties  
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While political analysts in Georgia often make dismissive comments about 
political parties saying that they are ideologically opportunistic and all that 
matters about them are the personalities of their leaders, the picture based 
on their own assessments shows quite a distinct ideological spectrum. The 
absence of certain ideological configurations is especially notable; for in-
stance, there is no party that would be leftist in its economic policies but take 
more progressive/individualist stands on cultural issues – something that 
would be considered a normal combination in Western parties (in our graph, 
such an attitude would be placed towards its lower right corner).  
In Georgia, economic leftists tend to be cultural conservatives at the same 
time 
In Georgia, economic leftists tend to be cultural conservatives at the same 
time. Georgian independent analysts and political party representatives also 
could not find economic libertarians holding culturally conservative posi-
tions (the upper left corner in our graph). This would not be an impossible 
combination in developed Western countries either.  
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Graph 2. Ideological positioning of parties by experts. 
This allows us to conclude that the perception of ideological issues in Geor-
gia still largely depends on attitudes towards the Communist past on the one 
hand and values and institutions of the modern West on the other. It is the 
Communist past that symbolizes the combination of economic leftism and 
cultural conservatism. Progressivism, on the other hand, implies movement 
towards both cultural and economic liberalism. This is what in Georgia is 
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symbolized by the concept of the “West.” One could say that the more a 
Georgian political party moves to the upper-right corner of the graph, the 
more it distances itself from the Communist past and supports Westernizing 
attitudes. At least in the view of the non-party experts, the two-dimensional 
scheme is thus transformed into a one-dimensional one.
The perception of ideological issues in Georgia largely depends on 
 attitudes towards the Communist past and the values and institutions of 
the modern West
At the same time, these two issues allow us to define quite a broad space of 
ideological consensus in Georgian politics. When it comes to economic is-
sues, there is no more or less important political party in Georgia that openly 
challenges free market principles.105 The most leftist among them, the La-
bour Party of Georgia, also declares loyalty to the market economy and as 
one of its representatives described, they differ from the parties of the right-
ist orientation because “…the leftist parties are more socially oriented than 
the parties on the right. The latter claim that all economic problems will be 
resolved by business, whereas we think that it is the state who should be 
responsible for resolving social problems.” Labour also disagrees with priva-
tization of those state assets that it considers “strategic” (this especially in-
cludes the infrastructure). Labour leaders mainly emphasize social problems 
in their speeches and consider the population, which indeed is in a difficult 
economic situation, as their target group. At the same time, the party leaders 
position themselves in the moderate wing of the leftist spectrum and attrib-
ute the radicalism of some of their statements to the political situation in the 
country. To them the popularity of the leftist slogans is directly linked to the 
widespread poverty. Labour claims that its existence prevents the rise of a 
hard-line Communist party in Georgia.  
Similarly, no strong political party in Georgia does openly challenge the 
liberal principles of individual liberties and human rights. However, most 
parties try to combine this with demonstrating support to traditional cultural 
values. For instance, no political party would openly challenge the privileged 
position of the Georgian Orthodox Church as compared to other religious 
institutions in Georgia. Although this is a highly debated issue in the society, 
the overwhelming majority of Georgians support preserving or even 
strengthening the special position of the Georgian Orthodox Church. There-
fore, even the most liberal politicians would consider the political price for 
taking a too liberal view on the issue of the position of the Church as too 
high.106 The parties' programs extensively treat the issues of protecting the 
Georgian language, the Orthodox faith and traditional family values. 
                                                          
105 Several Communist parties that haved been created since independence have never 
enjoyed mass support from the population. 
106 For instance, the December 2005 statement of Sozar Subari, the Public Defender, that 
the Constitutional Agreement between the state and the Georgian Orthodox Church put 
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It is notable that, according to the analysts’ estimates in Graph 2, the Labour 
Party outperforms on this account right-wing parties (and is positioned quite 
closely to them in Graph 1, which represents the parties’ mutual percep-
tions). Another interesting conclusion from the comparison between the two 
graphs is that independent analysts tend to assess the Georgian political 
parties as more culturally traditionalist than the parties themselves do. Con-
versely, the political observers think Georgian parties are less committed to 
personal freedoms than they themselves claim to be.
No strong political party in Georgia challenges the liberal principles of 
individual liberties and human rights 
Another feature revealed in Graph 2 (but not in Graph 1) is that analysts 
consider the Republican Party and even the United National Movement 
more economically libertarian than the New Conservative Party and Industry 
Saves Georgia, the parties that are widely perceived as the parties of the 
business sector and businessmen. This may reflect the fact that under the 
new government, representatives of these parties have taken part in some 
social protest events and have criticized privatization deals or some other 
steps taken by the government that may be considered economically liberal. 
Consequently, they are sometimes criticized in the Georgian media for not 
being consistent with their creed in their actual policies. A discrepancy be-
tween the stated values and public image of these parties may be also ex-
plained by the fact that promoting economic liberalism does not help to in-
crease party ratings in Georgia; therefore, these parties prefer to advertise 
cultural conservatism and even social protection as more popular items on 
their agenda.  
In any case, the analysts positioned three main conservative parties quite 
closely to each other on Graph 2. It is interesting to see how these parties 
themselves describe their own party positions and their differences. As a 
New Conservative Party representative said, their conservatism is particularly 
well-manifested in giving primacy to issues of tradition, religion, ethnic 
identity, and scepticism about human capabilities. Representatives of the 
Conservative Party of Georgia and the Industrialists held similar views. The 
opinion that globalization poses a threat of sorts to the Georgian cultural 
identity is also common to them. Representatives of the Conservative Party 
of Georgia state that the struggle for the establishment of liberal institutions 
in the country's political and economic system should be combined with 
efforts to preserve the country's cultural originality. In the words of a New 
Conservative Party activist, “our priority is harmonization of national values, 
originality, and identity with the requirements of modern life and civiliza-
tion.”
                                                                                                                               
other churches at disadvantage, was sharply criticized by representatives of all political 
parties in government and in the opposition. 
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However, different conservative parties also have different priorities. The 
New Conservatives clearly stand out for their emphasis on the market econ-
omy and the protection of private property rights as preconditions for mak-
ing other public benefits possible. Their former partners, the Industrialists, 
also underline their commitment to the same principles, but their main em-
phasis is on promoting the development of the local manufacturing sector. 
The most notable difference concerns attitudes towards free trade. The In-
dustrialists promote economic protectionism and they call on the state to 
protect the Georgian market from being flooded by imports. This party is the 
most outspoken critic of the IMF-promoted policies of economic globaliza-
tion, as they threaten the development of the Georgian manufacturing sec-
tor. As one the leaders of the Industrialists affirmed “…what may be the dif-
ference between us and the NCP is that we want the Georgian people to be 
first and foremost pro-Georgian and only then have good relations with 
America and others.” The Industrialists and the Conservatives also put 
greater stress on the combination of free-market principles with social safety 
nets than do the New Conservative Party. The latter underlines not caving in 
to popular moods.
Interestingly, when asked about role models in the West, the United Na-
tional Movement representatives mentioned the US Republican Party and 
Tony Blair’s (but not traditional) Labour Party in the UK. The leaders of the 
party say that the reforms which they have initiated are of a liberal nature. 
Arguably, the main direction of the National Movement policies may be 
compared to the “Third Way” associated with the New Labour in the UK. It 
was mentioned above that, as a party in power, the United National Move-
ment presents itself as the unifying force and tries to combine both leftist 
and centre-right policies. But most of their real policies put them closer to 
parties in the centre-right; this includes giving priority to strengthening the 
police and the army, ambitious programs of privatizing public assets, ag-
gressive cuts in the state bureaucracy, adoption of a liberal tax code and an 
extremely pro-business labour code.  
When it comes to cultural issues, the United National Movement – as do 
other Georgian parties – tries to combine cultural traditionalism with sup-
port for liberal principles. Apart from a conscious effort to find a balance 
between the two principles, there is debate on these issues within the party 
as well. One of the leaders of the party described the internal party debates 
on the reform of secondary education as that between supporters of libertar-
ian and paternalistic positions. He also stated that while all the party mem-
bers recognize the principle of freedom of religion, there is no common view 
on how to handle the special status of the Orthodox Church.107
To sum up, there are points of consensus and divergence in Georgian 
politics. On the one hand all parties pay allegiance to the principles of the 
free market, but try at the same time to combine them with policies aimed at 
                                                          
107 In December 2005, this became manifest in sharply different reactions of different 
MPs from the UNM towards the Public Defender’s criticism of the privileged position of 
the Georgian Orthodox Church. 
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some social welfare for the population. On the other hand, everybody agrees 
that Georgia needs democratic institutions and protection of individual free-
doms (including religious freedom, even though this is the most controver-
sial issue of all). Everybody also agrees that some measures should be taken 
to preserve the Georgian cultural identity. However, parties differ as to 
which issues take priority in their party programs, party statements or spe-
cific political decisions.  
All parties agree that some measures should be taken to preserve the 
Georgian cultural identity 
There is a certain discrepancy between general principles which all Georgian 
parties avow, such as the liberal principles of the free market and personal 
freedom, and those issues that, they believe, are more popular and give the 
parties more votes, such as state intervention to protect social welfare and 
traditional cultural institutions. This tension can be linked to another point 
of consensus in Georgia, one that is perhaps the most important but has not 
been discussed in this chapter so far: that of Georgia’s European and Euro-
Atlantic orientation. As has already been said, Georgian political parties do 
not challenge the idea of joining the European Union and NATO (the Labour 
Party was to a certain extent an exception but never made it a central part of 
its discourse). Liberal ideas of the free market and personal freedoms are 
associated with this Georgian fundamental choice, and they are not chal-
lenged either, at least as general principles. However, the Georgian political 
market forces the parties to put social and cultural protectionism in their 
public performance. 
Defining political priorities 
In analyzing the parties' activities, it is important to understand how a given 
party formulates the course of its policies. Do the policy options correspond 
to the ideological values that it says it stands for – if there are any? How do 
they define their priorities? Do the opposition parties propose to society their 
own agenda and policy packages or are their activities merely reactions to 
those of the authorities? The latter, of course, is essential in a democratic 
society.
The Georgian public often associates parties with the specific issues that 
they promote rather than with more general ideological profiles. One could 
call these the “trademark issues” of Georgian political parties. For example, 
the Industrialists are associated with demands for the promotion and protec-
tion of the local manufacturing sector. “The only reason why we joined poli-
tics was to use the parliamentary forum to change the economic policy in the 
country,” Gogi Topadze, the leader of the party, has said. He meant support 
for policies that would protect local manufacturers and resist the influence of 
the IMF that the party considered harmful to the Georgian economy. The 
Republicans are best known for safeguarding the principle of supremacy of 
131 
law, that is criticizing the government for cutting corners with existing legis-
lation. The New Conservatives claim to have a similar image. The Conserva-
tive Party of Georgia is most known for its campaigns to exempt small busi-
ness from taxes, to issue pensions to senior citizens according to the work 
record,108 and to defend the right of depositors who lost their savings in So-
viet banks.
Such “trademark issues” were important in previous years as well. The 
Labour Party put great emphasis on fighting the American energy distribu-
tion company, the AES, for increasing electricity tariffs. The National Move-
ment built up its support on exposing corruption and lobbying for the law 
that would allow seizing property of civil servants if they could not document 
their revenues.
The public often associates parties with the specific issues they promote 
rather than with general ideological profiles 
Parties insist that their trademark issues correspond to their stated values 
and goals and that at times they promote certain issues even if they are un-
popular. The New Conservatives claim that they supported the authorities on 
the land privatization bill even though the majority of the population felt 
negatively towards it. However, the parties often accuse each other of pro-
moting specific causes that put them at odds with their general principles 
and values. In particular, it is often said about conservative parties that they 
promote leftist causes because this is a better way to boost their ratings.  
The party leaders well realize the need for a permanent rapport with soci-
ety when setting goals and priorities. For this, Georgian political parties 
widely use public opinion research. Most parties often conduct opinion polls 
on their own to expose problems that exist in society. They also use the re-
sults of opinion calls conducted by other organizations.  
Local branches play an important role in helping the leadership to iden-
tify the problems that concern people most. New Conservative Party mem-
bers say that regular meetings with party activists and local residents in dif-
ferent parts of the country bring many new problems to the attention of the 
party leadership. The Conservative Party leaders said that, when choosing 
their policy priorities, they are mainly guided by how large a social group is 
affected by a given problem. Yet another criterion, they added, is the exis-
tence of a realistic way to tackle it.
Party leaders point out that the policy they formulate must coincide with 
the prevalent mood among the population. Party representatives understand 
that such an approach may lead to populism, or accusations thereof. There-
fore, they argue that, whenever necessary, politicians should go against pub-
lic opinion out of ideological or long-term pragmatic considerations. “If you 
are a politician, you must be able to go against public opinion if the public is 
                                                          
108 Today, the Georgian state gives a flat amount to all Georgian senior citizens as a re-
tirement pension. 
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mistaken,” one of the leaders of the United National Movement said. More-
over, representatives of this party maintain that precisely this principle may 
ensure the party's popularity in the long haul.  
Another pitfall in relying too much on public opinion research when se-
lecting party agendas is that people’s sentiments are fickle and difficult to 
gauge accurately. This might be connected with the absence of stable and 
consolidated societal groups and, as a Republican Party leader said, “We have 
to incur political risks here.”
Republican Party: ideological profile 
The Republican Party is one of the oldest Georgian parties. Its origin goes 
back to 1979, when members of dissident circles initiated the creation of 
an underground party with this name. The political outlook of its leaders 
was similar to the views widespread among part of the Georgian intelli-
gentsia of that time: general commitment to democratic values, anti-
Communism and moderate nationalism. With regards to these points the 
party’s ideology have not undergone drastic changes. Some analysts link 
the stability of the party’s principles to the social profile of its members, 
with middle-class intellectuals having been dominant until recently. 
Today the party positions itself as the main party of the liberal centre, 
while most of the other parties sharing a liberal agenda tend to be more 
conservative. Positions of different members of the party may fluctuate 
more to the left-of-centre, center-right or neo-liberal directions. According 
to one of the founders of the party, even social-democratic ideas were 
originally close to them, but the rising national movement pushed them to 
the right. As it appears from program documents as well as from inter-
views with party leaders, left-of-centre positions are closer to them. 
Most opposition parties focus their activities on criticizing policies of the 
party in power rather than proposing comprehensive policy alternatives. The 
United National Movement stresses this point, saying that the opposition is 
not “constructive”, but some independent analysts also hold this opinion. 
The opposition, however, retorts that the ruling party simply ignores their 
opinion and blame the latter for the absence of constructive policy dialogue. 
“This parliamentary majority has two-thirds of the votes and that is the con-
stitutional majority. This is why it is pointless for us to propose any specific 
initiatives in writing,” one of the leaders of the Conservative Party of Georgia 
said. Accordingly, the opposition parties tend to focus on monitoring the 
authorities' actions and criticizing them. Sometimes opposition parties do 
raise specific legislative initiatives on their own, but this is infrequent. 
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The excessive dependency on the personality of the leader 
As has been said, the voters first and foremost associate the parties with their 
leaders and only after this with their policies, values or ideologies. One of the 
leaders of the Labour Party said that “it depends on the leader what 95 per-
cent of the Georgian population thinks about the party.” According to the 
Conservative Party, opinion polls show that many people are familiar with 
the activities of their leaders Koba Davitashvili or Zviad Dzidziguri, but they 
have heard nothing about their party. This problem may be more natural for 
this relatively new party, but representatives of other parties say the same. 
“No one can deny today that what unites [our] party is its leader and that the 
party is associated with him,” one of the leaders of the United National 
Movement said.  
The leader not only attracts voters and members, but also, to a significant 
extent, secures the members' loyalty to the party. Activists of the parties' 
local organizations note that the number of admissions of new members to 
the parties increases particularly after the leaders' public speeches. The party 
leaders themselves realize that their disproportionate role constitutes a major 
problem. In conversations, they give numerous examples of parties’ having 
dissolved following their leaders' departures from the political arena. Many 
of them agree that in the event the incumbent leaders left their parties, this 
would deal a severe blow to these organizations as well.  
Some parties, however, say that they are in a better position on this ac-
count. For instance, representatives of the New Conservative Party recognize 
that they went through a difficult period after the Rose Revolution when 
many party supporters and one of the principal party leaders, Levan 
Gachechiladze, left the party. However, the party managed to overcome the 
crisis quite soon and it was the only opposition party to get over the thresh-
old in the March 2004 parliamentary elections. 
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Main findings 
? Identities and support for Georgian political parties depend more on 
the personalities of their leaders than on political principles, agendas, 
or representation of distinct social interests; 
? Most political parties have a distinct ideological self-identification and 
position themselves on the right or the left flanks of the ideological 
spectrum. The party in power avoids clear ideological denomination 
and positions itself as a unifying force serving society as a whole; 
? The Georgian political spectrum is notable for the general pre-
eminence of centre-right parties. This may be explained by the fact that 
the left is still to some extent tainted by association with the Commu-
nist past; 
? No parties espousing extreme right or extreme left ideologies play a 
significant role in Georgian politics; 
? Economic and social liberalism tend to go together in Georgian party 
platforms, while attachment to social welfare policies is often combined 
with cultural traditionalism; 
? General acceptance of the European and Euro-Atlantic choices by al-
most all major political parties constitutes a major point of consensus 
in Georgian politics. This implies general support for liberal principles 
of the free market and personal freedoms, though parties try to com-
bine this with popular demands for social welfare and Georgia’s own 
cultural identity; 
? Public images of political parties often largely depend more on their 
specific “trademark issues” than on their general ideological prefer-
ences;
? Parties recognize the excessive dependence on the personalities of their 
leaders to be a serious long-term challenge and try to develop strategies 
aimed at reconstituting their identities in less personalistic ways. 
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2.4 Human and Financial Resources 
What to do? 
? Delegate more rights and responsibilities to local branches of political 
parties;
? Develop clear procedures that ensure equitable distribution of rights 
and responsibilities among internal party positions; 
? Ensure members’ active involvement in party life during non-election 
periods;
? Establish clearly defined formal mechanisms and procedures for differ-
ent functions of party life, such as recruitment and internal conflict 
resolution;
? Establish effective information-sharing mechanisms within parties, 
most notably between their national and regional offices. 
Basic organizational structures  
All six political parties surveyed have head offices in Tbilisi, the capital, as 
well as territorial branches (see box on p. 39). The territorial structure of the 
parties coincides with the country’s municipal division and electoral admin-
istrative units. In every party, the basis of the structural pyramid is created by 
primary organizations (in some cases they are called ‘clubs’). Geographically, 
their distribution coincides with the areas with polling stations. A primary 
organization is established when a party has at least three local activists liv-
ing in the area. No party has established primary organizations in all of the 
approximately 3,000 electoral districts that currently exist in Georgia. How-
ever, every party aspires to reach this goal and considers it a part of its strate-
gic development plan. The United National Movement claims to have pri-
mary organizations in each of the around 2884 poll stations in Georgia.  
No party has established primary organizations in all of the approximately 
3,000 electoral districts that currently exist in Georgia 
While no party has branches in every locality (district level representation), 
all six parties are represented in all or most of the provinces (mkhare). This 
does not include the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where 
Georgian jurisdiction does not effectively extend and whose de facto authori-
ties consider themselves independent from Georgia. The de facto authorities 
in these regions do not allow elections to government bodies of the Georgian 
state to be held (save for some villages in South Ossetia populated by ethnic 
Georgians) and would presumably be hostile to attempts to establish 
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branches of Georgian political parties there. If Georgian political parties 
were to conduct activities in these regions, they would have to go under-
ground.
While all parties are represented in almost every region of Georgia, the 
strength of their organizations varies widely from one region to another. 
These variations depend on various factors, occasionally including the ori-
gins of party leaders and concentration of a loyal electorate.  
Primary organizations are led by chairpersons that may be locally elected 
or selected by the party leadership (see more on this below in this chapter). 
The main function of the primary organizations is to work with people and 
attract supporters at the grass-roots level. Their activities greatly intensify 
during the election campaign. In these periods, apart from working with 
local communities on their own, they organize pre-election meetings of their 
candidates. On election days, they ensure the active participation of party 
supporters. In the period between elections the activism of the primary or-
ganizations dies down. Their main function then is to register new members 
and supporters and inform the local communities of the decisions and activi-
ties of their parties. In the event that a party initiates some massive social 
campaign, primary organization activists are responsible for mobilizing local 
support and for collecting signatures from local citizens. 
Almost all the parties have intermediary units between the primary and 
district organizations, at least in the larger districts. These are called zone 
organizations and their function is to ensure better coordination between 
primary territorial organizations. Such units are created as a matter of expe-
diency and they are not usually regulated by party statutes. Each zone com-
prises from 8 to 12 primary organizations and has a coordinator responsible 
for mediating between the district and primary organizations and coordinat-
ing the party’s activities within the respective area. Typically, a district or-
ganization comprises four or five zones. 
Primary organizations come together in district (rayon) organizations. 
Their areas also coincide with electoral districts. 
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Territorial structure of political party organizations 
Head Offices: Provide general leadership and management, define party 
ideology and policies and manage fundraising and spending priorities. 
Regional (mkhare) Organizations: Responsible for supervising the work of 
district organizations and implementing party policies at the local level. 
District (rayon) Organizations: Responsible for carrying out recruitment 
policies, planning and implementing specific local activities, collecting 
membership fees and registering new members. 
Zone Organizations: Intermediary organizations between primary and 
district levels. They are established in large districts to ensure better co-
ordination between territorial units. 
Primary Organizations: The primary level of the parties’ structural pyra-
mid. They are responsible for recruiting members, working with the pub-
lic, carrying-out grass-roots campaigns and mobilizing supporters during 
the election period. 
District-level organizations are managed by chairpersons. In addition, they 
have boards or bureaus that serve as administrative agencies involved in 
decision-making and problem-solving processes at the local level. The num-
ber of members of bureaus/boards and 
the staffing regulations vary from party to 
party. Typically, bureaus/boards have 
from five to nine members. Their respon-
sibilities include recruiting and registering 
members and supporters, collecting 
membership fees (if such fees are stipu-
lated), planning and carrying out cultural 
and sports activities and co-ordinating 
activities related to other party initiatives.  
A major responsibility of district or-
ganizations is to draw up electoral lists 
with the help of primary organizations. 
The reason for this is that political parties 
do not trust lists compiled by the electoral 
administration and try to rectify mistakes 
through their own censuses. “In our own 
files we register local citizens who have 
the right to vote. We ask them to give us 
their passport information and age and 
ask about the party they intend to vote for 
(answering this is optional). Thus by the 
election period we have a clear under-
Central 
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Figure 1. Party hierarchy
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standing of the electoral feelings at the local level,” a member of Industry 
Will Save Georgia said. 
The work of district organizations is coordinated by and their relations 
with the head office are mediated by the regional (mkhare) organization 
(figure 1). Their geographical borders coincide with the administrative divi-
sions of the country. Although so far there have been no elections at the 
mkhare level in Georgia, district organizations play an important role in the 
administrative distribution of power, and parties consider it necessary to 
have offices at this level as well. Usually, establishing regional organizations 
and determining what functions they will carry out are the prerogative of 
central administrative bodies. In most cases, general procedures are defined 
in the statutes. The structure of regional organizations is similar to that of 
district units: their work is managed and led by the chairpersons, who are 
assisted by regional bureaus or boards.  
The work of territorial branches is supervised and governed by the head 
office. Whereas party statutes may be rather general when it comes to regu-
lating party positions at the local level, the statutes of every party strictly de-
fine the rules for filling positions in each body of the national party organiza-
tions.
The distribution of rights and responsibilities in the national-level party 
offices differs from one party to another, but each of them includes at least 
three main units: 
1.  The supreme legislative body – party congress/conference; 
2.  The executive body – political boards, chairpersons and secretaries; 
3.  The structural branch responsible for inspecting/auditing activities of 
the party organization as a whole – inspection committee.
Functional – youth and women’s – organizations 
Almost all Georgian parties have youth party organizations while only 
some of them have set up women’s party organizations as well. All parties 
give priority to creating youth branches because young activists play a very 
important role in grass-roots campaigns, especially during election peri-
ods. These functional organizations have their own structures and are 
represented in head offices and at the regional and district levels of their 
party organizations. 
In addition, all parties have youth organizations. Generally, there are no 
formal restrictions on those wanting to join, although one of the parties does 
limit the membership to those who are “under the age of 35.”109 The youth 
organizations have their own organizational set-ups. Typically these struc-
                                                          
109 Article 15.2, Statute of the Conservative Party of Georgia. 
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tures mirror those of the principal organizations, and the former are repre-
sented in the latter. In most parties, bureaus or boards of the territorial party 
organizations include the leaders of the respective youth organizations. 
These organizations follow the main policies of the parties but do so from 
a youth perspective. They are all primarily concerned with the promotion of a 
healthy life-style among young people; they play an important role in initiat-
ing and organizing cultural and sports events. Parties make extensive use of 
the energy and enthusiasm of their young activists in canvassing activities, 
public opinion surveys, recruitment, gathering signatures, handing out leaf-
lets, etc.
Most parties have women’s organizations as well. Like youth organiza-
tions, they are established both in the centre and in the regions. Most of 
them are charity-style organizations and their activities are mostly targeted at 
the socially vulnerable strata of society. Many initiatives of the parties’ 
women’s organizations aim to help families with many children, as well as 
disabled people. They register socially vulnerable families, study their prob-
lems and, if possible, give out free meals and medical aid vouchers, and dis-
tribute financial and other material support. Those women’s organizations 
that have links to international organizations involve their members in dif-
ferent educational programmes, such as leadership trainings. However, the 
latter projects are not regular and they are usually limited to the organiza-
tion’s leaders. Moreover, they are initiated and run by international organiza-
tions rather than by the women’s organizations themselves.  
Leadership positions at the three levels of party organization (primary, 
district and central levels) may be filled in three different ways: they may be 
elective, elective with subsequent approval by superior bodies, or appointed 
by the latter. In Georgian political parties, the latter two methods of selecting 
party leaders of the territorial branches are more common. In most political 
parties, leaders and heads of different structural organizations are elected by 
members of the respective organization, and the appointments are subject to 
the approval of the superior bodies. Members of primary, district and re-
gional organizations are free to elect their chairpersons, but the bureau of 
the superior body makes the final decision.  
Some parties prefer leaders of local party organizations to be appointed 
by the national bodies. The statute of the United National Movement states: 
“Candidacy to the post of structural sub-unit leader shall be nominated by 
the party’s General Secretary and shall be confirmed by the party’s Political 
Committee.”110 The Labour Party of Georgia follows a similar principle, 
namely, the party’s structural units are “directed by the coordinators who are 
nominated by the party leader and approved by two-thirds of the political 
committee members.”111
It is unusual among Georgian political parties for leaders of local 
branches to be elected by their own members. In fact, no reasonably success-
ful party has used this method to date. In 2004, it was introduced by the 
                                                          
110 Article 8.1, Statute of the United National Movement. 
111 Article 5.1, Statute of the Labour Party of Georgia. 
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Conservative Party of Georgia, and the party statute formally established this 
as the principle of party organization. According to the statute, all internal 
party positions are elective and the term of office extends to the next elec-
tions. Until then, leadership positions may be terminated only if holders 
choose to resign or if they violate the party statute. The idea behind this is 
that intra-party relations should encourage competition within the party. 
Party leaders hope that a competitive environment within the party will help 
to produce strong leaders and create robust local party organizations.  
The rights and responsibilities attached to different positions within the 
parties are generally determined by party statutes. However, these docu-
ments describe in detail only the functions of a handful of senior positions. 
Almost all parties have chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and general secre-
taries of the parties, who are responsible for determining party policy, plan-
ning and conducting all party activities, appointing and dismissing the heads 
of structural units, making decisions on the creation or winding-up of local 
offices, signing all official party documents and representing the party in 
external relations. However, party statutes or other party documents do not 
define as clearly the rights and responsibilities of other party branches and 
their officers. 
Unequal and unclear distribution of functions at the lower levels of the 
party hierarchy leads to diminished effectiveness and efficiency. For in-
stance, the functions of heads of district organizations and zone coordinators 
overlap with regard to cooperating with local bureaus/boards and coordinat-
ing the activities of different groups within the party. In some parties, the 
duties and responsibilities of chairs and deputy chairs of party organizations 
of different levels are so similar that it is almost impossible to differentiate 
between them. Regional and district organizations of the United National 
Movement may be considered an exception, as they maintain three positions 
(chair, executive secretary and organizational secretary) for managing party 
work in their organizations, and the distribution of tasks between these three 
party officers is fairly clear-cut. Most parties recognize that their system of 
distributing tasks between different levels of party organizations and their 
officers is inadequate and that this limits their flexibility and effectiveness in 
responding to emerging challenges; some of them suggest specific solutions 
to this problem, but these ideas have yet to be finally shaped.  
The only structural unit whose scope is strictly defined in all parties is the 
inspecting/auditing body. It is responsible for auditing all financial docu-
ments, reviewing activities carried out by structural units and monitoring 
and assessing internal party elections (if applicable). In every party, members 
of inspection committees are elected and their right to occupy any additional 
position within the party is restricted. 
Most parties have not established effective mechanisms for sharing in-
formation within their organizations. This causes serious gaps between dif-
ferent levels of the structural pyramid. The flows of information tend to be 
one-sided. Delivering messages from the central office to territorial organiza-
tions is fairly easy and is usually done by cell phone. However, members of 
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regional and district organizations have much greater difficulty in reaching 
leaders of the national organization. They are obliged to write down their 
statements and send mails to the central office. This mechanism, however, 
does not work effectively and is rarely used. 
Excessive centralization of party management 
Political parties in Georgia are overly-centralized organizations. Moreover, 
the more successful parties tend also to be more centralized than the others, 
while experiments at delegating more tasks to local branches are restricted to 
parties that have not had electoral successes so far. All major resources, fi-
nancial and professional included, are concentrated in the national offices. 
The head offices make all major decisions with regard to party policies. They 
plan, manage and supervise the implementation of all party work. The range 
of responsibilities of heads of central organizations varies from appoint-
ing/approving chairs of district organizations to drawing up lists of candi-
dates for parliamentary elections. In most cases party leaders are simultane-
ously ideologists, decision-makers, managers and representatives of their 
parties in external relations.
In most cases party leaders are simultaneously ideologists, decision-
makers, managers and representatives of their parties in external relations 
All the tools of fund-raising and expending party finances are controlled by 
the central administrative bodies of the parties, both according to their stat-
utes and in practice. The statutes of almost all parties assign the responsibil-
ity of drawing up a budget and determining priorities in expenditures to the 
central administrative body. The Conservative Party of Georgia is the only 
exception in this regard. Expenditure priorities are similar for all parties: 
office expenses, the expenses for party events, remuneration of office-holders 
within the party, support of socially vulnerable strata and technical equip-
ment for offices.  
Unequal and unclear distribution of functions at the lower levels of party 
structures leads to diminished effectiveness and efficiency 
Most district and regional offices of the parties are free to cooperate with 
local businessmen and raise funds from them, but this level of fund-raising 
is limited in scope and is always coordinated with the centre. The involve-
ment of party members in fund-raising activities may be controversial in that 
donations to political parties are presumed to imply some reciprocal benefit; 
party members think that if they accept financial aid, they by implication are 
obliged to grant some benefits and privileges to party sponsors. But they do 
not have a strong enough mandate to make such decisions. As a result, the 
local structural units prefer to avoid the responsibilities implicit in fund-
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raising and cede them to the head offices. In case of need, structural units 
address the centre with a written request for financial support. 
The mechanism is different in the Conservative Party. Here, the local 
structural units are given freedom to fundraise from business organizations. 
There are only two restrictions: they cannot accept financial donations from 
illegal businesses and they must transfer 20 per cent of the collected 
amounts to the head office. As with the structural units of other parties, they 
can also turn to the head office if they are unable to cover the office expenses 
or finance party events themselves. The head office will consider their re-
quest and make a decision about whether or not to release funds. 
Intellectual and professional resources are also concentrated in head of-
fices. Analytical bureaus, professional groups and services operate only at the 
highest level of institutional pyramids. They determine party ideology, poli-
cies and programmes to be carried out in different areas of public life, iden-
tify recruitment priorities, draw up questionnaires for different surveys, etc. 
Professional groups specializing in public relations are also concentrated in 
the head offices. Owing to lack of influence and professional resources, dis-
trict and regional organizations depend on the press services of central of-
fices for promoting their activities. Considering the specific characteristics of 
different localities, regional structural units may act at their own discretion 
as well, but this is only possible within strictly limited frameworks.  
To sum up, the function of head offices is to come up with strategies and 
decisions, while territorial organizations are there to implement them. It can 
be argued that concentrating all leadership functions in a single head office 
makes it easier to make decisions and manage party organizations more 
effectively in the short term. However, such excessive centralization limits 
the effective allocation of resources, stifles local initiative and impedes the 
development of local party branches in the long term. While carrying an 
enormous amount of responsibilities, leaders of party organizations in the 
centre run the risk of failing to judge public needs adequately, evaluate or-
ganizational resources and find effective responses to emerging challenges.  
Development strategies of party organizations  
One of the main challenges that parties face in the process of further devel-
oping their organizations is the absence or unclear formulation of party 
strategy. As the parties are aware that excessive dependence on the personali-
ties of one or several leaders is a strategic weakness, they are focused on how 
this problem can be overcome.  
Most parties are trying to respond to the new challenges of the new situa-
tion in the country and are undergoing an overhaul of sorts (see more on this 
in the last part of this chapter). Apart from streamlining their parties’ organ-
izational structures, they are trying to rethink the general vision of what kind 
of parties they are and what they want to achieve in the long term. For this, 
some of them may seek assistance from various non-governmental organiza-
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tions and international partners. In this sense, the identities of some political 
parties in Georgia can be said to be under construction.  
At present, no political parties involved in this research save for one have 
comprehensive written strategy documents. In some parties, work is under-
way to draw up such documents, while within all of them various issues of 
party strategy are actively being discussed.  
Most parties are trying to respond to the fresh challenges that the new 
situation in the country poses and are undergoing an overhaul of sorts 
The only exception is the United National Movement, whose leadership de-
veloped a document entitled “What our organization will be like in 2010.” 
The document lists the goals which the party hopes to achieve in the course 
of its development. The party leaders say that the document aims at over-
coming the problem that is common to the Georgian political parties, that of 
excessive dependence on one single leader. They say that the party is striving 
to rally a large group of honest individuals who care about the country's de-
velopment, and they expect that the party will eventually be associated with 
this group of individuals and the goals that the party has set rather than with 
the personality of its leader. Other goals listed in the document include creat-
ing a strong party structure, ensuring stable public support and achieving 
adequate representation in state institutions. However, the document is still 
quite general; it sets out goals to be achieved but does not contain a specific 
action plan of how to achieve them. The plan assumes that the party will stay 
in power until the end of its mandate (2010).  
While other parties do not have written strategies of development, their 
leaders follow certain sets of guidelines with regard to the development of 
party organizations. One example may be the Republican Party. Its influence 
peaked in 1995, when it played an important role in elaborating the Georgian 
Constitution. Later, however, its political influence waned significantly. The 
party had several prominent civil society figures that became well-known to 
the public in that capacity, but as an organization it had an image of a loose 
intellectual club rather than a serious political player. It never depended on a 
single leader, and it was proud of being different from other parties on that 
account, representing a genuine political team. But lack of clear leadership 
could also be considered a cause of its organizational weakness. It returned 
to the fore when it took an active part in the Rose Revolution, and in 2004 
several of its members gained parliamentary seats as part of the United Na-
tional Movement list. However, even after this it was associated with several 
well-known names but almost no party organization had been established. In 
2005, the party elected Davit Usupashvili, a prominent civil society activist, to 
be its chairman in the hope that he might succeed in building up a strong 
political organization. The new leadership of the party has set a goal of be-
coming a strong and independent political player rather than of having to 
rely solely on forming coalitions with other parties (something that it has 
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been doing throughout its history). It also urged members who had joined 
civil society organizations to come back and help to build up the party.  
The Labour Party shares this sceptical attitude towards coalitions and ex-
presses it even more forcefully. Its representatives say that the party refuses 
to follow the pattern that has established itself in Georgian politics of form-
ing coalitions without regard for ideological principles. New Conservative 
Party leaders, on the other hand, believe that they can create a firm electoral 
support base for the party on the right despite the popularity of leftist slogans 
in the country. Moreover, they believe that this goal has already been largely 
achieved and the party has a stable group of voters that will gradually expand.  
Formal and informal regulations of party work 
In all parties, relations between party members are based on informal bonds 
of personal trust rather than on allegiance to common principles or com-
mitment to established formal procedures. Most members of parties say that 
their relations are similar to those in a family. In many organizations, culti-
vating these informal relationships is also a matter of policy. The parties’ 
district and regional organizations keep records of their members’ birthdays 
and office workers call them every year to wish them well. They also regu-
larly extend their best wishes to party members on public holidays. “Such 
gestures are quite effective, because people like it when there are signs of 
being appreciated,” a Labour Party member said.  
Most members of parties say that their relations are similar  
to those in a family 
Parties make wide use of informal connections in the process of recruiting 
new members as well. When asked about general mechanisms of attracting 
new members, party representatives typically say that they rely on the public 
statements made by their leaders. Presumably, responses to them define the 
area of potential supporters of a political party. However, when it comes to 
more proactive methods of recruiting new members, political parties usually 
work through personal networks, such as friends, family members, relatives 
and neighbours whom they trust and believe in. “Today the majority of the 
supporters of our party are close relatives and friends of ours who respect 
and hold us in high esteem,” a member of the Industrialists’ party said. Po-
litical parties usually do not try to define any specific social groups where 
they are more likely to find supporters on account of their ideology or 
agenda. Nor do they treat the religious and ethnic minorities, women or 
other groups differently. Thus wider social groups are not singled out as 
potential areas of recruitment for political parties.  
The only social group beyond personal networks of trust that the parties 
do try to attract is the youth. Carrying out special cultural and sport projects 
for young people is the main method of engaging with this group.  
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The success in recruiting new members mostly depends  
on the party leader’s image 
According to the parties’ own observations, roughly two-thirds of the suc-
cessful recruitment of new members depends on the leader’s image. The 
remainder is attributable to the successful work of party members within 
their personal networks of trust.  
This dependence on informal personal relations continues after new 
members join party organizations. Of course, parties have statutes that are 
major documents regulating the functioning of the organization, the rela-
tions between the structural units and the distribution of rights and respon-
sibilities among them. However, statutes are considered to be very general 
documents that are adopted in order not to violate the Law on Political Asso-
ciations of Citizens which states that all political organizations are obliged to 
adopt statutes at their first conference.112 The law also determines the major 
issues that should be included in the document: the goals of the organiza-
tion, procedures for accepting and expelling members, the rights and re-
sponsibilities of members, organizational structure, division of responsibili-
ties among governing bodies,113 etc.
While defining the general goals and tasks of a party, in most cases the 
statutes leave it to different structural units to adopt their own rules and 
regulations. However, none of the parties’ organizational units have addi-
tional regulatory documents, save for the United National Movement. In the 
second half of 2005, the United National Movement adopted “Ten Main 
Principles of the Organization’s Functioning” and “Five Main Rules for 
Party Members.” The first document identifies the values determining the 
party’s activities and the second sets out the principles to be followed by 
party members in their work. 
Informal mechanisms are crucial for resolving conflicts within parties. A 
statute is the only formal document that indirectly deals with the issue of 
conflicts. In particular, it identifies the grounds on which a party can expel 
its members. A party member can be expelled if he or she change their po-
litical views and beliefs, fail to obey the decisions taken by superior bodies, 
do anything damaging to the party image, etc. “If anyone disagrees with a 
decision taken by the party and finds that decision contrary to his/her per-
sonal principles, this person should leave the party,” a member of the United 
National Movement said.
The statute does not cover other problems that may arise between party 
members and does not provide any procedures for their solution. Therefore, 
parties rely on informal ways of resolving internal conflicts. It is an estab-
lished practice that in case of any kind of disagreement between members, 
parties call the opposing sides for a dialogue. Such dialogue usually takes the 
form of an informal discussion with the participation of party leaders. More 
                                                          
112 Article 12, Law on Political Associations of Citizens. 
113 Article 13, Law on Political Associations of Citizens. 
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formal methods of conflict resolution, such as discussing these issues on the 
bureaus/boards of the respective organizations, are almost never used. All 
parties found it difficult to name an internal conflict that had been regulated 
formally. They could not even recall an example of a member being formally 
expelled, save for the Industrialists who had the experience of officially ter-
minating the membership of those charged with dishonest behaviour in one 
district-level organization. While differences of opinion are quite common in 
parties, such differences almost never go beyond informal discussions. If the 
two sides fail to come to an agreement, the side with the least support has to 
leave the party.
There are no formally established methods of conflict  
resolution within the parties 
The principles of relations or codes of conduct inside a party structure are 
dictated by the members who enjoy the highest authority within the party. 
Therefore, such codes are very stable and those members who disagree with 
them usually leave the party of their own accord so as not to undermine 
unity. Although such mechanisms are quite effective in ensuring party unity 
in the short term, they may be less than productive for a party’s long-term 
interests: if particular individuals lose their authority within a party, it may 
become impossible to deal with conflicts and overcome lesser obstacles. 
Some parties consider the lack of formal conflict regulation mechanisms 
to be a handicap. For instance, due to its different principles for structuring 
the organization, Conservative Party of Georgia members foresee that they 
may face conflicts that are dissimilar from those of other parties. In particu-
lar, they expect that internal elections will become a source of conflict. Every 
party member who intends to seek a position within the party should be 
ready to compete with fellow members, be defeated and accept that other 
candidates are legitimate competitors rather than enemies. However, they 
admit that in order to regulate possible conflicts they might need to establish 
additional articles in the statute or to adopt separate regulatory documents. 
Party finances 
Material and human resources are crucial to a robust party organization. All 
the parties suffer from lack of resources, although they also have problems 
in efficiently using the resources they actually have.  
The main material resource party organizations need is office space. Par-
ties do not usually own their offices but rent them. Central, regional and 
district administrative bodies of all of the parties use their own offices. Office 
space is not provided to primary and zone organizations. The latter are given 
financial support to open an office only during election campaigns. All the 
offices except for the head office have from two to three rooms, one of which 
is used for meetings. 
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There is usually little technical equipment at party offices. District offices of 
all the parties except the New Conservative Party and United National 
Movement have only the most basic office furniture (tables and chairs) and 
the telephone is the only means of communication. The district and regional 
offices of the New Conservative Party as well as the regional offices of the 
United National Movement are equipped with computers. Owing to the lack 
of finances, other parties have computers only at their central offices. They 
see equipping their offices as a major priority if and when they attract suffi-
cient financial support. 
The principal source of funding for parties is donations made by party 
members and their friends, as well as by private businesses 
The main sources of income for parties are membership fees and donations. 
The money collected from membership fees is often too little to cover even 
the expenses of district offices. The principal source of funding is the dona-
tions made by party members and their friends, as well as by private busi-
nesses. Raising funds from businesses is the prerogative of head offices, 
while local branches are free to fundraise only for sport and cultural activities 
at the local level. On the one hand, this concentration of fundraising activi-
ties at the head offices relieves local branches of the necessity to concern 
themselves with financial problems. However, this also limits their possibili-
ties of further development.  
Party According to votes 
received in the last 
elections  
According to seats 
in Parliament  
Total 
United National 
Movement
1 203 076  300 000 1 503 076  
Conservative party 
of Georgia 
79 542 9 600 89 142
Republican Party 59 657 9 600 69 257
Industry Will Save 
Georgia
113 313 14 400 127 713
New Conservative 
Party 
113 313 19 200 132 513
Labour Party of 
Georgia
179 962 2 400 182 362
Freedom Party 131 313 - - - 131 313 
Table 10. State funding (in Georgian laries) to be received by political parties in 2006  
In addition to the above-mentioned sources, parties can receive financial and 
material support from the state. From 2006 on, public financing for parties 
will increase considerably. Whereas earlier modest funding was allocated 
only on the basis of parliamentary seats, from now on, those parties that 
received at least five per cent of the vote in the last parliamentary elections 
148
will receive additional funding higher than before.114 Table 10 shows how 
much public funding seven Georgian parties will be eligible for. However, 
even this increased funding will cover only a small portion of party expenses. 
As for international support for political parties, the law limits this to techni-
cal equipment, literature, seminars and other educational activities.115
Parties exercise a wavelike recruitment policy. The party activists attract 
their friends, neighbours and relatives, who in turn involve people close to 
them 
In this area as well, the Conservative Party of Georgia has tried to innovate. 
In 2005, it was the first in the Georgian political environment to arrange a 
fund-raising dinner and thus initiate a new transparent mechanism for at-
tracting funds. 
Human resources 
All parties agree that able and committed human resources are their main 
asset. These include first of all party leaders: they are the magnets for attract-
ing both rank-and-file members and voters. But no party can achieve success 
unless it has a well-organized network of activists who do party work at the 
grass-roots level. Working with human resources consists of at least two 
major elements. First, a party needs to attract activists; then it must use them 
as efficiently as possible.  
Attracting new members is the duty of primary and district organizations, 
while the leaders of the party define the general policy of recruitment. Most 
parties exercise a so-called wavelike recruitment policy. The party activists 
attract their friends, neighbours and relatives, who in turn involve people 
close to them. According to a member of the New Conservative Party, “In the 
first place one relies on one’s friends, who rely on their friends. This is a 
wavelike process passing from person to person and finally covering quite a 
large area.” Others maintain a special formula for recruiting new members 
called “n+1.” This means that each member has to attract at least one new 
member every month. This formula is not formally set out in statutes or 
other documents, but the parties believe that it benefits their organizational 
development.
However, whereas in the first years of their existence parties tend to be 
primarily oriented towards increasing the number of their members, experi-
ence subsequently constrains them to focus more on quality than quantity. 
“Generally it’s impressive when a party has a lot of members, but we don’t 
need those who are members only on paper and who won’t perform the 
tasks given them by the party,” a Labour Party member said. In order to solve 
                                                          
114 See more on rules for public funding for political parties in Section One, chapter on 
Parties and State.
115 Article 26, Law on Political Associations of Citizens 
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this problem, many parties try to distinguish between active members (activ-
ists) who are actually involved in the party work and supporters who are not 
(see more on this distinction in the next chapter on Internal Democracy and 
Membership).
In order to make the best use of people they have attracted, parties need 
an effective and efficient system of assessment, management and distribu-
tion of their human resources. First of all, they need information. For this 
purpose, every party requires its members to fill in an application form, indi-
cating, in addition to personal information, their education, profession and 
interests. Typically, these data stay in files kept in district organizations and 
are rarely used. As a result, decision-makers within the party cannot effec-
tively make use of the knowledge about their party’s human resources. Only 
the New Conservatives maintain a computer database, which easily allows 
them to update information, to measure human resources according to age, 
gender and profession, and to take advantage of those resources more effec-
tively.
Human resources and their management 
The New Conservative Party has taken steps towards introducing a more 
efficient system of human resources management. It is the only Georgian 
party so far that has managed to create a computer database of its mem-
bers. This database contains detailed information about party members, 
including their educational background, working experience and areas of 
interest, which enables the party to manage and direct all human and in-
tellectual recourses effectively. In order to fill in information regularly, the 
party charter obliges party organizations to update information annually. 
The party considers even details such as service in the army. As its repre-
sentative said, “We require such information about our members in order 
to take it into account in our activities. In particular, the party gives short-
term tasks to those members who have not yet served in the army as they 
may be conscripted.” According to the Georgian legislation, entering mili-
tary service leads to automatic termination of party membership. 
Apart from having adequate information on the capacities of their members, 
efficient use of human resources within political parties depends on the ra-
tional distribution of tasks between party officers and activists. Most parties 
face difficulties in carrying out their activities due to the unequal distribution 
and overlap of responsibilities between different positions within the party. 
This is true at the national level, and it can also be seen in the division of 
tasks between the different levels of territorial organizations.  
Most parties face difficulties due to the unequal distribution and overlap 
of responsibilities between different positions within the party 
150
The ongoing process of restructuring 
All Georgian parties find themselves in the process of restructuring their 
organizations. While all parties have followed quite different trajectories 
since their establishment, after the Rose Revolution they faced a radical 
change of political environment. In order to respond adequately to the new 
challenges they have to implement changes within their own institutions as 
well. However, the type of change varies, as parties have different starting 
points.
The Republican Party has existed for several decades, but until 2005 it 
was not strongly institutionalized as a party; even its members and a sympa-
thetic section of the public regarded it rather as an intellectual club that hap-
pened to have a statute and the structure of a political party. Therefore, its 
activities were not very effective or organized. Currently this party is making 
serious efforts to overcome its image and develop into a well-organized po-
litical institution. 
The Conservative Party of Georgia and the United National Movement 
were both registered in 2004. The constituent parts of the latter, the National 
Movement and the United Democrats, appeared in the political arena a few 
years ago, but in 2004 they merged and registered as a single party. The Con-
servative Party’s present reorganization has been brought about by its trans-
formation from a party in opposition into one in power. This increased its 
responsibilities and imposed new duties. Party members think this should 
lead to changes of its organizational structure as well: “Before the revolution 
the party’s structure was different, now it has completely changed. Today we 
are the ruling party.”  
The Conservative Party of Georgia was created as a result of a merger be-
tween a group that called itself the National Forces (supporters of former 
President Gamsakhurdia), which took part in the Rose Revolution together 
with the National Movement but then broke away, and the Conservative 
Party. Currently, this party is also undergoing drastic structural changes on 
the basis of the statute adopted in 2004.  
Serious challenges were faced by parties that did not support the Rose 
Revolution, such as the Labour Party, the New Conservative Party and Indus-
try Will Save Georgia. They lost significant numbers of members but man-
aged to maintain their organizations. Currently, they are in the process of 
evaluating the new environment and revising some of their principles 
against the backdrop of new political realities, thus making their agendas 
more attuned to public needs. 
There are a number of changes that characterize most parties. One is a 
redefinition of the institutions of membership – this will be discussed in the 
next chapter. The other is a tendency for parties to create additional func-
tional bodies within their organizations. Parties give priority to involving 
citizens in different kinds of party work, as it makes parties more responsive 
to public needs and enhances the quality of their work. Some of major politi-
cal organizations hope to involve citizens by establishing advisory councils, 
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working groups or shadow cabinets at the level of district organizations. 
Councils are open structures and do not limit the number of their members, 
thus anyone interested can participate in their activities. As regards working 
groups and shadow cabinets, participation is limited to party members and 
supporters, and their size is also restricted to reasonable numbers. All these 
bodies perform similar functions in different ways: they act as consultative 
boards and provide party organizations with recommendations on local and 
national issues. They can also become instruments for generating new initia-
tives and ideas, and involve professionals from different fields in the party’s 
activities. More information about each individual party and the files they 
produced for this research can be found in the Annex. 
   
Main findings 
? The organizational structures of Georgian parties mainly follow similar 
patterns in that the regional structure of their branches mirrors the ter-
ritorial administrative division of the country as well as borders of elec-
toral districts and precincts. Almost all parties have youth and women’s 
organizations; 
? Currently all parties are in the process of restructuring their organiza-
tions. This includes, among other things, trying to define more clearly 
the concept of party membership, creating lists of supporters and estab-
lishing new functional organizations within the parties; 
? Financial and professional resources of the parties are concentrated in 
their head offices. Head offices play a dominant role in determining 
policies, raising and distributing funds and conducting public relations; 
? Within parties, informal relations based on personal closeness and 
trust have priority over those defined by shared goals and formal proce-
dures. This ensures internal cohesion within political parties but limits 
their possibilities of growth in the long term; 
? Parties tend to have insufficiently developed formal institutional struc-
tures. The division of responsibilities between the parties’ leaders and 
staff at different levels is often unclear, and there are frequent overlaps; 
there are no effective procedures for sharing information or resolving 
conflicts within parties. 
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2.5 Internal Democracy and Membership
What to do? 
? Make information concerning different models of party organization 
accessible to parties; 
? Become more transparent and open to civil society and develop a con-
sistent, coherent and clear policy profile; 
? Increase capacity for policy analysis and policy-making at different lev-
els of party organisation; 
? Increase the role of members in policy-making and decision-making in 
political parties. 
General approach to the issue of internal democracy 
In general, Georgian political parties do not seem to consider the issue of 
internal democracy to be very acute. Political parties have recently introduced 
or are planning to introduce considerable structural changes, but these 
changes do not aim to give their members a greater role in decision-making 
or increase pluralism within the parties. The main purpose of reforms is to 
increase the parties’ efficiency as electoral machines.  
Participants of almost all the meetings held during this interactive as-
sessment characterized the principle of decision-making established in their 
parties as democratic and oriented towards members' involvement. How-
ever, the essence of this democratic principle was seen in the general atmos-
phere characteristic of relationships and conduct within the parties rather 
than in a set of established formal rules. On the other, analysis of such rules 
when they do exist demonstrates that party structures and decision-making 
are rather centralized.  
It is noteworthy that party members during two of the meetings charac-
terized the type of internal management within their parties as “democratic 
centralism”, revoking the organizational model of the Soviet Communist 
Party. According to them, there is no reason “to reinvent the wheel” and by 
that they seem to express their belief that this model is pretty much univer-
sal. This reflects the fact that most political party members and activists were 
socialized in the Soviet period and its political culture and today are not well-
informed about other models of party organization.
154
Top-down  
The analysis that in all modern societies political power is concentrated in 
the hands of a small group of party leaders or party oligarchy has been 
extensively elaborated by different authors, among them the German soci-
ologist Robert Michels in the beginning of the 20th century. According to 
him, in societies with democratic public politics, those members who are 
better than the average members at communicating and understanding 
political issues become party leaders. They create party elites and become 
autonomous or even independent from the mass of party members. 
Michels considered this to be a negative phenomenon, but also an in-
evitable feature of liberal democracies. The concentration of power in the 
hands of elites is intrinsically linked to the very nature of democratic ar-
rangements, and interparty relations are merely relations between party 
elites.116 Michels was clearly a man of his time and ended rationalizing the 
reasons of fascism. 
In the case of Communist parties, the concentration of power does not 
follow this analysis. It is rather based on the following idea: in order to 
implement the far-reaching goals set by the party, such as coming to 
power and completely transforming society into one based on socialist 
principles, a total unity of will is necessary. Correspondingly, internal 
party debates preceding a decision to be made by the party are allowed, but 
once the decision is arrived at, members are no longer permitted to chal-
lenge it. Such an approach, known as “democratic centralism”, brought 
success under specific circumstances. The Bolshevik Party in Russia and 
Communist parties in Europe stood united against their internally frag-
mented opponents, the democratic parties, and this gave them some ad-
vantage in power struggles. In part it explains the coming to power of 
Communist parties in some Eastern European countries (such as Czecho-
slovakia or Yugoslavia) after World War 2. However, this kind of internal 
arrangement was also the cause of the Communist parties’ structural 
weakness. They did not demonstrate sufficient flexibility in responding to 
changing attitudes in their societies and failed to adjust their image and 
policies once the ideology that they had advocated was no longer popular. 
This resulted in the disappearance of the Communist parties in a large 
number of countries.
                                                          
116 R. Michels, Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der Modernen Demokratie, Leipzig: 
Klinkhardt, 1911. 
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Attitudes towards the issue of internal democracy are different among mem-
bers of the Conservative Party. For them, internal democracy based on spe-
cific procedures is an important part of how members perceive their own 
party. As one party member said, they offer Georgian society a model of the 
party in which appointments to internal party positions are not based on 
personal networks. Moreover, party members believe that an internal de-
mocratic organization of their party is a precondition for its democratic func-
tioning when in power. Members of this party also hope that internal de-
mocracy will inspire greater public trust in the party and, subsequently, 
greater electoral success.  
The Georgian political parties do not consider the issue of internal democ-
racy to be very acute 
Many respondents from other parties are aware of this new principle in the 
Conservative Party's organization, which gives much greater autonomy to its 
local branches. But this is a relatively recent innovation in Georgian political 
life, and representatives of other parties do not yet have a clearly defined 
attitude toward it. 
Bottom-up 
A more horizontal distribution of power within a party and constant mu-
tual adjustments between different groups in it might best preserve party 
unity. Members of same party usually aspire to party unity more than to 
splits. Reconciling different interests inside the party allows unity to be 
safeguarded. The participation of rank-and-file members in policy and 
programmatic discussions could give them important motivation, even 
when the outcomes of these discussions do not influence the conduct of 
the party to any considerable degree.  
Moreover, while such a broad democratic ideal is related to the wider 
involvement of citizens, excessive centralization of decision-making inside 
the parties might also prove harmful for a party's image. Therefore, 
greater involvement of members in making certain kinds of decisions 
might both improve popular attitudes towards parties and increase moti-
vation of party members; this could happen without the party leadership 
losing the ability to make the most important decisions that are necessary 
for the parties’ operation. According to some political scientists , improv-
ing the public image is an additional consideration for many parties in the 
West to better develop procedures of internal democracy, and this is char-
acteristic of the recent period of party development. 
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The Institute of party membership
Members are the backbone of every political party. Analyzing what member-
ship actually means is of utmost importance for understanding the nature of 
political parties. In many modern Western political parties, the act of joining 
a party is a unilateral decision taken by an individual and it may be per-
formed by technical means, for instance, on the Internet.
Most Georgian parties take a different approach. For admissions proce-
dures of new members one can use examples of the New Conservative Party 
and United National Movement. All interested persons who are Georgian 
citizens with the right to vote and claim to share the views and aims of the 
party may be given membership status. Such people should submit a written 
application to a local party office, but this is only the first step. Prospective 
members are also asked to submit two or three references from existing 
party members and have an interview with the admissions board in which 
they must demonstrate their good will and positive attitudes. Similar proce-
dures are in place in most other parties as well. 
All successful applicants receive membership certificates and with them 
are granted the general rights and responsibilities declared in the statutes. 
These include the right to elect and be elected to certain positions within the 
party, to receive information on the activities of any of its structural units and 
submit proposals and initiatives to its governing bodies. In practice, mem-
bers of most parties are primarily required to pay membership fees, actively 
participate in the events organized by the party and follow and implement 
decisions taken by the decision-making bodies.
Usually, formal procedures such as obtaining recommendations and hav-
ing interviews with admission boards are not viewed as serious obstacles to 
gaining membership. At the same time, however, the latest trend in most 
parties, with the exception of the Conservative party, is to make their admis-
sion rules stricter. The reason for this is that parties are putting greater 
stress on the loyalty of their members, widespread defections from parties 
being one of the most frequently mentioned reasons for this. Those parties 
that did not support the Rose Revolution lost a number of members after-
wards and want to create safeguards against disloyal members. Prospective 
members are required to be honest, reliable, trustworthy and patriotic. All 
parties realize that these qualities are rather difficult to assess, but they nev-
ertheless still hope that loyalty may be safeguarded though institutionalizing 
recommendations for candidates for party membership and investigating 
candidates’ political backgrounds.  
At the same time, most parties are planning to clearly distinguish be-
tween full members or activists on the one hand and more passive mem-
bers/supporters on the other. The Conservative Party has already institution-
alized this distinction in its party statute. There are two kinds of party mem-
bers - full and associate. The former have the right to be elected to internal 
party positions and are obliged to assist the party both with financial contri-
butions and though their work. Associate members do not pay membership 
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fees and do not have the right to be elected to a party position. However, they 
can participate in internal party elections.  
The United National Movement has also introduced a special status of 
‘activist.’ It is suggested that those party members who do not pay member-
ship fees and are not regularly involved in party activities will receive the 
status of supporter or associate member. This will have implications for their 
rights and obligations.
All the parties except the Conservatives are planning to make their mem-
ber admission rules stricter 
Recently the Republican and Labour Parties have taken steps to formalize 
this distinction as well. Only dependable activists will be called members, 
while the supporters are those who have no major responsibilities and are 
not required to take an active part in the events organized by a party. But 
they are expected to be loyal to the party and vote for it in elections. Paying 
fees is optional for supporters. The Labour Party is planning to assign its 
passive members to the category of supporters; moreover, those who vote for 
particular parties in the elections but have not made up their minds to join 
the party will also be included in the list of supporters. Parties draft lists of 
their supporters according to their residence.
It can be concluded that most Georgian political parties appear to have 
changed their priorities with regards to membership and recruitment. If 
attracting a large number of members used to be considered the main prior-
ity, currently the stress is on loyalty to the party ideas and policies, profes-
sional qualities, a good reputation and active involvement in a party’s work, 
even if this is achieved at the expense of a declining number of members. 
This approach is close to the model described as “cadre parties” in political 
science.117 Only the Conservative Party and, to a lesser extent, the Labour 
Party seem to be oriented towards mass membership. 
Engaging members 
Once new members are admitted, parties face the problem of keeping them 
inside their organizations, especially during periods between elections. 
Georgian political parties are more successful in recruiting members than in 
ensuring their active engagement in party work and continuing loyalty after 
they have been recruited. Some party representatives believe that in order to 
solve this problem the parties should provide greater motivation to their 
members. That is, while the parties require loyalty and activism from their 
members, they should also give their members the opportunity of self-
realization and allow them to satisfy their interests and political ambitions.
                                                          
117 R.Koole, “Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel? A Comment on the Notion of the Cartel Party,” 
Party Politics 2, 1996.  
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Some parties attempt to ensure the active involvement of their members 
between election periods by creating working groups on different issues. 
Generally, these are groups working on legal, social and economic issues 
that usually have the task of issuing recommendations to the party, the gen-
eral public and institutions of the state and self-government.  
Parties are more successful in recruiting members than in ensuring their 
active engagement once they have been admitted 
Some parties try to keep members involved in party work through educa-
tional programmes. One party maintains free training courses in computers, 
foreign languages and accounting for its active young members, while others 
intend to establish party schools. “We have a special interest in having such 
schools since those who will study there will later occupy positions within 
the party and (later on) in the executive agencies of the country,” a member 
of the United National Movement said. The Republican Party introduced a 
new system of training specialists. As was mentioned in the previous chap-
ter, parties also create shadow cabinets in which their members are involved. 
These shadow cabinets will enable the interested members to test their abili-
ties in bodies similar to the existing public agencies and to practice their 
management skills.  
To sum up, most parties try to maintain members’ loyalty through cul-
tural, educational and sports activities. They are less successful in involving 
them in the decision-making and policy-defining processes.
Participation of party members and activists in selecting candidates for the 
elections
The nomination of candidates for elections at various levels is one of the key 
functions of the party organization and the selection process is an important 
indicator of how power is distributed within a party. The presence or absence 
of participatory mechanisms in candidate selection helps to reveal the extent 
of a party's internal democracy. In different countries, party leaders as well 
as the leaders at lower levels, party activists, members and sometimes even 
ordinary citizens without any formal attachment to the party may participate 
in the selection of party candidates. 
Candidate selection procedures in the Georgian political parties differ de-
pending on the level of elections involved. The statutes of some of the parties 
studied either say nothing about the candidate selection procedure or entrust 
this function entirely to the party's central bodies. The Conservative Party's 
statute is an exception in this respect: it strictly defines the sequence in 
which party leaders occupy places in the proportional list. It also provides for 
the participation of the party membership in the nomination of candidates 
for the presidential and majoritarian elections. 
The interviews conducted during the research project demonstrated that 
rank-and-file members of most Georgian parties take no part in the nomina-
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tion of candidates for the national elections. The Conservative Party is an 
exception here, which is related to the internal organization of this party as 
well as the particular ways in which its membership is defined. Here, the 
party's majoritarian candidate is established by means of internal elections. 
The party's full members (activists) as well as its associate members (sup-
porters) participate in internal elections.  
Georgian Parties and internal democracy 
While Georgian political parties promote democratic agendas, in their 
internal structures they are largely under the influence of the model of 
democratic centralism. The parties are strongly centralized, and their 
members have little say in defining overall party policies. If divisions on 
serious policy issues emerge, they lead to party splits. This make parties 
less sustainable in the long run. The disappearance of a large number of 
Georgian parties from the political arena is also evidence of this. 
That is not to overlook the fact that parties need a strong and compe-
tent leadership to make timely strategic decisions. The leadership needs to 
have the room to manoeuvre delegated to it by the party’s rank-and-file. 
Parties need to think about a correct balance between effective leadership 
and inclusive policy-making. This requires, for example, well-defined for-
mal rules for making decisions within the party. 
The situation is somewhat different in the case of local elections. According 
to the Labour Party members, the party's local activists nominate candidates 
for the local government elections. An episode in the Dusheti district branch, 
where this party is particularly strong and controls the district government 
structures, illustrates the point. Party activists in one of the villages nomi-
nated a candidate for the position of village administration head (gamgebeli)
while the chairperson of the district party organization opposed the nomina-
tion. In spite of the opposition, the candidate received support from the dis-
trict party council and was elected to the position. This example shows that 
the district party organization may not always follow the will of its leader; but 
it also shows that the nomination of a candidate for the village-level local 
elections ultimately requires the approval of the higher (district) level of party 
organization.
Leaders of local party branches and most respected rank-and-file activists 
have a greater say in the process of selecting candidates for the local gov-
ernment and majoritarian elections. It is believed that such candidates have 
to be able to perform some important services for a given district, have an 
excellent reputation in the area and have a reliable character. National lead-
ers believe that local party organizations are better judges of such qualities. 
As one of the leaders of the Industrialists said, “The opinions of the regional 
leaders on these issues are decisive since they know the people and the situa-
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tion on the ground better. Due to the trust towards the local leaders, the per-
son the leader selects is trusted by the party leaders as well. The local leader 
also takes the responsibility for this person. This cannot be done in any other 
way.”  
The importance of the local leaders and top activists that constitute the in-
formal core of the district organization is probably connected to the fact that 
the parties' local branches are often established around existing structures of 
power, i.e. groups of influential people or informal leaders of the local com-
munity in the first place. Giving them a prominent role in selecting local 
candidates for elections is important for maintaining their commitment to 
the party as a whole. Otherwise, they might switch their allegiance to other 
parties.
Which of the party power levels is involved in the nomination of local 
candidates differs from one party to another and according to the importance 
of elections. Usually, local party leaders exercise control over the nomination 
of candidates for local elections. In some parties, nomination of candidates 
for local elections also requires the approval of the party's central bodies; in 
others, such approval is not needed. Local branches also have considerable 
influence on nominations of majoritarian candidates from their district, but 
the national leaders still have the final say on this issue. As regards drafting 
party lists for the national elections based on the principle of proportional 
representation (PR)(which some consider proper “party elections” as op-
posed to majoritarian elections where personalities are more important than 
parties), here the role of local party organizations is the least prominent if 
they can be said to have a role at all. Usually, leaders of local branches can 
effectively influence the process of drafting national electoral party lists only 
if they at the same time are represented in a party's central governing bodies. 
Leaders choose parties 
Rules for selecting leaders for internal party positions constitute another 
important indicator of internal party democracy. The nature of these rules is 
often defined by two, sometimes contradictory requirements. On the one 
hand, in order to achieve coherent functioning of the party organization at all 
its levels, party leaders strive to establish control over all appointments to the 
leading party positions. On the other hand, if one aspires to greater participa-
tion of members in the party activities at the local level, it is expedient to 
allow them to elect their own leaders.  
Successful parties must find a way to reconcile both requirements. Politi-
cal parties functioning in Georgia vary widely in terms of their rules of selec-
tion for party positions. The differences reveal what priority they give to each 
of these goals.  
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Empowering local organizations 
It is understood that channelling the interests of different social groups is 
an important function of a political party. Without this the party can 
hardly be popular. Strong ties between local party organizations and local 
communities are of crucial importance. The function of parties is not only 
to deliver goods and services to the nation as a whole but also to serve as 
effective mechanisms for solving particular problems, including those 
specific to particular regions or localities.  
If local party organizations have a greater degree of autonomy, they will 
have a better chance of devising their own initiatives and serving as inter-
mediaries between their own communities and the party leadership. 
For electing their top leaders, Georgian political parties have fairly democ-
ratic rules and regulations. The leaders have to be elected by regular party 
congresses held every two or four years. In practice, however, the process is 
not competitive and inclusive. As has been stated several times, Georgian 
political parties are leader-oriented. Most parties were created fairly recently 
around a popular leader or a small group of leaders. Therefore, the mem-
bers' and activists' influence on the process of electing the party's highest-
level leaders has been rather limited so far. In fact they legitimize the leaders 
whose identity is well known beforehand. It should be noted that political 
leaders of parties in most cases also act as their top functionaries.
Founding new parties around popular political figures may be natural for 
young democracies. More indicative of the internal democratic practices 
within the party is how the leaders are replaced. Most parties involved in this 
research have been in existence for a fairly short time and have therefore not 
had many opportunities to change their leaderships. However, a survey of 
the history of political parties in Georgia during the last fifteen years shows 
that there is a very limited record of successful change of top leadership in 
Georgian political parties. It is rare that electoral failure leads to a change of 
leader – something that is standard practice in political parties of developed 
democracies. If a change does take place, parties rarely survive it. As a rule, 
the exit of political party leaders from the political scene leads either to the 
total disappearance of the party (as occurred with the Citizens’ Union of 
Georgia, the Union of Revival and many other less prominent parties) or to a 
split in the party. This happened to the National Democratic Party, which 
was one of the most popular parties of the early 1990s. Some time after its 
leader, Giorgi Chanturia, was assassinated, it split into several independent 
groups.
The influence of the rank-and-file members on the process of electing the 
party's highest-level leaders has been rather limited so far 
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However, there are counterexamples and they are becoming more frequent. 
For instance, after the poor showing of the Republican Party in the 1999 
parliamentary elections,118 Davit Berdzenishvili replaced Ivliane Khaindrava 
as party leader (with Khaindrava remaining as one of its most important 
public faces). The Republican Party leadership changed once more in 2005 
when Davit Usupashvili became the chairperson of the Republicans – 
though on this occasion it was unrelated to electoral results. In the summer 
of 2003 there was a leadership change in the NCP as well when David 
Gamkrelidze replaced Levan Gachechiladze as the party chairman. More 
recently, there was also a change of leadership in Industry Will Save Georgia. 
Giorgi Topadze, who served as a leader of the party before the Rose Revolu-
tion, afterwards transferred his day-to-day management responsibilities to 
Zurab Tqemaladze, who is at present a chairperson of the party. However, 
this cannot be considered a fully-fledged case of leadership change as Giorgi 
Topadze formally remained a “leader of the party”, a position specially cre-
ated for this case. 
In all these cases, however, the decision to change party chairperson was 
made within the narrow circle of the party leadership and then legitimized 
by the broader body of the party without any public competitive process or 
open discussion. The change could not be explained by pressure “from be-
low”, that is, from the rank-and-file members, who scarcely participated in 
the process. In 2005, the Conservative Party demonstrated a different model. 
At its congress, two candidates for the position of party chairperson were 
proposed to the members, and one of them, Koba Davitashvili, narrowly 
defeated the second, Zviad Dzidziguri (both continue to cooperate closely in 
the party leadership).  
There is a very limited record of successful change of top leadership in 
Georgian political parties 
To conclude, one cannot say that the process of selecting top leaders in 
Georgian political parties has been inclusive and competitive so far, although 
there have been some promising signs recently. The situation is somewhat 
different at the lower levels of party hierarchies.  
Selection of leaders and party personnel at the local level  
In most of the parties studied here, the position that is elected by the rank-
and-file members is that of a chairperson of a primary organization which is 
based on the election precinct. In most cases, this position does not attract 
party activists with higher ambitions. It mainly involves carrying out techni-
cal responsibilities such as recording supporters in the election precinct or 
canvassing.
                                                          
118 It was in a bloc with the National Democratic Party then. 
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Internal democracy: the case of the Conservative Party 
The Conservative Party of Georgia is the most recently established of the 
parties involved in this research. It is distinguished from other parties by 
what is for Georgian politics a novel approach to internal democracy. As 
its members say, the Conservative Party is currently in the process of 
building a bottom-up party structure, something that is in part the result 
of its cooperation with the International Republican Institute. All leaders 
in the party are elected by members, either directly or indirectly. At the 
primary level, party members elect chairpersons of local organizations. 
These take part in electing local (rayon- and region-level) and national 
leaders. This kind of system is said to not only empower the party rank-
and-file, but to create a layer of strong and independent mid-level leaders.   
Party members attach both normative and pragmatic importance to in-
ternal democracy. If a party is internally democratic, the Conservatives say, 
it is more likely to govern democratically once it comes to power. Fur-
thermore, internal democracy opens up the party to ambitious people 
seeking a career in politics. This will bring more dynamism to the young 
party, but also additional votes. The Conservatives believe that the internal 
democratic structure will also make the party more popular with ordinary 
people not interested in a political career. As local organizations enjoy 
greater autonomy, they have greater chances of putting problems specific 
to local communities on the party’s agenda. 
In some cases (for example in the Labour Party's organizational structure), 
appointments to this position do not require approval by any party structure 
of a higher level. At the same time, in some parties, chairmanship of a pri-
mary organization can be a rung on the party hierarchy ladder. For instance, 
the district-level leader of the Conservative Party (chairperson of the district 
branch council) is elected from the precinct chairpersons. 
According to all party statutes, chairpersons of the precinct branches are 
also the main decision-makers in terms of electing district branch leaders 
through the district conference. Unlike the Conservative Party, the circle of 
local leaders in most parties is not limited to precinct chairpersons. This 
allows any active member of the party (wherever he or she resides in the 
district) to become a member of the district branch leadership. Moreover, it 
seems that, in effect, in most parties, district branch leaders represent a cer-
tain core of the activists rather than people who came from lower down, such 
as precinct-level leaders. This can be assessed from two different perspec-
tives. The fact that any member of the party can become a leader of a district 
branch (including those who are not part of the district party organization) 
gives greater flexibility to the central leadership of the party in terms of ap-
pointing the leaders it considers desirable for a given position. However, this 
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is also a feature of greater centralization: in a number of cases, Tbilisi resi-
dents have become leaders of district branches without having any direct 
links with them. 
The statutes of most parties stipulate that electing leaders in local organi-
zations requires the agreement of the national office of the party. Since party 
leaders have the right to veto the choice of the local organizations, the candi-
dacies are often coordinated with the centre in advance. This may explain 
why there is rarely any difference of opinion between the local and the na-
tional leadership regarding the election of chairpersons of a local branch. In 
some cases, party leaders have the right to dismiss local chairpersons. In 
cases where the dismissal of a chairperson of a local branch is at issue, his or 
her popularity among local party members and activists is a factor to be con-
sidered, though not the decisive one. What matters most are the party's local 
election results and the local leader's loyalty to the party (in effect, to its na-
tional leadership).
All this does not mean that elections in the parties' local branches are en-
tirely masterminded from the party’s national offices. The discussions dur-
ing the meetings with all six political parties revealed that both party leaders 
and members understand that the coordinated work of ordinary members, 
activists and leaders is necessary if local branches are to work successfully. 
“Locally, the members have to work with the local leader, not the head of-
fice,” a member of the Labour Party said. This is why, in most cases, the 
initiative for electing the local branch chairperson lies with the local active 
members. The institutional procedure for this very functional approach is 
election by the district conferences: chairpersons of the precinct branches 
and members of the district branch councils attend the conference and have 
the right to elect or approve any member of their party as a head of district 
organization. The national leadership of the party, in most cases, reserves the 
right to offer preliminary consultations on specific issues, express support 
for a specific candidate, or exercise its right of veto. This gives the ordinary 
members an opportunity to build a party career “from below” and it also has 
a positive effect on maintaining the local leaders' loyalty to the party. 
This can be illustrated by listing procedures for selecting leaders of the 
local organizations in different parties. As we said earlier, in the Conserva-
tive Party, precinct branch members elect precinct chairpersons, who then 
elect the district branch chairperson among themselves. They also participate 
in the election of the party leaders. In the United National Movement, chair-
persons of the district branches are nominated by the party leadership and 
then approved by the district conference. In the cases of Industry Will Save 
Georgia, the New Conservative party and the Labour Party, chairpersons of 
local party organizations are elected at the conference of the respective level 
and then approved by the party leadership. In the case of the Republican 
Party, the election of the district organization chairperson does not require 
approval from the party’s central authority, although, according to the party 
statutes, the national committee still has the power to annul any decision 
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made by the local organization (supposedly, including that which is con-
nected to the election of leaders of the local organization).  
In most cases, the initiative of electing the local branch's chairperson lies 
with the local active members 
Participation in formulating party strategies and political position 
The narrow or inclusive character of the policy-making process in any given 
party is a further important indicator of how democratic its internal structure 
and practices are. While party leaders may take a lead in formulating the 
party’s agenda, its internal structure can hardly be considered democratic 
unless rank-and-file activists contribute to the process of defining the party 
agenda and strategy, rather than merely taking part in its implementation.  
What influence do rank-and-file members of the Georgian political par-
ties have on the stance that their parties take on different issues? To begin 
with, this influence is different when it comes to formulating party policies 
at the national and local levels. One important aspect of this is the issue of 
relations, alliances and cooperation with other parties. What is the role of the 
parties’ leadership and of their local activists when a party decides to enter 
into partnerships and coalitions with other parties? 
One generalization that we can make based on the research is that, on the 
whole, the rank-and-file of Georgian political parties have a rather modest 
input in formulating their strategies and political positions. However, it does 
not appear to be a policy by party leaders to restrict the right of members to 
discuss party issues. But, of course, they may often prefer to make important 
decisions without having to depend on approval by some larger forum of 
party members (such as party congress or some other format). Many party 
members also assume that, by joining a party, a person is making a choice in 
favour of certain pre-defined policies and his or her role is to promote and 
implement these policies. This is indirectly confirmed by the fact that, in the 
event of serious disagreements within the party regarding an important po-
litical issue, those dissenting from the general party line simply quit without 
even trying to initiate a discussion or create a faction within a party. In par-
ticular, such episodes occurred in parties that did not support the revolution-
ary events of November 2003: those who preferred their parties to join the 
protesters simply had to leave the party. During some of the discussions, 
party leaders often preferred to refer to the “interests of the people” as de-
terminants of their party policy choices, without mentioning the views of 
their own members.  
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Party platforms 
When politics are oriented towards personalities, as is the case in Georgia, 
party platforms are usually of secondary importance. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that they are not produced. A number of parties that 
emerged from the national movement of the late 1980s were trying to 
emphasize certain programmatic goals, be it liberal values or attainment 
of national independence. However, they usually made no attempt to con-
nect these goals to the needs of the public. Instead, it was assumed that 
the role of parties is to propagate certain values throughout the wider soci-
ety.
One can also argue that parties produced platforms because this made 
them look serious in the eyes of the electorate. The very presence of stra-
tegic documents rather than their content was what counted. Such strate-
gic documents, sometimes drafted by experts who did not necessarily have 
stable links with parties, were forgotten soon after elections.  
In recent years, Georgian parties and politicians have tended to appeal 
directly to societal interests more often. Sometimes such appeals are not 
targeted at any particular audience and represent general slogans rather 
than concrete proposals. However, attempts to create more consistent 
policy platforms are increasingly being made. 
This does not mean that no debates on important policy issues and respec-
tive party strategies are held in the local party organizations. Representatives 
of parties have noted that in many cases, before the party leadership makes 
an important policy decision, the proposal is submitted in writing to the 
precinct and district branches, where it is subject to discussion. The Labour 
Party’s campaign on some citizens’ lost bank deposits119 was mentioned as 
an example of an internal process of decision-making. Activists of a district 
branch of the Conservative Party also said that they are often involved in 
debates around issues related to the party platform.  
In many cases, before the party leadership takes an important policy deci-
sion, the project is submitted in writing to the precinct and district 
branches, where it is subject to discussion 
Apparently, most of such discussions take place at the parties' precinct or 
district-level organizations. However, party documents do not define how the 
results of such discussions are supposed to influence the decision-making at 
the top.
                                                          
119 In the early 1990s, many citizens lost their savings deposited in banks as a result of the 
hyperinflation of that period. Some political parties, including the Labour party, de-
manded that the State pay citizens compensation for their lost deposits.  
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One more mechanism available to a party’s rank-and-file to influence their 
leadership is direct meetings between the party leaders and members. For 
instance, in the New Conservative and Labour parties, meetings of this kind 
are held on a regular basis. During such meetings, policy issues are dis-
cussed as well as organizational problems,  
Local branches of political parties have greater influence when policies at 
the local level are being defined. What are involved are not necessarily com-
prehensive policy platforms towards the development of a given area but 
policies expressing the party’s stance in relation to a particular issue. The 
local branches of political parties are concerned not only with promoting 
party initiatives designed at the centre (through collection of signatures, pub-
lic campaigning, etc); they also come up with specific initiatives important 
for their district or the larger region. Naturally, these local initiatives fit into 
the general framework of party policies. For instance, a local branch of an 
opposition party may attack certain activities of the local branch of the na-
tional government.
District branches usually coordinate their local initiatives with the party's 
central offices and may ask for support in implementing their initiatives. 
There are cases when local branches do not require the centre’s consent for 
raising certain issues of local significance (this is the case in the Conserva-
tive Party).
While local branches of political parties are much more autonomous with 
regards to designing and implementing policies on local issues; most of 
them are much more directed towards implementing policies that are de-
signed at the national level.  
Another important sphere of interaction on policy issues between the na-
tional offices and local branches of political parties concerns relations with 
other parties and creating alliances or coalitions with them. The creation of 
blocs or mergers with other parties is usually decided on at the national level, 
and local branches have to follow these decisions. As a rule, such decisions 
are taken without there having been any prior discussions in the local 
branches. This may lead to disagreements at the local level. For example, 
when the United National Movement was being created, based on the 
merger between the National Movement and the United Democrats, quite a 
few members of both parties quit the Mtskheta District branch because they 
opposed the merger. Similar problems arised when a bloc between the New 
Conservatives and the Industrialists was created.  
On the other hand, while general decisions about cooperation between 
individual parties are usually made in the centre, there are cases where the 
local branches of some parties cooperate independently of their respective 
national offices. This mainly concerns opposition parties.
Divergence of Opinions among Party members
How much divergence of opinion between members is tolerated or wel-
comed within a party? How far can discussions go within a party without 
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threatening party unity? Both questions are relevant to assessing the level of 
internal democracy within a party. This also shows once more whether rank-
and-file party members are perceived as creators of party policies or only a 
vehicle for promoting and implementing them. During the meetings, the 
majority of the parties emphasized that their party is first and foremost a 
party united around certain values and an ideology. Therefore, disagree-
ments around current political issues cannot be a reason for leaving the 
party or being expelled from it. During a number of meetings, ordinary party 
members referred to specific cases in which the opinions of individual party 
members regarding certain issues did not coincide with the party line, and 
this divergence was fully accepted by party organizations.
Some members said that the main point of internal party discussions is 
to convince individual party members that the general position and assess-
ments of the party are correct. This may imply that different sides in a given 
debate are not considered equal to begin with. However, some party mem-
bers also said that internal discussions are not only means for ensuring ideo-
logical coherence within the party but tht they have an inherent value as an 
internal checking mechanism. “Someone on your side has to criticize you in 
order for you to learn the truth; we cannot find out the truth through criti-
cism from outside,” said a member of the Labour party. Positive significance 
is also attributed to members' participation in the discussion of local issues, 
when local party leaders receive suggestions and criticism from party activ-
ists.
In sum, every party should seek a balance between a wide divergence of 
opinions on different issues and the party’s internal coherence. However, it 
is generally desirable to maintain the highest possible level of pluralism. 
This helps to accommodate differences of opinion and to avoid large groups 
of party members leaving the party. At the same time, divergence of opinion 
within the party gives it greater flexibility in responding to the changing en-
vironment.
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Main findings 
? Political party members and activists in Georgia do not consider inter-
nal democracy to be among the most acute problems for their parties’ 
development;
? Most Georgian political parties seek to maintain control over the proc-
ess of admission of members in an effort to ensure their loyalty. They 
give priority to creating “cadre parties” that consist of dependable activ-
ists. The parties look for ways to draw a hard and fast line between 
these and more passive supporters or “associate members”; 
? Georgian political parties mainly have rather centralized structures. 
The higher the position in the party hierarchy, the greater the central 
leadership's control over the selection of candidates for it; 
? Drawing up party lists for the national elections is mainly the preroga-
tive of a party's central office. However, the leadership of the local party 
branches has a say in selecting candidates for majoritarian elections in 
the single-mandate districts and they have a fairly prominent or deci-
sive role in selecting candidates for local elections; 
? While party statutes define democratic mechanisms for electing the top 
leadership of political parties, usually the process is not competitive and 
rank-and-file members of political parties have little, or rather limited, 
influence on it. There are few precedents of change of political party 
leaders without party splits or a dramatic decline of the party’s role and 
popularity;
? Rank-and-file members have little involvement in defining party poli-
cies at the national level. District branches sometimes put forward ini-
tiatives of local significance which may or may not be co-ordinated with 
the national offices; 
? Policy discussions within the parties are accepted but weakly developed. 
Often their point is to convince rank-and-file members of the correct-
ness of the pre-defined party line rather than to contribute to the for-
mulation of party policies; 
? There is a gap between the formal rules within the party, which are by 
and large democratic, and the actual practice of non-competitive, elite-
controlled formation of cliques. 
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2.6 Women and Politics 
What to do? 
? Develop intra-party democracy by establishing clear and transparent 
mechanisms for the involvement of women members in the decision-
making process; 
? Support women’s organizations in parties through educational and 
exchange programmes; 
? Promote gender equality programmes within party organizations; 
? Promote public debates on the participation of women in politics. 
The November 2003 Rose Revolution changed attitudes to many issues, in-
cluding those of gender. Before the revolution there was little public debate 
on the topic. Public officials showed no interest in gender equality, consider-
ing it to be a secondary issue that was scarcely topical. If there were any pub-
lic statements on the subject, they were purely formal and did not lead to any 
change. Mikheil Saakashvili was the first Georgian president to highlight the 
issue and state publicly that the government was interested in increasing 
women's involvement. “We want to have and will have as many women as 
possible in the government and the political system,” Saakashvili said. The 
President reiterated this statement on various occasions.  
Experts who work on gender issues also admit that governmental dia-
logue with women’s organizations on the subject of women's involvement in 
public life increased after the Rose Revolution. In August 2003, when the 
non-governmental organizations working on women's issues presented a 
legal initiative on introducing quotas for women within parties to Parlia-
ment, the majority of MPs ignored it. Only 67 MPs out of 235 took part in 
the voting procedure,120 and the rest were not even present. Today, almost all 
parties recognize the need to encourage women's involvement in political 
activities. Leaders of almost all political organizations have expressed a will-
ingness to help to increase women's involvement in party activities. How-
ever, while recognizing the importance of this issue in general, none of them 
has set out a clear vision on the matter. 
In reality, the role of female leaders in public and political life has mod-
estly increased recently as the result of a strengthened position and public 
support for political leadership of the Speaker of Parliament, Ms. Nino Bur-
janadze, as well as other female politicians, albeit few in numbers.  
Of the three main leaders of the Rose Revolution one was a woman. En-
joying a high degree of public approval, Nino Burjanadze managed to fill the 
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niche of a balanced and calm politician who can be a unifying figure. This 
contrasted with the image of her male colleagues, who were seen as more 
confrontational figures. She noted that, during demonstrations, it was im-
portant “that there was a woman on their side. I was trying to mitigate the 
situation, I was cautious (...) I believe that the peaceful ending of the revolu-
tion was, to a certain extent, my accomplishment.”121
Another sign of the increased role of women is that the last two years 
have seen a modest increase in the level of women's representation in the 
legislative, executive, and judiciary branches in the whole period of Georgia's 
independence. Before October 2005, women accounted for 17.6 per cent of 
Cabinet. In 2004, four out the seventeen ministries were headed by women.  
The visibility of the issue of women's involvement in public life increased 
after the Rose Revolution 
This ratio fell, however, as women ministers gradually lost their positions, 
and, at the time of writing this report, there was only one female minister 
remaining. In the 2004 convocation of Parliament, women's representation 
increased to 9.4 per cent (22 women MPs out of 235), in comparison to 6-7 
per cent throughout the 1990s. The Speaker of Parliament as well as the 
leader of the parliamentary majority are women, two out of 13 parliamentary 
committees are chaired by women, and four committees have women deputy 
chairpersons. Women's representation in the judiciary branch has reached 
40 per cent.122
Elections Legislative 
body
Total number 
of deputies 
Women depu-
ties
Percentage of 
women 
1919 Constituent
Assembly
130 4 3
1990 Supreme
Council
250 18 7.2
1992 Parliament  222 14 6.3
1995 Parliament 250 16 6.4
1999 Parliament  235 17 7.2
2004 Parliament 235 22 9.4
Table 11. Women’s representation in Georgian legislative bodies 
Even though women's representation is increasing, it still falls very far short 
of the requirements of a democratic state and does not correspond to the 
standards of a modern and fair society. Experts in gender issues believe that 
it is unacceptable for a social group which represents 59 per cent of all voters 
to have a 10 per cent representation in the legislative body. They believe that 
a society which lays claim to being just is obliged to make each one of its 
members feel that, by being represented in a decision-making body, their 
equality with other members of society is ensured and they are protected 
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from any discrimination. Gender equality means “that a woman and a man 
are enjoying equal conditions and chances in their lives to realize their po-
tential in full, are participating equally in the processes of political, eco-
nomic, social, and cultural development and are enjoying equally all public 
benefits, opportunities, and resources.”123 It follows from this that the key to 
fulfilling all these aims lies in ensuring that women are adequately repre-
sented in a decision-making body so that they can protect the interests of the 
group.
Women's involvement in party activities 
As in other areas of public life, women's participation has also shown a 
slight increase in party activities throughout the recent history of political 
party development. However, while they are reasonably active at the lower 
levels of organizational structures, their representation appears insufficient 
in the decision-making bodies. “Despite the fact that there are no artificial 
barriers to women's involvement, the lower the level of the party structure, 
the more harmonious is the gender balance. There are more women in dis-
trict structures, that is to say, where decision-making is not as crucial for 
party life, than at the high levels of the hierarchy,” according to a member of 
the Industrialists’ Party. 
Women's representation at the decision-making levels in political parties 
is on average 9 per cent. Female party members are rarely involved in the 
decision-making process and only a handful of them occupy high-ranking 
party positions. This indicator is quite low, given that the ratio of female to 
male members in political parties is more or less equal.  
While women are quite active at lower levels of organizational structures, 
their representation appears insufficient in the decision-making bodies of 
political parties 
Interestingly, the Labour Party of Georgia and the Republican Party have 
radically different indicators on this. In the former, the number of female 
members exceeds the number of male members. In the latter, the number of 
female members constitutes only 30 per cent of the total. However, as the 
party is growing, this indicator is changing in favour of women; as a result, 
the Republican Party might soon be included in the list of “women-friendly 
parties.”124
Just as in society as a whole, where stereotypical gender roles attribute 
leadership positions in public life to men while women are portrayed as 
‘caretakers’, political parties broadly reflect the same bias. In most organiza-
tions, including political parties (save for rare exceptions), women serve in 
                                                          
123 Interview with Lela Khomeriki; Elections/Gender and Media Component, UNDP 2004, 
p. 26. 
124 Reet Laja, Estonian Women’s Roundtable, Conference presentation, 31 May, 2005. 
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lower or mid-level positions rather then having senior and leadership roles. 
The majority of female party members are also brought together in women's 
organizations that exist along with the main party structure; they are often 
called women’s ‘clubs’ or ‘councils’. Women have major functions within the 
framework of these women's clubs/councils and primary organizations 
within parties. 
Women’s organizations exist within the New Conservative Party, Industry 
Will Save Georgia, and the Labour Party. Such organizations also have 
branches (local councils) at the regional and district levels. Chairpersons of 
these councils also take part in bureaus of regional- and district-level organi-
zations and are active in other kinds of party work. Women’s clubs/councils 
within the parties usually act as charitable organizations and mainly target 
socially vulnerable groups. The Conservative Party is planning to establish a 
functional organization of the same kind in the near future. Party members 
think that its possible functions could be developing special outreach meas-
ures to directly engage the female electorate and conduct humanitarian ac-
tivities to benefit families with many children - “care and support to mothers 
who have many children, and organizing events interesting to these 
women.”125
Industry Will Save Georgia Women’s Club 
The Industry Will Save Georgia Women’s Club was established in 1999, 
the same year as the party was founded. The Club has its own structure 
and is represented at the central and district levels of party organization. 
The Club is mainly concerned with the problems of the socially vulnerable 
strata of society. Through district representations the party women study 
the needs of orphanages, families with many children and young artists, 
and tries to provide support. The Club considers the low level of women’s 
involvement in the public and above all in the political life of the country a 
serious problem and tries to promote the active involvement of women in 
party life through different programmes (mainly supported by interna-
tional organizations such as the International Republican Institute and 
UNIFEM). They initiated and conducted educational programmes for 
women as they believe that women are eager to get involved in public life 
but lack experience, knowledge and skills. The Club provided a special 
education and empowerment programme to women who stay home care 
for their children (the Housewives’ Project), which was aimed at increas-
ing the participation of women in public life through involving them in 
the organization of public cultural activities and educational programmes 
offered by international organizations.  
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At the district and regional level, women’s organizations register mothers 
with many children and families with disabled people; they study their prob-
lems and try to help them as much as party resources allow. For instance, 
coupons for free meals and medical assistance have often been distributed to 
the mothers with many children and elderly people over 100, this at the ini-
tiative of the New Conservative Party’s women's organization. Thanks to 
their mediation, the party's central office has often provided disabled peo-
ple's families with financial or in-kind assistance.  
Monitoring state-run social security programmes is another responsibility 
of women's organizations within the party. For example, the women's or-
ganization of the Labour Party has started an evaluation programme aimed 
at finding out how appropriately the state spends moneys allocated for social 
security.
Other important responsibilities of female party members, which are 
more directly related to their party organizations, include recruiting support-
ers for political parties, staffing the precinct electoral commissions126 and 
carrying out administrative and office work in party organizations at differ-
ent levels. In this, they become more active in the run-up to elections. Parties 
believe that women, like young people, are good campaigners and their work 
in terms of attracting new members and supporters is effective. At election 
time, women mostly carry out administrative duties within precinct organi-
zations. As party representatives have argued, women members are particu-
larly strict and tend to pay attention to even minor infringements of the elec-
toral code which are often ignored or overlooked by male members. Corre-
spondingly, their representation in the local election administration is quite 
high (for instance, women constituted 70 per cent of those involved in elec-
toral administration for the New Conservative Party).  
Only a small number of women’s organizations within parties are in-
volved in facilitating women's involvement in political activities 
Another reason for parties to staff precinct administrations mainly with fe-
male members, as parties declare themselves, is their skills in resolving con-
flicts. They are excellent conciliators and cope more successfully with con-
frontations between parties or other conflicts that occur on Election Day. As 
a member of Parliament from the New Conservative Party said, women “sta-
bilize tensions between the parties.”  
Only a small number of women’s organizations in parties are involved in 
facilitating women's involvement in political activities. Important educa-
tional and leadership training projects targeted at women leaders and party 
activists are mainly organized by international organizations. According to a 
                                                          
126 According to changes to the Election Code of Georgia adopted in 2005, non-party citi-
zens fill positions in election committees at central and district levels, while in the polling 
stations the top three parties which obtained the best results in the previous parliamen-
tary elections are allowed two committee members (Article 36.3 of the Election Code of 
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female member of the New Conservative Party, “We are actively involved in 
the Political Academy programme offered by the International Republican 
Institute, we participated in the trainings that were held by UNIFEM and 
which concerned women's role in conflict resolution, we took part in the 
National Democratic Institute's project called Leader Women, and so on.” 
The only note of discontent that was sounded regarding the international 
organizations was the fact that the number of participants in these projects 
was restricted and only a few women had a chance of being involved in 
them. It was also often stated that only women are involved in these projects 
while men are also in need of gender education.  
Different attitudes to women’s’ participation in politics 
As has been mentioned, public interest in gender equality issues has in-
creased to a certain extent since the Rose Revolution. Apart from the Presi-
dent’s statements already quoted regarding the increase of women's in-
volvement in government bodies, there has been an increase in the number 
of public discussions on gender issues on the most popular television pro-
grammes. Political parties have intensified their cooperation with Georgian 
as well as international non-governmental organizations on this topic. How-
ever, although these actions have brought about positive changes, statistical 
data show that active work in this direction is still insufficient. 
Cultural and psychological stereotypes are the main factors determining 
the relatively low level of women’s involvement in politics 
Parties admit that the gender balance in the decision-making bodies is 
skewed. However, the lack of equal representation of male and female mem-
bers is not currently understood as a significant problem by political parties 
themselves. Parties believe that in Georgia, gender equality standards do not 
correspond to Western standards,127 but they hope to improve the situation 
in the future. Parties explain the prevailing situation by alluding to broad 
societal factors that are beyond their control. In particular, they believe that 
there are simply not enough active women and that this is caused by social 
hardships and the pre-eminence of traditional values. Women turned out to 
be particularly vulnerable to the depressed economic conditions that fol-
lowed the economic break-down of the early 1990s. As many men lost their 
jobs, a large number of women were forced to become the main bread-
winners of their families mainly through self-employment in small business 
and entrepreneurial sector. This did not leave them enough time or energy to 
be involved in political activities. 
The second key factor which, in the parties’ opinion, hampers women’s 
involvement in political activity is traditional attitudes towards gender roles 
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in society: a woman is considered successful if she has a good family life and 
excels at domestic activities.  
Many successful female politicians avoid talking about women's problems 
Female party members themselves admit that cultural and psychological 
stereotypes are the major factors determining the relatively low level of 
women’s involvement in politics. They believe that there are no formal or 
artificial barriers to the involvement of women in the decision-making bod-
ies in any party. Apart from the perceived passivity of the female members of 
parties, they refer to a lack of interest in this issue in society in general. “We 
cannot see a clear public demand here. As long as the Georgian voters do not 
express a liking for the parties that are harmonious in terms of gender and 
do not say that they do not like parties resembling men-only clubs, it is hard 
to expect the parties to put this issue on the agenda on their own.”128
Interestingly, the majority of successful female politicians avoid talking 
about women's problems, hinting that these either do not exist or are not 
very typical. “I think that women are already enjoying privileged treatment in 
Georgia and if a woman is a housewife, this does not at all mean that she is 
oppressed. I cannot say which is better, family or politics; there is no better 
or worse in this regard,” Pikria Chikhradze129 believes. Nino Burjanadze has 
remarked on gender equality, “I do not think that this issue is acute in Geor-
gia, although it certainly does exist.” Female leaders hardly talk about male 
politicians' conduct and do not consider this to be a possible barrier to the 
increase of women's involvement. Male members of parties agree with them 
on this and believe that what matters is that a woman has the right and op-
portunity to make a choice: “Working in a mine is man's work but I am sure 
that women have the right and opportunity to work in a mine; the important 
thing is that this should be their choice.”130
Ways to increase women's involvement in political life 
The country's legislation provides for general principles of gender equality, 
but it does not introduce any special measures to facilitate it. The Georgian 
Constitution defines the principles on which the entire legislative system is 
based and it rules out discrimination of citizens on any grounds, including 
gender. Article 14 of the Constitution says that “everyone is free by birth and 
is equal before law regardless of race, colour, language, sex, religion, political 
and other opinions.” Added to this is the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women signed in 1994. Experts in gen-
der issues admit that the Georgian legislation is not discriminatory but note 
that there are no special laws that would facilitate the achievement of gender 
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129 Member of Parliament, New Conservative Party 
130 Member of the Republican Party. 
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equality. In 1995, Georgia became one of the countries which undertook the 
obligation to elaborate a national action plan to improve women's conditions. 
All parties agree that introducing quotas for increasing the role of women 
in politics is not the way to make progress 
The political parties have not developed any specific ideas about how to in-
crease the involvement of women either. All of them admit that the indica-
tors of the increase of female leaders' representation in the political arena are 
lower than they would wish, but, so far, they cannot see any effective meth-
ods of effecting change in this regard. One issue on which they all agree is 
that introducing quotas is not the way to make progress. Parties believe that 
this is an artificial mechanism which will not have a positive effect: quotas 
might be equated with fairness in theory but this is not the way it happens in 
real life. Both female and male members of parties share this view. Parties, 
as well as society in general, believe that quotas for women’s representation 
in internal party structures and state bodies constitute an imposition which 
violates the principle of equality between men and women. Moreover, quotas 
are believed to be insulting to women themselves. Career advancement in 
the political arena should be on the basis of merit, in other words, based on 
knowledge, experience, and professionalism. Interference in this process and 
the introduction of artificial mechanisms is seen as a possible cause for the 
emergence of cadres that lack professionalism.  
Factors conducive to an increase in women's participation in politics: 
? Increase of public interest in gender equality; 
? Government leaders’ support for the increase of women's participation 
in politics; 
? Parties’ admission of the lack of gender balance in decision-making 
bodies and their willingness to improve the situation; 
? Intensification of public discussions on gender issues. 
Factors hampering an increase in women's participation in politics: 
? Persistence of traditional attitudes which oblige a woman to undertake 
all domestic work; 
? Prevalence of a view that gender quotas violate gender equality;  
? Lack of awareness in society of the importance of gender equality and 
ways to achieve it; 
? Existing economic conditions that lead to many women being self-
employed and working to provide for their families;  
? The fact that successful women politicians do not emphasize gender 
issues. 
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There are a few divergent opinions, however. While the Industrialists do not 
support blind quotas either, the chairperson of its women's club believes that 
the share of educated, professional women who have leadership skills is 
quite large in society and finding them should not just be a matter of good 
will, but a direct obligation for parties. 
Some experts on gender issues explain the negative attitude toward the 
quotas that prevails in society by citing the negative collective memory of the 
Soviet era. “Women's involvement in the political arena was determined in 
advance through election quotas; women's participation in political life was 
balanced through quantitative indicators although, in terms of quality, 
women's participation in the ruling structures was mostly fictitious.”131
Therefore, although some developed Western democracies practice quotas in 
order to increase women's participation in political and public life, this idea 
is quite unpopular in Georgia.
Gender experts also criticize the second argument named by the parties 
against quotas: the probability of diminished professionalism. “In the case of 
the introduction of quotas, parties will be compelled to find qualified profes-
sional women to fill their ranks. It is their main function as political organi-
zations as they have a direct obligation to recruit qualified cadres from soci-
ety.”132
Creating more sophisticated mechanisms for parties to attract new mem-
bers, increasing the participation of ordinary party members and improving 
their political awareness may be considered instruments for facilitating 
women's participation in party activities, which will be perceived as neither 
artificial nor imposed. The Conservative Party has created a precedent for 
effectively introducing women into political life. It achieved better balance in 
terms of the proportion of men and women appointed to various positions 
within the party. There is one woman among the three elected members of 
the audit commission, and the party's legal service is headed by a woman. In 
addition, the heads of four of the seven Tbilisi district branches are women. 
Presumably, the Conservatives achieved this because their principles of in-
ternal organization are different from those of other parties. In particular, 
this may correlate with general higher levels of internal democracy.  
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Main findings 
? Women's involvement in political life has been on the increase in re-
cent years; their representation in the legislative and executive branch 
is growing; 
? Georgian legislation guarantees gender equality in the country; no legal 
act restricts women's involvement in any sphere. However, there are 
no legislative acts that provide any measures specifically designed to 
increase women's public participation; 
? The proportion of male and female members of political parties is al-
most equal. The same cannot be said about their roles, however. Fe-
male members are less well represented in party leaderships, but are 
usually active at the lower levels of the organizational structure. In par-
ticular, they are involved in campaigning, and they participate in elec-
tions as precinct election administration members; 
? Women's clubs and organizations are functioning in some parties; 
they are occupied mainly with the problems of the socially vulnerable 
strata of society; 
? There is a consensus among the parties that the involvement of women 
in decision-making bodies is quite low. However, there is agreement 
that no special measures, such as quotas, should be introduced in or-
der to increase their representation in party leaderships. 
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2.7 Parties, Elections and Campaigning 
What to do? 
? Develop comprehensive public relations strategies; 
? Conduct election campaigns targeted more at specific groups; 
? Improve the awareness of local party activists in the field of campaign 
management;
? Establish closer cooperation with non-governmental organizations and 
trade unions. 
Changed electorate, new campaign strategies 
Georgian political parties and the Georgian public are undergoing rapid and 
radical changes. The Georgian political party system is far from settled, and 
the same can be said of Georgian society. All six parties involved in this re-
port recognize that society is in the middle of a process of transformation 
that is also changing and to a certain extent modernizing its political culture. 
The parties realize that a decade ago it was comparatively easy to win popular 
support by carrying out an intensive election campaign. Accordingly, they 
were active mainly in the immediate pre-election periods. Scarcity of re-
sources also accounted for this: the political parties saved what they had to 
run short but intensive election campaigns.  
Parties now believe that, in recent years, the situation has changed con-
siderably. There is a distinct trend among voters towards making more ra-
tional electoral choices. They do not fall easily for simple and attractive pre-
election promises. Dealing with such a public requires increasingly refined 
methods.
As one of the members of the Republican Party stresses, Georgian voters 
today are different from what they were 15 years ago, and in 15 years’ time, 
they will be different from what they are today. A member of the United 
National Movement noted that, in contrast to the past, it is no longer possi-
ble today to deceive or bribe the electorate. This suggests that parties need to 
fine-tune their political technologies and make their electoral programmes 
more elaborate, realistic and pragmatic. Moreover, every political organiza-
tion feels compelled to substantially improve forms and mechanisms of its 
relations with the public. Public relations campaigns should be long-term 
and cannot be restricted to the immediate pre-election period. For a United 
National Movement representative, “it is always a pre-election period.”  
Parties recognize the need to establish a strong rapport with the public 
well before election time. First of all, they have to set up regular channels of 
communications and information exchange. While the parties still complain 
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of the lack of financial resources, they do their best to regularly remind the 
public of their existence by all the means at their disposal. As the new envi-
ronment is more demanding on the parties’ resources, this also makes them 
more vulnerable.  
Although parties differ in their public relations strategies, in almost all 
cases, these strategies are defined in a centralized manner. The party’s cen-
tral governing bodies take the decisions as to how to maintain relations with 
potential voters, and these are among the most important decisions they 
make. On the other hand, local branches (see more on this in the chapter on 
Human and Financial Resources below) can amend or change the mecha-
nisms of implementing policy in accordance with specific local conditions. 
There is a distinct trend among voters towards making more rational elec-
toral choices. Dealing with such public requires increasingly refined 
methods 
The campaign formulated by the party leaders is implemented at two levels, 
the central and the local. The forms and mechanisms of public relations at 
these two levels are radically different. At the national level, the party leaders 
themselves are mainly involved in public relations, and they do this for the 
most part via the media. At the local level, members of party organizations 
establish direct personal contact with the voters. This does not mean that 
party leaders do not try to establish direct contacts with citizens as well by 
organizing public events, but even in a relatively small country like Georgia, 
they cannot afford to visit many places regularly. Therefore, such events usu-
ally happen in the immediate pre-election period.  
The leading role of the media 
All parties have professional PR groups, or press services, which are part of a 
central governing structure. They have two main responsibilities: on the one 
hand, they monitor electronic and print media and prepare daily analytical 
reports; on the other hand, they organize the party leaders' news confer-
ences, draw up press releases and disseminate them via news agencies. Be-
cause the press service of the central office is the only professional body 
which maintains close regular relations with the media, they provide services 
to the territorial organizations as well, if the need arises. In almost all par-
ties, staffers of the press service are also party activists. The Conservative 
Party of Georgia is the exception, as it intends to create a professional non-
partisan press service.133
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staffing at the Public Relations office. 
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From the OSCE/ODIHR report on partial repeat Parliamentary elections 
in Georgia (March 2004): 
“Despite the general freedom enjoyed by the media, during the pre-
election period media freedom became the object of public discussion and 
political confrontation, while serious restrictions of journalists’ activities 
in Adjara raised concerns.” 
“The simultaneous cancellations of talk shows on the most popular 
private TV stations in early February raised concern among opposition 
parties about undue government interference in the editorial policies of 
independent media. However, none of the media in question confirmed 
allegations about direct or indirect pressure, claiming instead that the 
programmes were being revised in view of the pre-election campaign.” 
Party leaders not only formulate public relations strategies, but they are also 
the main spokespersons through the media. The main means of reporting to 
the public and disseminating party statements is through national electronic 
media. All the parties attach great importance to the debates and discussions, 
which are organized by the central TV companies both during election cam-
paigns and periods between elections. In Georgia, it is rare for debates to be 
held among independent experts; instead, high-ranking representatives of 
the government and the opposition are usually involved in direct and very 
heated disputes. This format is especially appreciated by the opposition par-
ties as it allows them to confront the government on an equal footing.  
Initiating or participating in events that receive coverage in the news pro-
grammes is another important resource for the public relations of political 
parties. In this, the incumbent party has a natural advantage as its efforts, 
which are also part of fulfilling the governmental functions, at the same time 
serve as a tool to attract voter support once they are covered by the media. 
The opposition often resents it as a form of “state and administrative re-
sources” abuse by the government party. However, news programmes also 
invite party leaders to make brief comments on main political issues, and 
leading TV channels usually try to balance comments made by the govern-
ment and opposition representatives. 
Opposition parties also have ample opportunities to appear on television 
as they organize news conferences to protest against specific government 
actions, initiate or take part in protest rallies, and so forth. For instance, it is 
widely believed that electoral support for the United National Movement in 
the run-up to the November 2003 elections was boosted by coverage of their 
trips to Bolnisi, Batumi and Zugdidi, where local authorities or groups of 
thugs, allegedly encouraged by the incumbent authorities, physically dis-
rupted their rallies, which was widely covered by the national media.  
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TV Channels October 2003 February 2006 
Rustavi 2 1 daily talk show 1 weekly talk show  
Imedi 1 daily talk show
1 weekly talk show 
2 weekly talk shows 
Channel 1/ Public TV 1 daily talk show 
1 weekly talk show 
None
Mze 1 daily talk show None
Channel 9 1 daily talk show Channel closed 
Iberia TV 1 daily talk show Channel closed 
Kavkasia 1 daily talk show 1 daily talk show 
202 None 1 daily talk show 
1 weekly talk show 
Table 12. Reduced number of TV talk shows. “Daily talk show” applies to working days. 
Usually talk shows start late at night, at 10 or 11 p.m. Only Rustavi 2, Imedi and Channel
1 cover most of the territory of the country; others broadcast mainly to Tbilisi. Non-
political talk shows are not taken into account. 
All parties, whether in government or in opposition, are dissatisfied with the 
media coverage of political issues, party activities, and political life in Geor-
gia. The opposition parties complain that, under alleged pressure from the 
government, the number of live debates on national TV channels has been 
reduced and that they therefore have fewer opportunities to present their 
views to the audience directly. The incumbent party claims that in none of 
the developed democracies do top party leaders engage in direct political 
debates with the opposition as often as in Georgia. In addition, there are two 
widespread allegations towards the media shared by various parties: that 
coverage and assessments of political events by the media are unbalanced 
and tendentious, that is, favourable to their opponents (the opposition al-
leges hidden pressure or censorship, while the government refers to journal-
ists’ natural anti-government bias), and that the media is oriented towards 
“scandals” rather than substance. 
The internet does not play any significant role in party campaigning 
At the same time, the national electronic media provides almost no coverage 
of the activities of local party organizations. Brief news reports on protest 
actions in one region or another constitute the only exceptions. Otherwise, 
the national media presents political parties through a handful of their lead-
ers or, as the saying goes, “recognizable faces.”  
Only the regional media134 takes an interest in the activities of the re-
gional branches of the parties. However, if the local party branches take the 
initiative, the interest of the local media is all but guaranteed. Since the latter 
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is chronically short of fresh information, it is ready to cover any events that 
take place in their regions.  
Creative PR campaigns 
It should be remembered that access to electricity is much lower in the 
regions than in the capital, and some villages can be without electricity for 
months if not years. Therefore, disseminating information via mass media 
is most effective in the capital and a few major administrative centres. 
Dissemination of printed media is hampered by the low income of the 
population; consequently, circulation of even the most popular newspa-
pers is rather limited. This calls for the use of other methods. For in-
stance, the Labour Party found an original method of familiarizing the 
population of the regions with the party activities and programme: the 
party leader recorded his speeches on an audio tape and disseminated 
copies in different villages. 
The use of the internet is less developed, for the obvious reason that only a 
small part of the Georgian population has access to it. At present, only a few 
parties manage to regularly update information on their web pages.135 How-
ever, the internet is still increasingly important inr influencing elite opinion, 
especially that of the young people. Some political leaders have joined popu-
lar chat-rooms with young and politically active Georgians and defended 
their positions there.  
The parties manage to inform the public on their activities by using their 
publications. None of them has a newspaper, but during the campaign, every 
party prints and disseminates reports on work accomplished and future pro-
jects.
Direct communication with voters 
The most effective method of familiarizing people with party policies and 
activities, especially outside the capital, is by having direct contact with the 
people. Parties do their best – as much as their resources allow – to maintain 
permanent offices for their district and regional organizations and to have 
party activists present so they are always accessible to the people. The party 
charter, programme and other documents are kept at all offices, so that rele-
vant information can be readily provided to anyone who shows interest. The 
distinguishing feature of relations between the parties' territorial branches 
and the public is that they are less formal. Members of primary organiza-
tions often meet people, learn about their problems and tell them what the 
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party's positions on different issues are. These meetings are usually ad hoc, 
informal and often rather ingenious. “We discuss party decisions and posi-
tions among ourselves but do it aloud, for the bystanders to overhear, in the 
metro, bus, minivan, or other forms of public transport. Accordingly, by 
simply chatting to one another, we carry out a public relations campaign.”136
The parties consider direct contact with voters to be the most effective 
means of familiarizing people with party policies and activities 
On the other hand, the parties have not been successful so far in developing 
mechanisms through which the public can inform them about their prob-
lems and interests. From this point of view, they are mainly dependent on 
how much initiative members of the public take. 
Visits by citizens themselves to the party offices are common. For the 
most part, they ask political organizations to resolve any legal problems they 
may have with government agencies or to help them receive adequate public 
benefits and services. Because opposition parties do not control the mecha-
nisms for resolving such problems, local party offices often give informal 
advice as to how to approach the issue. If the suggestion does not work, 
more formal procedures are initiated. The citizen files a request with the 
party and asks the party to serve as a mediator in dealing with the authori-
ties. The parties often file court suits based on citizens' requests. 
Contacts with other organizations  
The parties, mostly those in opposition, try to co-operate closely with non-
governmental human rights organizations both in the centre and in the re-
gions. These contacts take the form of regular exchanges of information and 
statements of common positions on different issues. Citizens often approach 
both for advice on issues related to dealing with the authorities. At times, the 
central offices of the parties also cooperate with analytical non-governmental 
organizations and utilize the expertise which is concentrated in these or-
ganizations. However, this co-operation is rather sporadic. Moreover, most 
leading NGOs usually avoid direct association with any particular political 
party and prefer to maintain a non-political stance. The number of NGOs 
that are ready to be seen as partners of specific political organizations is 
small.
The parties' relations with trade unions are even less regular and institu-
tionalized. Many parties have experience of contacts with organizations that 
express the interests of a specific social group, such as the unions of seamen, 
farmers, schoolteachers or doctors, although this is less regular. Political 
parties take an interest in these types of organizations mainly when they 
raise a specific problem related to their professional activities and cause a 
major political stir. Relations end, however, as soon as the problem is re-
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solved or is no longer pressing. The parties say that such organizations are 
still at an early stage of development in Georgia; as a result, they are not in-
stitutionalized enough, and it is impossible to cooperate with them as stable 
organizations.  
Methods and resources of election campaigns 
People with experience of participation in past election campaigns are a 
great asset for political parties, even though they have usually not been 
trained 
There are some specific tools used by Georgian political parties during their 
election campaigns.
Managing electoral campaigns and developing strategies. Parties differ on 
how advanced they are in election campaign management. Most representa-
tives of local party organizations mention that in the run-up to the elections, 
they draft a clearly formulated strategic plan. These plans differ considerably 
in the degree of elaboration and detail. The major parameters of the election 
campaign strategy, such as the content of the party message and the ways to 
deliver it to the voters, are designed by the national offices of the party. How-
ever, local organizations can modify both the content of the message and its 
presentation according to the character of their region. 
In the run-up to elections, the network of party offices is usually greatly 
expanded. Parties try their best to open their offices in all electoral districts 
and precincts, though very few parties succeed in this. Apart from general 
strategies designed in the parties’ main offices, what matters most is the 
presence of people with experience of participation in past election cam-
paigns. Research shows that, in most parties, the planning and management 
of election campaigns at the local level are conducted by groups of activists 
with some electoral experience. Some of them have taken part in more than 
one election and have learned a great deal from this experience. This knowl-
edge, however, is usually purely empirical, since they have had barely any 
training in the technologies and procedures of electoral campaigns.  
Over time, the management of election campaigns has become increas-
ingly institutionalized. In parties that have greater resources, such as the 
New Conservative Party, electoral campaign management follows a more 
organized pattern. It is led by a party member who is appointed to a salaried 
position; in some cases, during the election campaigns parties also attract 
resources from the outside, such as consultants or research organizations.  
   
Using research. Before defining the content of the campaign strategy, the 
parties study both the given electoral district and their rivals. Party organiza-
tions have experience in conducting public opinion polls locally and intend 
to use this method in future elections too. For example, before reaching the 
decision to nominate Giorgi Masalkin as their candidate in the parliamentary 
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by-elections in Batumi in the autumn of 2005, the Republican Party con-
ducted an opinion poll to determine his approval rating (subsequently the 
party decided for tactical reasons not to nominate any candidates in these by-
elections). The Kutaisi organization of the New Conservative Party also con-
ducts opinion polls periodically, especially before they launch an election 
campaign. For this, the party may hire personnel or use party activists. When 
conducting such research, the parties take an interest not only in specific 
candidates' approval ratings, but also in popular attitudes towards, and con-
cerns about, the processes that are underway in the country. Since the local 
organizations of political parties may lack financial resources and expertise, 
the parties' central offices usually sponsor such research. On some occa-
sions, international organizations, in particular the IRI, have conducted re-
search specifically for the parties.
In recent years, several local and foreign consultancy firms have started to 
offer parties their services not only for conducting public opinion polls, but 
also for planning their election campaigns, studying their own and the rivals' 
strengths and weaknesses, and helping to fine-tune the content of their 
campaigns. However, parties are not always satisfied with the results of such 
co-operation.  
One of the methods popular among Georgian political parties is conduct-
ing research in a given precinct in order to compile their own lists of eligible 
voters and establish the number and identity of party supporters within a 
given precinct. The parties say that one of the main reasons for doing this is 
to combat electoral fraud, as faulty voter registers have been an important 
instrument of fraud in past elections. It is also useful to know who the party 
supporters are. 
Formulating campaign messages. Georgian political parties realize how im-
portant it is to clearly formulate the main message or slogan of the cam-
paign. There have been numerous examples in recent election campaigns 
that were built around a specific general message, such as the National 
Movement's campaign, in which the idea of replacing President Shevard-
nadze’s regime was central (“Georgia without Shevardnadze”), or the Indus-
trialists’ campaign in 1999, which centred on supporting local manufactur-
ing (their slogan, “Industry Will Save Georgia” also became the name of the 
party).
Some political parties attach no less importance to determining more 
specific issues around which the election campaign should revolve. Exam-
ples of such issues are the National Movement's campaign for the repay-
ment of pensions; the Labour Party’s successful court campaign against the 
AES Telasi energy distribution company for a reduction in electricity tariffs; 
the Conservative Party of Georgia's campaign for unfreezing assets national-
ized by the Soviets and exemption of small businesses from taxes for two 
years, etc. Representatives of the parties' local organizations often indicate 
that these ideas and issues are successful in attracting specific social groups 
(pensioners, the socially disadvantaged, small business owners, etc.). The 
189 
parties often gain recognition and a significant number of supporters 
through these campaigns.  
Not all parties, however, want their identity to be linked to such relatively 
narrow issues. For example, the Industrialists say that their party intention-
ally avoids making specific promises and keeps to the central message – 
promoting development of the country's manufacturing sector. 
Target groups. Apart from using “general” campaigning methods, Georgian 
political parties increasingly address their campaigning efforts towards indi-
vidual target groups. They think that this more nuanced approach may bring 
their parties significant successes. As already noted, slogans and the scope of 
issues are often devised with specific social groups in mind (such as pen-
sioners, small shop owners, schoolteachers, etc).  
Political parties increasingly address their campaigning efforts towards 
individual target groups 
At the same time, in the opinion of the parties' representatives during the 
assessment, they also have their own core “natural” electorate. It is com-
posed of voters who support the party because its programme coincides with 
their specific interests as a social group. For example, representatives of the 
Labour Party deem the socially disadvantaged strata to be their supporters, 
whereas the Industrialists rely on the support of economically independent 
individuals with entrepreneurial skills.  
Appeal to the majority mindset. While focusing on specific social groups, 
parties are also eager to demonstrate that they are part of the mainstream, 
that is that their values and principles are close to those of the majority of 
Georgia's population. However, they have different views as to what consti-
tutes that mainstream. As one of the representatives of the Labour Party 
remarked, Georgians are leftists due to their economic situation and because 
of their mindset. By contrast, in the opinion of representatives of the New 
Conservative Party and Industry Will Save Georgia, Georgians' cultural val-
ues make them rather inclined to right-wing ideas and that is why all at-
tempts to promote leftist ideologies in Georgia have been unsuccessful. 
Members of the Conservative Party of Georgia rely on the Georgians’ con-
cern about the negative effects of globalization on traditional culture, which 
they think is characteristic of most Georgians. 
Looking for key supporters: informal leaders and ‘recognizable faces’. One of 
the chief methods of attracting voters used by the Georgian parties, espe-
cially outside urban centres, is to focus on informal leaders, or people re-
spected in a given village, district or neighbourhood. Support from these 
individuals might secure the support of the majority of local voters.  
In small localities, parties seek the support of informal leaders 
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However, there are different types of informal leaders, and party activists say 
they are not indifferent to the kind of respected individuals they deal with. 
What they have in mind is a trade-off between those who command respect 
and individuals who have greater influence. The parties say it is preferable 
for them to attract individuals who have earned their good reputations on 
account of their education and knowledge and what they have done for the 
good of the community. However, it is not always these kinds of individuals 
who wield the greatest social control; in some cases, these are powerful indi-
viduals on whom a significant number of people depend financially. For 
example, seamen in Batumi are such persons; each of them often supports 
two or three families and may decisively influence the choices people make 
on Election Day.
One the most controversial issues is related to the relations between the 
political parties and criminal networks. In some communities, criminal 
bosses exert a considerable level of social control; however, relying on their 
influence might ultimately prove damaging to a party's credibility. Still, party 
members did not deny that their parties do on occasion use the influence of 
this kind of individual in trying to attract votes.
Representatives of some opposition parties were sceptical about relying 
on the support of informal community leaders. As they say, some people 
who enjoy a high standing in the local community are, at the same time, civil 
servants or are otherwise already linked to the powers that be. Therefore, 
even if opposition parties are successful in working with the informal com-
munity leaders, these leaders eventually switch their allegiances owing to 
pressure from the local authorities. 
Another way to capitalize on the informal authority of certain individuals 
for electoral purposes is to include a celebrity or “recognizable face” in the 
party list. The parties often persuade popular performers or sportsmen to 
run for elections in their party lists or in single-mandate districts. They are 
often included in the top ten of the party lists. Parties hope that the name 
recognition and popularity of these well-known figures will extend to their 
parties. But some parties who have used this method in the past have been 
disappointed with the results.  
Popular performers and sportsmen may bring votes  
but are unreliable afterwards 
“We were oriented towards attracting recognizable faces to the party, who 
were not necessarily politicians; we simply needed their name recognition. It 
turned out that the method did not work. It might yield some results during 
the elections, but it hinders our work within the elected body itself.”137 The 
implication is that, once popular figures belong to an elected body, they are 
found to be both unqualified and unreliable. Moreover, such a practice is 
considered unfair and lowers motivation among the real activists in the 
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party: the latter may think that the party does not properly appreciate their 
work, as popular personalities who have done nothing for the party are in-
cluded in party lists instead of them.  
Using the personal contacts of party members. One of the most effective 
methods of election campaigning used by Georgian political parties is work-
ing with networks of personal trust. A member of the Conservative Party 
said that “in the elections, he who has most friends and relatives always 
wins.” The United National Movement representatives also said that, in their 
work, they relied heavily on using personal contacts. One of its local officials 
said that party activists try to attract individuals among their circle of friends 
and relatives who had hitherto been completely indifferent to politics and 
that this strategy has proved particularly effective. The parties also said that 
their efforts to attract support among politically indifferent voters through 
personal networks of trust tend to strengthen over time.
Meetings with voters. Organizing public meetings in a given locality is one 
of the most popular methods of election campaigning used by the Georgian 
political parties. These meetings usually take place when the party leader or 
one of the top party activists visits the precinct or village. Information about 
the upcoming meeting is spread by party members within the community.  
One of the most effective methods of election campaigning in Georgia is 
using networks of personal trust 
Parties believe that meeting in person is much more effective for boosting 
party support in a given community than using more anonymous methods 
such as distributing party posters or leaflets. However, the parties’ abilities to 
use such methods are restricted for understandable reasons: most popular 
leaders cannot visit all the communities during the period of election cam-
paigns.
TV campaigns. The central importance of the media has been discussed 
above. In the run-up to elections, TV commercials are added to the parties’ 
usual methods of using the media. It is the business of the parties’ central 
offices to produce such commercials and put them on the national TV chan-
nels. This, however, is a rather expensive undertaking and only the most 
affluent parties can afford to run long TV ad campaigns. Though in the run-
up to elections political parties receive some free TV time that they can use 
for TV ads or otherwise, this is not considered sufficient. Running TV ads 
therefore takes up a considerable part of the party election budget.  
Canvassing. The parties employ canvassing as a vehicle for influencing the 
voters. As party representatives said, the IRI has played an important role in 
helping political parties to develop campaign methods. During canvassing 
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(as well as at meetings with voters), the party activists distribute pamphlets 
and newspapers which are especially published for campaigning purposes.
In preparation for elections political parties think not only about how to 
attract voter support but also about how to fight unfair electoral practices 
Street advertising. As happens in elections in every country, in the run-up to 
each election Georgia is full of campaign posters and billboards. They usu-
ally display the party name, the picture of its leader (rarely – several leaders), 
the main slogan and the number of the party in election bulletins. In this 
way main items that define the party identity get imprinted in voters’ minds.
Most parties start such campaigns a few weeks before the elections, as 
they believe doing this earlier would be less effective, and only very affluent 
parties can run such lengthy campaigns. Parties usually have groups of 
young people designated for this purpose, who in some cases receive a small 
remuneration for their work. In these very intense few weeks of election 
campaigning, campaign posters become important tugs-of-war between po-
litical parties. Posters are often torn off by representatives of rival parties or 
covered by the opponent’s election propaganda. Sometimes such rivalry 
leads to brawls between party activists, usually at night when they do their 
work.
Some party activists expressed scepticism about the effectiveness of elec-
toral posters precisely because they are often destroyed by rivals. However, 
the party leaders presumably do not share their opinion as political organiza-
tions devote considerable efforts and resources to street advertising.  
Allegations of unfair electoral practices. One of the main problems related to 
electoral politics in Georgia is the participants’ lack of trust in the fairness of 
the electoral process. In a number of Georgian elections before the Rose 
Revolution, independent observers, whether international or Georgian, 
noted many substantial irregularities in the electoral competition, which may 
include direct fraud on Election Day or in the process of tabulating the re-
sults, flawed voter registers, inappropriate pressure on the voters (by intimi-
dation or bribery), etc. This tendency peaked in the November 2003 parlia-
mentary elections, and was the immediate reason for the mass protests that 
led to a change of government. Elections held during 2004 and 2005 were 
greatly improved in comparison, but there are still significant shortcomings. 
Most importantly, election participants do not express confidence that the 
next elections will be fair. The opposition parties believe that the government 
will use dishonest means in order to rig the results in favour of the incum-
bent party, but the latter also thinks the opposition will resort to fraud if it 
gets a free hand (see on this also The Political Party System chapter above).
Therefore, in preparation for elections, political parties think not only 
about how to attract voter support but also about how to combat the unfair 
electoral practices that they expect to be used by their opponents or, pre-
sumably, how to use such methods to their own party’s advantage (naturally, 
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no party would speak about this openly). In fact, accusing rivals of violations 
and unfair practices may be part of campaigning in its own right. Public 
statements, usually issued by leaders of political parties, in which they 
charge political rivals with specific violations or deny such accusations made 
by their opponents have become part and parcel of election campaigning in 
Georgia.
Campaign resources. What kinds of resources are available to the parties 
when they carry out election campaigns? Notably, parties consider human 
resources to be the most important. Many party activists agree that the most 
important resource for the party is the personality of the leader, in some 
cases a group of leaders. This means leaders at both the national and the 
local level. There are several specific qualities that leaders should have: name 
recognition, financial resources that they either possess or can attract, links 
with influential groups and organizations, etc.  
Parties consider human resources to be extremely important. This means 
first of all the personality of the leader, the leaders of local organizations 
and the networks of dedicated local activists 
However, different parties may have different views on which qualities in a 
leader are most important. For instance, the New Conservatives said that 
name recognition was not as important as they initially had thought and the 
candidates who were less well-known before the elections also achieved suc-
cess.
When it comes to local leaders that run in single-mandate districts, it is 
crucial to be a native of that district. A local candidate always commands 
more trust than an “outsider” because voters tend to think that he or she 
knows the district's problems better and will accordingly be more sympa-
thetic towards local interests. Therefore, displaying an emotional attachment 
to a given district is crucial for the candidate’s success. It is important to be a 
“real native of Kutaisi” or a “true citizen of Telavi.”  
A team of committed and able individuals who will dedicate their time 
and energy is also crucial in the pre-election period. These are the individu-
als who organize campaign meetings and take part in them, get involved in 
canvassing, putting up posters, and so on. These teams are created and 
managed by local organizations. Relying on local party organizations when 
carrying out election campaigns makes it possible to accumulate and main-
tain activist networks, experience and expertise in those organizations.  
Naturally, finances constitute a no less important resource. In this, local 
party organizations fully depend on their central offices. This issue is dis-
cussed at greater length in the chapter on human and financial resources. 
Opposition parties routinely accuse the government party of using the so-
called “administrative resources” for carrying out their election campaigns. 
These accusations were made as regularly under the previous government as 
they are made today. What is meant here is that staff, premises, finances and 
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influence of government institutions are used to benefit the pro-government 
candidate.
Main findings 
? The parties recognize that during the last fifteen years, the Georgian 
public has also become more sophisticated and demands more from 
political parties. Therefore, they need more substantive messages and 
more advanced methods to achieve success; 
? Parties think that they need to make their public relations campaign 
work continuously rather than having it focused on the few pre-election 
weeks; base it on an overall strategy and on more careful research of 
societal needs; establish closer contacts with professional research and 
consultancy organizations, NGOs and trade unions. Such changes, 
however, put a strain on the limited resources of political parties; 
? In general, Georgian political parties conduct rather blanket-type cam-
paigns appealing to the general public rather than to specific interest 
groups. Of late, however, parties are increasingly trying to combine this 
approach with focusing on particular constituencies through highlight-
ing specific issues relevant to the latter; 
? All parties doubt the fairness of the electoral process. Efforts to prevent 
fraud and accusations of unfair practices by their opponents have be-
come part and parcel of the parties’ election campaign strategies and 
rhetoric;
? The personalities of party leaders rather than brand names are decisive 
for the image and electoral chances of political parties. Therefore, the 
personal participation of party leaders is especially important for the 
public relations work; 
? Having a well-organized and committed network of campaign organiz-
ers and activists, preferably with an experience of past elections, is con-
sidered the key to the success of grass-roots campaigning work 
throughout the country; 
? At the local level, the most important methods are working through the 
party activists’ personal networks of trust (friends, relatives, etc), as 
well as securing the support of informal community leaders who are in 
a position to “deliver” the votes of their communities. 
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2.8 International Support for Political Par-
ties
What to do? 
? Enter a long-term commitment and help to create the stable environ-
ment necessary for the institutional development of political parties; 
? Connect the consensus among political parties on foreign policy issues 
and the wide-spread European orientation to working practically on 
these issues;  
? Facilitate inter-party cooperation and support multiparty dialogue; 
? Support strategic capacity-building activities; 
? Provide parties with the tools and knowledge to carry out regular public 
opinion surveys and internal party research; 
? Increase parties’ capacity for international networking; 
? Create a common database of different projects aimed at developing 
the political party system. 
General picture 
The collapse of Communist rule in the early 1990’s created a demand for 
democratic institutions and, in particular, political parties, as democracy was 
associated in the public mind with the multiparty system as contrasted with 
the single-party Soviet state. However, there was no experience with democ-
ratic institutions and little adequate knowledge about them. This created a 
gap between the relatively high social expectations of a democratic system 
and the available human capital necessary to build and sustain democratic 
institutions. International support and expertise appeared to be one of the 
principal ways to fill this gap and help Georgia develop democratic institu-
tions, including political parties.
International democracy-assistance programmes became active in Geor-
gia from 1992 on, and such assistance has steadily increased since then. In 
the period from 1994 to 1996, a number of international donor organizations 
(such as USAID, the Eurasia Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 
the Open Society - Georgia Foundation, which is part of a network funded by 
an American philanthropist George Soros) opened their offices in Georgia, 
thus making support for democratic institution-building more systematic 
and structured. Even though the priorities of assistance coming from the 
Western countries have shifted in accordance with the events unfolding in 
the country and other political factors, it is clear that the international com-
munity has been committed to providing large-scale assistance to Georgia. 
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The United States is the main donor country. Its government has allocated 
more than $1 billion from its budget for different humanitarian, develop-
ment and democracy-assistance programmes in Georgia since 1992.138 In 
recent years, annual assistance has exceeded $100 million, of which about 
$20 million are spent on the implementation of democracy-related pro-
grammes.139
The EU is another major donor. From 1992 to 2003, it supported Georgia 
through a range of programmes. The main activities have involved more 
traditional development assistance: ECHO humanitarian assistance (€92 
million 1992-2002); the Food Security Programme (€59 million 1992-2002) 
and the Tacis National Programme (€84 million 1992-2002). Total EU assis-
tance has amounted to €370m (not including assistance from the Tacis Re-
gional Programme or from member states). From 2000 to 2003, the budget 
of the Tacis Programme reached €29 million, focusing on support for insti-
tutional, legal and administrative reform, as well as on support in addressing 
the social consequences of transition.140 In September 2003, the EU adopted 
a new Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Georgia and defined thematic priori-
ties for assistance in 2004-2006, which includes the rule of law, good govern-
ance, human rights and democratic institutions. It is also important to note 
that in the summer of 2004, the European Commission decided to make 
available some funds under its Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) for meas-
ures to reinforce the rule of law and democratic processes in Georgia.141
After Georgia was included in the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004, 
there was increased cooperation between the EU and Georgia.  
Only a small fraction of international democracy-assistance programmes 
have targeted political parties so far 
Notably, however, only a small fraction of democracy-assistance programmes 
have targeted political parties. Most programmes envisaged reforming vari-
ous government agencies and supporting civil society and the media. 
Strengthening election administration was also one of priorities, but this 
concerned parties only indirectly. Very few donors have been interested in 
working directly with political parties.
One reason for this might have been that international donors did not 
want to be accused of getting involved in Georgia’s internal political strug-
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gles. But the instability of the political party system itself was also an impor-
tant reason. There are no political parties that have steadily played a key role 
in the Georgian political scene during the last 10 to 15 years; in fact, the 
party scene is radically different before each election. Western political par-
ties seeking like-minded strategic partners in Georgia were baffled by the 
fact that political values or ideologies did not appear to be central to how 
Georgian political parties were created. The absence of stable partners natu-
rally hampers the implementation of long-term projects.  
Georgian political parties, on the other hand, are quite open and moti-
vated to establish close international ties. They express willingness to co-
operate with both the international organizations and like-minded parties in 
other countries. Since all parties admit that they need to improve the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of their party work, they believe that learning from 
successful international experience is crucial. Parties believe that, while the 
Georgian political system has its unique features and Western experience 
cannot be directly transferred to the Georgian scene, international coopera-
tion can have an important positive effect.  
Georgian political parties hope that their international connections will 
increase the parties’ capacity and recognition and secure greater guaran-
tees for the development of a multiparty system in Georgia 
Apart from increasing their capacity through learning best practices from 
more experienced political parties, international connections have an impor-
tant additional dimension for Georgian political parties. They imply recogni-
tion. Especially for the opposition parties, such recognition is, to a certain 
extent, a guarantee of their security. They believe that international projects 
targeting political parties, as well as partnerships with like-minded parties 
among leading political parties in the developed countries, constitute some 
additional guarantee for maintaining a multiparty system in Georgia.
In order to develop stable international connections, almost all the politi-
cal parties surveyed have established international relations services in their 
central offices. But these offices are for the most part recent creations, and 
their capacity and experience are not up to the task. The result is that there is 
a gap between expectation and reality: Georgian political parties want to have 
a strong network of international connections, but such contacts and part-
nerships are relatively weak and unstable. 
Party representatives recognize that they are not sufficiently active in this 
regard. In most cases of international contacts, the parties emerge as passive 
consumers of these relations and rarely take the initiative themselves. “The 
relations that we have established so far were offered to us by the interna-
tional organizations. They offer us the assistance and we accept it.”142
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In most cases of international contacts, parties emerge as passive con-
sumers of these relations and rarely take initiative themselves 
Those international contacts and partnerships that have already been estab-
lished may be divided in two main categories: 1) parties' relations with inter-
national organizations and international NGOs, and 2) parties' relations with 
like-minded parties abroad. The former is usually initiated by the interna-
tional organizations (international NGOs) and their aim is to implement 
specific programmes and projects aimed at strengthening party organiza-
tions in Georgia. Some parties have relatively stable relations of this sort. 
The second kind of relations are often (but not always) initiated by the Geor-
gian parties themselves. Here, the main aim is some kind of international 
recognition.
Relations with international organizations and international NGOs 
The only international donor which has carried out relatively continuous and 
stable programmes aimed at strengthening political parties in Georgia is 
USAID. This area of work has been one of the priorities in the programmes 
USAID has been implementing since 1992. It has carried out its pro-
grammes of assistance to parties and parliamentary factions through the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Insti-
tute (IRI). NDI was the most active organization in this field in the 1990s, 
but in the last several years the Georgian office of the IRI has been consid-
ered by the Georgian parties to be the key international organization working 
with them. Since 1998, it has been actively cooperating with all the main 
parties, helping them to increase their competitiveness by means of various 
educational programmes. 
The IRI has two main directions in its activities in Georgia. It works to 
promote the parties' institutional development as well as to improve their 
electoral capabilities. In order to increase the quality of party work and 
strengthen their organizational structure, the IRI is implementing a consult-
ing programme which is carried out individually with all parties. Within the 
framework of this programme, by means of developing recommendations to 
parties and training their activists and staff, it is trying to help the parties 
improve their structure, develop primary and functional organizations and 
streamline party work during the election period. 
The second direction of the IRI's activities encompasses its work with the 
parties as well as the voters. In order to develop the parties' capabilities, it 
has carried out campaign academy programmes which aim to teach party 
members the techniques that are required for carrying out a fully-fledged 
election campaign: for instance, how to define an election strategy, how to 
compose public appeals and how to work with the voters and the media. The 
programme entitled Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV), which is carried out by the 
institute and whose aim is to increase the participation of society and espe-
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cially of its young people in elections, also constitutes one of the priorities of 
the IRI’s work.
Parties value the IRI's work and believe that more international assis-
tance is necessary to achieve the parties' effective development. The number 
of participants in the educational programmes organized by IRI is restricted. 
It is mostly leaders of various structural units of the parties that are involved 
in them. These programmes cannot include all party members wishing to 
participate. However, it is noted that, after having participated in such educa-
tional programmes, party members have better chances of securing promo-
tion in internal party positions as compared to other members. The New 
Conservative Party has gone as far as creating a paid position of election 
consultant, and today, members who have been trained in the IRI's cam-
paign academy are employed in the majority of the party's regional branches. 
Political parties think that the current work of the international non-
governmental organizations aimed at assistance to parties is useful but 
insufficient
Another organization which has been actively working with the Georgian 
political parties is the National Democratic Institute (NDI). Unlike the IRI, it 
cooperates with parliamentary factions. Therefore, parties that do not have a 
faction in Parliament are beyond its scope. Programmes implemented by the 
NDI are aimed at increasing the efficiency of the parliamentary factions' 
work. By organizing working meetings and conferences, it helps to step up 
the work of Parliament: “Before Parliament adopted the new Tax Code, the 
NDI helped us twice in setting up meetings related to this issue. It also fre-
quently organizes trainings for Parliament members.”143 Since opening a 
field office in Georgia in 1994, NDI has assisted political party leaders and 
activists representing pro-reform parties to develop policy programmes and 
messages, to create party- building strategies, to reach out to supporters and 
voters, as well as to strengthen national and local party organizations. In 
1995, NDI helped to create the International Society for Fair Elections and 
Democracy (ISFED), a non-partisan, non-governmental Georgian civil soci-
ety organization. Since that time, it has provided financial and technical as-
sistance to ISFED to assist in its organizational development and build skills 
to monitor elections, conduct civic and voter education programmes, publish 
newsletters to increase citizens’ awareness of their constitutional rights, 
organize local and national advocacy campaigns, and assist and advise 
elected officials at the local and national level in reaching out to citizens to 
address their needs. ISFED has monitored numerous elections throughout 
Georgia and drafted reports on the conduct of elections with recommenda-
tions for improvements. Alongside ISFED, NDI has helped local officials to 
convene town hall meetings designed to increase outreach to citizens and 
solicit their input. NDI and ISFED have further promoted the development 
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of citizen advisory committees, volunteer bodies of citizens to assist elected 
officials in addressing the needs of local communities.  
NDI has assisted numerous political parties in local party-building and 
skills-building of national and local activists in such areas as campaign orga-
nizing, canvassing, membership recruitment, voter targeting and voter con-
tact (media, message development and delivery) for the 2001 local elections 
and 2003 parliamentary elections. In addition, NDI has worked to build con-
sensus and cooperation among opposition parties on issues such as electoral 
reform. In the aftermath of democratic change in Georgia in 2004, NDI ad-
vised party members on the changing role of parties in Georgia’s new politi-
cal environment, the challenges inherent to democratization, and the need 
for opposition parties to cooperate, given the popularity and strength of the 
governing National Movement Party. After the March 2004 parliamentary 
elections, NDI has continued working with the governing National Move-
ment and other parties in the opposition. But its work is now completely 
concentrated in Parliament.144
Other donor organizations cooperate with political parties as well but 
their work is limited to the issues of their specific interests (election systems, 
women's involvement, etc.). The German Friedrich Evert Stiftung (FES) 
operates according to the principle of “topic-related” instead of “actor-
related” work and therefore does not focus on one particular social-
democratic party in the country – which, according to the FES, is simply not 
available in Georgia. The projects that the FES and other organizations like 
the German Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) and Friedrich Naumann 
Stiftung implement are usually carried out in the form of conferences, 
seminars, round tables and discussions. These and other programmes of 
other organizations are often implemented by Georgian non-governmental 
organizations in partnership with donors, who in most cases identify the 
topics and agendas.
Unfortunately, the majority of programmes are often one-offs and do not 
form part of long-term systemic efforts. They are more concerned with de-
veloping the working skills of individual parties, while inter-party relations 
are not really considered. However, the need for international support for 
establishing a stable political environment based on consensus among major 
parties is emphasized by all political actors. A better coordination of activities 
and the exchange of information between international actors are generally 
perceived as issues that should get more attention. The creation of a stable 
environment is considered necessary to develop a multiparty dialogue and a 
culture of inter-party cooperation, including opposition parties outside Par-
liament.
                                                          
144 The information about NDI comes from its Political Party Department in Washington 
and was provided by its Director, Ivan Doherty. 
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Relations with like-minded parties in other countries 
Establishing relations with like-minded parties in developed countries and 
joining international associations of parties with similar ideological princi-
ples are important priorities for Georgian political parties. Apart from gain-
ing international recognition and status, these links provide an additional 
way for the parties to more clearly define their identities at home. Joining 
ideologically-based party associations may also be a matter of competition 
between Georgian political parties of similar ideological orientation: this may 
be used as an indicator that a given party is the pre-eminent representative of 
certain (centre-right, centre-left, liberal) political directions within Georgia. 
Therefore, if they establish any kind of contacts with major foreign political 
parties or party associations, Georgian political parties are usually eager to 
publicize this within Georgia.  
As a rule, it is on the initiative of the Georgian parties that contacts with 
like-minded parties abroad are sought.145 In that sense, Georgian parties 
follow the same pattern as other parties in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union since the beginning of the 90’s. However, these contacts rarely 
lead to the establishment of the strong partnerships to which the parties 
aspire. The main reason for this is that Georgian political parties have often 
been unable to satisfy the main requirements of their prospective foreign 
and international partners. In particular, the majority of them do not have a 
long-term record of party work and independent participation in parliamen-
tary elections. On the other hand, the main political political families in 
Europe now seem to have a more cautious attitude towards new parties than 
they did in the last decade of the 20th century.
Only a very small number of parties have more or less settled relations 
with political party associations in the US, Europe, and the former Soviet 
Republics. These relations are expressed mainly in formal expressions of 
support, participation in congresses, exchange of information and the or-
ganization of joint working meetings. Several parties have declared their 
wish to cooperate with the International Democrat Union (IDU), an interna-
tional association of centre-right parties, but only the New Conservative Party 
has become its associated member so far. The New Conservative Party also 
claims to have relatively advanced relationships with the European People's 
Party (EPP), a European-level centre-right party of the European Union. It 
hopes to acquire an observer's status in this organization in 2006 or 2007. 
                                                          
145 Precedents to the contrary exist as well: “The Chinese Communist Party expressed 
willingness to cooperate with us on its own initiative. Even though we do not have much 
in common in terms of ideology, we will try to find common ground on economic is-
sues.” – Interview with the member of the United National Movement. 
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International fraternity 
While establishing close relations with foreign political parties is consid-
ered desirable by all Georgian parties, only a few of them have succeeded 
in obtaining international recognition: 
The New Conservative Party is an associated member of the International 
Democratic Union (IDU); the Youth Organization of the New Conserva-
tive Party is affiliated with the Youth Organization of the European Peo-
ple’s Party (EPP) and IPU. In 2007 the New Conservatives are planning to 
join the EPP. 
The United National Movement started conversations with the EPP in 
2005 after having decided to identify itself more with Christian-Democrats 
and the European conservative family than with the liberals. In 2006, it 
attended an EPP summit (in Rome) for the first time and has officially 
applied for admission. 
The Labour Party of Georgia is mainly cooperating with the Socialist In-
ternational and the Party of European Socialists. It has succeeded in estab-
lishing close contacts with the European Forum for Democracy and Soli-
darity.
The Republican Party is a strategic partner of the Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation (linked to the liberal German Free Democratic Party) in Geor-
gia.
Only one of the parties surveyed in Georgia, the Labour Party of Georgia, 
defines itself as a centre-left party and is looking for steady contacts among 
parties and international party associations, principally with the Socialist 
International (SI) and the Party of European Socialists (PES). Its most active 
contacts are with the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity (EFDS), 
an organization established by the social-democratic parties and political 
foundations from EU countries in order to support transformation and de-
mocratization processes in Central and Eastern Europe. The Labour party 
participates in the conferences and meetings organized by this institution.146
The EFDS has also paid incidental visits to Georgia to asses the situation. 
The same holds for the EPP and related parties from Europe. 
In the autumn of 2005, the Republican Party of Georgia became a strate-
gic partner in Georgia of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation linked to the 
German Free Democratic Party. This may be a first step for this party to es-
tablish closer contacts with the international family of liberal parties.  
Georgian political parties desire but have rarely enjoyed stable partner-
ships with like-minded parties abroad 
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Some parties give priority to establishing close relations based not on com-
mon ideology but on specific issues. These are more pragmatic contacts that 
enable parties to share problem-solving mechanisms with foreign political 
actors facing similar challenges and obstacles during different stages of their 
development. Thus some parties are seeking “to contact the parties of truly 
liberal-democratic ideology in the post-Soviet and former socialist bloc coun-
tries and establish close relations with them.”147 Since parties in these coun-
tries are developing along more or less similar lines and have emerged from 
a historical background similar to that of Georgian political parties, their 
experience may be more appropriate, comprehensible and acceptable in the 
Georgian political space. However, so far Georgian political parties have not 
succeeded in establishing stable partnerships in this area.  
Most parties are not satisfied with the state of their relationships with 
like-minded political parties and party associations so far and they hope to 
achieve much more. Usually they have no well-designed plans or strategies 
with regard to developing their international networks, but they do have 
more or less specific ideas concerning the direction in which they would like 
to move. For instance, they believe that the establishment of international 
contacts by their functional organizations (this implies mainly women's and 
youth organizations) and the organization of training programmes and 
working meetings are vitally important for their party work. This might con-
stitute the initial stage of what could become fully-fledged partnerships in 
the future.
The high death rate of political parties in Georgia during the last 15 years 
is certainly linked with the high political instability in the country and vice-
versa. For international actors, consolidation and stabilization of an institu-
tionalized political party system should be a high priority in the democratiza-
tion agenda. This is crucial and demands a strategic approach from the in-
ternational community.
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Main findings 
? A large number of democracy-assistance projects have been imple-
mented in Georgia since 1992 with support from international organi-
zations, foundations, and Western governments. Only a small fraction 
of them targeted political parties;
? In the last ten years, there have been only two organizations that have 
had long-term systematic programmes aimed at strengthening the 
party system in Georgia: the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and 
the International Republican Institute (IRI); 
? Georgian political parties consider international party-assistance pro-
grammes useful and want more of them. They believe that such pro-
grammes give them an important opportunity to learn from best inter-
national practices and increase their capacity. Moreover, they consider 
international links to be an important sign of recognition and an addi-
tional guarantee for maintaining a multiparty system in Georgia; 
? Political parties think that the scope of existing international party-
assistance programmes is insufficient for their needs. Only a limited 
number of party activists can participate in them; 
? Because most international party-assistance programmes were targeted 
at individual actors, attention to interparty relations and development 
of the culture of co-operation and dialogue between parties has been 
insufficient;
? Parties seek contacts with like-minded parties abroad but only a few of 
them have been able to establish more or less stable contacts; 
? All the parties surveyed have international relations services in their 
central offices but they usually have insufficient capacity and experi-
ence. Despite their strong interest in international contacts, parties are 
rarely proactive in this regard. 
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3. A Framework for Democratic Party Build-
ing
What to do? 
? Georgia can only stabilize as a state if it develops effective and sustain-
able democratic institutions. The strong support for democracy among 
the Georgian public is the main asset for that development; 
? Cooperation with European and Euro-Atlantic partners and institutions 
is a key for Georgia’s democratic development. It provides a strong mo-
tivation for Georgian democratic reforms; 
? Political parties in Georgia are generally free to express their views and 
they serve as a foundation for political pluralism. But the political party 
system is weakly institutionalized, and Georgian political parties need 
to successfully pass their initial stage of institutional development; 
? While there is a fairly high level of consensus among Georgian political 
parties on the most important policy issues, there is a need to increase 
the level of trust in the political process and the cooperation between 
parties across the political spectrum; 
? Parties require cooperation with peers to implement structural and 
organizational reforms; 
? Political parties are open to international co-operation. They see the 
important benefits from political party-assistance programs and de-
mand a long-term commitment from partners. 
The above two sections have presented a general picture of the Georgian 
political situation and the state of the development of political parties cur-
rently active in this context. This is a picture of a dynamic country that has 
had a troubled recent past but also a very strong determination to achieve its 
national goals. These goals are fairly distinct and there is considerable public 
consensus about them; but Georgia has yet a lot to do in order to consolidate 
its political institutions. 
For years, Georgia was seen by most analysts as a remote and unstable 
country whose fate largely depended on the outcome of geopolitical competi-
tion between Russia and the United States. Transportation of oil and gas 
from the Caspian region to the consumers in the West was seen as the most 
important stake in this real or perceived “Great Game.” On the other hand, 
Georgia – and the South Caucasus region in general – was seen as a region 
of conflict. About fifteen percent of Georgia’s territory and a comparable 
share of its people live in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, self-proclaimed states 
that are often referred to as zones of “frozen conflict”. Effective jurisdiction 
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of Georgia was also problematic in some other parts of the country. Due to 
its inabilities to extend control over a large part of its territory and perform 
many other functions, Georgia was often described as a “failing state.” The 
context of the international fight against terrorism gave a new dimension to 
the international attention on Georgia: states that cannot enforce minimal 
order on their own territories easily become home to terrorist and criminal 
networks or plunge into internal conflicts. This creates threats not only to 
their citizens, but to the international community as well.  
Today Georgia wants transcend its position as a hostage in geopolitical 
games or a passive object of international assistance. This can be achieved 
through the development of effective democratic institutions that are capable 
of providing public goods and are accountable to its citizens. 
The project of consolidating effective democratic institutions defines both 
Georgia’s internal and international agenda. Georgia’s long-term project has 
been to join the European and Euro-Atlantic space. Georgians consider ac-
cession to the Council of Europe in 1999 as the first step on that road, to be 
eventually followed by joining NATO and the European Union. Achieving 
these goals, however, is inseparable from successful democratic reforms.  
The Rose Revolution of November 2003 gave a new impetus to Georgia’s 
efforts to establish a democracy and its movement towards Europe. It put 
Georgia in the vanguard of the new wave of democratic transitions in the 
post-Soviet region, thus offering a real chance to consolidate democracy. 
Georgia increasingly defines itself as being part of the family of countries 
that were late in their transitions to democracy and could not make the first 
train to Europe but are determined to go the whole way nonetheless. Georgia 
is an active member of the Community of Democratic Choice, the new 
grouping of Eastern European countries that was established in 2005 upon 
the initiative of the presidents of Georgia and Ukraine.  
Georgia also strives to show solidarity with the democratic world and con-
tribute to international peace through participation in the military operation 
in Iraq and the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo.
While accession to the European Union looks like a distant and uncertain 
prospect at the moment, Georgians believe that the Rose Revolution and its 
aftermath have already brought Georgia closer to Europe. Inclusion of the 
South Caucasus into the European Neighbourhood policy (ENP) in 2004 and 
the forthcoming agreement between the EU and Georgia on the Action Plan 
within the framework of ENP will move Georgian-EU cooperation to a quali-
tatively new level. On the other hand, after the International Partnership 
Action Plan (IPAP) with Georgia was approved by NATO in the fall of 2004, 
Georgia sees joining NATO as a prospect that could become reality in the 
current decade. Cooperation with these organizations serves as a catalyst for 
democratic reforms.
Political parties are the most important institutions that underpin a stable 
democracy. So far, the Georgian political parties have ensured a considerable 
level of pluralism in Georgian political life and have allowed different groups 
of citizens to express the variety of their positions. However, the Georgian 
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political parties, as well as the political party system as a whole, are unstable 
and underdeveloped. Political parties are excessively dependent on the per-
sonalities of their leaders and easily go out of business as soon as the leader 
exits the political scene. The political party landscape is radically different 
before each election. None of the parties that defined Georgia’s political life 
in the mid-1990s have any influence today. At the same time, however, after 
each change of government, the same structure of political parties is repro-
duced: there is a single dominant party that is effectively merged with the 
state institutions, and of the large number of opposition parties, none of 
them is automatically considered a viable contender for power.  
Apart from being weakly institutionalised, the Georgian political party 
system is characterised by a low level of ideological polarisation indeed, there 
is no strong difference between the policy agendas of the different parties. 
However, the level of confrontation is high, although political debates, while 
frequent, are oriented towards personalities rather than policy issues. Politi-
cal parties do not trust the integrity of either their political opponents or the 
electoral process. While there are many instances of cooperation between 
political parties, such cooperation very rarely includes both the government 
and the opposition.  
The research shows that Georgian political parties have a realistic view of 
their weaknesses and understand the necessity of structural change. Parties 
recognize that having accumulated political experience in the past decade 
and a half, the Georgian public has become much more informed and selec-
tive in its choices. Therefore, parties also need to reach a qualitatively high 
level of development in order to convince citizens that they are viable politi-
cal organizations that can effectively serve their society. Political parties un-
derstand that they should develop not only as strong electoral institutions but 
also as alternative policy options for Georgian society. Based on that under-
standing, the majority of the currently functioning political parties are in the 
process of formation or reorganization, which is manifested in a reviewing 
and overhauling of their functions, roles, policies and organizational struc-
ture.
While the parties are competitors in the political space, it is extremely 
important for them to cooperate constructively with other parties, state agen-
cies and civil organizations. Although the government has the primary re-
sponsibility for the administration and policies of the country, all major po-
litical actors have a shared responsibility for the general functioning of the 
democratic system. During this research project, the parties themselves not 
only highlighted some of the significant obstacles which they come across in 
the process of development, but they also demonstrated a high degree of 
openness and expressed their desire to cooperate with non-governmental 
and donor organizations. So far, the National Democratic Institute and the 
International Republican Institute have been the only international NGOs 
that have run comprehensive party-assistance programmes in Georgia. 
Georgian political parties recognize they have benefited from cooperation 
with these and other international organizations, but also emphasize that 
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more assistance to political parties is welcome. The development of the 
Georgian political parties is first and foremost their own business – and that 
of the Georgian society. But they can also learn a great deal from interna-
tional experience and contacts, something they are eager to do.  
This chapter summarizes the difficulties in the process of party develop-
ment which were identified during the study and outlines recommendations 
for addressing them effectively. The recommendations are categorized into 
groups according to the three principal actors concerned: the state, political 
parties, and non-governmental/donor organizations involved in political 
party-assistance programmes. An Action Plan for the medium term can be 
found at the end of the chapter. 
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3.1 Conclusions, Recommendations and
Action Plan 
Recommendations to state institutions 
Relations between the state bodies and political parties drew especially great 
attention from the party representatives in the course of this research. All 
parties agreed that, in the past, the legislation and, especially, actual behav-
iour of state agencies were unfair and limited the development of political 
pluralism in Georgia. However, when it comes to assessing the current 
situation and defining desirable models of relations between the state and 
political parties, the opinions of the party in power and those in opposition 
tend to differ dramatically. These differences are at the root of much political 
controversy, as is true in other countries. 
This report does not intend to take sides in tense political discussions on 
the details of election legislation, which is currently taking place in Georgia. 
Moreover, some of the issues related to state regulations relevant tor political 
parties will be revised in the section of inter-party dialogue, as strong inter-
party cooperation is a prerequisite for a greater legitimacy of the rules regu-
lating political competition. Recommendations in this area will be limited to 
two general points.
1. Monitor the effects of new legislation on state funding for political parties.
The recently enacted changes in the law on political parties were given a 
positive assessment by both representatives of the parties and international 
experts. These changes may constitute the most important positive step in 
the development party-related legislation in the last few years. The legislation 
recognizes the public value of political parties and provides important 
(though not sufficient) resources for the parties’ institutional development. 
At the same time, no final solution to the problem of the public financing of 
political parties exist. Actual effects of the new legislation on the develop-
ment of individual parties and the party system in general should be care-
fully studied. Moreover, discussion will continue on the possible adoption of 
alternative mechanisms of public funding for political parties, such as 
matching grants, spending limits, tax exemptions, etc. 
2. Consider implementation of the OSCE/ODIHR and Council of Europe 
recommendations on lowering the electoral threshold. In the last two years, 
the issue of a high threshold for political party lists has developed into one of 
the most controversial issues of Georgian party politics. This threshold is 
among the highest for the OSCE region. The Council of Europe recom-
mended that Georgia lower the threshhold by at least two percent, and oppo-
sition parties also consider it unfairly high. Many political observers believe 
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the threshold hinders political pluralism and fair representation of different 
social groups in the governing bodies of different levels.  
This issue became especially dramatic in the context of repeat parliamen-
tary elections in March 2004, when there was a high probability of not a sin-
gle opposition party being able to overcome it. In the end only one opposi-
tion bloc barely made it to Parliament. 
At the same time, parties in power and in opposition share the concern of 
high fragmentation of Georgian political party system and proliferation of 
weak parties that do not really represent serious social interests. Therefore, 
even parties in opposition support relatively a high threshold of about 4-5 
percent.
The ruling party should give greater consideration to the concerns of both 
the international community and Georgian political players and reconsider 
the issue of the electoral threshold.  
Recommendations to political parties 
The study exposes a number of problems that exist within the Georgian po-
litical parties and in the relations between them. Respectively, recommenda-
tions formulated in this part of the chapter focus on these two broad sets of 
issues: those related to inter-party relations and the institutional develop-
ment of the parties.
Parties acknowledge that one of the most important problems in develop-
ing a multiparty system is the lack of dialogue between political organiza-
tions. The level of cooperation between the parties is very low and the spirit 
of confrontation by far exceeds that of cooperation.
The difficulties within the parties for the large part stem from their low 
level of institutional development. Accordingly, some of the recommenda-
tions deal with the issue of laying down clear internal rules and strengthen-
ing the formal mechanisms of decision-making as compared to the informal 
ones. Another important direction of changes that will lead to strengthening 
political parties will be assigning a more important role to the members, 
which implies involving them more in the decision-making processes and 
improving mechanisms of supplying information to the party leaders from 
the party’s grass-roots level.  
Most parties also recognize that their systems for distributing tasks be-
tween different levels of the party organizations and their officers is inade-
quate and that this limits their flexibility and effectiveness in responding to 
emerging challenges; some of them suggest specific solutions to this prob-
lem, but these ideas have yet to be finally shaped.
1. Inter-party dialogue 
Maintaining continuous inter-party dialogue on rules of political competi-
tion. The direct and indirect effects of legislation regulating electoral proc-
esses and other aspects of political party activities are never fully neutral 
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politically-speaking. Every change in legislation, though formally not dis-
criminating against anybody, can have beneficial effects for some parties 
more than for others. On the other hand, overall legitimacy of the political 
process requires that all major political players consider the existing rules of 
political competition to be generally fair. This is not the case in Georgia, 
however, where the level of legitimacy of the system of political competition 
is rather low. Therefore, despite obvious political difficulties, seeking con-
sensus with regards to state legislation concerning political parties remains 
necessary. The party in power should not take advantage of its dominating 
position in the legislative and impose rules that do not take into account the 
interests of other political players. The opposition parties, on the other hand, 
should realistically assess their chances of influencing the outcome of the 
political dialogue and avoid excessive politicizing of relevant issues. Of 
course, the role of the opposition is to check and critize the government, but 
always with the general interest in mind. The same holds for the govern-
ment.
Such an inter-party dialogue may take many different forms. It is possible 
to create a permanent or ad-hoc forum of the party leaders, which would give 
them the opportunity to discuss the issues related to party activities and im-
portant political topics in relatively equal conditions. To make the dialogue 
more informed and open, local and foreign organizations and experts should 
be involved. Overall, broad participation of the political and social groups in 
the dialogue might be critical to its success. 
One could also consider creating an inter-party body that would monitor 
compliance with the agreements reached in the course of inter-party dia-
logue.
Developing a code to regulate relations between parties. Mutual distrust is a 
significant factor that hinders cooperation between the parties. Regular use 
of physical force as a method of settling the scores between political players 
is an especially disturbing feature of the political life. It would be highly de-
sirable for the parties to prepare a common document that would set forth 
the fundamental issues of regulating relations between the parties. There 
have been some attempts at adopting such documents in the past, but they 
were relatively narrow in scope. This applies to the codes of conduct adopted 
by the opposition parties in 2003 and by politicians in the Georgian Parlia-
ment in 2004. The latter document described acceptable forms of debates 
and dialogue within Parliament, although there were numerous violations of 
its provisions later. Therefore, apart from adopting rules, there is a need for 
an effective mechanism of monitoring their observance.
Renewing inter-party dialogue on procedures for forming the electoral ad-
ministration. The composition of the electoral administration remains a 
controversial political issue and one that has caused distrust about the im-
partiality of the election administration. While the current party in power 
insists that the new rules of staffing the electoral administration is on the 
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principle of impartial civil service and constitutes an important step forward, 
the opposition dismisses these rules as a single- party domination of the 
election commissions. There is a pressing need to achieve a higher level of 
inter-party consensus on these issues.  
Coordinated efforts by the parties to avert the use of administrative resources 
and election violations. The use of administrative resources and election 
violations is the cause of an intense confrontation between the opposition 
and the ruling party. The opposition’s belief that it cannot have realistic pos-
sibilities of competing for power using conventional methods of party poli-
tics pushes it to take radical positions and exercise populist rhetoric. Setting 
up an inter-party body to monitor and examine specific instances of misuse 
of administrative resources and/or election violations could be one way to set 
clearer standards in these areas and develop greater trust between competing 
political parties. Such bodies could be created at the national,regional or local 
level.
Developing other forms of inter-party dialogue and communication. Devel-
oping inter-party dialogue with the specific purpose of resolving controver-
sial issues related to political competition is an important though difficult 
task. However, parties should also develop different forms of communica-
tion and dialogue that do not necessarily aim at resolving specific political 
issues, such as discussing mutually interesting issues of politics and party 
life, educational activities, etc. This will develop the culture of cooperation 
and trust between competing political actors.  
2. Constructive opposition  
Opposition parties should identify themselves more with suggesting alterna-
tive policies. A substantial part of society as well as many experts believe an 
important problem to be that opposition parties focus on criticizing the gov-
ernment without matching this criticism with specific alternative policy pro-
posals. This, together with the extremely confrontational style of relations 
between the party in power and its opponents, creates an image of “uncon-
structive opposition”, which is first of all damaging to the opposition itself. 
Therefore, putting more emphasis on alternative policy proposals will make 
the opposition’s criticism of the government more productive while enhanc-
ing a positive image of the opposition and increasing public trust towards it. 
At the same time, this will contribute to the quality of policy debates in the 
country and increase the opposition’s chances of influencing political deci-
sions.
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3. Cooperative ruling party  
The party in power should be more open to cooperation with the opposition.
As has become a general pattern of Georgian politics, the party in power 
tends to be politically so strong that it can take crucial decisions without con-
sulting and eventually cooperating with the opposition. The current majority 
in Parliament is even stronger than before: it is in a position to change the 
Constitution without engaging the opposition. However, such domination 
has its hazards as well, since no ruling political group in Georgia has been 
able to preserve its power against internal splits or to maintain its own iden-
tity. Moreover, excluding the opposition from the decision-making process 
tends to lead towards a more radical agenda and methods, which even wors-
ens the chances for a constructive policy dialogue. Therefore, the dialogue 
between the party in power and different groups of society and opposition 
parties is a pre-condition for maintaining the stability of the political system. 
Such dialogue will also improve the quality of political decisions and the 
sustainability of policy implementations.  
Therefore, even though there is no imminent necessity for involving the 
opposition in the decision-making process, the party in power should be as 
open as possible to cooperating with the opposition and considering its views 
and concerns. This is needed not only for the stability of the party system in 
Georgia but also for the long-term viability of the party in power. The conti-
nuity of good governance will also increase. 
Maintaining separation between party and state institutions. There is a per-
ceived lack of separation between the ruling party and state institutions, cre-
ating the possibility of misusing state resources for political purposes. That 
has, in reality, also been the fact for the last 15 years. Such a trend under-
mines the legitimacy of the political process and it has negative repercus-
sions for the performance of the government and for the the long-term vi-
ability of the party in power. It is always a big challenge for the party in 
power to maintain its image not only as a governing group but also as part of 
society. This problem can be solved only by clearly formulating, publicizing 
and consistently following specific standards and rules that guarantee a dis-
tance between party organisations and state agencies. This includes strict 
adherence to legislation that distinguishes between non-partisan civil ser-
vants and political appointees.
4. More institutionalized parties  
A clearer division of rights and responsibilities between internal party posi-
tions and structural units. One of the main organisational problems in the 
parties' activities is excessive concentration of power and, accordingly, re-
sponsibilities, in the hands of individual party officials who are mainly active 
in the parties’ national offices. Responsibilities of party leaders often include 
defining party policies, representing the party in relations with third parties 
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and the public, general management, fundraising, etc. At the local party 
branches, on the other hand, it is the overlap in functions of different party 
officers that create problems. Chairpersons of local branches often simulta-
neously head the bureau and thematic groups. An uneven distribution of 
responsibilities among the leaders of local party organizations causes ineffi-
cient management of the human and other resources available to the organi-
zation.
Developing more efficient schemes of distributing rights and responsi-
bilities between party officers of different levels is an important task for the 
institutional development of Georgian political parties. This will increase 
party efficiency and help overcome excessive dependence on party leaders.  
A clearer formulation of party strategies. Georgian political parties rarely 
draft comprehensive strategy documents that guide their activities in differ-
ent areas of party work. Instead, their activities are directed by small leading 
groups that tend to make ad hoc decisions in the changing political envi-
ronment. The lack of a formulated and clear-cut party strategy makes a 
party’s activities less understandable and transparent to both its own mem-
bers and the wide public, jeopardizes the process of institutional develop-
ment and hampers the influx of new members on the basis of support for 
the party platform.
It is important for the parties to formulate their strategies following a re-
alistic assessment of the social and political environment, existing needs and 
concerns of the public and their own resources. These strategic documents 
should cover such issues as the party’s values and policy outlooks, strategies 
of institutional development and public relations work, cooperation with 
other political or non-political players, general and specific policy-objectives 
and methods to reach them. 
Creating effective mechanisms of information exchange within the party.
There are no developed and institutionalized mechanisms of information 
exchange between different units within most Georgian parties. In fact, 
communication flows are one-sided, with the parties' central offices usually 
taking the lead in contacting their local branches. The latter, however, have 
much greater difficulty in gaining access to party headquarters. Horizontal 
contacts between sub-national units are weakly developed in general. The 
lack of efficient and institutionalized channels of bilateral and multilateral 
communication and information exchange reduces the efficiency of the party 
as a single organization and reduces the extent to which its structural units 
are involved in the party activities and decision-making. 
Parties could strengthen themselves considerably by instituting a set of 
measures to facilitate and streamline communication and information ex-
change within a party.
Enhancing expertise of middle-level party officers. Georgian parties have 
many dedicated party activists and local leaders who have accumulated con-
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siderable experience of participating in election campaigns and other party 
activities. However, these people, who are the backbone of the party organi-
zations, do not have sufficient up-to-date expertise. Focusing on enhancing 
the capacity of such people may be extremely beneficial to the institutional 
development of political parties.
Establishing formal mechanisms of resolving internal conflicts and dis-
agreements within parties. The parties have not developed any formal regu-
lations for resolving disagreements and conflicts as they inevitably arise in 
party organizations. The only regulatory document which in some way deals 
with conflict situations is the party charter. However, it defines only those 
violations that constitute the grounds for expelling a member.  
Once disagreements and conflicts do arise, members usually try to re-
solve them through informal discussions between the individuals in the 
presence of respected party members. In many cases, this approach works. 
However, the lack of clear and transparent rules of conflict resolution outlin-
ing rights and expected behaviour of members makes the process too de-
pendent on personal relationships and trust. This in turn makes the struc-
ture of the party too closed and limits the potential broadening of party struc-
tures beyond the personal networks of trust. As a result, party members tend 
to identify more with such personal networks rather than with issues of pol-
icy, values or social interests. Moreover, as all disagreements easily turn into 
personal confrontations, interventions of informal leaders often prove insuf-
ficient and frequent splits ensue.  
Adopting formal documents like codes of conduct and establising effec-
tive mechanisms to monitor them would help avert or regulate conflicts and 
stabilize the parties' internal organizational structure.  
Sharing international experience. Parties often recognize a need for 
strengthening ties with like-minded foreign parties and international party 
networks. One of the benefits that the parties can draw from such contacts 
consists in learning from the experience of advanced and consolidated party 
organizations. This concerns general experience with respect to their institu-
tional development and solving specific problems that these parties have 
confronted in the past. In this, Georgian parties can learn not only from 
ideologically like-minded parties, but the experience of political parties in 
Eastern Europe and NIS countries could also be particularly helpful.  
 The international contacts of Georgian political parties are rather spo-
radic. Such contacts would be much more advantageous for the parties if 
they develop strategies of international cooperation based on an assessment 
of their needs and the specific benefits they expect to get from such coopera-
tion. Such strategies would also help better identify prospective partners they 
seek contacts with. 
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5. More Democracy within the Parties  
Increasing the role of members in party activities. Most Georgian political 
parties are in the process of redefining the institution of party membership. 
Most parties move in the direction of creating a core of actively involved and 
dedicated members, and clearly delimiting them from a more passive sup-
porters or associated members. However, the stress in this process is made 
on defining member's responsibilities. While this may be legitimate and 
useful for creating more effective party organizations, an equally clear defini-
tion and expansion of members’ rights would make their role more effective, 
and membership in political parties more attractive to the politically moti-
vated part of the public.
Currently, rank-and-file members tend to be weakly involved in party ac-
tivities in the period between the elections and play little role in the decision- 
making process. This does not contribute to their strong self-identification 
with the party. Greater opportunities for taking initiatives, debating and in-
fluencing party policies, electing to or being elected to internal party posi-
tions become a significant motive for involvement in the party activities and 
broaden the pool of prospective members.  
Increasing the role of members would also allow parties to highlight the 
diversity of issues of local importance and include them in party agendas. 
This is linked to the next recommendation regarding development of inter-
nal democracy.
Increasing the capacity of party members in policy analysis. While the lack of 
tradition of a broad discussion of party policies may be one reason for insuf-
ficient participation of party members in internal decision-making processes, 
the lack of capacity may be an important objective factor that hinders such 
participation. Parties can enhance their strength if they find ways to train 
their activists from different levels in policy analysis and policy development 
skills. That will empower political party members to assume a more active 
role in internal party processes and participate in defining party policies and 
strategies.
Decentralizing organizational structures of the parties. The study results 
show that the majority of the parties have a rather centralized structure. Most 
of the party's financial, intellectual and human resources are concentrated in 
the centre, whereas the role of the local organizations is limited mainly to 
carrying out campaigns initiated by the central office. Apart from making 
parties less internally democratic, this makes party management less effi-
cient and flexible. But there are objective reasons for this situation. The cen-
tralization of the national administrative system does not leave room for 
strong local governments and logically does not motivate political parties to 
decentralize. An administrative decentralization would certainly contribute 
to a more locally organized political life.  
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However, even under the current circumstances, parties can consider dele-
gating greater functions and competences to their regional and local organi-
zations. In this process, the local organizations could gain broader rights 
with regards to fund-raising and financial management, get more involved in 
the formulation of party policy and achieve greater freedom in electing party 
officers at the local level.  
Benefits of the decentralized party organizations include chances of better 
synergy between a diversity of local interests, greater motivation for party 
members, the creation of a broader pool of able leaders and a positive effect 
on the party’s popularity.
Decentralizing party funds. While almost all parties suffer from a shortage of 
financial and material resources, this problem is particularly acute for the 
local organizations. This is in part caused by fewer opportunities to raise 
funds outside the capital, but the over-centralized internal structure is an 
even greater obstacle. If the parties allow their local organizations greater 
rights to raise and manage funds, this will also give them greater chances of 
becoming strong and autonomous players at the local level, of taking specific 
initiatives and carrying out election campaigns and other activities more 
effectively.  
Supporting women’s involvement in decision-making processes and promot-
ing women candidates in elections at different levels. In almost all major 
Georgian political parties there is a balance between men and women mem-
bers, and women play an important role in party work at the grass-roots 
level. There are individual women leaders who are prominent in some par-
ties. However, the overall level of women participation and influence at high 
levels of party leadership tends to be quite low. This harms the representative 
character of political parties and the effectiveness of their work.  
Notably, there are a greater number of successful female political leaders 
in the regions than in the centre. There are also many able female function-
aries at different levels of party organisations whose work is crucial to the 
parties’ success. One could expect that establishing more open and transpar-
ent procedures for regulating internal party work would positively affect 
women’s representation in general.  
A greater degree of internal party democracy should also result in pro-
moting female candidates in elections at different levels. This would bring 
about a more balanced and effective representation of men and women in 
the decision-making bodies. However, as there are currently more strong 
women leaders in local party organizations, it appears more realistic to have 
more women candidates in local government elections.  
Capacity-building efforts and training of cadres and members should ex-
plicitly be focused on an equal participation of men and women.  
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6. Developing party identities and policies  
A clearer definition and presentation of parties’ identities and principles.
Many ordinary people assume that the activities of Georgian political parties 
are not guided by a (more or less) coherent system of ideological principles 
and that their identities are in fact defined by the personalities of their lead-
ers. Rank-and-file party members often have a slight or incorrect knowledge 
of their own party's stated political values and goals. Actual steps and initia-
tives of political parties are repeatedly criticized for not being in accordance 
with their proclaimed general principles. Sometimes, the leaders of political 
parties underscore the need for highlighting a party's ideological identity so 
that it is more distinct and better known both to its members as well as to 
the broad public.
The current situation hinders creating a stable party system, harms the 
long-term viability of political parties and undermines their accountability to 
the voters. Without being identified with their principles and clear political 
record, it is very difficult for political parties to build stable support constitu-
encies.
The best way to craft clearer identities for political parties linked to politi-
cal principles and policies is to encourage wide and inclusive policy dialogue 
within the party and with different social groups. General political principles 
cannot simply be borrowed from international experience or textbooks on 
political theory. They should grow out of analysis of local problems and con-
cerns and be based on specific policy platforms addressing those problems 
and concerns. The above-made suggestions to increase the capacity of party 
activists in matters of policy analysis and policy development and to involve 
them more in formulating party policies are also relevant in this context.  
Georgian political parties often see contacts with like-minded foreign par-
ties as one way to highlight their ideological identities. Studying interna-
tional experience may be highly useful for increasing the capacity of party 
leaders and activists in the field of political analysis. However, it can only be 
a supplementary tool for defining what a given party stands for in the Geor-
gian political context.  
7. Reducing the gap in relations with society 
Improving ways of connecting to and aggregating public interests. The 
Georgian political parties are often seen as detached from the public. The 
latter is fairly well informed about the relations between individual politi-
cians, but it is less familiar with the activities of the parties as political or-
ganizations.
There may be several different ways for more successfully embedding po-
litical parties in Georgian society. One is through careful study of societal 
needs, which can be achieved both through more frequent direct contacts 
with different groups and cooperation with Georgian research organisations. 
On the other hand, parties could benefit from establishing a system of dia-
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logue and debates with representatives of social groups. Parties are stronger 
if they are proactive in seeking feedback for their specific political decisions 
and initiatives.  
The above-formulated suggestions for developing mechanisms of internal 
party democracy that would involve both active members and actual or po-
tential supporters in the process of formulating party policies can also play 
an important role in overcoming the image of the parties as relatively closed 
elite groups. Parties can be assisted in developing tools to measure the dif-
ferent societal preoccupations and the agendas of ordinary people. 
Broadening the party recruitment policy through targeting individual social 
and interest groups. The parties' policy of attracting new members is ori-
ented mainly towards the existing members' immediate networks of per-
sonal trust, such as neighbours, relatives and friends. While close personal 
contacts may be effective for the party’s work in the short run, this also con-
tributes to the image of parties as closed networks and limits the parties’ 
ability to attract members on the basis of social interests and policies.  
This could be greatly helped by defining the social groups which parties 
consider to be their natural constituencies and running carefully designed 
campaigns for the latter. This will help to better explain the party policies to 
the public, create a stable support base and recruit motivated new members.  
Establishing closer contacts with professional associations, interest groups 
and other civil society organizations. The network of civil society organiza-
tions is not strongly developed and it does not involve a large part of Geor-
gian society. This may be the reason why the political parties do not consider 
them as socially representative and do not strive to establish stable contacts 
with them. When contacts occur, they tend to be motivated by short-term 
considerations of gaining political support. However, this is rarely successful 
as civil society organizations usually prefer to maintain the image of political 
neutrality. Some parties tend to run their own network of civil society or-
ganizations rather than build bridges to the existing ones.
However, while the network of organizations that do exist may not have a 
broad social base, they constitute the most active part of Georgian society 
and articulate important professional or civic interests. Motivation to cooper-
ate with such organizations should not be limited to considerations of short-
term political expediency. For the parties, this cooperation can be the source 
of important information on social interests and needs and can provide 
feedback in developing party strategies. At least in some cases, such contacts 
can serve as an interface for getting involved with broader social groups.  
Recommendations to donors and non-governmental organizations 
International actors have been involved in political party-assistance pro-
grammes in Georgia since the mid-1990s. However, such activities have 
been much more limited than programs concerning institutional reforms 
and the development of civil society organizations. Foreign donors have con-
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sidered Georgian political parties too unstable and have avoided possible 
accusations of getting involved in local politics.
After the 2003 Rose Revolution, political organizations faced new chal-
lenges. An increased role for the parties may be a possible and positive out-
come of the new political environment. The migration of a number of 
prominent civil society leaders to political parties, both in power and in op-
position, is one of the indicators of this. Political parties themselves recog-
nize the need for their greater institutionalization and are motivated to use 
external assistance to this end. In the course of this research, the party repre-
sentatives repeatedly underscored their readiness to cooperate with interna-
tional organizations and NGOs and to take an active part in the educational 
and research activities organized by them. They give priority to activities 
involving training party activists, formulating party strategy and discussing 
models of organisational development for their parties. 
All this shows that party-assistance programmes are greatly needed and 
that the Georgian political parties are open to such cooperation and hope to 
benefit from it. In the following pages we will discuss several ways in which 
external assistance may be productive for the development of both individual 
parties and the Georgian party system in general.  
Supporting inter-party dialogue. One of the main impediments preventing 
the further development of a multiparty system in Georgia is the lack of co-
operation, dialogue and constructive policy debate between different political 
actors. Excessively confrontational relations between the political parties are 
also one of the important concerns of the Georgian public in general.  
So far the focus of most political party assistance programmes has been 
on enhancing the capacities of individual parties. Naturally, improving the 
atmosphere of inter-party relations depends primarily on the will of political 
players themselves. However, external organizations, whether Georgian or 
international, can also contribute to this goal.  
In particular, external players can provide neutral spaces for interparty 
dialogue and cooperation. Meetings of leaders and activists of political par-
ties may focus on acute policy issues but also on more politically neutral 
subjects, such as mutually interesting issues of party development, educa-
tional and cultural activities, or the like. Through being involved in such 
activities, the parties may see that developing a spirit of multiparty coopera-
tion and dialogue creates a friendlier environment for developing individual 
parties as well.  
Supporting educational projects on party-building and structural develop-
ment. Until now, most party-assistance programmes implemented by inter-
national organizations have been oriented mainly towards the elections. In 
particular, they have aimed at improving election legislation and the technol-
ogy involved in the elections themselves. There is also a great need to focus 
work on the long-term institutional development of political parties.
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Such programmes may combine activities aimed at increasing the organiza-
tional strength of political parties and their internal democracy. As this inter-
active assessment has shown, the parties are keen to focus on the former 
issue but are less inclined to see the lack of internal democracy as a problem. 
However, assistance activites may demonstrate that, in fact, these two issues 
are interrelated. More flexible and inclusive party structures may broaden the 
parties’ support base and motivate their members.  
To realize these aims, training and educational programs may be de-
signed that should avoid presenting any single universal model to the parties 
so that each party can develop according to its own views and goals. Informa-
tion may be supplied to party leaders and activists on various models of party 
structures and the strengths and weakness of each of these models may be 
discussed interactively. This approach to the issue will enable the parties to 
make their own choices. The advantages of developing and following formal 
internal procedures regulating relations within the party, and from broader 
internal party democracy in general, can be more effectively demonstrated 
based on the experience of different parties.  
It is important that not only party leaders but also party activists from dif-
ferent levels take part in such work. Such activities should be designed as 
systematic programmes rather than one-off events.  
Supporting the parties in developing their platforms and formulating poli-
cies. Training and educational programs should focus on increasing the 
capacity of party members to analyze and formulate public policies and de-
sign party platforms. Party representatives can also be trained in skills 
needed to adequately interpret the data of public opinion research in the 
process of formulating public policies. Such work will help parties to better 
define their identities and will also increase the participation of party activ-
ists at different levels in the process of designing party platforms and formu-
lating policies. The members thus trained will also gain a better understand-
ing of the goals and activities of their own parties. This will increase the ef-
fectiveness of the party’s work, increase the long-term viability of political 
parties, contribute to the development of the parties’ internal democracy and 
help define more distinct public profiles for the parties.  
Training and educational programmes aimed at achieving these goals 
may focus on the general enhancement of skills for public policy analysis 
and formulation, but, under some circumstance, they may be even more 
effective if they focus on helping parties develop specific policy proposals.
Conducting regular research on public opinion, the effectiveness of the par-
ties’ work, and the parties’ policy behaviour. One of the factors that weakens 
the ties between the political elites and the public is the mutual lack of in-
formation. The parties do not have a clear and comprehensive understanding 
of public concerns, while the public does not have a broad and full picture of 
how the parties actually behave with regard to specific policy issues.  
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External players can help both the parties and the public through supporting 
methods to measure public opinion, such as polls and focus groups. Political 
players and the public need more qualitative and quantitative public opinion 
research on both public attitudes to individual political parties and the party 
system in general as well as on the attitudes of different social groups to 
specific problems facing the country. In the last two years, the research by 
the International Republican Institute has in part filled this void, but there is 
a need for more nuanced and in-depth research that would be available to the 
public and the research community. 
The internal party activities and processes of party institutional develop-
ment are also rarely studied. Here again, the National Democratic Institute 
and the International Republican Institute are the main organizations that 
cooperate with the parties on this. More efforts and available information 
about the outcomes are needed.  
Georgian political parties are often blamed for a lack of consistency be-
tween declared goals/ideologies and the actual practice of parties. However, 
there are no tools to measure this. The electorate is not adequately informed 
about the actual political record of the players it has to choose from. To over-
come this deficiency, there is a need to study party behaviour in electoral 
bodies and monitor the stands that the parties or individual politicians take 
on important issues of public policy. The results should be analyzed and 
made available to the public.
Broad availability of these kinds of research topics would help members 
of the party as well as the public in general by providing them with more 
adequate information about the policy implementation and the political be-
haviour of their representatives. Such data would also help the leadership of 
the parties to develop more targeted and relevant policies. But also to inform 
the public about what the party is actually doing. 
Supporting development of professional public relations groups within the 
parties. The majority of parties have created professional public relations 
groups in their central governing offices. Their main responsibility is orga-
nizing the leaders' press conferences, preparing and disseminating press 
releases and monitoring the media. However, the parties usually do not have 
comprehensive and clearly formulated public relations strategies and are 
often unfamiliar with up-to-date mechanisms of public relations work. These 
groups also tend to be insufficiently informed about current public opinions.
External players can assist political parties through increasing the capacity 
of their public relations groups. In particular, this could include training 
them in analyzing public attitudes and concerns, formulating public rela-
tions strategy, studying technologies and improving the skills needed for 
public relations work.
Carrying out programmes for a broader involvement of women in decision-
making procedures within political parties. Female members are quite ac-
tively involved in political party activities, especially at the local level. How-
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ever, their involvement in decision-making, while far from non-existent, is 
utterly insufficient. Almost all parties recognize the existing lack of balance 
as a problem, although none of them has formulated any plan for resolving 
it.
External players could help by conducting educational programmes on 
the mechanisms that facilitate women's involvement in the decision-making 
processes of political parties in different countries. Also important is that 
these types of educational programmes envisage both women's and men's 
involvement and include a broad range of party activists at different levels of 
party hierarchies.
Initiating public discussions on gender equality and encouraging successful 
female politicians to get involved. There is insufficient awareness among the 
Georgian public of the need for the representation of women in the decision-
making bodies. The media also pays little attention to this issue.
Therefore, there is a need to generate a greater public interest in the issue 
of women’s participation in decision-making processes. International and 
local civil society organizations can take a lead enlarging public-awareness. 
This may involve focusing on identifying the factors that hinder women's 
involvement, developing recommendations on how to overcome them and 
increasing women's interest towards political activities. 
Helping parties in establishing and strengthening international partner-
ships. All the parties stress the need for and the positive effects of interna-
tional cooperation and partnership. However, with very few exceptions, the 
parties do not have comprehensive strategies in this area. They willingly take 
advantage of chances for international contacts but are not sufficiently proac-
tive in seeking them. 
All the parties have international relations services, but they suffer from 
lack of experience and resources. External players could assist parties in de-
veloping more professional international relations services and increasing 
the capacity of their staff.  
Helping functional organizations of the parties to develop international con-
tacts. Almost all parties have created their own women's and youth organiza-
tions whose representatives usually take some part in the decision-making 
bodies of political parties. These organizations play an important role in 
strengthening the ties of the parties with different social groups and improv-
ing the public image of the party.  
Such organizations rarely maintain international contacts and often do 
not have information on the activities of similar specialized organizations in 
foreign parties. Helping them establish such contacts would help them re-
view their functions and improve their work. Sharing international experi-
ence may also help them gain access to resources that would enable them to 
make their activities more varied and inclusive. Moreover, in some cases 
strengthening the international cooperation of the youth and women's or-
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ganizations with their counterparts abroad might pave the way for successful 
international partnerships at the party-party level.
Ensuring better coordination between different projects aiming at political 
party assistance. While there are not too many activities and strategic pro-
grammes implemented by international organizations or international and 
Georgian NGOs whose purpose is to assist political parties, it is still rather 
difficult to find out which of them have been or are being implemented by 
the different players. There is almost no exchange of information between 
the programmes. Even when it is known that certain projects have been im-
plemented, the information about their outcomes, lessons learned, etc. is not 
available. All this makes each new project or programme aiming at assisting 
political parties less effective than it could otherwise have been.  
Creating a unified database and ensuring an exchange of information be-
tween the party-assistance projects would help both Georgian and interna-
tional organizations carry out more effective and targeted work. At the same 
time, it would be desirable to systematically monitor the implemented pro-
jects in order to assess their results and summarize the lessons learned from 
them.
Action Plan 
The framework for the institutional development of democratic and pro-
grammatic parties in Georgia presented in this book is very extensive in its 
recommendations. Nevertheless, the agenda for improvement based on 
issues interactively assessed and iedentified by the Georgian political par-
ties contains five main lines along which the medium and long-term pro-
grammes to support the development of political parties in Georgia should 
be structured: 
1. The first line is party-organization building: the main aspects of this 
is the development of elite and activist recruitment criteria in order to 
increase the coherence and focus of the parties. The parties themselves 
emphasize the need to (re)define the role, purpose and position of party 
members, activists and supporters. Concurrently, parties want to work on 
the reformulation and adaptation of the internal party regulations. This 
first cluster of activities can depart from a multiparty approach, while par-
ties also conclude that more concrete activities concerning the inner rules 
and workings of parties might also require single-party activities (made 
available to all political parties). 
2. As a second cluster of activities, parties stress the need for develop-
ing more international contacts, mainly establishing links with interna-
tional organizations and international party unions, in order to develop 
ideas on organization, ideology, policies, electoral strategies and internal 
procedures. All parties express an eagerness to exchange experiences with 
European party leaders, activists and members. Particularly trainings pro-
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grammes in policy formation and implementation, oppositional parlia-
mentary activity and internal policy discussions need to be included in this 
cluster of activities. In this cluster, programmes can be both of a multi-
party character and individually oriented, again under the condition that 
all parties receive equal access to these activities. 
3. Thirdly, parties stress the need for local capacity-building. Parties in 
various parts of the country are less developed or face structural weak-
nesses. Activities in this cluster will probably be on a single-party basis as 
the differences among parties are substantial. In addition, parties want 
more training of active members in youth and women‘s organizations of 
the parties. Also activities for increasing member participation should be 
included in this cluster. Most of the latter activities will include multiparty 
settings as all parties want to improve on these points. 
4. As a fourth line of activities, parties in Georgia want to work on im-
proving inter-party relations. As sketched above, the relations between 
parties need to be improved and intensified in a multiparty setting. 
5. Finally, a cluster of activities needs to focus on the lack of resources
for most of the political parties, particularly those in opposition. That in-
volves improving their capabilities to do the political work, both in finan-
cial and human terms. It also involves enlarging the access of Georgian 
society in general to the knowledge of political institutions and politics in 
democracies.

ANNEX: Political Party Files 
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Conservative Party of Georgia 
Brief history 
The Conservative Party of Georgia 
is the youngest among the centre-
right parties inthe country. It was 
created in May 2005 through the 
merger of two parties, the Union 
of Georgia's National Forces and 
the Conservative Party. Its current 
leaders and some of the members, many of whom were supporters of Geor-
gia’s first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, created the Union of National 
Forces-the Party of the Conservatives in 2000. In November 2003, they were 
among the leaders of the Rose Revolution and were elected to Parliament 
through the United National Movement's electoral list in repeat parliamen-
tary elections in March 2004. However, they soon afterwards split from the 
party, disagreeing on a number of issues including constitutional amend-
ments that changed the design of the Georgian political system. In their 
opinion, these amendments violated the principles of checks and balances 
between the different branches of government. Besides, they argued that that 
the United National Movement failed to keep a number of promises to the 
voters, mainly relating to protecting the interests of the poor. 
The main issues on which the party currently focuses include support 
for the socially deprived strata of society, such as pensioners and the unem-
ployed. The party thinks that increasing the budget of social programmes on 
the one hand and liberalizing the economy and fostering the development of 
small and medium-sized businesses on the other hand are the best ways to 
resolve the problems of the poor in Georgia. The party also actively promotes 
decentralizing political power and other aspects of democratizing the politi-
cal system. One more important issue of the party’s programme is to protect 
the cultural heritage and increase the role of traditional religious institutions 
such as the Georgian Orthodox Church in public life. 
Despite its short history, the Conservative Party of Georgia has intro-
duced a number of innovative ideas to the Georgian political party scene, 
such as holding primary elections among the opposition parties, staging 
fund-raising events, and establishing the principle of the electivity of party 
officials at all levels of party hierarchy. 
Structure 
The document that regulates the party's activities is its statute, which was 
adopted at the party’s Constituent Assembly in May 2005. The principle of 
the territorial division of the party structure follows the pattern of the coun-
try's territorial and electoral divisions. Creating structural units and defining 
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their rights and responsibilities are also regulated by the statute, which quite 
clearly specifies all the procedures and issues of internal relations. 
The supreme governing body of the party is the party Congress, which is 
convened at least three months before the parliamentary elections. The par-
ticipants to the Congress are members of the National Committee, members 
of Parliament representing the party, chairpersons of the primary, district, 
regional/city and youth organizations, and members of the regional organi-
zations' councils. The Congress is duly authorized if more than half of its 
members attend, and the decisions are reached by a simple majority. The 
Congress elects the party chairperson for a four-year term. The consent of 
two thirds of the participants is required to take decisions only on the issues 
of managing party property, amending or appending the statute and reorgan-
izing the party, as well as dissolving it. Both in the Congress and in any gov-
erning body of the party, decisions are reached by secret vote. 
The executive body of the party is the General Assembly. Its delegates 
are members of the National Committee, members of Parliament represent-
ing the party and chairpersons of the precinct, district, regional and youth 
organizations. It is convened at least biannually and is entitled to take any 
decision on party activities which are not a special prerogative of the Con-
gress. 
In the periods between the Congresses and Assemblies, the party is gov-
erned by the National Committee, which is composed of the party chairper-
son, the co-chair and five members. The members are elected for a 2-year 
term by the Congress, and, in the period between the Congresses, by the 
General Assembly. The National Committee: 
? represents the party in political and legal relations; 
? carries out decision made by the Congress and General Assembly; 
? manages the party's material resources; 
? reports to the Congress and General Assembly on the accomplished 
work;
? sets the cost of the membership fee and rules of its payment; 
? expels party members for violations of statute; 
? discusses the issue of terminating the chairperson's powers upon the 
Audit Commission's proposal. 
The Audit Commission has three members who are approved by the Con-
gress. It monitors all the internal party elections as well as activities of the 
governing bodies of the party and its local branches. It is also entitled to raise 
the issue of early termination of the chairperson's powers before the Na-
tional Committee. The Audit Commission is accountable to the Congress 
and the General Assembly. 
At the local level the party is represented by the primary organization, 
whose area of activities is limited to the boundaries of the electoral district. 
Its governing body is a general meeting of its members; in day-to-day activi-
230
ties, however, it is headed by the chairperson elected by the members. The 
duties of the organization include meeting regularly with the population, 
attracting and admitting new members and supporters, collecting signatures 
and organizing different party events at the local level. 
The primary organizations create district organizations, which are 
headed by chairpersons. The chairpersons are elected to state government 
bodies six months before every election by members of the district organiza-
tion. Chairpersons of primary organizations can nominate their candidates 
for the position of chairperson. The elected chairperson of the district or-
ganization retains his or her position until the next elections. He or she may 
resign after having explained the reasons in a resignation letter or if the 
council members dismisses the chairperson, which is possible only if the 
chairperson violates the statute. 
The district organization also has the position of the co-chair, which is 
taken by the person who came second in the district elections. The co-chair 
has similar responsibilities to those of the chairperson and carries out the 
chairperson's duties in the latter's absence. 
The district organization has a third elected body, the council. It has five 
members, two of whom are the chairperson and the co-chair. The council is 
independent in its decisions at the district level, including financial deci-
sions. The decisions are reached by a simple majority. The assemblies of 
district organizations can nominate candidates for president, MPs in single-
mandate districts, the mayor, regional governors and members of the local 
self-government bodies. 
The district organization manages its budget independently. It has full 
freedom to raise and spend funds, although there is a limitation with regard 
to attracting funds of questionable origin. At the same time, the district or-
ganization is obliged to transfer 20% of the revenues to the central office. 
The party structure also includes regional/city organizations, which con-
sist of at least two district organizations. Like in all other structural units, its 
leadership is elected. It is governed by the general assembly, which is made 
up of the members of the district organization councils. The regional/city 
council, which directly manages the regional-level activities, includes chairs 
of district organizations. 
The party has a youth organization as well, which unites party members 
under the age of 35. Its structure, set out in the statute, is similar to the pri-
mary organization's structure at the district level and to the district organiza-
tion at the regional level. The party does not have a separate structural unit 
for women nor has it formulated any special gender policy yet. However, the 
party plans to create a women's club, whose main function will involve car-
ing and providing support for mothers of large families and organizing 
events that will be of interest for the women. 
Despite the fact that the party's structure is very similar to the other par-
ties', the principle of filling party positions is radically different as all of them 
are elective. The party believes that decentralization of governance and en-
couragement of internal competition is important to consolidate and develop 
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the party's structure. The CPG is certain that in a competitive environment, 
the strong win. Accordingly, encouraging internal competition will help cre-
ate a strong organization. The main principle of the party's strategic devel-
opment is forming a party of three thousand leaders (there are about this 
number of electoral precincts in Georgia). Respectively, the goal is to create 
primary organizations in every electoral precinct. 
Yet another novelty which the Conservative Party of Georgia has intro-
duced to Georgian politics is the strict rule of compiling electoral lists. The 
party statute allots the first 35 positions on the parliamentary electoral lists to 
holders of specific party positions, whereas the identities of the rest of the 
candidates are determined by the National Committee on the basis of strictly 
defined selection criteria. 
Membership
Becoming a party member is quite simple. According to the statute, any 
Georgian citizen who recognizes the party statute can become a member. 
For this, the candidate fills out a form and provides personal data, informa-
tion on his/her occupation and interests. There are no limitations to becom-
ing a member; however, due to the current economic situation in the coun-
try, it is mainly the unemployed and the poor who are joining the party.  
The primary and district organizations have great freedom in implement-
ing the admission policy in practice. The party's opinion is that leaders of the 
primary and district organizations are better equipped to assess the local 
situation and plan specific steps aimed at attracting new members. 
The party is confident about its ability to expand the membership base. 
Its ultimate target is getting the support of every Georgian citizen who is 
eligible to vote. In line with this priority, each district organization has come 
up with specific quantitative criteria for assessing the work of its activists. As 
is expressed by the formula n+1 each member must bring to the party at 
least one more member each month. 
The party statute distinguishes between full and associated members. 
Full members pay monthly membership fees and have active and passive 
voting rights in party elections. Associated members do not pay monthly fees 
and have only passive voting rights. All party members have the right to pro-
pose an initiative on any issue. They can write to the party chairperson, the 
National Committee or the Audit Commission to familiarize these with his 
or her proposal. The party members are entitled to receive exhaustive infor-
mation on the party's activities. Only the National Committee has the right 
to expel a member if latter's action contravenes the party statute. 
The Conservative Party of Georgia has no special ethical code or provi-
sions that would be applicable when resolving internal party conflicts. They 
deem the absence of such a mechanism a problem and see the need for mak-
ing amendments to the statute or passing an additional regulatory docu-
ment. The party elections can be viewed as the main potential source for 
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emergence of a conflict. To avoid such a conflict, every member should be 
ready for defeat and realize that other candidates are rivals, not adversaries. 
Public relations and international contacts 
The Conservative Party of Georgia establishes direct contacts with the public 
through its primary organizations. In these relations, information flows in 
two directions: The party provides a detailed description of its activities, 
plans and programme, and, in turn, it learns about the people’s problems 
and interests.  
As for the media, it is usually the party's central governing body that co-
operates with it. The Conservative Party of Georgia maintains the regularly 
updated web page (http://www.conservators.ge/) as another tool of supplying 
information to the public. 
The party relies mainly on its own human and professional resources, al-
though it expresses its desire to work with different professional groups and 
experts if it has such an opportunity. The party is ready to cooperate with 
international organizations and accept any type of assistance that they pro-
pose, be it technical equipment, educational programmes or recommenda-
tions on improving the efficiency of the party organization. At present, the 
party is involved in programmes carried out by the International Republican 
Institute and the National Democratic Institute. The party plans to establish 
close relations with foreign parties of similar ideology because it believes that 
these links will help it in the processes of self-identification and the building 
of party structure. 
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The Political Movement Industry Will Save 
Georgia
Brief history 
Industry Will Save Georgia is one of 
those successful parties in Georgia, 
which has not been formed from a 
faction that was created in the legis-
lative body. It takes its origin in the 
Industrialists' Union, a civic organization created to protect the interests of 
the Georgian business community, especially its manufacturing sector. The 
party was founded in April 1999 upon the initiative of its future leaders, the 
people who worked in the business sector, disagreed with the economic pol-
icy of the government and wanted to influence it. Its list (in a bloc with the 
political association of Georgia’s Sportsmen) came third and exceeded the 
threshold for party lists in the 1999 parliamentary elections, and in the repeat 
2004 parliamentary elections, its joint list with the New Conservative Party 
came the second with 7.6 percent of the vote, also exceeding the threshold. 
Until February 2006, its MPs were in the same faction with the New Conser-
vative Party, and since February, the party has had a separate faction in the 
Georgian Parliament.
From the day of its creation, the party's priority has been to foster local 
business development. In the party's view, this can be best achieved by liber-
alizing the tax laws. The party often criticizes the International Monetary 
Fund's recommendations to the country, which they believe render the lo-
cally manufactured goods uncompetitive compared to foreign imports. The 
party views economic development as a solution to the most important prob-
lems that the country is faced with, in particular, social problems and the 
problem of restoring territorial integrity. The party’s slogan is: “Let us save 
industry, and industry will save Georgia.” 
Structure 
The internal relations, goals, and ways of achieving them are regulated by 
the statute, which was adopted at the Constituent Congress in 1999 and 
amended in 2005, although the main principles of the organization's work 
remain the same. 
The supreme body of the movement is the Congress, which convenes at 
least once in four years. No fewer than 200 delegates attend. The main func-
tions of the Congress include adopting, amending or appending the statute, 
assessing the party's work, and electing the chair, deputy chair, secretaries, 
the Council, the Main Committee and members of the Audit Commission. 
Leader: Gogi Topadze 
Chairman: Zurab Tkemaladze 
Address: Ilia Chavchavadze Ave. 9, 
Tbilisi, Georgia.
Telephone: (995 32) 227635. 
235 
During the period between the congresses, the party is governed by the 
Council. It is elected for a four-year term, and the number of members is set 
by the Congress. The Council is convened at least once in three months and 
maps out the party's strategy and tactics. 
The party's executive body is the Main Committee, whose members are 
nominated by the Council and approved by the Congress. It is in charge of 
ensuring the implementation of decisions taken by the Congress and the 
Council. The Main Committee's meetings are held at least once a month. 
The committee takes all the decisions which are not special prerogatives of 
the Council and the Congress. 
The party's activities and central apparatus are governed by the chair, 
deputy chair and secretaries. They are elected by the Congress for a four-year 
term and are at the same time members of the Main Committee. The chair 
or, in his or her absence, deputy chair represents the party in relations with 
other entities. 
The party's financial activities are managed by the Audit Commission. It 
has five members, who are nominated by the Council and approved by the 
Congress for a four-year term. The Commission sets the rules of its work 
independently. Its exclusive function is to audit financial documents of the 
party. The Commission reports to the Council annually and to the Congress 
once in four years. 
The party's principle of the territorial division of its branches follows the 
pattern of the country's administrative division. The basic unit is the primary 
organization, whose scope coincides with the boundaries of the electoral 
precincts. The primary organizations form zone, district and regional or-
ganizations. The primary organizations are responsible for directly working 
with voters. Their activities are intense during the campaign period, whereas 
during the periods between the elections they are mainly busy conducting 
the population census. The members of the primary organizations are con-
tinuously involved in canvassing, recording the residents' passport data, 
counting how many residents are eligible to vote and how many of them are 
party supporters. The primary organizations are also responsible for attract-
ing new members and supporters. 
The primary organizations' activities are coordinated by the district 
branches. The relation between these two levels of party hierarchy is often 
mediated by an intermediary structural unit, the zone organization. The 
latter are set up in the districts that are quite large in terms of area and popu-
lation. Zone organizations coordinate the relations and efficient exchange of 
information between the district and primary organizations. 
Apart from coordinating the efforts of the primary and zone levels, the 
district organizations are responsible for compiling the lists of party mem-
bers and voters and staging cultural and sports events. At the same time, 
they collect information on local problems and try to respond to these when-
ever possible. In particular, when there is a need for legal advice or a social 
or community problem arises, residents file an application with the party 
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organization and ask for help. The latter contacts appropriate state govern-
ment departments and tries to help resolve the issue. 
According to character of the district, councils working with specific so-
cial groups are created within the district organizations. This may include 
councils which focus on problems of ethnic minorities or internally dis-
placed persons. The party organizations try to involve representatives of 
these target groups as heads of the councils in order to make their work 
more relevant and efficient. Local branches of the youth and women organi-
zations also function at the district level. They are involved in organizing 
public relations and cultural and sports events at the local level. 
In their own turn, the district organizations create regional branches. 
Their activities are lead by the chair, who is elected by the local members and 
approved by the superior body. The regional and district organizations are 
obliged under the statute to report quarterly to the Main Committee on their 
activities. 
In parallel with the party's main structure, there exist the youth and 
women's organizations. The majority of the members of the youth organiza-
tion are sportsmen, who take active part in sports events organized by the 
party. Young people are also often used to disseminate various sorts of in-
formation, such as brochures on the party programme, among the voters. 
The party's women's organization is involved in studying the problems of 
and assisting the poor, including homeless children, mothers of large fami-
lies and young artists. It has also carried out the project of greater involve-
ment of housewives in public life. This envisaged involving housewives in 
organizing different political, cultural and educational events.
Membership
The rules of admitting and expelling members are laid out in the statute. The 
candidate for membership must apply in writing to the party's territorial 
organization. Usually the decision is taken by the regional office.  
The party pays great attention to the new members' political past, reputa-
tion and motives for joining the party. This information is collected during 
the interview with the candidate, an interview that is decisive for taking the 
decision on admission. The party does not have a target plan for admission 
of new members because it believes that pursuing numbers might detract 
from the quality of human resources. 
The grounds for expulsion from the party are set out in the statute. Viola-
tion of the statute and/or Georgian law as well as any action that causes 
moral or material damage to the organization might constitute the grounds 
for expulsion. The decision on expulsion is taken by the regional organiza-
tion. Expulsion from the ranks of the party is the only sanction which the 
statute envisages for mala fide members. There are no other formal mecha-
nisms provided for resolving conflicts within the party. Frequently used in-
formal methods of resolving conflicts include discussions in primary units 
that involve the parties to the conflict and other members. 
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Public relations and international contacts 
The party maintains both formal and informal relations with the public. 
Informal relations are usually maintained by local organizations. They meet 
personally with acquaintances and neighbours and familiarize them with the 
party's activities and goals. Contacts with the media comprise the formal 
component of the public relations work, and this is taken care of by the cen-
tral governing body. Only the head organization has the professional press 
service, which, if needed, provides services to regional and district offices as 
well. In the party's opinion, the media currently show little interest in cover-
ing the party's activities. With rare exceptions, the electronic media do not 
cover local-level party events and take interest only if party leaders take part 
in them. Therefore, the party does not see a need to keep public relations 
services at the local level. 
The party relies mainly on its own resources in formulating and imple-
menting its policy. However, it does admit that it needs expert assistance in 
terms of streamlining structure and improving work efficiency. The party is 
actively involved in educational projects funded by international NGOs, in 
particular, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republi-
can Institute. The party's women's organization also cooperates with interna-
tional organizations and takes part in different educational programmes on 
gender issues. The party has almost no experience of relations with foreign 
parties, citing lack of experience and resources as the reasons for this. It 
admits that the party has so far not taken an initiative in seeking interna-
tional connections and has only responded to emerging opportunities. 
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Georgian Labour Party 
Brief history 
Founded in 1995, the Labour 
Party of Georgia is the most 
successful left-wing political 
organization in the country. In 
the 1999 and 2004 repeat par-
liamentary elections the party was close to exceeding the election barrier. Its 
greatest electoral successes so far came in the 1998 and 2002 local elections, 
particularly in the 2002 elections to Tbilisi City Council where it won a plu-
rality of votes.
The party was formed in order to protect rights of social groups who suf-
fered from the failure of social safety networks in the period of transition 
from the centrally-planned economy to the market economy. The party as-
pires to develop into a Western-style (European) social-democratic party. 
The main issues that the party is vigorously raising are those of adding 
free education and healthcare systems to the existing paid systems, but this 
does not exclude privately paid education and healthcare, reducing utility 
prices and setting up social security networks for former civil servants who 
have been dismissed. It supports the idea of preserving (partial) state owner-
ship of land and opposes the privatization of the electrical power plants until 
the country achieves self-sufficiency and security in the energy sector. The 
party prioritizes support for local manufacturing, especially small and me-
dium-size enterprises, and believes that the liberalization of the tax code is 
the best way to achieve this goal. It advocates the idea of assigning to the 
Georgian Orthodox Church a greater role in public life and calls for protect-
ing and preserving cultural values and the traditional lifestyle. At the same 
time, it affirms that the rights of all other religious denominations alongside 
the Orthodox Church should be protected as well.  
Structure 
The party's structure and internal relations are regulated by its Statute. It was 
adopted in 1995 and underwent minor changes in 1998 and 2002, while the 
basic principles have remained almost intact. The Labour Party is known for 
its relatively simple structure compared to other parties. 
The main decision-making body in the party is its Central Office al-
though, important decisions are taken at party conferences and the political 
committee. However, when important decisions are to be reached, the issue 
is forwarded to regional branches for consideration. These offices are obliged 
to prepare their own remarks and suggestions and must inform the Central 
Office in writing of their decisions. If there is a disagreement, the decision is 
reached by the majority, and if votes are split in half, the chairperson has the 
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deciding vote. The decision that was taken by the political committee be-
comes mandatory and all structural units of the party are obliged to carry it 
out.
The supreme governing body of the party is the Congress, which is held 
once in four years. It is duly authorized if at least two thirds of the delegates 
are present, and decisions are made by the simple majority of those present.  
Special powers of the Congress include: 
? Adopting, amending, and appending the Statute; 
? Electing the chair of the party and hearing his/her report on party activi-
ties;
? Electing the Political Committee nominated by the party chairperson; 
? Electing the Audit Commission and hearing its report. 
? The party's executive body is the Political Committee, which has 25 
members (including the party chairperson). It is elected to a four-year 
term by the Congress and has to assemble at least once in three months. 
The everyday activities of the committee are carried out by the Bureau 
and secretaries. The Bureau usually has 10 members who are nominated 
by the chairperson and approved by the committee. The committee's 
rights and responsibilities include: 
? Admitting or expelling party members with two thirds of the vote, ap-
pointing heads of the local structural units; 
? Ensuring the holding of the Congress; 
? Managing party property in the period between the Congresses. 
The party chair is the highest position in the party. He or she represents the 
party in domestic and foreign relations and signs the official party docu-
ments. The chair is also authorized to manage the party finances and mate-
rial property. 
The basic local branches of the party are the primary organizations or 
clubs, which are established in the electoral precincts where the party has at 
least three activists. They are headed by chairs, whose main functions are 
attracting new members, organizing public relations events, and informing 
members about party decisions. At the same time, chairpersons collect in-
formation on the problems existing in their communities, especially in the 
social sphere. They are also obliged to ensure that supporters are active on 
election day and go to the ballot boxes. 
Some 8-12 primary organizations form a Zone Organization. It is headed 
by the supervisor, who is responsible for successful party activities in the 
area. The supervisor of the area is at the same time a deputy head of the Dis-
trict Organization in charge of some fields of activity. The supervisor has a 
deputy, or vice-supervisor, who assists with his or her work. 
The key tier of the local structural units is the District Organization. It 
leads the party activities within the given electoral district. The voters' lists 
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and files of supporters and members, compiled by the lower-level units of 
the party, are kept in the District Organizations. The District Organization is 
headed by the chairperson, who is nominated by the party chair and ap-
proved by the Political Committee with two thirds of the vote. 
The main sources of income for the District Organization are member-
ship fees or small donations by members. At present, funds that the party 
raises are only sufficient for renting the offices (which the party usually gets 
at a discount from its friends) and furnishing them. The membership fee is 
30 tetri (0.3 lari) per month. Half of these funds remain in the district, and 
the rest is sent to the centre. Often, if this amount is not sufficient to cover 
the local office expenses, 100 percent of collected revenues remain in the 
district and are spent for maintaining the office. However, in this case, the 
leadership of the District Organization must provide explanations to the 
central office. 
Apart from the main party organization, there also exist the Youth Or-
ganization and the Women's Council, which are represented in both central 
and local representative bodies. Their structural units are headed by chair-
persons.
The Women's Council, which is also called the Pedagogues' Council, is 
made up mainly of school teachers and nursery school teachers. Their main 
duties are registering mothers of large families and socially deprived families 
and studying their problems. They also monitor whether funds in the social 
security programmes are expended appropriately.  
Membership
The issue of granting party membership is decided by the Political Commit-
tee. The candidate must write an application and file it with the appropriate 
local organization depending on his or her place of residence. Ultimately, the 
decision is made by the Party Committee. At present, the party plans to 
tighten the admission procedures, this as a result of the general change of 
the principles of structural development. While in the first 2-3 years of after 
its creation the party was oriented towards expanding its membership base, 
it currently places emphasis on the quality of its members. By introducing 
stricter admission requirements, the party seeks to attract only worthy and 
active individuals. It avoids having members who will be listed only on paper 
but who will not fulfil any responsibilities. 
Apart from the application, the candidate for membership has to attach a 
letter of recommendation from a party member. If the candidate does not 
have a reference person, local party activists will gather information about 
him or her. In particular, it is important to know whether the candidate has 
been a member of another party, what his or her true motives might be, etc. 
Although raising the number of members is not the party’s priority, attract-
ing at least one member per month is viewed as a minimum target for each 
primary organization. 
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When granting membership to candidates, the party takes an interest in the 
applicants' occupation and interests. This information goes down in the 
members’ log books, which are kept at the offices of all the local branches. 
The log book also lists the members' birthdays. The party uses this informa-
tion, along with the national holidays, for the purpose of reminding its 
members of the party. The activists of the primary and district organizations 
regularly phone all the members on holidays and birthdays. They consider 
this as a simple sign of attention which pleases everyone. 
The party members are obliged to take part in party events, carry out the 
instructions and tasks assigned by the superiors and regularly pay member-
ship fees, or otherwise they will be expelled from the party. Dire financial 
circumstances often do not allow members to pay membership fees or take 
part in party activities. In such cases, the member does not leave the party 
but is given a special allowance and/or other members try to compensate the 
debt.
The Labour Party encountered the problem of the outflow of its members 
during and after the Rose Revolution. Roughly 15-17 percent of members left 
the party, mainly because of the position which the party took towards the 
revolution. Some of the members, mainly less active ones, could not accept 
the fact that the party did not join protest rallies against Shevardnadze’s gov-
ernment. The party was against Shevardnadze but did not cooperate with 
Saakashvili. However, the number of the party members has recently in-
creased again. 
The power to expel a member from the party is vested in the Political 
Committee. Actions that contravene the party Statute, programme or goals, 
refusal to participate in party events or failure to pay membership fees for 
four months (unless other decided) might constitute grounds for expulsion. 
Apart from membership, the party also has the system of supporters. The 
people who intend to vote for the Labour Party in the next elections as well as 
those who have forfeited their membership status due to their passivity but 
still side with the party can join the lists of supporters. These lists are drawn 
up by the clubs in their localities and kept at the District Offices. As results, 
the party knows almost exactly the share of votes (minimum amount) that it 
might receive in the next elections if they are held in a fair way. The party 
also spares no time or efforts to monitor the voters' lists and correct mistakes 
in them. 
Public relations and international contacts 
Propaganda is the main and most effective public relations tool of the party. 
The Labour Party has developed an unusual method of propaganda: repre-
sentatives of local organizations loudly discuss the party's activities and pro-
gramme in public transport and so arouse the bystanders' interest. When 
engaging in propaganda, members not only spread the party information 
among the public, but also listen to people's problems and try to serve the 
collective interest. The professional Public Relations Service exists only in 
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the Central Office, although local representative bodies ask for its help when 
needed. The party itself has no media outlet of its own and is entirely de-
pendent on the mass media. However, drawing the attention of the latter is 
quite difficult, and besides, the party complains that the media reports are 
biased and unbalanced. 
Yet another unusual public relations method which the Labour Party em-
ployed was the dissemination of audio tapes. The party recorded the chair-
person's addresses to the public, made multiple copies and disseminated the 
tapes in the regions where information from the centre is rarely available. 
Despite this, however, the party feels the need to improve the technology of 
maintaining relations with supporters and the public. They also deem exces-
sive the duties that are officially assigned to individual positions within the 
party, which makes the party activities less efficient. In particular, the chair-
man of a primary organization has to be present at the electoral precinct 
during the elections, but he or she would be able to mobilize supporters if 
someone else performed this duty. Accordingly, the party believes that revis-
ing and redistributing rights and responsibilities would improve the effec-
tiveness of party activities. 
The party closely cooperates with the International Republican Institute. 
It is involved in the IRI-organized projects, and its members undergo re-
training at the Campaign Academy, a programme that was founded by this 
organization. The party maintains links with foreign parties of similar ide-
ologies by cooperating with the funds and organizations that are founded by 
those parties. It is trying to get actively involved in the conferences and work-
ing meetings that are organized by the Westminster and Alfred Mozer foun-
dations as well as by the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity. The 
party is striving to join the Socialist International and the Party of European 
Socialists.
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New Conservative Party 
Brief History 
The New Conservative Party 
was established on the basis of 
a faction in the Parliament of 
the third convocation (1999-
2003). The young businessmen 
who had entered Parliament 
through the list of the Citizens’ 
Union of Georgia separated from the majority and united in a faction called 
“The New Faction.” Based on this faction, they founded the New Conserva-
tive Party in 2001. The main reason for leaving the ruling party – the Citi-
zens’ Union of Georgia – was a rejection of the government’s economic pol-
icy. The main reason for young successful businessmen having decided to 
start a political career was to represent and defend the rights of businessmen 
in the legislative branch of the government. As a gap widened between their 
approaches and the economic policy implemented by the government, they 
decided to design and promote their own policies. In the 2004 parliamentary 
elections, the party created a joint list with Industry Will Save Georgia, and it 
came second with 7.6 percent of the vote. In Parliament, the two parties had 
a joint faction 
The main aim of the party is to support the liberalization of the economy 
and create an environment open to entrepreneurial initiatives. The major 
characteristics of the party’s ideological identity include recognizing the cru-
cial importance of guaranteeing the security of private property, promoting 
the principles of the market economy, furthering the democratization of 
government institutions and preserving the traditional cultural values, 
norms and way of life. 
Organizational Structure 
The Statute of the party is the main document regulating the party’s struc-
ture and forms of its activities. Adopted at the founding conference in 2001, 
it gives a detailed description of the scope of each structural unit, describes 
the procedures of the structures’ interrelations and outlines the rights and 
responsibilities for different positions inside the party. The Statute also de-
fines governing, executive and auditing bodies within the head office of the 
party. The territorial representation of the organization is based on the prin-
cipal of the country’s territorial division. Heads of territorial organizations 
are locally elected positions but later need to be approved by the superior 
body.
Chairman: David Gamkrelidze
Secretary General: David Saganelidze 
Address: 3 Bevreti St., Tbilisi, 0114, 
Georgia
Phones: (+995 32) 92 03 13 / 92 03 18  
Fax: (+995 32) 92 38 58  
Web-site: www.ncp.ge 
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The supreme administrative body of the party is the Congress that is held 
once in four years. Generally one delegate to the Congress represents four 
hundred members of the party. The Congress is authorized if it is attended 
by more than half of the delegates. Most decisions are taken by the simple 
majority of those present. The exceptions are introducing amendments to 
the Statute, reorganizing or liquidating the party, adopting the programme 
and electing the chair, two deputy chairs, the general secretary and the main 
committee for four years. Such decisions can be adopted only by the two 
thirds of the Congress participants. 
The Congress also nominates a candidate for president, and it hears and 
approves the reports of the chairperson and the Inspection Committee. 
During the period between the Congresses the party is managed by the 
Political Committee., which unites the heads of all the structural units and 
the party members represented in the government. It is called once in six 
months and confirms the budget, determines the size of the membership 
fee, hears reports, confirms the party electoral lists and the candidates to be 
elected by the majority system and takes decisions on uniting into electoral 
blocs, boycotting elections or going over to the opposition. 
The executive body of the party is a main committee consisting of 17 mem-
bers including the chairperson, deputy chairs and general secretary. The 
committee is authorized to: 
? make statements on behalf of the party; 
? confirm the chairs of regional and district organizations and members of 
the bureau; 
? draw up the party electoral lists; 
? confirm annual budgets of district and regional organizations.
The highest position within the party is the chair, who is also the chair of the 
Political Committee and the Main Committee. He/she represents the party 
and is authorized to speak on behalf of the organization. During elections, 
he/she is responsible for establishing an elections office, defining its regula-
tions and structure and submitting them to the main committee. 
The organizational activities of the party are directed by the general secre-
tary, who coordinates the work of the party staff. He/she is authorized to 
appoint/dismiss staff members. The general secretary disposes of the funds 
in accordance with the budget approved by the political committee. 
The Inspection Committee is the auditing unit of the party and is com-
prised of given members elected by the congress for four years. The Com-
mittee is responsible for carrying out an annual “audit of finances and books 
as well as economic and legal inspection.” Sessions of the Committee are 
held at least once in six months. The Inspection Committee is accountable to 
the Congress. 
The main territorial representative organizations are regional, district and 
primary organizations. The supreme governing body of each of these units is 
247 
a members’ assembly. It is usually called up once per year and is authorized 
to elect the chairperson of the local organization that later has to be approved 
by a supreme body. In addition to the chairs, local organizations are man-
aged by bureaus. Usually there are five members in the bureau, but heads of 
local functional organizations (youth and women organizations) also take 
part in the bureau sessions. The bureau is a decision-making body at the 
local level that plans and carries out local activities and answers to the head 
office of the party.  
A primary organization is the basis of the party structure. It is established 
upon the decision of a district organization. The work of primary organiza-
tions becomes more active during the elections, although within the period 
between elections, members are busy spreading the party information and 
conducting surveys to register the voters, supporters, and members.
Primary organizations unite into district organizations, although, if 
needed, an intermediary unit – zone organization – is established between 
these two levels. Zone organizations function as intermediaries between the 
primary and district organizations and contribute to a rapid exchange of 
information and coordination of their activities.  
District organizations coincide with the areas of election districts. The 
main responsibilities of this unit is to supervise party work at the local level, 
gather information about the problems that local residents are facing, annu-
ally update the members’ database and collect membership fees. It can also 
approve and dismiss members and submit a candidacy for a majoritarian 
MP to the Main Committee.  
The district organization is free to raise finances on its own for imple-
menting party activities at the local level. Usually these are sports or cultural 
events where the costs of prizes and excursions are covered by the local 
businessmen. At present, the head office of the party remains the main 
source of funding for district organizations. The moneys received from the 
centre are spent mostly on office expenses. The positions that are remuner-
ated in the district-level organization are those of the chair and the technical 
staff, particularly the assistant/secretary and the election expert.  
District organizations have members who work on specific issues such 
as legal, social, and other problems. Their help is needed when citizens apply 
to the organization and ask for consultations. The members of a district or-
ganization try to provide at least small financial support to the poor. In par-
ticular, they solicit the head office for funds and, with this money, they im-
plement such projects as supporting mothers of large families, supporting 
the elderly over 100, distributing free lunches and medical aid vouchers, etc. 
Such initiatives are usually taken by the district representation of the 
women’s club and its head office.  
The district organization participates in taking significant decisions when 
the head office sends it a proposal for consideration. Such issues are consid-
ered by a bureau that summarises the opinions of its members and sends 
the comments to the party leadership. Generally, district organizations are 
executive bodies within the party structure. They receive instructions from 
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the central office, but choose the ways of implementing them in accordance 
with the local characteristics. 
The regional organization, an intermediate unit between the district or-
ganization and the head office, coordinates the party’s work and carries out 
activities at the regional level. It reports to the Main Committee, Political 
Council and Inspection Commission. 
The party has a women’s club and a youth organization. The resources of 
the latter are often used for carrying out canvassing activities. To attract 
youth the party organizes many cultural and sports events with their partici-
pation. For example, in 2002 and 2003 they carried out the project Dzegli 
(Monument), sending thousands of young people to different part of Georgia 
to restore medieval Georgian temples. For most active young people, the 
party has begun courses in computer sciences, foreign languages and ac-
counting.
The women’s club has its representatives both in the head office and in 
local administrative bodies. Its main function is to study the problems of 
mothers of large families and the disabled and to support these groups. The 
women’s club was the initiator and organizer of the occasional financial as-
sistance programme and the programme for providing free meals and medi-
cal aid. 
Membership
The rules and procedures of admission of new members are set out in the 
Statute. Any person wishing to join the party should fill in the required form, 
giving personal details, particularly contact information, educational back-
ground, working experience and spheres of interest. After that, the party 
coordinator will collect information about the person’s political background 
and possible reasons of his/her willingness to join the party. In order to be 
admitted to the party, an applicant should satisfy three main requirements: 
being a citizen with full rights, sharing a conservative ideology and being a 
reliable person. The party leaders admit that it is very difficult to assess the 
reliability of a person, but they think that, after obtaining information about 
the applicant and conducting an interview with him/her, it becomes possible 
to make a right decision.
While trying to attract new members, the party is facing the challenge of 
maintaining the loyalty of those who have already joined. During the Rose 
Revolution, the New Conservative Party lost about 15 percent of its mem-
bers. Although most of them were passive members, such experience was a 
good lesson for the party. The party believes that in order to keep the loyalty 
of its members, the party has to recognize that the latter should need the 
party just as the party needs them. Respectively, it tries to give its members 
the chance of self-realization and satisfy their healthy ambitions.  
A member can leave the party on his or her free will, and the resignation 
is effective from the date of handing in the request. The right of expelling a 
member is vested in the bureaus of district organizations. Such sanction can 
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be taken when a member commits an action that harms the party’s image, 
infringes upon its interests or prevents the implementation of the party’s 
decisions.
The party has no other formal mechanism for settling the conflicts than 
its Statute. Expelling is the only sanction for serious violations. Hence, the 
only way of regulating conflicts is through informal discussions. 
Public relations and international contacts 
The public relations of the party are run by its two different structural units 
employing different means. District organizations that do not have profes-
sional public relations services work through personal meetings with the 
public. Nearly all the members of primary organizations contact people on a 
daily basis, study their problems and explain to them details of the party’s 
activity.  
The central governing body of the party usually contacts the public 
through mass media. The party often complains about the passive and bi-
ased attitude of mass media but, since it does not have its own electronic 
media (except for the web page www.ncp.ge), it is always ready to cooperate 
with them. The party does not have a regular publishing house either, al-
though during the election campaigns its programmes are usually printed 
and widely spread.  
The party is actively cooperating with international organizations. It was 
deeply involved in the projects implemented by the National Democratic 
Institute and the International Republican Institute. The election consultants 
trained by these organizations are represented in all structural units and are 
paid for their work. 
The party has also established close relations with like-minded foreign po-
litical parties and party networks. In 2005, the New Conservative Party ob-
tained the status of associated member in the International Democrats Un-
ion (IDU). The youth organization of the party is a member of youth organi-
zation of the European Peoples’ Party (EPP), and the party itself claims it will 
obtain the status of observer within the EPP next year . The party is also co-
operating with the parties of Western and Eastern European countries: Nor-
way, Germany (Christian Democrats), Greece (Nea Democratia), Poland 
(Civil Platform), and the Ukraine (Our Ukraine). 
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The Republican Party 
Brief history 
The Republican Party is the 
oldest among the currently 
active Georgian political parties. 
Founded in 1978 as an under-
ground organization of dissidents who opposed the Soviet rule, the party has 
since then relied more on informal relations between its members rather 
than organized structures.  
With Georgia’s independence, a new period started in the evolution of the 
Republican Party. The party participated in all parliamentary elections held 
in independent Georgia, although it did so in blocs with other parties. Its 
influence peaked in the 1992-95 Parliament, where it formed a major opposi-
tion group and played an important role in drafting the 1995 Georgian Con-
stitution. Coalitions in which the Republicans participated in 1995 and 1999 
elections, could not overcome the threshold necessary to enter Parliament.  
The Republican Party leaders played an important role in the Rose Revo-
lution. They were among the founders of the United National Movement, 
and ran in the 2004 repeat parliamentary elections on that party's candidates' 
list. Later on, they left the parliamentary majority amid the controversy over 
the February 2004 constitutional amendments and the status of the 
Autonomous Republic of Achara. In the fall of 2005, together with the Con-
servative Party of Georgia, they created a new faction of the Democratic 
Front.
The inertia of a dissident group continued in the party for a couple of 
decades. Party members took an active part in discussions and public de-
bates on key problems of development in the country. Several party leaders 
were involved in the activities of non-governmental organizations, which 
brought them public attention. But the party was not as successful in attract-
ing large number of members. In fact, the party has acquired the nature and 
image of a political club of intellectuals.  
A major reorganization that is currently underway in the party aims to 
transform the party from a club-type entity into a well-organized political 
organisation.
The supreme political value of the party is the freedom of the individual. 
It is a proponent of developing democratic political institutions, strictly ad-
hering to the principle of the rule of law, developing the free market econ-
omy and protecting private property and of the minorities' rights. The party 
has drawn up a draft of an alternative Constitution, which envisages the par-
liamentary model of the state government system, decentralization of gov-
ernance and the development of local self-government institutions. It has 
also framed a draft alternative status of the Autonomous Republic of Achara. 
Chairman: David Usupashvili
Address: Alexander Chavchavadze St. 
#11, Tbilisi, Georgia 
Phone: (995 32) 92 06 34, 92 00 58 
Fax: (995 32) 98 83 43 
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Structure 
The party’s internal relations are regulated by the Statute, which was adopted 
immediately after the creation of the party and amended in 2005. The struc-
tural divisions follow the pattern of the country's administrative-territorial 
system, with local branches being set up at the regional, city and district 
levels. The right to establish these local branches has been given to the Na-
tional Committee. To make the work of the city and regional organizations 
effective, a managerial apparatus will be created that will be staffed by sala-
ried officials. This is a matter of principle for the party because members 
believe that, in order to do the quality work, a person should be a paid pro-
fessional and engaged full-time. However, the party does not yet have sala-
ried positions. 
The supreme body of the party, whose decisions are mandatory for all the 
members and structural units, is the Congress. It is convened once in four 
years and is entitled to: 
? Demand reports from the heads of the party's structural units and party 
members who were elected or appointed to official positions and assess 
them;
? Elect the National Committee; 
? Elect the Audit Commission. 
In the period between the congresses, the party is run by the Political Coun-
cil. It consists of members of the National Committee, party members who 
were elected to state government bodies of any level, chairs of the regional 
and youth organizations and other members whose number does not exceed 
one fifth of the number of the above-mentioned members. The meetings of 
the Political Council are held once in three months to hear the reports of all 
structural units on ongoing activities. The meeting is authorized to define 
the political course of the party, establish the cost of membership fees and 
revoke the decisions by the National Committee and party chairperson with 
support of more than half of all the members. 
The main body that governs the party activities on a day-to-day basis is the 
National Committee. It has 13 members who are elected to a four-year term 
by the Congress. The National Committee is eligible to: 
? Make statements on the party's behalf; 
? Elect the chairperson; 
? Create and close down the structural units; 
? Appoint and dismiss the heads of organizations; 
? Approve the lists of candidates running in the elections. 
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In accordance with the Statute, each member of the National Committee is 
assigned specific functions in different aspects of the party's activities and is 
personally accountable to the National Committee. 
The top official in the party is the chair, who represents the party in rela-
tions with third parties, makes political statements and issues executive or-
ders and manages the party's funds in compliance with the National Com-
mittee’s decisions. 
The Audit Commission, which is authorized to monitor party activities,t 
has five members who are elected by the Congress. Apart from making fi-
nancial audits, it is in charge of putting forward proposals regarding im-
provements in the party's organizational activities and personnel changes. 
In addition to the party's structural units, the party members can also join 
different groups within the party based on their professional or other inter-
ests. Entities alternative to state government bodies are also formed within 
the party. They define party policy and alternative ways of solving problems 
in different fields of government work. 
In 2005, a youth organization was established within the party. It has its 
own structure, but its members can also join the main party units. The or-
ganization has different thematic groups: legal, economic, foreign relations 
and administrative-territorial, and an alternative cabinet to governmental 
bodies.
Membership
The rules of admission and expulsion of members are regulated by the party 
Statute, which prescribes that any legally competent Georgian citizen who 
will submit his CV and recommendations together with his application may 
join. A member who has already proven himself may be the reference person 
who will be responsible for the new member. Besides the National Commit-
tee, the district organizations have the right to grant membership as well, but 
the candidate should be later approved by the National Committee. 
The party has no experience in regulating internal conflict situations. 
Even those people who left the party reached their decision without conflicts 
and withdrew from the party of their own will. Neither is there a precedent of 
expulsion. Hot debates are very frequent in the party, but they have never 
escalated into conflicts. Accordingly, the party has no special mechanism of 
regulating conflicts except for the Statute. It is interesting that, in contrast to 
other parties, the Statute envisages different types of punishment should a 
member violate the Statute or hinder the party's activities. Besides expulsion, 
the Statute also envisages softer sanctions, such as a warning and temporary 
suspension of membership. 
Along with membership, the institution of supporters is also being cre-
ated in the party. It will include people who have not decided to join but who 
intend to closely cooperate with the party. Accordingly, they will have com-
plete freedom of getting involved in the work of professional and interest 
groups that have been created within the party. 
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Public relations and international contacts 
The main vehicle of the party's relations with the public is the mass media. 
The party had its own newspaper but now it is no longer in print, which 
makes the party entirely dependent on the mass media for publicizing its 
activities. The party is displeased with its relations with the media. Its activi-
ties and news conferences are often ignored, and when they are covered, the 
media often presents them in a biased and unbalanced way. 
Since its creation, the party has mainly relied on its own intellectual re-
sources. While still adhering to this tradition, it does not rule out the possi-
bility of inviting and/or hiring local and foreign specialists if needed. In this 
respect, cooperation with non-governmental organizations is especially in-
teresting for the party. Compared with other parties, the Republicans have 
the longest and most successful record of close cooperation with the Geor-
gian NGOs. The party leaders themselves were founders or staff members of 
the leading NGOs. Currently, the party is using the expertise of the non-
government sector and deems cooperation between the parties and NGOs to 
be necessary to develop the Georgian state. 
Together with other parties, the Republicans closely cooperate with those 
international organizations which work on socio-political projects. Until 
now, cooperation with international organizations and foreign parties has 
been limited to participation in international forums and exchange of infor-
mation, although in the future the party intends to step up political coopera-
tion at the international level. In particular, it plans to establish closer rela-
tions with the US and Western European parties. At the same time, it in-
tends to contact the political organizations of liberal democratic ideology in 
the post-Soviet and former socialist countries and establish close ties with 
them. The party cooperates strategicly with Friedrich Naumann Foundation 
of the German Free Democrats’ Party.  
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United National Movement 
Brief history 
The United National Movement 
was created as a result of the 
merger of two parties, the Na-
tional Movement and the 
United Democrats in November 2004. These two constituent organizations, 
in their turn, were created in the early 2000s, and the leaders of both of them 
came from the reformist wing of the Citizens Union of Georgia, who quit 
that party being dissatisfied with its activities.  
The National Movement was founded in December 2001. In 2002, it took 
part in the local self-government elections and achieved an important suc-
cess in the Tbilisi Council Elections. After these elections, its leader, Mikheil 
Saakashvili, became the Chairman of the Tbilisi City Council. The United 
Democrats’ Party, created in 2003, was led by Zurab Zhvania and a group of 
other reformist leaders who broke away from Eduard Shevardnadze’s gov-
ernment in 2002.  
In the 2003 parliamentary elections, both parties participated as, respec-
tively, the Saakashvili-National Movement bloc and the Burjanadze-United 
Democrats bloc. After it became obvious that the elections were rigged, these 
parties played a key role in organizing the protest events that became known 
as Rose Revolution and led to the resignation of President Shevardnadze. In 
the March 2004 repeat parliamentary elections these two parties took part in 
a joint list. This list also included representatives of the Republican Party and 
the Union of National Forces, who were in a bloc with the National Move-
ment in the 2003 elections and in the days of the revolution. The joint list 
was victorious, with 66.2 percent of the vote. Later, representatives of the 
latter two groups went over to the opposition.  
At the current stage, the party has two clear-cut priorities in its activities. 
These are the restoration of the country's territorial integrity and the im-
provement of social conditions for the people. Regarding the former issue, 
the party is working on intensifying political negotiations, elaborating pro-
jects for peacefully settling conflicts and enlisting international support. 
With regard to the latter issue, the party promotes such measures as making 
more funds available to the social programmes, creating favourable condi-
tions for business, especially the medium-size and small businesses 
(through tax liberalization, the simplification of licensing) and other initia-
tives.
Chairman: Mikheil Saakashvili
Secretary General: Giorgi Arveladze 
Address: 3 Lesia Ukrainka, Tbilisi, 
Georgia
Phone: (995 32) 92 30 84/85 
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Structure 
The basic principles and structural divisions of the United National Move-
ment are defined by the Statute adopted in 2004. In addition, each structural 
unit has the right to adopt additional regulations or internal rules. In 2005, 
the party endorsed the five fundamental principles that were compulsory for 
members and laid out a 10-year development plan. 
The supreme governing body of the party is the Congress, which is con-
vened at least twice a year. A minimum of 200 delegates should participate. 
The Congress is duly authorized if it is attended by more than half of the 
delegates, and the decisions are passed by the majority of those present. Its 
special prerogatives are the following: 
? adopting, amending and appending the Statute; 
? electing the chairperson, secretary general, Political Council and Audit 
Commission of the union; 
? discussing and taking decisions on the issues of reorganization and dis-
solution of the union. 
In the period between the congresses, the most important decisions are 
made by the Political Council, which consists of the chairperson, secretary 
general, chairperson of the Tbilisi City Council and 23 members who are 
elected by the Congress. The council meetings are held at least once a 
month. The Political Council is accountable to the Congress and the chair-
person of the Union. It has the right to: 
? found/dissolve local branches of the union; 
? approve the regulations adopted by the local branches; 
? approve the union's budget; 
? lay down the rule of admission for members, activists and supporters; 
? expel members should they systematically violate the Statute, fail to carry 
out the superior body's instructions or exhibit unbecoming behaviour; 
? discuss the issue of revoking the status of activist; 
? formulate the rule of selecting Congress delegates. 
The auditing body of the union is the Audit Commission. It has seven mem-
bers who are elected by the Congress to a two-year term. The commission is 
in charge of monitoring the financial activities of the union and auditing the 
financial and bookkeeping documents of the union. It is accountable to the 
Congress and, once a year, to the Political Council. 
The top official of the party is the chairperson of the union, who governs 
the party directly and represents the organization both inside and outside the 
country. The chairperson can take political statements and deliver addresses 
on behalf of the union. He or she also signs Congress’ decisions. 
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The organizational work of the union is managed by the secretary general, 
who organizes the Congress and the sessions of the Political Council. The 
secretary general also proposes the budget to the Political Council with the 
chairperson's assent. He or she can appoint and dismiss the heads and staf-
fof structural units. 
There are two main decision-making tiers within the party, central and 
local (including regional and district organizations). The most important 
decisions are made by the central office; in particular, the central officer 
formulates the party's philosophy, policy and ideology. It also manages the 
process of raising and spending funds. Accordingly, all other activities, in-
cluding those at the district level, have to be coordinated with the central 
office. As for the second decision-making tier, the district offices, they take 
decisions on local problems and coordinate this with the superior bodies. 
Usually, party policy is formulated by its leaders, while other units carry out 
the decisions. 
The grass-root level of the party structure is the primary organization. It 
operates within the boundaries of the electoral precinct. To coordinate the 
district- and primary-level activities and ensure rapid reaction, zone organi-
zations have also been created. 
The zone and primary organizations are headed by coordinators, who are 
considered mediators between the party and the public and are responsible 
for conducting party activities at the local level. In particular, it is incumbent 
on them to familiarize themselves with the precinct, its residents and local 
problems. They organize the meetings between the party representatives and 
local residents and register supporters and voters. The prime responsibility 
of the coordinators is generating propaganda and enroling new members 
and supporters. On election day, they are expected to mobilize supporters. 
The activities of the primary and zone organizations are coordinated by 
the district organization. It has the administrative apparatus needed to effi-
ciently manage the activities, namely, the administrator, organizing secretary 
and chief clerk. The district branches organize the implementation of the 
party activities, in particular, staging cultural and recreational events, collect-
ing aid, discussing the problems of the impoverished strata and raising them 
with the executive branch. 
The nine-member councils exist within the district organizations and are 
made up of local party members. The council is a body that makes decisions 
which are then carried out by the apparatus. District organizations try to 
make councils widely representative so that they include people from differ-
ent precincts, ages and professional groups. In ethnic minority-populated 
districts, the organizations try to involve the minority leaders too. The coun-
cil's functions include admitting new members, approving candidates to 
become heads of precinct organizations and dealing with the district organi-
zation's financial issues. The council usually convenes weekly or once in two 
weeks. 
The party's strategic development plan envisages creating boards in addi-
tion to councils at the district levels. The boards will be open structural units 
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without limitations for the number of members. Along with party members, 
non-members will have the right to take part in the board's activities. The 
board will act as a consultative body, which will give recommendations to the 
district organization on local issues. It will also pursue the goal of attracting 
specialists in different fields and interesting them in the party’s work. 
Parallel to the main organization is the party’s youth organization with its 
same structure and governing council. Usually it stages sports and cultural 
events and promotes a healthy lifestyle. In the summer of 2005, the youth 
organization made a major contribution to organizing the Patriot summer 
camps sponsored by the Ministry of Culture. 
Membership
The rules of admission of new members are set out in the Statute. The appli-
cant must submit an application and a minimum of three references to the 
council. At the initial stage of the party's history, it was quite easy to join, and 
almost all applicants were granted membership. At present, however, select-
ing, formulating, and tightening the new criteria is part of the party's strate-
gic development plan. During the period of research, enrolment was sus-
pended because the party was working on a new admission policy. In the 
future, potential members will need to submit references from people who 
are respected and trusted by the party. The reference persons will be held 
responsible for the activities and reputations of their nominees. 
Apart from membership, the party has the system of supporters and ac-
tivists. The central secretariat, city and district organizations register and 
keep records of supporters. As for the activities, they can either be affiliated 
with the party or not. The activist must get actively involved in all the party 
events and carry out his superiors' decisions. 
Leaving the party is voluntary. Expulsion of members falls under the Po-
litical Council's jurisdiction. The “Five Fundamental Principles for Party 
Members,” which were laid down by the party in 2005, further defines the 
limits and principles of the member's activities. In the party's opinion, those 
members who excel in their adherence to these principles will be encouraged 
as best as possible, whereas those who grossly violate any of them will im-
mediately leave the party's ranks. 
Internal conflict situations are quite rare in the party. They are usually re-
solved in an informal atmosphere through dialogue. Should an irreconcilable 
confrontation arise, the member who has the fewest supporters leaves the 
party. The party maintains that the best way to avoid conflicts between 
members is making a clear division between rights and responsibilities and 
ensuring a strict hierarchy in the party's structures. 
Public relations and international contacts 
Public relations are the responsibility of the party's central government bod-
ies and local branches, although the forms of maintaining relations differ. 
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The central office's prerogative is relations with the mass media. The service 
for relations with professional communities is also part of the central office 
but, if necessary, serves the needs of local branches as well. The primary 
organizations' relations with the public are of a less formal nature. The or-
ganizations' members try to regularly familiarize themselves with the local 
residents' problems, hear their complaints and make them aware of the 
party's activities. 
The party takes pride in its ties with the leading political parties in 
Europe, including the European People's Party (Christian Democrats), the 
Dutch Liberal Party and others. It closely cooperates with the International 
Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute offices in Geor-
gia. It has plans to make the foreign relations service more active in the fu-
ture and, accordingly, establish close international contacts, which in the 
party's opinion are necessary to form a strong party organization. 
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